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ABSTRACT 
The political violence and vigilante activities that characterised Natal and Zululand 
between 1985 and 1996 had numerous causes. The formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) in 1983 contributed to the rise of vigilantism and political violence. The 
formation of the Congress of the South African Trade Union (COSATU) in 1985 
compounded this situation. Both these movements were known to be sympathetic to the 
African National Congress (ANC), which was still banned at the time of their formation; 
hence they had similar objectives to the ANC. During this time, Inkatha was the only 
strong Black political movement in the country, and particularly in Natal and Zululand. 
The Inkatha movement and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi regarded the formation of 
the UDF and COSATU in 1985 as a challenge to the hegemony of Inkatha in the region, 
following his fall-out with the ANC leadership in exile. Local leadership of political 
movements, namely, UDF and COSATU on one hand and Inkatha on the other, 
mobilised their support-base and took arms against each other. The lifting of the State of 
Emergency in 1986 intensified political violence and vigilante activities in the region. 
The Natal Midlands’ violence saw a high number of deaths and causalities. Local 
communities as well such as Vulindlela suffered a great deal.  
Clan faction fights were characteristic of KwaShange in the period 1940s-1970s, but 
from the late 1980s onwards (especially 1987) political unrest and struggle against the 
Nationalist apartheid regime changed into conflict between Inkatha and the UDF, which 
gradually worsened into civil war. In the course of my previous studies in KwaShange I 
discovered that the violence had impacted upon families and inter-generational 
relationships. According to some senior residents’ thinking, a number of youths were ill-
disciplined. Issues of disciplining of youths had obscured the political struggle and 
violence, making it hard to disentangle them. When researching memories of the 
violence, I found that persons spoke of different incidents within this struggle period and 
described their violent nature and how it had impacted on families’ survival, both 
psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying that it was hard to forget 
the memories engendered by their horrific experiences. 
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The South African Government was accused of secretly provoking acts of violence in 
Natal and Zululand and was furthermore accused of having sent IFP troops to the Caprivi 
in Namibia for training in guerrilla combat. The Government later acknowledged this, 
explaining that the Natal Legislature needed specially trained forces for its officials. The 
unbanning of political parties and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 saw KwaZulu-
Natal entering a new phase of random vigilante activities and violence. The security 
forces (the South African Police and the South African Defence Force) were accused of 
supporting IFP vigilantes. All this led to the “Seven Days War” in 1990 in the Midlands, 
particularly in KwaVulindlela. In KwaShange this violence, from 1986 until 1996, 
created divisions in families and the community. Many people lost their lives. All efforts 
to put an end to the violence and vigilantism failed. The announcement that the first 
democratic election in South Africa was to be held in 1994 triggered more violence in 
Vulindlela. Exhaustion in the area, and a national climate which promoted peace were 
elements which eventually brought the conflict to an end. 
Socially and economically, the area is still experiencing problems. Survivors and 
generations born during and after the turmoil talk about endless psychological and 
emotional suffering born during this turmoil.  
My contention is that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences 
influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across 
generations, through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these 
people and their families were affected for a long time, and many are still traumatised. 
The social structure of the community has been affected by it and by implication that of 
successive generations will also be affected.  
This study describes and analyses political violence in KwaShange and investigates how 
it is remembered by the survivors.  It also attempts to answer the question of how 
communities, families and individuals survived these traumatic experiences, how they 
coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and fifteen years after the end 
of violence.  
By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal, I 
hope to determine what was in play in the province, and find a common pattern 
underlying the dynamics of the conflicts. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the 
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present, been confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that were a response 
to the struggle against the apartheid regime. 
Keywords: KwaShange, Vulindlela, Natal, Zululand, South Africa, political violence, 
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This chapter will give a brief background to the study area and explain why this topic 
was chosen. It will also outline the research questions, broader theoretical framework, 
and literature survey. In the literature review special attention will be given to writing 
on political violence in Natal and Zululand, including primary and secondary sources. 
I will also consider what the relevant theoretical issues are. Topical areas, such as use 
of oral history, memory, especially painful memories, as well as the accounts of 
persons involved or present as spectators, will be looked into briefly. Lastly, this 
chapter will give an account of the methodology employed to investigate the topic as 
well as the types of literature used. 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
 
1.2.1 Scenery of KwaShange 
 
KwaShange is a rural area 30 kilometres from Pietermaritzburg. The population there 
is largely traditionalist, and the settlement was established in the nineteenth century as 
the Natal Zwartkop Location under the colonial administrator Sir Theophilus 
Shepstone’s Location Policy. Around 1975, under the Nationalist Government’s 
homeland policy, it was renamed KwaVulindlela, and made part of greater KwaZulu.1 
After the first democratic elections in 1994 the area was absorbed into the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal. KwaShange is at present an economically depressed area, probably 
because of the racial policies applied in both the colonial and nationalist eras.  
 
1Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal The Natal Regional Survey, 
vol. 7 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 195.  
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In the late 1940s to mid-1960s the informants whose testimonies form an important 
part of my research moved from farms where they were tenants, into KwaShange.2 
They chose to make this move because of the proximity of the area to the city, where 
work was obtainable. Since they were from traditionalist Zulu backgrounds, their 
lifestyles reflected all that this implies in terms of beliefs and value-systems. 
KwaShange was typified by faction fights in the period 1940s-1970s but during the 
late 1980s to 1990s these intensified into political factionalism and resistance against 
the Nationalist apartheid regime.3 This conflict expressed itself locally as civil war 
between the Inkatha Movement and the United Democratic Front (UDF).  
 
The history of the leaders in the struggles of the apartheid era has already been told. 
Media, the TRC and academia have dealt with these histories extensively. I have 
realized however, during my research that the history of this period has hardly 
touched on the experiences of members of the affected communities after the 
violence. How are the survivors of the turmoil coping or failing to cope? How have 
the affected communities reconstructed themselves? I realized that while I was 
researching the community of KwaShange, and assessing it as a local Zulu culture 
more than usually prone to violent conflict, I was discovering an alternative history.  
  
In the course of my previous study (2005) in KwaShange I discovered that the 
violence had impacted upon inter-generational relationships. Senior members of the 
community felt that the youth was ill-disciplined. It appeared that issues of 
disciplining the youth had obscured the other effects of political struggle and 
violence, making it hard to disentangle them. This violence spread to neighbouring 




2Interview with Manciza Zondi and MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2009. See also 
interviews with Moses Ndlovu, Nunu Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
3Interview with Manciza Zondi and MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2009. See also 
interviews with Moses Ndlovu, Nunu Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
4See Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the 
Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. 
Shabalala and R. Buikema eds., From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in 
Contemporary Society (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2007), 226-227. 
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1.2.2 Scenario of the Unrest 
 
It is difficult, however, to identify the exact date of the beginning of violence in 
Vulindlela, but a number of incidents occurred in 1985 that could be regarded as 
contributory factors. In February 1985 there were a series of incidents that resulted in 
deaths; injuries and destruction of property (see Chapter Four). Tension became 
perceptible in 1983 after the formation of the UDF as some community members 
began to organise and align themselves with the UDF (see Chapter Four). Records of 
this period were not kept as effectively, as in the period from 1990. From 1985 
violence monitors and media in the Natal Midlands focused primarily on the Edendale 
complex, including Edendale itself, Imbali, Ashdown Sobantu, Slangspruit and 
Mpumalanga. While the focus was on townships, violence in rural areas of Vulindlela 
was escalating.5 When eventually attention was turned to Vulindlela, a lot had 
happened but it was not recorded. As a result the genesis of the violence in Vulindlela 
was not explored and the ‘whys’ were left unexplored. One report that deserves 
special mention was written by John Battersby of the New York Times.6 He noticed 
that Vulindlela’s violence was atrocious, went to KwaShange and recorded his 
observations and findings. I shall quote Battersby at some length on the subject. His 
report sets the scene for the period of KwaShange with which this thesis is concerned.  
In the dim light, the young man's face radiated a youthful zest for life as he 
spoke of death, revenge and warfare. “We want to fight them until it is the end 
of them or the end of us,” Rodney said to the approval of his ‘comrades’, as 
the young militant opponents of the Zulu tribal authorities here are known.  
About 20 ‘comrades,’ some as young as 12 and 13, huddled in the iron-and-
mortar dwelling and brandished homemade weapons as they discussed 
military tactics and chanted freedom slogans in hushed tones. Outside, other 
teenagers kept a night watch for the police and conservative Zulu vigilantes. 
[…] 
… Rodney left home three weeks ago and is afraid to return. “I know that if I 
do, I will die,” he said. The conflict among Zulus has already claimed more 
5See for example, John Aitchison, “The Civil War in Natal”, in G. Moss and I. Obery eds., South 
African Review 5 (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1989), 457-473. See also Black Sash Records, Black Sash 
Papers, Killie Campbell Africana Library Box 18: File-Miscellaneous, Affidavits 1988, 1989, 1990.  
Details of what happened in Vulindlela from 1986 can be viewed in John Aitchison’s presentation to 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing in Pietermaritzburg: 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_2.htm. Accessed on 11 March 2011.  
6John Battersby, “Special to the New York Times”, Edendale Journal; In Apartheid’s Shadow, Zulu 
Wages War on Zulu (9 November, 1987).   
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than 170 lives this year. At least 80 people have died in the last seven weeks. 
[…] Last month, in the KwaShange district, where many of the killings have 
occurred, 13 young members of Inkatha were killed when opposition militants 
set fire to the house where they were meeting. Those who tried to escape were 
beaten to death. In another incident, vigilantes, enraged that they could not 
find a man they were hunting, decapitated his 10-year-old son instead.  
A Pietermaritzburg court this week issued a preliminary injunction restraining 
two of the Inkatha leaders [Chief Shayabantu and David Ntombela] from 
further attacks on their opponents after two girls, 11 and 12 years old, 
described in affidavits how they watched their 11-year-old sister shot in cold 
blood. 
[...] Both sides say they resort to violence only in self-defence, although some 
Inkatha leaders have endorsed revenge killings. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, the 
paramount Zulu leader, said this week he could not be held responsible for the 
conduct of every member in an organization with more than a million 
adherents. He accused the African National Congress, an outlawed anti-
apartheid organization, of fomenting violence to make South Africa 
“ungovernable.”  
Chief Shayabantu Zondi, an Inkatha leader in KwaShange, an area that 
overlaps with part of Edendale, said the civil strife could be resolved by 
making Zulus responsible for their own law and order. “We no longer trust the 
South African police,” he said. “Some of them try to kill us. If we can get a 
police force of our own in this area which would not take sides – as we have in 
others – we could quickly solve the problem.” But Chief Zondi made clear that 
he would not tolerate members of the three million-strong United Democratic 
Front, another anti-apartheid umbrella organization, or the trade unions 
operating in his area. Civil rights workers say most of those killed and 
wounded have belonged to youth organizations affiliated with the United 
Democratic Front. Recently, however, there has been evidence of its members 
striking back, they say.7  
This quotation paints a picture of the violence that engulfed KwaShange. 1987 is the 
year that will probably be remembered by most people in Natal and Zululand, and 
more so in KwaShange, because of the ‘KwaShange Massacre’ in September 1987.8 
This event marked the beginning of the end to ‘normal’9 life in KwaShange, 
7John Battersby, “In Apartheid’s Shadow, Zulu Wages War on Zulu” (The New York Times, November 
9, 1987).  
8See Chapter Five. Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository (PAR) State v. Hlengwa and others, 
transcript of judgment by Mr. Justice N.S. Page, Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court, 
Pietermaritzburg, 11 April 1988, 775, 777. Personal communication with the ‘first accused’ Chris 
Hlengwa, KwaShange, 2005. See also Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict in 
Natal (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997). 
9I say ‘normal’ life had turned to ‘abnormality,’ knowing that there was never anything normal about 
that lifestyle. As Beinart (1992) suggests, violence was a normalised feature of life in apartheid South 
Africa. Historically South African society has been structured around violence. Structural violence, 
 4 
                                                 
Vulindlela and the province in general. From 1986 in Natal and Zululand people’s 
lives were marked by drastic and traumatic change.10 There were visible divisions in 
the families and communities. Friends and neighbours had turned against each other 
and became enemies because of their political affiliations or non-alignment to any 
party. This state of affairs was the result of the area being ravaged by political 
violence – which up to this point has not been fully documented. 
 
 I have noticed, however, that the strength of the people of KwaShange is in their 
memory. Even though a lot of this turmoil has not been recorded, it is alive in their 
memories. Two senior members of the KwaShange community shared their memories 
with me about the area of KwaShange before the violence erupted. These memories 
are significant in this thesis because they set the tone of the memories of my 
interviewees about the history of the area and how they remember KwaShange before 
and after it was turned into “a place of pain”11 during the times of political violence. 
MaZamisa Shange said: 
 
[Ironically] This place is indeed a place of peace; yes, we had violence that 
left many people devastated. We were all devastated. Many people lost their 
lives and others lost their loved ones but still there is no place like this area – 
this is still a place of peace. When my folks left Richmond because of faction 
fights, they chose this area because of the peace I am talking about […] 
violence that took place was everywhere and it was just caused by the devil. It 
is something that was meant to be for that particular period and it really never 
shocked me that much because it is something written in the Word of God. It 
had to happen […] it happened really to serve a purpose. Only those that do 
not read and understand the Word of God, who thought that the violence was 
forever and they moved from KwaShange permanently. Look at us now, we 
are living peacefully. Our children go to schools, we go to church, and people 
go to work. We are just leading normal lives. Those that left…in fact maybe 
God wanted them to leave us, so He allowed the devil to cause people to fight 
for no reason. Those who were violent and caused unhappiness in this village 
suppression and compulsion were the central characteristics of the apartheid state. See William Beinart, 
“Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies. 1992. 18:3 (1992), 455-486. See also Antony Altbeker, A Country at War with Itself: South 
Africa’s Crisis of Crime (Johannesburg and Cape Town: Jonathan Ball, 2007), 33. 
10Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal,” PhD Thesis (Wits University, 2007), 1. 
11MaZakwe Khambule whose four children and husband were killed in two separate incidents in 
KwaShange. She refers to KwaShange as a place of pain. She now resides in Edendale and has never 
gone back to KwaShange since her husband was killed in 1990, because she “does not want to 
remember what happened to her family.” I interviewed her on 17 January 2008 at Edendale.  
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were displaced forever and others died – I suspect that the whole violence was 
meant to ‘clean up dirt’ [evil-doers] in the area.12  
 
MaMkhonza Ntusi’s memories of KwaShange are different. She says: 
 
We arrived in KwaShange from a farm near Vryheid in the early 1960s, I 
cannot remember the exact year but it was early in the 60s. This area has never 
been what we thought it would be. When we arrived here, there were lots of 
tensions between people of different clans. The faction fight that comes to 
mind is that of the Zondi clan fighting with the Dlamini clan. When we came 
here, the fight had already started and that animosity continued until the 
1990s. There was another one between Zondi and Ndawonde clans in the 
1970s, even thought it did not last long, but its consequences were devastating. 
Mchunu and Ndaba clans also fought. All these fights happened one after the 
other – sometimes they happen concurrently. The political violence of the 
1980s-1990s came to an [already] violent community. Had the KwaShange 
community been peaceful, the results of the violence would not have been as 
atrocious as it turned to be. If the community members were united, they 
would easily avoid killings and solve differences in a disciplined manner. The 
results of the violence are still felt today and there is no peace yet – one small 
disagreement can lead to violence because people have not yet forgotten what 
happened to them and they have not forgiven the perpetrators of evil 
[violence].13  
  
These contrasting narratives about the area of KwaShange signify belonging and 
familiarity as well as dispossession and desperation. They present the history as well 
as contradicting memories of the violence in KwaShange, depending upon relative 
perspectives. Both history and memories of the turmoil are the themes that this thesis 
is concerned about. 
 
Like many other rural residents in South Africa, KwaShange residents came from 
vastly different backgrounds as well as different generations. The area evokes 
different feelings and senses, and provides a spatial focus for people to locate 
memories of the violence of the 1980s-90s and situate them in the identities of the 
place. Throughout, I found that persons spoke of incidents within this struggle period 
of the 1980s-1990s and described their violent nature and how they had impacted on 
families’ survival, both psychologically and physically. The interviewees kept saying 
12Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
13Interview with MaMkhonza Ntusi, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
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that it was hard to forget the reverberating memories engendered by their horrific 
experiences. 
 
1.3 Why this topic of study?  
 
This study aims to close the existing gap in the literature on political violence in the 
Natal Midlands. The aim of the study is to describe and analyse the history of political 
violence in KwaShange, centring the account it offers on the testimony of survivors, 
and its effects on the community members in the ensuing years. Earlier studies did not 
obtain details of what happened in local communities. I shall look into the events that 
took place in a relatively small community, and how the violence generated there 
subsequently spread to surrounding areas of Vulindlela. I shall also outline key events 
prior 1987 – such as the breach between supporters of Inkatha and those of UDF in 
the early 1980s. My work is unique in the sense that it is taking place 15 years after 
the end of violence in the province. Central to my work is the urge to know how the 
violence is remembered by its survivors 15 years later. This work also aims to touch 
on a subject that has never been adequately dealt with in the studies of violence in the 
Natal-Midlands, namely the effects of that violence on the generations that were not 
involved because of their age (those who were very young at the time) and the ‘born 
free’ generation (those born after violence and the first democratic elections in 1994). 
I shall argue that the impact of war is felt beyond immediate survivors and can 
become part of a people’s identity.  
By focusing on KwaShange as a case study of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal 
(then Natal), I hope to determine what ‘was at play’ in the province, and find a pattern 
underlying the dynamics of the conflict. Pre-civil war divisions have not, up to the 
present, been thoroughly confronted, and these fuelled the political affiliations that 
were a response to the struggle against the apartheid regime. 
1.4 Research hypothesis and questions   
I postulate that trauma experienced as a result of this violence and its consequences 
influenced the lives of all persons affected by it, and that this was transmitted across 
generations and sexes, through whole families and communities. The social structure 
of the community was affected by it and by implication successive generations were 
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also affected. The consequences of the experiences affected family life and schooling 
and caused the displacement of families. This dissertation will try to answer the 
following questions: how did communities, families and individuals survive these 
traumatic experiences? How did they cope (or fail to cope) with their experiences, 
both then and 15 years after the end of violence?  
Similar studies in Natal and Zululand proved that political conflict brought about 
destruction of individuals, families and the social and political structures of a society. 
Debby Bonnin’s research into violence in Mpumalanga attested that everyday life for 
many people was marked by the need to survive within a situation of intense and 
traumatic change. 14 Violence was a normal feature of life in apartheid South Africa,15  
embedded itself into every aspect of the society and shaped the nature of state 
power.16 This thesis also tries to establish the historical and cultural connections to the 
KwaShange violence.17 It reveals continuities in the form of the history of conflict in 
the region. I shall take note of William Beinart’s warning that adopting a contextual 
approach to understanding violence is not sufficient to explain the forms of violence 
within African communities. While it is necessary to locate violence in its colonial 
historical context and so avoid the colonial and racist discourse that sees African 
societies as intrinsically violent (e.g. Black on Black analysis), it is also imperative to 
‘avoid the ahistorical assumption that African violence was born in the colonial era’.18 
My thesis tries to probe these historical continuities. KwaShange has become the 
place of memory to many political survivors – it is used to recall the history of 
violence. I shall argue, moreover, that the impact of war is felt beyond immediate 
survivors and can and does become  a part of a people’s identity, and that this has 
happened in the case of KwaShange. 
14Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD Thesis (Wits University, 2007), 1. 
15William Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 18:3 (1992), 455-486.   
16See Jacklyn Cock, Colonels and Cadres: War and Gender in South Africa, (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1991); Shula Marks and Neil Andersson, “The Epidemiology and Culture of 
Violence”, in N. Manganyi and A. Du Toit eds., Political Struggle and the Struggle in South Africa 
(Halfway House: Southern Book Publishers, 1990), 29-69. See also Catherine Campbell, “Learning to 
Kill? Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal”, Journal of Southern African Studies 18:3 (1992), 
614-628. 
17Bill Fraud, “The Violence in Natal 1985-1990”, in R. Morrell ed., Political Economy and Identities in 
KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 186. 
18William Beinart, “Introduction: Political and Collective Violence in Southern African 
Historiography”, Journal of Southern African Studies 18:3 (1992), 469. 
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1.5 Literature review 
The political violence in South Africa during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s attracted the 
attention of the international community. All citizens were either directly or indirectly 
affected by the violence; a fairly large body of literature was published on this 
violence.19 Due to the fact that the violence was particularly severe and evidenced its 
own regional specifics, a number of local and international media houses and 
researchers focused on it. These records present divergent explanations and 
interpretations of the violence – how it started and why people sought to resolve their 
disputes through arms, arson, killing and other atrocities of civil war. Some of these 
documents claim that there was no single cause but ‘clearly multiple causes of the 
violence: socio-economic deprivation, urban-rural tensions, conflict between 
traditional and modern forms of governance [and generational tensions], as well as 
political rivalry between the IFP and the ANC. A crucial factor was state backing, 
both overt and covert, for the IFP before 1994.’20 
19 “For a broader view on the violence in South Africa during the 1980s and 1990s, see, for example, E. 
Bornman, R. van Eeden & M. Wentzel: Violence in South Africa - A Variety of Perspectives (Pretoria: 
HSRC, 1998); The explicit political violence, more prominent in urban areas, got its major momentum 
in 1985. According to D. Oakes (ed.; in: Illustrated History of South Africa – The real Story; Cape 
Town: The Readers’ Digest, 1994: 482): ‘On the evening of Saturday, 20 July 1985, P.W. Botha 
[Prime Minister from 1979 until 1989] announced that a state of emergency would be imposed on 36 
magisterial districts from midnight – the first time since the Sharpeville crisis of 1960 that such a 
measure had had to be resorted to.’ A. Krog (in: Country of my Skull, Cape Town: A.Samuel, 1998: 43) 
writes about this period: ‘The funeral of the Cradock Four on 20 July 1985 changed the political 
landscape of this country forever. It was like a raging fire. ANC and SACP flags were defiantly 
displayed – buses full of people turned up, but were turned away – a state of emergency was declared. 
But in a sense it was the real beginning of the end of Apartheid.’ In order to deal with the ongoing 
violence, on 12 June 1986, a few days before the 10th anniversary of the start of the Soweto uprising, 
the Government announced a nationwide state of emergency” (Marinus Jacob de Haan, Deadly 
population dynamics in Richmond: An analysis of stories collected around a local mission station”, 
paper presented at the conference at the Msunduzi Museum, 25-26 March 2010), see also Bernard 
Magubane, Philip Bonner, Jabulani Sithole, Peter Delius, Janet Cherry, Pat Gibbs and Thokozani April, 
Chapter Two “The turn to armed struggle”, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa 
Volume 1, 1960-1970 (Pretoria: UNISA, 2004), pp. 53-145. 
Some of the literature has been criticised as being propagandistic. Adam and Moodley criticised the 
following works as propaganda: Brian McKendrick and Wilma Hoffman, eds., People and Violence in 
South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1990), and N. Chabani Manganyi and André du 
Toit, eds., Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa (Johannesburg: Southern Books, 1990). 
The Natal conflict is perceptively analysed by Heribert Vilakazi, “Isolating Inkatha—A Strategic 
Error” Work in Progress 75, June 1991, pp. 21–23, and by Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, “South 
Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction,” Review of African Political Economy no. 53, 
1992, (Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993).  
20 WRITENET, KwaZulu-Natal - Continued Violence and Displacement, 1 July 1996, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6bc4.html [accessed 16 November 2012]. 
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Most of the documents, however, that present specifically the  KwaZulu-Natal 
Midlands violence are non-academic; such as newspaper articles or research reports 
that were not published in peer-reviewed journals or books (see examples below). It is 
my aim to fill this lacuna in academic research and publications on the Natal 
Midlands political violence, in particular on my home area of KwaShange, Inadi, in 
Vulindela. The very limited unpublished documentation was written with a political 
rather than an academic underlying principle.21 Debby Bonnin states that the 
documentation and descriptions were to alert the public to the horror of what was 
happening and to shame the state into an impartial intervention to end the violence.22 
These documents are significant for this study. A few of these works deal specifically 
with the Midlands and these will be considered far below. Some of these works 
contain material that was recorded concurrently with the violence, while others were 
written at some distance in time. I intend here to focus on works that cover the Natal 
Midlands and touch base on the works that cover other parts of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Before getting to the non-scholarly works mentioned, let me consider the academic 
works that have dealt specifically with the Midlands violence of the time, works 
which this thesis aims to complement. These studies serve as models for my research. 
Debby Bonnin’s thesis, for example, proved to be invaluable. Her thesis investigates 
political violence between the UDF and Inkatha in Mpumalanga Township in the 
early 1980s and early 1990s. She asks and answers necessary questions: why and how 
did the conflict between political organisations in Natal become violent? What forms 
did the violence take? Why, as a result of the violence, did ordinary people with little 
prior history of political activity come to identify with either UDF or Inkatha? How 
were these political identities produced?23 This work deserves a special mention here 
because it serves as a model for my study of KwaShange, supplying suggestions on 
how to carry out an in-depth study in a relatively small region.  
Another work that deserves special mention because of its relevance is that of 
Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, on the political violence in 
21Aitchison states that he was a political activist in the 1980s-1990s. Personal Communication with 
John Aitchison, University of KwaZulu-Natal, February 2009.   
22Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007), 21.  
23Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007). 
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Nxamalala. Their work gives detailed and intriguing historical background to violence 
in Vulindlela and their oral history methodology and critical analysis of recorded 
interviews of the violence survivors is important because it took place almost ten 
years after the violence. It is also pertinent to my study, not only because its method 
of investigating the topic is similar to my own, but because of the proximity of 
Nxamalala to KwaShange. Some of the events covered in their book were mentioned 
by KwaShange informants.24 Lou Levine’s book records stories of survivors of the 
Vulindlela violence. His book reflects, firstly, the degree to which people's faith was 
able to assist them to deal with the turmoil of the war. Secondly, it reflects the fact 
that some people's faith was thrown into turmoil by the trauma of the situation they 
were faced with and the issues it raised.25  
1.5.1Overview of the literature on political violence in Natal 
Here I provide a synopsis of the literature on political violence in Natal and Zululand 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Some authors have published works that focused on specific 
areas in the province. Matthew Kentridge concentrated on the violence in 
Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas,26 Nkosinathi Gwala published on Edendale 
violence,27Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela on conflicts in Durban28 and Paulus 
Zulu on political violence in KwaMashu and Umlazi hostels.29 Stavrou and Crouch 
recorded the Molweni turmoil.30 Bruntville mayhem was documented by Anthony 
Minnaar.31 Debby Bonnin described the violence in Mpumalanga.32 Lou Levine 
24Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, eds., Indians versus Russians: An Oral 
History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993) (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publishers, 2011). 
25 Lou Levine, Faith in turmoil: The Seven Days War (PACSA, 1999). 
26 Matthew Kentridge, An unofficial war: Inside the conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
27 Nkosinathi Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 15/3 (April 1989), 506-524; see also, S. Stavrou, “Underdevelopment: Natal’s 
Formula for Conflict”, Indicator SA 7/3 (Autumn 1990), 52-56. 
28 Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the spatial dimension of black resistance and political 
violence in South Africa: the case of Durban”, Urban Geography 9/6 (1988), 629-53; see also, Doug 
Hindson, Mark Byreley and Mike Morris, “From violence to reconstruction: the making, disintegration 
and remaking of an apartheid city”, Antipode 26/4 (1994), 323-50. 
29 Paulus Zulu, Durban hostels and political violence: case studies in KwaMashu and Umlazi,” 
Transformation 21 (1993), 1-23. 
30 S. Stavrou and A. Crouch, “Molweni: Violence on the Periphery”, Indicator SA 6/3 (Winter 1989), 
46-50. 
31 Anthony Minnaar, “Locked in a Cycle of Violence: the Anatomy of Conflict in Bruntville 1990-
1992”, in Patterns of Violence: An Overview of Conflict in Natal during the 1980s and 1990s, ed. A. 
Minnaar (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), 95-106. 
32 Debby Bonnin, “Claiming Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in 
KwaZulu-Natal”, Journal of Southern African Studies 26/2 (June 2002), 301-316; see also, “Legacies 
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captured the testimonies of the victims of the “Seven Days War” in Vulindlela.33 
Philippe Denis et al. studied political violence in KwaNxamalala.34 Most of these 
studies provide an analysis of the causes of violence.35 Many of the authors reason 
that the violence started in the mid-1980s, mainly due to political rivalry. Political 
conflict between Inkatha, on the one hand, and the UDF and ANC, on the other, is an 
essential dimension of the phenomenon of violence.36 
1.5.2 Non scholarly literature 
Some of the KwaShange events were covered by the Unrest Monitoring Project. Of 
the authors who focused on the political violence in Vulindlela and the Natal 
Midlands in general, some provided ‘raw information’, or information that is not yet 
analysed. What makes this project appropriate to my study is that it provides 
information that was collected by the monitoring groups concurrently with the 
violence. These project reports were an invaluable source of information. They paint a 
clear picture of what was happening in Vulindlela and the Natal Midlands, in general. 
These sources, however, do not provide much analysis, since the objective of these 
publications was to provide factual information, rather than commentary.37  
John Aitchison, of the Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, headed the Unrest Monitoring Project. Aitchison, Wendy Leeb and 
Vaughn John produced a number of unpublished articles based on this project,38 e.g. 
of political violence: an examination of political conflict in Mpumalanga Township”, Transformation 
62 (2006), 59-83.  
33 Lou Levine, Faith in turmoil: The Seven Days War (PACSA, 1999). 
34 Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, eds., Indians versus Russians: An Oral 
History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993) (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publishers, 2011). 
35 For an overview of the interpretations of political violence in Natal, see Andrian Guelke, 
“Interpretations of political violence during the South Africa’s transition”, Politikon 27/2 (2000), 239-
54; William Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”, Journal 
of Southern African Studies 18/3 (September 1992), 455-485; Johnston, “Politics and Violence in 
KwaZulu-Natal”, 82-90, quoted in Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, eds., 
Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993) 
(Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publishers, 2011). 
36 Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, eds., Indians versus Russians: An Oral 
History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993) (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publishers, 2011), 
p. 7. 
37 Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal, 1987-1993”, PhD Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007). 
38John Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead”, unpublished mimeograph, 1988; John Aitchison, “The 
Pietermaritzburg Conflict - Experience and Analysis”, unpublished paper, (Centre for Adult Education, 
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1989); John Aitchison, “A Story of What Happened”, 
unpublished mimeograph, 1990; John Aitchison, “Interpreting Violence: The Struggle to Understand 
the Natal Conflict, unpublished mimeograph, 1990; John Aitchison, “The Seven Days War: The 
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“Numbering the Dead”39, “Misplaced, displaced and abandoned”40 and “…and the 
killing goes on”.41  The documents present statistics on political violence and unrest 
in the Natal Midlands. Members of the project even went into cemeteries and 
recorded names of the dead people from tombstones. This information, however, is 
incomplete. There are a number of fatalities that were not recorded.42  
 
Of these works by members of the Unrest Monitoring Project, some are more relevant 
to my study in KwaShange. Leeb’s articles deal with the destruction of families and 
communities caused the violence: “families have been decimated, destroyed, 
separated, rendered parentless, childless, homeless and hopeless”.43 Leeb discusses 
the psychological effect the violence had on the generations that were  involved in the 
infighting and on generations to come: “[…] this damage manifests in life-long 
psychological disturbances, amongst which are the inability to form long-term 
relationships, problems with parenting, alcoholism and/or drug abuse, criminality, 
neurotic behaviour, lack of motivation and lack of self-esteem.”44  
 
Other projects that performed similar tasks in the province and in the whole country 
were the Natal Monitor, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative(s) for South Africa 
(IDASA), the Indicator Project, the Black Sash, the Peace in Natal led by Radley 
Keys, linked to the Democratic Party and the Christian Ministries. They all monitored 
violence and provided data on the trends of violence, indicators and conflict 
chronologies. All ‘hot-spots’ in the province were monitored. Indicator provided an 
overview of political conflict in South Africa: data trends, 1984-1988, claimed that at 
least 4 012 people were killed in political violence in South Africa (including 1 113 
by the police and army), from September 1984 until the end of December 1988. There 
was evidence of the decrease of death tolls from 1987-1988. However, there was an 
Victims Narrative”, unpublished paper (Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1991). 
39John Aitchison, “The Civil War in Natal”, in G Moss and I Obery, eds., South African Review 5 
(Johannesburg: Ravan, 1989), 457- 473.  
40Wendy Leeb, “Misplaced, displaced and abandoned” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John V, Political 
violence in the Natal Midlands  (Pietermaritzburg, Centre for Adult Education, 2010).  
41 Wendy Leeb, “…and the killing goes on” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John V, Political violence in 
the Natal Midlands  (Pietermaritzburg, Centre for Adult Education, 2010). 
42 Interview with Wendy Leeb, Pietermaritzburg, March 2012. 
43 Wendy Leeb, “Daily life, daily death in Pietermaritzburg” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John, V, 
Political violence in the Natal Midlands (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 2010), p. 69. 
44 Wendy Leeb, “Daily life, daily death in Pietermaritzburg” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John, V, 
Political violence in the Natal Midlands (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 2010), p. 72. 
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increase in fatalities in the Midlands between 1987 and 1988.45 The Christian 
Ministries recorded the data trends in South Coast areas, including Port Shepstone, 
Ezingolweni and KwaShobashobane. The Black Sash provided some invaluable data 
on human rights violations.46 Much information is published in a periodical bulletin 
of events.47 The works of these violence monitors are predominately statistics of 
deaths and injuries, they locate the incidents in a context and sometimes describe at 
least in rough terms the incidents; they are, however, invaluable raw information for 
any researcher studying this topic.   The Human Rights Commission, later in the 
1990s, took over the work initially carried out by these violence monitors. The Natal 
Monitor, however, continued its work, including the publication of reports.48  
 
The work of the monitoring groups, however, was criticized by Anthea Jeffery. She 
commented on the work that was done by the above-mentioned violence monitoring 
groups, including the 1992 Amnesty International Commission of Jurists and the 
South African–based Human Rights Commission, as engaging in disinformation 
about violence in South Africa.49 Jeffery states that these reports were biased; they 
overlook the violence committed by UDF or ANC allies such as COSATU supporters, 
and instead focused only on the collusion between Inkatha and the South African 
security forces in perpetrating violence.50 ‘[…] the ANC’s strategy of fostering 
“ungovernability,” which has led to widespread intimidation, and notes that the 
refusal to disband Umkhonto or ANC “self-defence units” is often ignored in reports 
about township anarchy.’  
45 Bennett and Quin, An Overview of “Political Conflict in South Africa: data trends 1984-1988”, 
quoted in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John, V, Political violence in the Natal Midlands 
(Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 2010), p. 89. 
46Black Sash Records, Black Sash Papers, Killie Campbell Africana Library Box 18: File-
Miscellaneous, Affidavits 1988, 1989, 1990. File, Democratic Party, Information Sheets, 1990-1991. 
File, Democratic Party, Information Sheets, 1989-1990 and Durban Network Funerals, 1989-1990. Box 
19: File, All Bulletin’s Office Copy.  
47S. Bakker, ed., Capturing the Event-Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992. (Durban: 
Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992); see also M. Bennet, and D. Quinn, eds., Political Conflict in South 
Africa. Data Trends 1984-1988 (Durban: Indicator Project, 1988). 
48 Personal Communication with John Aitchson, University of KwaZulu-Natal, February 2009.  
49 Anthea Jeffery, Spotlight [South African Institute of Race Relations], October 1992 quoted in 
Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
50 Anthea Jeffery, Spotlight [South African Institute of Race Relations], October 1992, quoted in 
Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
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These human rights organizations not only distort the causes of violence, but 
also set the stage for increased confrontation and undermine attempts to 
generate lasting solutions to the conflict. In the politicized atmosphere of 
South Africa, however, it can hardly be expected that the members of the 
South African Human Rights Commission, who are also ANC members, 
would criticize their own party. Even the reporting and monitoring of the 
political violence is inevitably politicized.51  
1.5.3 Studies emphasising the political factors: the origins of violence 
 
The following authors focused on providing background and explanations of why 
violence started in the Natal Midlands, broadly; and in some focus on Vulindlela, 
specifically:  
A detailed account of the Vulindlela violence is provided by Matthew Kentridge. His 
study of the conflict of the late 1980s and 1990s was invaluable to my thesis. 
Kentridge gives a clear picture of the cycle of turmoil in the region. He states that the 
Midlands war pitted people against people of the same region, along party political 
lines. Kentridge believes that the war emanated from the different political 
movements existing in Natal and Zululand. He attributes the genesis of enmity in the 
Natal-Midlands to the alliance between COSATU and the UDF, which posed a 
serious threat to the power of Inkatha in the region. According to Kentridge, it was 
out of this challenge that the unofficial war between the Inkatha and the alliance 
started.52 Debby Bonnin cautioned, however, that Kentridge’s book had its 
limitations, sociologically.53 Nevertheless, it is more than a description of events, as it 
tries to analyse the violence in Vulindlela, which makes it more pertinent to my study. 
John Aitchison’s work provides a detailed background to the Midlands violence. He 
documented not only what was happening in the townships, but also what was 
happening in rural Vulindlela albeit not in great detail. Aitchison points out that the 
51 Anthea Jeffery, Spotlight [South African Institute of Race Relations], October 1992, quoted in 
Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
52 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
53Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal, 1987-1993”, PhD thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007).  
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UDF, which was formed in October 1983, opposed the Nationalist government 
proposals for a tricameral parliament, which would constitutionally enshrine the 
exclusion of Africans from the government of South Africa. “At the opening rally of 
the UDF in Edendale, a wounded student from the University of Zululand reported to 
the UDF leadership that he had been assaulted at the University residence and many 
other students who were alleged to be from UDF aligned communities were assaulted 
and others were killed.” According to Aitchison, this event was one of the 
precipitating causes for violence in the Natal Midlands and Durban.54 
Another cause of the violence in the Natal Midlands, according to Aitchison was bad 
conditions in townships around Pietermaritzburg. These conditions included the high 
cost of housing and the shortage of houses; transport costs had risen; residents in 
Imbali and Ashdown townships were discontented about the excision of their 
townships from the Pietermaritzburg municipality, so that they came under direct 
KwaZulu Government control; the role of Inkatha-supporting town councillors in 
black local authorities; the rise of vigilante groups associated with Inkatha; conflict 
between Inkatha and the trade union movements; and the lack of tolerance of any 
opposition by the KwaZulu/Inkatha authorities.55  
I comprehend Aitchison’s reasons for the origins and rapid escalation of violence in 
Pietermaritzburg townships, but I find it disconcerting that his reasons seem to 
suggest that Inkatha was the only cause of this pandemonium. UDF supporters also 
played their part in the violence. Khaba Mkhize, a seasoned journalist who resided in 
Edendale, observed and reported widely that ‘crime and troublesome activities’56 
angered local leaders and senior men who were mostly aligned to the Inkatha Cultural 
Movement. Richard Carver agrees with Mkhize.  
54 John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” in Greenstein, R, ed. The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), p. 53; see also Philippe 
Denis and Graham Duncan, The Native School that Caused all the Trouble: A history of the Federal 
Theology Seminary of Southern Africa (Dorpspruit: Cluster Publishers, 2011), p.175. 
55 John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” in Greenstein, R, ed. The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), p. 52. See also, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-2-nature-and-character-vigilantes-kwazulu-natal. 
56 Telephonic interview with Khaba Mkhize, Pietermaritzburg, February 2009. See also Khaba Mkhize, 
quoted in Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1990).  
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He states that ‘there have undoubtedly been criminal elements, comtsotsis, who have 
exploited the political struggle on the UDF/ANC side.’57 
Adams and Moodley believe that others joined the vigilantes due to ‘mob psychology 
with the belief that it was nice being part of the vigilantes’. Others participated in 
vigilantism activities because they had no choice, in the sense that their families and 
next-of-kin’s lives were in danger if they refused to be part of them.58 Father Tim 
Smith stated that the bias displayed by the police was the cause of the violence; he 
narrated his personal experiences of violence in Vulindlela as a priest in the Roman 
Catholic Church in Elandskop. He frequently “called in the riot police to stop an 
attack in Elandskop. However, when the police arrived, it was alleged that they 
continued assisting the attackers to hunt down UDF supporters, either to arrest them 
or make them disappear from society.”59  
According to Keesing’s records of World Events, containing ANC-IFP conflict, the 
violence in the Pietermaritzburg region was exacerbated by what was happening in 
the neigbouring areas. For example, in September 1992 there was a big Inkatha rally 
in KwaMakhutha, near Amanzimtoti. This rally was not peaceful in KwaMakhutha. 
As a result, even in Pietermaritzburg the violence flared up anew. A large group of 
Inkatha supporters attacked the ANC-controlled townships outside Pietermaritzburg, 
particularly the Ashdown area, damaging property and assaulting residents.60 The 
conflict in Pietermaritzburg was a bitter one, because the issues at stake were bigger 
than simply the control of several townships. The main issue that led to the attack was 
the deep-rooted hatred that existed amongst Inkatha members for members of the 
UDF.61 During October 1992, conflict in the Pietermaritzburg region seemed to 
escalate. Violence became an almost everyday occurrence. Regular skirmishes 
between IFP gunmen and ANC supporters took place. It was believed that Chief 
57 Richard Carver, South Africa after the Elections. WRITENET for UNHCR/CDR, June 1994 
(UNHCR/CDR REFWORLD Databases). 
58 in Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
59 Tim Smith, “Experiencing the Violence”, paper presented at the Centre for Adult Education Seminar 
on Violence, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1988). See also Richard Carver, quoted from 
UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) “KwaZulu-Natal – Continued Violence and Displacement” (South 
Africa: Writenet, 1996).  
60 Keesing’s Records of World Events, Containing ANC-IFP Conflict, 12 October 1992; Keesing’s 
Records of World Events, Containing the ANC, 10 September 1992. 
61 Keesing’s Records of World Events, Containing ANC-IFP Conflict, 12 October 1992; Keesing’s 
Records of World Events, Containing the ANC, 10 September 1992. 
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Gatsha Buthelezi knew about the violence that was taking place in KwaZulu-Natal. It 
was believed that he was the cause of the violence, when he refused to take part in the 
upcoming 1994 elections, at least until international observers were allowed in 
KwaZulu-Natal.62 
K von Holdt gives more details concerning the sequence of spiralling violence in 
Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas. He states that in August and September 1986 
things turned violent when IFP supporters embarked on forced recruitment campaigns 
in a number of townships around Pietermaritzburg. Violence had simmered in the area 
since 5- 6 August 1986, when township residents heeded the UDF/COSATU call for a 
stay-away, to protest against the all-white parliamentary elections in KwaZulu-Natal, 
which supported and favoured the IFP. A number of bus drivers, members of the 
COSATU-affiliated Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), were allegedly 
attacked by IFP-supporting vigilantes.63 It was followed by sporadic attacks on UDF 
and COSATU members throughout the rest of the year. In 1987 the conflict escalated 
into a full-scale struggle for control of the Pietermaritzburg townships. There were 
numerous allegations that the recruitment by the IFP was accompanied by force and 
demands for money. As vigilante violence increased and adversely affected the 
communities, they swung their support to the UDF and COSATU alliance. Defence 
committees were set up in many areas and the balance of power turned against the IFP 
supporters.64 
According to Anthony Minnaar, vigilantism was just one side of an often-violent 
struggle for power. Vigilantism had its own distinction, which, according to those 
who were engaged in it, was a way of defending themselves in the way they thought 
was best. The most important distinction can be identified through the different 
‘styles’ of violence of the two sides. Since the fury of 1985-1986 abated, opposition 
violence usually involved small groups of lightly armed youths, striking at specific 
people in minority segments of the community. It was alleged that vigilantes had 
generally enjoyed loyal support from the KwaZulu Legislature and, in some cases, the 
62 Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), 35-40. See also, Keesing’s Records of World Events, Containing the ANC-IFP Conflict, 
12 October 1992; Keesing’s Records of World Events, Containing the ANC, 10 September 1992; 
Keesing’s Records of World Events, Mass protest over increasing Natal Violence, 2 July 1990. 
63 http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-2-nature-and-character-vigilantes-kwazulu-natal 
64 K. von Holdt, Vigilantes versus defense committees: The Maritzburg War: A Turning Point for IFP? 
South African Labour Bulletin 14 (2), 1988, pp. 16-17.  
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SAP and the SADF were alleged to have aided vigilantes, while also acting 
vigorously to restrain the opponents of the vigilantes.65  
Some authors attributed the intensity of the violence in the Natal Midlands to 
“Warlordism”66. Aitchison agrees with Minnaar that the Midlands warlords 
perpetuated the violence. He defines warlords as “powerful local leaders who rely on 
the force of arms to maintain their power. They tend to gather a group of professional 
strong-arm men around them and they pay for their services by screwing [extorting] 
the local populace.”67 UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, equated the warlords to the 
gang leaders, asserting that their activities were similar to those of gang leaders. The 
only difference was that they were ‘not motivated exclusively by the acquisition of 
personal wealth and power, but in addition they owe allegiance to a central power, 
namely Inkatha. Warlords were champions for a political cause.’68 Whilst my 
research in KwaShange proved this assertion to be true, I nevertheless find it biased; 
UDF had its own warlords. For example, in the Midlands, David Ntombela, leader of 
Inkatha, was known to be a warlord. However, the actions of some of the leaders of 
the UDF and ANC were similar to those of Inkatha leaders. The ‘Lion of the Natal 
Midlands’, Harry Gwala, and Sifiso Nkabinde, the ANC leader who later joined the 
United Democratic Movement (UDM) were warlords. The warlords and their political 
movements did not own up to the violence committed by their supporters. Up to the 
present there is no warlord in the Midlands who has accepted the blame. Minnaar, 
however, believes that all those who were accused of being instigators of violence 
(warlords) and vigilante activities were involved in one way or another. Minnaar 
describes and discusses violence between hostel dwellers, UDF and Inkatha 
supporters in Bruntville township outside Mooi River when Inkatha undertook a 
vigorous recruitment drive.69 The collusion was specifically pointed out by the Daily 
65 Anthony Minaar, Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of contact in Natal, pp. 3-4. See also, 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/chapter-2-nature-and-character-vigilantes-kwazulu-natal. 
66 See, for example, Anthony Minnaar, “Undisputed Kings: Warlordism in Natal” in Minnaar (ed.) 
Patterns of Violence, p. 61.; UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) “KwaZulu-Natal – Continued Violence 
and Displacement” (South Africa: Writenet, 1996). 
67 Aitchison quoted in Anthony Minaar, “Undisputed Kings: Warlordism in Natal” in Minaar (ed.) 
Patterns of Violence, p. 61.  
68 UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) “KwaZulu-Natal – Continued Violence and Displacement” (South 
Africa: Writenet, 1996). 
69Anthony Minnaar, “Locked in a Cycle of Violence: The Anatomy of Conflict in Bruntville (1990-
1992)”, in A.Minnaar ed., Patterns of Violence. Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1992), 143-162. See also Anthony Minnaar, ‘Patterns of Violence’: An 
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News, which regarded it as evidence of another form of the strong ties between the 
IFP and the vigilantes.70  
 
Senzosenkosi Mkhize provides the social background to the political conflict at 
Richmond.  He describes the formation of Self-Defence Units (SDUs) and Self-
Protection Units (SPUs) as the reason why violence escalated in Richmond. It was 
established at the time that the police were perceived as part of the problem.71  
Andrew Ragavaloo discusses, in detail, the violence in the western part of 
Richmond.72 Steinberg gives an analysis of the living conditions which contributed to 
the violence in rural areas in the Midlands, particularly near Richmond.73 Riens de 
Haan provides an overview of the violence in eNkumane during the late 1980s and the 
1990s.74 De Haan also assesses the various narratives given by people of Richmond as 
the reasons for violence; stories about love triangles; stories about lost guns; stories 
about massive violent clashes; stories about assassinations; stories about random 
attacks. He gives examples of these five types of stories and comments on their 
historical background, concluding that the violence in Richmond around 1990 was not 
only about the power of political parties, but, especially in rural areas, about the 
power of tribal authorities in a period of accelerated urbanisation. 75  
There are projects done by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
that sought to examine the nature and extent of violence during South Africa’s 
transition from apartheid rule to democracy (Phase 1) and within the new democracy 
itself (Phase 2), in order to inform a violence prevention agenda. This series 
Overview of Conflict in Natal During the 1980s and 1990s, in A. Minnaar ed., Patterns of Violence. 
Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. (Pretoria: HSRC, 1990), 1-26. 
70 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), p. 144. 
71 Senzosenkosi Mkhize, “Spirals of Suffering: Political Violence in Richmond KwaZulu-Natal, 1980 
to 1999-An Autobiographical narrative,” paper presented at a conference at the Msunduzi Museum, 25-
26 March 2010. 
72 For an overview of the violence in the western part of the Richmond (KZN) District during the late 
1990s see A. Ragavaloo: Richmond - Living in the Shadow of Death (Johannesburg: STE, 2008). 
73 For an analysis of the living conditions which contributed to the violence in a rural area neighbouring 
eNkumane see J. Steinberg: Midlands (Jeppestown, Jonathan Ball, 2002). 
74 Marinus Jacob de Haan: Mission on the Margin (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
PhD, 2010: 100-118). 
75 Marinus Jacob de Haan, “Error! Main Document Only.Deadly population dynamics in Richmond: 
An analysis of stories collected around a local mission station”, paper presented at a conference at the 
Msunduzi Museum, 25-26 March 2010. 
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comprises a set of self-contained, but interrelated reports, which explore violence 
within key social loci and areas.76 
  
The Goldstone Commission believed that the nature and characteristics of vigilantes 
in KwaZulu-Natal were mainly due to the economic, social and political imbalances 
that had resulted from apartheid and a police force and army who were instruments of 
oppression and who were therefore perceived as unfair and biased. The Commission 
attributed the forming of vigilantes to a way of fighting a system that was not 
favourable to them. Surprisingly, the Commission said nothing about the vigilantes 
who operated together with the security forces in thwarting the efforts of democratic 
forces in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands.77  
Anne Truluck noted that competition for land between clans constituted another basis 
for vigilantism in KwaZulu-Natal. In this form of factional organisation, men who 
received land from a chief traditionally owed him military loyalty.78 In rural 
KwaZulu-Natal, this obligation was the source of vigilante activities. It was another 
issue that the IFP exploited. In urban townships and informal settlements, particular 
leaders who were appointed by the chief himself controlled men. The best organised, 
but rarest form of vigilantism was the private army. To finance it, a levy was imposed 
on all the households of a shantytown. The Lindelani settlement on the northern 
fringes of Durban offers a useful case study.79 It sprang up around 1985 and by 1986 
had 120 000 inhabitants. From the start it fell under the control of an IFP warlord, 
Thomas Shabalala. Land was annexed in a violent way. In 1987, an attack was 
launched from Lindelani into neighbouring Ntuzuma, driving people from their 
76 Injobo Nebandla (2005), confronting the legacy of weapons in Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Braamfontein: The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. 
77Centre for the Study of violence and Reconciliation, The Goldstone Commission’s Inquiry regarding 
the prevention of public violence and intimidation in KwaZulu-Natal, pp. 19-20. 
78 Anne Truluck, No Blood on Our Hands: Political Violence  in the Natal Midlands 1987-Mid-1992 
and the Role of the State, ‘white’ Political Parties and business (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Midlands 
Region of the Black Sash, 1992). 
79 Anne Truluck, No Blood on Our Hands: Political Violence  in the Natal Midlands 1987-Mid-1992 
and the Role of the State, ‘white’ Political Parties and business (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Midlands 
Region of the Black Sash, 1992). 
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homes and burning it down to acquire new land for settlement. Those who received 
the land in the neighbouring Ntuzuma owed military loyalty to Shabalala.80  
Fatima Meer records that the SAP were often accused of playing political games in 
deciding which areas of violence they had to attend to as quickly as possible. In IFP 
controlled territories, it was alleged that the SAP even brought expensive equipment 
from Pretoria to assist the IFP supporters, bearing in mind that some of the equipment 
needed special care and service. The political games that the police were playing in 
the name of combating political violence in KwaZulu-Natal was costly to the 
Government and thus also to society.81  
Some attribute the violence to political movements’ leaders, such as Chief Buthelezi. 
Fatima Meer claims that Buthelezi engineered the violence due to his ambitions to 
play a leading role in the new government. A reason that has been put forward by 
some authors is that of a “third force” of right-wing elements in the security 
establishment, bent on derailing the government’s negotiation agenda. Another 
suggestion was that the Inkatha/ANC rivalry was engineered by an ambitious 
Buthelezi, who feared being sidelined rather than treated as an equal third party.82  
Fatima Meer states that Mangosuthu Buthelezi was alleged by many people to be 
giving orders for the attacks, since he was afraid of any breakaway in the area, within 
the ranks of Inkatha. For example during attacks in KwaMakhutha in January 1987 
Inkatha vigilantes shot and killed 12 people, including children. This alleged action by 
Buthelezi left many speechless, especially since innocent children were killed in the 
process. ‘[This] seemed to confirm what many observers believed, namely that 
Buthelezi himself, together with his party, had a direct link with vigilantes.’83  
In 1987, Buthelezi made a miscalculated comment, that should any member of 
the IFP be attacked, then the IFP would have no option but to retaliate, since it 
would be assumed as the deeds of the ANC and the UDF. This further 
contributed to the hostile political situation in KwaZulu-Natal. After this 
80 Anne Truluck, No Blood on Our Hands: Political Violence  in the Natal Midlands 1987-Mid-1992 
and the Role of the State, ‘white’ Political Parties and business (Pietermaritzburg: Natal Midlands 
Region of the Black Sash, 1992), pp. 2-3. 
81 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), pp. 10–11; A. J. 
Jeffrey, Spotlight on the disinformation about violence in South Africa, South African Institute of Race 
Relations, pp. 38-39. 
82 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989) 
83 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), p. 145. 
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comment, daggers were all out for both ANC and IFP supporters in the 
KwaZulu-Natal Midlands. The comment was regarded by many that Buthelezi 
was calling for vigilantism against the ANC and UDF, should any member of 
his party be attacked. It implicated that UDF and ANC supporters were the 
masterminds behind the killing of IFP supporters.84  
Meer also mentions Harry Gwala’s speeches for inciting violence and the ANC’s 
campaign of armed struggle, ungovernability, and revolutionary intolerance; ingrained 
tribalism, unleashed by the lessening of white repression that resulted in “black-on-
black” violence.85  
David Everatt examines the nature and causes of the pre-election period violence. He 
felt that, on the basis of a close analysis of monitoring data, that the commonly held 
view that the violence was multi-causal, involving elements of poverty, ethnicity and 
political contestation, is wrong and that, though the violence indeed drew on a range 
of socio-economic and political factors, it was deliberately fomented; and that the 
security forces played a key role, beyond that of favouring Inkatha in trying to affect 
the negotiation process and protect their own futures.86  
Jackie Dugard looks at the mechanisms instituted by the Nationalist Party government 
in response to public (and international) demands that it take action against the 
violence. She examines the role of the 1991 National Peace Accord and the 
Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation 
(the Goldstone Commission) which, despite their massive resources and a high media 
profile, never managed to lower the levels of political violence or to publicly reveal 
those responsible for it. She concludes that, in many respects, these bodies were 
effective only as diversionary tactics that allowed the negotiations to continue against 
the backdrop of continued violence. They played the transition game from the 
outset.87  
84 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), p. 139. 
85 Fatima Meer (ed.), Resistance in Townships (Durban: Madiba Publishers, 1989), pp. 180-181. 
86 David Evarett, “Analysing political violence in Reef, 1990 to 1994” in Greenstein, R, The Role of 
Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry, 2003). 
87 Jackie Dugard, “The ‘government’s dustbin’?” in Greenstein, R, The Role of Political Violence in 
South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003). 
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Heine Marais revisits some of the issues concerning the interpretation of the violence 
and shows that the violence was a not easily separable part of the broader influence on 
the way we are now. Understanding contemporary South African society and what is 
to be done is illuminated by the political violence of 1987 to 1994 and its role in 
ensuring that the democratic movement was assimilated into the South African state, 
rather than taking it over. Marais points out that the Low Intensive Conflict strategy 
coincided with several socio-economic changes that played an equally important role 
in countering the values systems once advanced by the main resistance movements. 
The state-sponsored violence of the late 1980s and early 1990s at most exacerbated 
emerging fault-lines and encouraged existing conflicts that arose as much from 
structural (political, economic, social and ideological) trends in society as they did 
from the acts and omissions of individuals, organisations and state institutions.88  
Piers Pigou evaluates the extent to which the TRC findings throw sufficient light on 
this period of violence and provide adequate closure. Analysing its findings on the 
roles of the parties to the conflict and the security forces in particular, Pigou finds the 
TRCs attempts to expose the truth of the past both admirable and flawed. As the 
product of political settlement, it is probable that it was never intended to secure full 
disclosure and quite probable that it has revealed more than some of its sponsors 
would like it to have done.89  
Rupert Taylor point fingers at the system of apartheid as the cause of the […] conflict: 
“Apartheid has succeeded in engineering group divisions among the oppressed.”90 
Adams and Moodley concur with Taylor, that the conflict “is not of some essential 
ethnic forces,” they argue, however, that to blame it solely on the manipulations of 
apartheid is an oversimplification.91 They reason:  
 
Ethnic antagonisms exist in societies that do not have apartheid. Above all, in 
demystifying ethnicity, the analyst needs to show why the manipulators are so 
88 Hein Marais, “The shattered settlement”, in Greenstein, R, The Role of Political Violence in South 
Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003). 
89 Piers Pigou, “The state and violence”, in Greenstein, R, The Role of Political Violence in South 
Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: Community Agency for Social Enquiry, 2003). 
90 Taylor, Rupert. 1991. “The Myth of Ethnic Division: Township Conflict on the Reef,.” Race and 
Class 33, no. 2, 1–14 quoted from Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid 
Mind: Options for the New South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
91 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
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successful in constructing and exploiting ethnic cleavages. Apartheid did not 
invent all ethnic divisions; it skilfully utilised collective memories and distinct 
histories. Analysts who deny this historical reality invoke magic formulas to 
wish away deep-rooted perceptions that can be mobilised for progressive as 
well as retrogressive ends.92 
To attribute all violence to a state-directed “third force” does not explain the attacks 
against Inkatha officeholders and the police. Among the fatalities in KwaShange are 
equal numbers of ANC and Inkatha members or sympathizers.93  At the level of the 
province, however, Aitchison contends that there were more UDF/ANC victims than 
Inkatha ones.94 There is also evidence that both movements had their own “third 
forces” that were not under the direct control of the national leadership. When MK 
units “take out” specific Inkatha targets in Natal and local Inkatha warlords organise 
attacks against ANC leaders and sympathisers, it is difficult to ascertain which side 
has started the violence and which wreaks revenge. Generally it can be said that the 
MK violence is carried out more professionally and with the use of sophisticated 
firearms. In contrast, the more primitive (“cultural”) weaponry of Inkatha members 
lends itself more to random violence by excited mobs against anyone who is not part 
of the crowd.95  
 
John Argyle has opines that much of the Natal conflict was motivated principally by 
the desire for revenge and therefore resembles centuries-old blood feuds. In the past, 
such feuds originated not only over land but also over insults to honour or violations 
of women. Both sides cite provocation as a defence.96 As Kentridge notes, “In a war 
there are no aggressors; ostensibly no side ever initiates an attack…if an attack is 
made, it is always retaliatory.” Yet, while it is wise “to believe neither side” until 
independent conclusive evidence is available, as Argyle cautions, one cannot simply 
blame the conflict on long-standing cultural traditions of habitual feuding. The 
92 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
93 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
94 John Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal 
Midlands 1987-1989”, MA thesis (University of Natal, 1993). 
95 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South 
Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
96 John Argyle quoted from Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: 
Options for the New South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
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waxing and waning of the feuds can be traced to the changing conditions that 
precipitate or repress intergroup and interpersonal violence.97 
 
Few authors have referred to certain incidents of violence in KwaShange.98 These 
authors, political analysts and the media focus on two incidents of violence in 
KwaShange and attribute these incidents to the political violence between Inkatha and 
the UDF in the area. While doing research in my home area of KwaShange for my 
Masters degree in History, I provided a detailed historical background of the area.99 In 
my study I offer a critique of the view by these two authors (Matthew Kentridge and 
Anthea Jeffery), who claimed that the violent incidents of 1987 and 1990 in 
KwaShange were wholly politically motivated. My interviews with residents at the 
time showed that clashes between generations were equally to be blamed for the 
Midland’s violence. Older men were absent at migrant-jobs, communities had moved 
in from elsewhere and the youth were perceived as ill-disciplined. The two factions 
then aligned themselves politically on opposing sides, often with fathers against sons 
and vice-versa. Social change was surely also to blame. To critique such a strong view 
one needs to provide a detailed understanding of the KwaShange milieu pre-dating the 
start of the violence in the 1980s.100 
Matthew Kentridge and Anthea Jeffery discuss the ‘KwaShange Massacre’ of 25 
September 1987. This is the first KwaShange incident of violence to be documented 
in literature, despite there having been many other incidents that had taken place 
before it.  
Twelve people, including three black policemen, were arrested in connection 
with the KwaShange massacre killings […] The evidence showed that at about 
97 John Argyle quoted from Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: 
Options for the New South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
98 Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context 
of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. Shabalala and R. 
Buikema, eds., From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape 
Town: UCT Press, 2007); Anthea Jeffrey, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (South African 
Institute of Race Relations: Johannesburg, 1997), pp. 244-245; see also Matthew Kentridge, Matthew 
Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1990).  
99 Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: a study of the changing patterns of fatherhood 
of three generations of Zulu fathers and sons in the Inadi, Vulindlela, area of Pietermaritzburg, 
KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s to the 1990s.” (unpublished MA thesis, 2006). 
100 For these details see Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: a study of the changing 
patterns of fatherhood of three generations of Zulu fathers and sons in the Inadi, Vulindlela, area of 
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s to the 1990s.” (unpublished MA thesis, 2006). 
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11 pm on 25 September 1987 a group led by Mr Nkosinathi Hlengwa, a 
policeman, attacked the house in which the youngsters were gathered. The 
house was encircled by Hlengwa’s men and stones were thrown, breaking 
windows. Shots were fired and a door smashed in. When the youth tried to 
barricade the doorway fire was started. More shots were fired into the house. 
Those who sought to escape from the blazing house were struck down one by 
one. The screams of those that remained in the house ceased only when a gas 
bottle exploded, ‘producing the final holocaust’. 
Jeffery also discussed the ‘KwaShange Ambush’ of 10 February 1991:  
Two buses returning from the Inkatha and ANC peace talks were ambushed in 
KwaShange (near Pietermaritzburg). Some 18 Inkatha supporters were killed 
and 11 injured […] they were spread out within a one kilometre radius spot, 
suggesting desperate attempts to escape. Automatic weapons had been used to 
rake the vehicles and to dispatch those who, frantic to escape the bullets, 
jumped from the buses only to be cornered and slaughtered by an ANC 
ambush party. Many of the bodies were stabbed repeatedly and some had their 
heads crushed or beaten in so they were almost unrecognizable.  
Jeffrey and Kentridge relied heavily on media reports to discuss these two major 
incidents in KwaShange. They reasoned that these incidents were exclusively political 
violence, motivated by nothing else but abhorrence of Inkatha by UDF supporters in 
KwaShange. As a member of the community residing in KwaShange when these 
incidents occurred, I find it difficult to commit to this sentiment. I question this view 
by showing that generational differences were at the bottom of both incidents. Owing 
to the State of Emergency in operation at this time, media reports were not free to 
explore either the political ramifications or the links between these two incidents. 
Nevertheless, Judge Page, in the court summation of the first incident, warned of the 
dire consequences for generational interactions that would surely result from the first 
incident. Local IFP member, Velaphi Ndlovu (commenting at the time of the second 
incident in 1991), recorded that the two incidents had taken place at the exact same 
location. At the time the media failed to make the link, which points to a generational 
skirmish. This was possibly because of the confusing and complex nature of the two 
incidents. The older men who were responsible for the first incident were, in fact, 
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UDF aligned. This is in contrast to the conventional media view of political 
allegiances and age, which regarded the UDF as an organisation with a popular youth 
base. Thus it was assumed that the youth belonged to this movement and Inkatha was 
assumed to have the support of the older men.  
In reality, however, things were more complex because the political allegiances of 
younger and older men appeared to shift from the one incident to the other. The 
explanation for this is most likely found in the political opportunism of both factions, 
which used the politics of the time as a front to resolve other issues.101 Most notably, 
this would be generational tensions, caused by socio-economic factors of change, but 
climaxed in the concerns of the older generation about young people’s lack of 
discipline. Importantly, this is the common understanding of the community itself, 
which still bears the scars of these traumatic events.102 There are three factors that 
give substance to the assertion that the incidents were cases of generational struggle, 
rather than solely of political conflict: 
(a) The community understanding with regard to the indiscipline of the younger 
age group, such as robbery and theft, stemming from their not receiving proper 
fathering, for whatever reason. 
(b) The need, and the acts, of the older generation men to wrest back control by 
implementing ‘disciplinary courts’, and  
(c) The political opportunism on the part of the younger men and older 
generations involved in the incidents.  
I would be inclined to say that this assumption of mine needs to be rethought, in the 
light of further information deriving from my doctoral research. Rather, what was 
happening was so complex that some people in KwaShange were not opportunists to 
the point of aligning themselves with political movements; they were conscious, fully 
aware and genuine.  
101 I admit here, however, that subsequent doctoral research has indicated yet another dimension or 
layer of complex origins of these political alignments; namely the UDF and the unions versus the 
chiefs and Inkatha were other possible causes of the violence. 
102 Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context 
of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. Shabalala and R. 
Buikema, eds., From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape 
Town: UCT Press, 2007). 
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Two British Social Scientists, Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley,103 reasoned that 
Matthew Kentridge’s work on political violence in Vulindlela, ‘like most other 
journalistic efforts, describes the impact of the war on people’s lives but does not 
analyse the forces that have caused and sustained the conflict. Most of these are 
“verbal snapshots.”’104 Both Kentridge and Jeffrey’s works on KwaShange violence 
are ‘mostly of the propagandistic kind’.105 Kentridge implicitly blames Inkatha 
warlords, backed by the South African state, as if their one-sided aggression was self-
evident, whereas Jeffrey blames the violence on the UDF supporters as if Inkatha 
were innocent victims.106 
I postulate that respect and discipline are key features in constructions of traditional 
Zulu masculinity. In response, younger men insisted on being treated as men, 
asserting their claims of manhood against the older generation men, who they 
believed were trying to extend their generational subordination.  
1.5.4 Studies emphasising gender and generation 
Few authors recorded that this political violence had had gender and generational 
tension dimensions;107 it was not simply Inkatha and UDF supporters fighting one 
another. Campbell explains that ‘[the] analysis of South African violence has failed to 
take explicit account of the fact that the conflict has almost always taken the form of 
103 Heribert Adam is professor emeritus of political sociology at Simon Fraser University, specializing 
in human rights, comparative racisms, peace studies, Southern Africa, and ethnic conflict. He is 
married to Kogila Moodley, Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Education at the University 
of Columbia, who is co-author of his book Seeking Mandela: Peacemaking Between Israeli and 
Palestinians and other works. 
104 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
105 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
106 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
107 For a broader view on the generational conflict and Zulu masculinity see, for instance, Ari Sitas, 
“The Making of the ‘Comrades’ Movement in Natal, 1985-1991.” Journal of Southern African Studies. 
Vol 18, No 1 (March 1991), pp. 629-641. Kumi Naidoo, "The Politics of Youth Resistance in the 
1980s: The Dilemmas of a Differentiated Durban". Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol 18, No 1 
(March 1991), pp. 143-165.  Gerry Mare and Thembisa Waetjen, “Men among Men”: Masculinity and 
Zulu nationalism in the 1980s, in R. Morrel (ed.) Changing Men in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 2001). Thokozani Xaba, “Masculinity and its malcontents: The confrontation 
between ‘struggle masculinity’ and ‘post struggle musculinity’ (1900-1997), in R. Morrell (ed.), 
Changing men in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001). Catherine 
Campbell, “Learning to Kill? Masculinity, the family and Violence in Natal,” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 18 (3), 1992. 
 29 
                                                 
men fighting men’.108 Looking at the statistics provided by John Aitchison’s 
“Numbering the Dead”, Debby Bonnin rather believes that the violence stemmed 
from the usurpation of the political sphere by young men.109 She explains that the 
numbers ‘of those killed and injured in the violence indicates that the majority were 
young males. In effect the political violence concealed a generational rapture.’110 
[…] politics became the domain of youth organisation and politics the sphere 
of young men. Older people, men in particular, were marginalised from local 
politics. When the young men brought their political stances into the domain 
of the household it unsettled the practise of [ukuhlonipha] and consequently 
patriarchal relations.111 
The lack of discipline and ukuhlonipha resulted in older generational men deciding to 
forcibly discipline the youth in what could be termed ‘kangaroo courts’. Khabo 
Mkhize, a seasoned journalist, reported on the violence in Vulindlela, I quote his 
assertion from Matthew Kentridge: ‘The comrades do not confine their disciplinary 
activities to their own ranks, however, residents are also punished if they infringe 
some newly imposed standard of decency and good behaviour.’112 
Adam and Moodley attribute the violence of ‘mob psychology to the youths who 
became part of vigilante activities [which] was a serious cause for concern.’ They 
blame parents in Natal and Zululand for failure to provide proper guidance to their 
108 Campbell, C, “Learning to kill? Masculinity, the family and violence in Natal”, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 18; Gerry Mare and Thembisa Waetjen, “Men amongst Men: Masculinity and Zulu 
nationalism in the 1980s, in Morrel, R (ed.) Changing men in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 2001); see also Thokozani Xaba, “Masculinity and its malcontents: The 
confrontation between ‘struggle masculinity and post-struggle masculinity(1900-1997), in Morrell, R 
(ed.), Changing Men in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2001). Matthew 
Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 
1990); David Hemson, “For Sure You are Going to Die!: Political Participation and the Comrade 
Movement in Inanda, KwaZulu-Natal”, Social Dynamics. 22:2 (1996), 74-104. Ari Sitas, The Making 
of the ‘Comrades’ Movement in Natal, 1985-1991, Journal of Southern African Studies, 18:3 (1992), 
629-641. 
109 Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007), p 3.  
110 Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007), p 3.  
111 Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal”, PhD Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007), p. 3. 
112 Khaba Mkhize quoted in Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), p. 29. 
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children. They claim that this factor played a role in the massive increase of political 
violence in the region.113  
Adams and Moodley state that people in the rural communities and the migrant 
hostels resented the political activism of the urban-based youth as a subversion of the 
traditional order in which children are obedient and politics is left to the elders. 
Adams and Moodley stress that, for the older generation, youthful activism was ‘an 
ungrateful waste of the educational opportunities for which the parents sacrificed so 
much. On the other hand, youth accuse their parents of having compromised 
themselves with the system.’114 Anthony Minnaar records that similar tensions took 
place among the youth, traditional leaders and farm workers in Richmond.115   
 
Evidently this facet of generational conflict of the violence destroyed many families’ 
cohesion and pitted communities against each other, particularly in the semi-urban 
settlements surrounding Pietermaritzburg, where rural and urban values clashed 
directly under conditions of dire poverty.116  
 
In seeking to find historical precedents for such generational conflicts, I have relied 
upon historian Ben Carton, who suggests that this was one of the root causes of the 
Bhambatha Uprising of 1906. I quote from Carton: 
Youthful rebels so disturbed those African patriarchs who refused to join the 
rebellion that they taunted them ‘from the hilltop […] to plait a long rope with 
which to climb to the heavens,’ and they looted the poll tax. One Nkandla 
homestead head, Lumbe ka Nombana, reported that ‘old loyalist[s]’ were 
being warned that they would be killed by the rebels.117 
 
113 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
114 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
115 Anthony Minnaar, “Patterns of Violence: An Overview of Conflict in Natal during the 1980s and 
1990s”, in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: 
Human Sciences Research Council, 1992), pp. 1-25. 
116 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993). 
117 Carton, B, Blood from your children: The colonial origins of generational conflict in South Africa 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2000), p. 152.  
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1.5.5 Studies emphasising the socio-economic factors 
Many of the works covering this violence emphasised, as I will show, that socio-
economic factors which resulted in the migrant labour and labour laws introduced by 
colonial and apartheid governments, respectively, were the underlying causes of the 
violence. Thomas McClendon provides data on social and economic relations within 
African farm-tenant families in segregation-era Natal. McClendon explores the ways 
in which rural patriarchy was constructed and contested in South Africa.  He believed 
that the South African state, in conjunction with African patriarchs, sought to further 
subordinate African minors (unmarried young males and females) to the labour needs 
of elder males and white farmers, through the use of an increasingly rigid system of 
“customary” and contract law.118  
As some authors feel that socio-economic factors in the region contributed immensely 
to the start of political violence in the region,119 Bill Berkeley reasons that “there is no 
doubt that political violence in KwaZulu-Natal has fed upon mass poverty.”120  
118 Thomas V. McClendon, Genders and Generations Apart: Labor Tenants and Customary Law in 
Segregation-Era South Africa, 1920s to 1940s (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002). 
See review of the book for H-SAfrica by Aran MacKinnon, Department of History, University of West 
Georgia. published by H-SAfrica@h-net.msu.edu (January 2004). 
119 John Aitchison, “Interpreting Violence: The Struggle to understand the Natal Conflict”, unpublished 
mimeograph, 1990; see also Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the Spatial Dimensions of 
Black Resistance and Political Violence in South Africa: The Case of Durban”, Urban Geography. 9: 6 
(1988), 629-653; Nkosinathi Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in 
Pietermaritzburg”, Journal of Southern African Studies. 15:3 (1989), 506-524; Doug Hindson and Mike 
Morris, “Trying to Piece Together the Peace in Natal” Work in Progress 69 (1990), 21-23; A  Louw, 
and S. Bekker, “Conflict in the Natal Region – A Database Approach”, in S. Bekker, ed., Capturing the 
Event, Conflict Trends in the Natal Region 1986-1992 (Indicator SA Issue Focus, 1992), 15-54; 
Anthony Minnaar, “Locked in a Cycle of Violence: The Anatomy of Conflict in Bruntville, (1990-
1992), in A. Minnaar, ed., Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1992), 143-162; Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political 
Violence, Reform and Reconstruction”, Review of African Political Economy, 53:43-59; Rupert Taylor 
and Mark Shaw, “Interpreting the Conflict in Natal (South Africa)”, unpublished paper presented to 
Conference on Ethnicity, Society and Conflict in Natal, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1992; G. 
Woods, “Rebels with a Cause, the Discontent of Black Youth”, Indicator SA 7, 1 (1989), 63-65; G. 
Woods, “Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics”, A. Minnaar ed., 
Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 
1992), 37-48. Forsyth P, 'Pietermaritzburg Conflict Chronology: A Chronology of Political 
Develoments in Pietermaritzburg, 1980–1986', produced by the Project on Contemporary Conflict in 
Natal, Department of Historical Studies, University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg), April 1991. Desai A 
and Van Holdt K, 'Natal Violence: New Conditions, New Strategies' in South African Labour Bulletin, 
vol 15 no 4, November 1990. Cronin J, 'For the Sake of Our Lives! Guidelines for the creation of 
people's self-defence units', Project for the Study of Violence: Seminar Paper No 2, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 1991. Cunningham-Brown N, 'The Natal violence continues', South 
Africa Foundation Review, February 1990. 
120 Bill Berkeley, “The Warlords of Natal”, The Atlantic Monthly (March 1994). 
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Social and economic deprivation is the factor most often cited by Inkatha itself to 
explain the violence. Gavin Woods of the Inkatha Institute argued “that reasonably 
contented communities have a negligible propensity for violence” and “politics is, in 
itself, not enough to have caused the levels of violence experienced.”121 Bromberger 
and Bhamjee explore the high numbers of unemployed in the Natal Midlands 
townships, especially amongst the youth. Unemployed young people had a lot of time 
doing nothing and were frustrated about their life conditions. Consequently they 
resorted to violence.122 Radford and Leeb investigated ‘the effects of job loss on the 
township of Mpophomeni’.123 People left rural areas and went into townships in an 
attempt to seek employment. Some had been evicted from farms and refugees from 
the conflict in the greater Durban area came to Pietermaritzburg in numbers in 1984 
and 1985. Leeb states that ‘these growing numbers of people [were] forced to share 
limited resources in terms of land, houses, schools, clinics…’ and the fact that there 
was a lack of representation in the ruling system, and the oppressive nature of the 
State, it became apparent that the frustration must give rise to expression.124  Adam 
and Moodley write on vigilantes in KwaZulu-Natal: “A vast majority of vigilantes 
had no formal education; therefore they were illiterate in a way. Most of them joined 
the vigilantes as a way of survival, since they were unemployed.” Young believed that 
being part of the vigilantes meant they were going to achieve something and forget 
about their unemployment.125 Chabani Manganyi blames poverty and unemployment 
suffered by the people of KwaZulu-Natal as the causes of political violence and 
vigilantism in the region.126  
121 Gavin Woods, "Natal Violence: A Contemporary Analysis of Underlying Dynamics" in Anthony 
Minnaar (ed.), Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal (Pretoria: Human Sciences 
Research Council, 1992), quoted from WRITENET, KwaZulu-Natal - Continued Violence and 
Displacement, 1 July 1996, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6bc4.html 
[accessed 16 November 2012]. 
122 See, for example, Bromberger, N and Bhamjee, Y, “Unemployment in Pietermaritzburg with special 
reference to Sobantu”, paper presented at the Association for Sociology in Southern Africa conference, 
University of the Western Cape, Bellville; see also Bromberger, N, Bhamjee, Y, Francis, M, and 
Sikhosana, M. J, “Unemployment and public works programme in the Pietermaritzburg district. 
Development Studies Research Group, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg.   
123 See Radford, J and Leeb, W, “An investigation into the effects of job loss on the township of 
Mpophomeni”, paper presented to the Industrial Court of Inquiry (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult 
Education, 2010). 
124 Wendy Leeb, “Daily life, daily death in Pietermaritzburg” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John, V, 
Political violence in the Natal Midlands (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 2010), p. 72. 
125 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, The Opening of the Apartheid Mind: Options for the New 
South Africa (US: University of California Press, 1993) 
126 N. C. Manganyi, Political violence and the struggle in South Africa, pp. 155-156  
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1.5.6 Literature on effects of violence in the society 
Some studies have taken a different approach, by looking not so much at gender or 
generational dimensions and economic factors that were a cause of the violence, but 
rather at the effects of violence in schools and on teaching and learning. Authors 
whose works support the assertions of Leeb are Gultig and Hart, Smith and Khumalo 
and Nzimande and Thusi. They present more than just ‘raw information’, with some 
in-depth analysis, for instance Gultig and Hart studied the negative impact the 
Midlands violence had on schooling. A number of schools were closed in townships 
near Pietermaritzburg. This caused an escalation of violence, because school learners 
were frustrated and had too much time at home.127 Smith and Khumalo explain the 
bad effects the violence had on Natal schools.128 Nzimande and Thusi concur with 
Smith and Khumalo that the violence had a serious negative impact on teaching and 
learning.129 Aitchison states that schools in the Midlands were ‘not significant sources 
of violence’ in the region. Schools were ‘disrupted, and severely so, but this was 
because of the conflict outside them, usually in the form of external invasions into 
schools by the groups of armed men.130 As Bonnin puts it, ‘these studies show the 
huge societal disruptions caused by violence, the destructive effects of violence; the 
breakdown of community and family life, the resulting poverty, the complete 
disruption of the education system, and the psychological damage to individuals.’131 
In my thesis, I reason that not only those of the generations and communities involved 
in the fighting were psychologically affected, but that even generations to come 
would reap the fruits of the hatred and discord that was sown by those involved in the 
violent activities. Such future generations will have to ‘clean-up the mess’ created by 
the unrest.    
 
127 Hart, M, “The impact of violence on schooling”, paper presented at the Centre for Adult Education 
Seminar on Violence, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1988), see also Gultig, J and Hart, M, 
“The effects of violence on black schooling in Edendale and Vulindlela”, paper presented at the Kenton 
Conference, Cape Town, 1988). 
128“'Suffer the Children: Refugees and Disrupted Schooling in Natal”, in Anthony Minnaar (ed.). 
Patterns of Violence: Case Studies of Conflict in Natal. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 
1992, pp. 259-264 
129 Blade Nzimande and S. Thusi, “Children of War: The Impact of Political Violence on Schooling in 
Natal.” Education Project Unit, (University of Natal, Durban, 1991).  
130 Aitchison, “Numbering the dead” in Aitchison, J, Leeb, W and John, V, Political violence in the 
Natal Midlands (Pietermaritzburg: Centre for Adult Education, 2010), p.21. 
131 Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-
Natal, 1987-1993”, PhD Thesis (University of Witwatersrand, 2007). 
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I want to reiterate here that few journalists or liberal academics bothered to explore 
the views of rural people, migrants and squatters, who are thought to be ably 
represented by popular sophisticated elite. Most of the liberal literature and media 
(particularly international media) is that Inkatha was regarded as the only cause of 
violence (with the assistance of the police). The present study shows that, in fact 
Inkatha and the UDF were equally vicious with each other and the state exacerbated 
the situation. Many English-language South African journalists, as well as most 
foreign correspondents writing for a liberal opinion abroad, were more favourably 
inclined toward the ANC’s interpretations than “tribal” Inkatha or Africanist 
visions.132  
1.6 Main argument and contribution to study 
1.6.1 Main argument 
The main argument of this thesis is that the effects of political violence remain, and 
become, traumatic in the memory of survivors, affecting their current lives, mostly 
adversely. I reason that this violence caused much psychological damage and trauma 
to the victims. As a result, the violence and its consequences influenced the lives of 
all persons affected by it. This influence was transmitted across generations and sexes, 
through whole families and communities. It must be realized that these people and 
their families were affected for a long time and many are still traumatised. The social 
structure of the community was affected by it and, by implication, that of successive 
generations was also affected. 
How did communities, families and individuals survive these traumatic experiences? 
How did they cope (or fail to cope) with their experiences, both then and now? To 
what extent does resentment survive between neighbours and relatives who turned on 
each other? Answers to these and similar questions are reflected in the stories of pain 
and loss, alongside hope and a realisation for some that violence was temporary but 
its outcomes would be permanent 
Previous studies dealt with political analysis of the causes of war and sometimes the 
physical results, death statistics and the vandalisation of property. This thesis 
132 See for example, John Battersby, “In Apartheid’s Shadow, Zulu Wages War on Zulu” (The New 
York Times, 9 November, 1987).   
 35 
                                                 
particularly contributes to understanding the psycho-spiritual effects that coincides 
with social destruction, this is the trauma, if you will, that survivors have to cope, or 
fail to cope, with. 
1.6.2 Contribution to Study 
Even though the political violence in South Africa has been well documented; albeit 
unpublished, particularly the records of the Natal Midlands political violence, there is 
a lacuna in the literature. There is also a lacuna on generational and masculinity 
tensions which are not well covered in the literature. I should add that any scholarly 
work is incomplete by definition because it does not include the subjective element.133 
Many authors and observers were people outside the communities that were directly 
affected by the violence. Some who experienced the violence avoid writing their 
stories from the eye-witness perspective; this is probably because they consider 
autobiographical life-stories too subjective. I have, however, decided to include a 
chapter on my own and my mother’s experience of the unrest in my home of 
KwaShange, from 1987 to the present. I feel that the accusations, lack of objectivity 
and the anxieties of recall are worth recording, in spite of such drawbacks. These 
details together with those of my interviewees, many of whom were neighbours or 
relatives, cover a range of age-groupings and both sexes. They can only but enrich the 
understanding of the trauma caused by the violence stemming from the civil unrest. 
 
Thus the subject matter of this thesis is grounded in my personal odyssey: how I 
experienced the political violence of the 1980s and 1990s, from the age of 
approximately eight up until my early teens. This period of uncertainty and violence 
marked my life and affected my identity. For this reason alone I would argue that my 
thesis cannot be written without frequent reference to my historically constructed self; 
the study is shaped by my own history and past experience. Only when the thesis is 
completed, will I be able to grasp the nature of memory and its relationship to 
violence-induced trauma that characterised the experience of the civil war that marred 
my childhood. Mine was a childhood that in its interactions between parents, children 
and siblings very possibly was echoed in other families in KwaShange. While I am 
aware that a PhD is a serious and difficult undertaking, I nevertheless feel that this is 
my chance to come to understand some of the effects of war on families’ dynamics. 
133 Personal conversation with Philippe Denis, Pietermaritzburg, December 2012. 
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That is why I, in this thesis, permit my own voice to be heard. My aim with this layer 
of autobiography is to produce findings that seek to add a contemporary and authentic 
dimension to the existing knowledge on the experiences of violence in the Midlands 
and to the methodological use of self in research.134 
 
In order to understand the trauma of the survivors, I contend that historians and social 
scientists must venture to approach persons who are survivors of trauma in order to be 
able to understand the results of a life touched by such trauma. For example, in 
Chapter Three I discuss my personal experiences of trauma, while the other chapters 
quote verbatim accounts of other interviewees’ experiences of trauma. This 
auto/biographical dimension to my study, I realise, is fairly new to South African 
historiography. While arguably subjective, the pay-off is in-depth understanding. 
There is also a need to have a cultural understanding and language skills in the 
survivors’ world that can elucidate some of the impact of such stress, in context. 
Being an insider, with language skills and community and cultural backgrounds, helps 
to articulate the depth of the applicability of my hypotheses regarding trauma as post-
traumatic stress. In Chapter Seven, Eight and Nine I have studied, in detail, muthi 
within war and, in Chapter Eight, healing of those men who have been doctored and 
have to return to their communities that they have violated during the unrest. Chapter 
Nine deals with women’s dreams and precognitions of violence. This study has been 
ignored, often deliberately I suggest, by many political analysts, perhaps for reasons 
of the cultural dynamics of muthi and healing being associated with the IFP in 
particular, while, in fact, all local parties, the UDF/ANC and the IFP/Inkatha 
Movement of the time, also used the same cultural practices. The role of war-doctors 
and the importance of the impi being cleansed have perhaps for the first time, been 
dealt with in a history doctoral dissertation. It is hoped that this will contribute to the 
African understanding of trauma and healing. Chapter Nine brings to light a new 
dimension to women and war and their role in the subsequent return to civilian life. 
From my language, insider and community position I can advocate confidently for 
cultural continuity, not only as seen in muthi and healing, but where I found, for 
134 I have dealt with this subject matter in my chapter, “Are Rural Communities Open Sources of 
Knowledge?”, in Philippe Denis and Radikobo Ntsimane, Oral History in a Wounded Country: 
Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008) 
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instance, that the causation of the civil war could be attributed not just to political 
partisanship, but also to earlier displacement/settlement practices under the apartheid 
regime. The tenant-labour laws of the 1960s for example, resulted in families from 
white-owned farms moving into areas under Amakhosi of perhaps related clans, living 
nearer places of work in cities. Generational tensions arose and younger and older 
men became aligned in groups during the state of emergency of the 1980s. I argue for 
a dimension of such clashes that is more than political preferences but also 
generational frustrations. 
Another void in the existing literature is the theme of memory and trauma. Most 
studies explore and record the interviews of survivors describing what happened, but 
this thesis takes the matter further by exploring the link between history and memory. 
I believe that history is what happened and memory is how we remember what 
happened. This thesis will look into the history of what happened in KwaShange and 
the history of the manner in which people remember what happened in KwaShange 
and of how these memories have affected them since then. People are better able to 
remember an event if they have an opportunity to tell others about it. 135   
 
1.7 Broad theoretical issues  
My study is constructed upon the following concepts, namely narrative and memory, 
commemoration, trauma and violence, culture of conflict, healing and reconciliation 
and psycho-social intervention. As a starting point, I think it necessary to explore 
literature on memory and oral history as these constitute the main method of this 
study. The works of scholars such as Alessandra Portelli,136 Pierre Nora,137 Philippe 
Denis,138 Paul Thompson,139 Sean Field140 and Michael Fischer141 are useful in this 
135 Denis, P, in Never too small to remember. Memory work and resilience in times of AIDS 
(Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 2006) gives an overview of the theory of memory. 
136Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History.(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
137For example Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in L. D. Kritzman,  
ed., Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Volume 1: Conflicts and Division. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1-20.  
138For example Philippe Denis, “Healing the Wound of the Past: Oral History in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa”, in G. Danisman ed., Crossroads of History: Experience, Memory, Orality. XIth International 
Oral History Conference, Istanbul, 15-19 June 2000, (Istanbul: Bogaziҫi University, 2000), 960-65; 
Philippe Denis, “Oral History in a Wounded Country”, in P. Denis, Orality, Literacy and Colonialism 
in Southern Africa (Semeia Studies, Vol. 46) ed., Jonathan Draper (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature; Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 2003), 205-16. Philippe Denis, Never Too Small to 
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regard in that they give a vivid method of understanding oral sources testimonies and 
their memories. 
As Gary Baines pointed out, memory, like history, is a reconstruction of the past from 
which meaning is derived. He states, however, that “history and memory are not 
synonymous.”142 Baines refer to Pierre Nora’s view of memory that it “is in a 
permanent state of flux, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, 
vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation.” He argues that there is a tension 
between history and memory, “[…], history and memory are in a fundamental state of 
tension. The tension is between the past [which is gone] and the history [which we 
construct today].”143 Memory is the link between the two (we remember the past and 
our memories become history). Baines see no need for the tension between the two. 
He reasons:    
 
History and memory are often in contestation but they need not be. Indeed, 
there can be intersection or elision between history and memory for they are 
mutually constitutive. So the juxtaposition of history and memory is 
something of a false dichotomy to start with. What we are actually interested 




Remember: Memory Work and Resilience in Times of AIDS (Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 
2006) gives overview on the theory of memory.  See also Philippe Denis, “Introduction”, in P. Denis 
and R. Ntsimane, eds., Oral History in a Wounded Country; Interactive Interviewing in South Africa  
(Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2009). 
139See for an example, Paul Thompson, The Voices of the Past: Oral History, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
140Sean Field, “Beyond ‘Healing’: Trauma, Oral History and Regeneration”, Oral History 34:1 (2006), 
31-42. 
141Michael Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). 
142 Gary Baines, “The Politics of Public History in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (Rhodes University, 
2004), this article can be access online: 
http://sun025.su.ac.za/portal/page/portal/arts/department1/geskiedenis/docs/baines-g.pdf - accessed on 
11 July 2012. 
143 Gary Baines, “The Politics of Public History in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (Rhodes University, 
2004) , this article can be access online: 
http://sun025.su.ac.za/portal/page/portal/arts/department1/geskiedenis/docs/baines-g.pdf - accessed on 
11 July 2012. 
144Gary Baines, “The Politics of Public History in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (Rhodes University, 
2004), p. 5 this article can be access online: 
http://sun025.su.ac.za/portal/page/portal/arts/department1/geskiedenis/docs/baines-g.pdf - accessed on 
11 July 2012. 
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Portelli says that “the content of the written source is independent of the researcher’s 
need and hypothesis; it is a stable text, which we can only interpret.”145 The 
interpretation, however, in this case belongs to me as historian. The memories which I 
use are now texts and reconstructions, reproduced in my text; “from an 
epistemological perspective, they are subjective reconstructions.”146 Borrowing from 
Portelli’s thesis, my intention in here is not only to give information about the events 
of the past but to describe what the significance of these  [political violence] events 
was and still is for the survivors and perpetrators of the violence in KwaShange and 
secondarily, for the production of scientific knowledge.147 In other words, memories 
are primarily significant for the people who remember and only secondarily for 
scholars. In this study, I am interested in the memories of a place (KwaShange). 
Whilst I am looking for facts and the truth (even though these concepts are contested) 
about the past in oral history, one could note that truth is a problem whether one uses 
oral history or written sources. Portelli says: 
 
If you are only seeking verifiable factual evidence, then memories presented 
through oral histories will sometimes give you facts and at other times they 
will not. But if you are trying to understand how and why people believe what 
they believe, think what they think and – most crucially – why people act in 
the way that they do, their memories and oral narratives or text are of vital 
research significance.148    
 
 
Portelli also warns that approaching oral history and memory in a positivist or 
artifactual manner runs the risk of excluding a wealth of information which is deemed 
emotional, subjective, nostalgic or immeasurable, and therefore not worthy of study. 
Research practices that flow from these assumptions are disempowering, and it is 
unfortunate that these attitudes still drive much academic research.149  
145Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?”, quoted in Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A 
Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 235-254. 
146 Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?”, quoted in Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A 
Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 235-254. 
147Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?”, quoted in Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A 
Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 235-254. 
148Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different?”, in R. Perks and A. Thomson eds., The 
Oral History Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), 67, 70. 
149Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) quoted in Sean Field, R. Mayer and F. 
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Many of my interviewees came from KwaShange and interviews were conducted in 
KwaShange where, many years before, they had experienced this turmoil. The place 
of KwaShange is significant for the interviewees. Christopher Tilley argues that place 
is a socially constructed expression that is an integrated part of people’s everyday 
life.150  
 
The interpretation of place includes both subjective and social dimensions, and 
place cannot be understood without them. In other words, the nature of place 
depends on the person who experiences it and the way he or she experiences 
it; a place does not exist without relations and is essentially restricted by the 
human vision and consciousness. In this thesis, place is understood as a 
construction that individuals and communities produce through speech and 
writing and creation of space.151  
 
Nora explains the mechanisms through which the meanings of a phenomenon from 
the past – such as a place of memory – are recreated. 152 Nora’s Realms of Memory 
falls into the genre of history of mentalities, which focuses not on war and politics, as 
is usual in earlier history-writing, but on the wider world-views of past cultural and 
social groups. He characterizes his approach as a “history of the second degree.” He 
defines it as “a history in multiple voices … less interested in causes than in effects 
…less interested in ‘what actually happened’ than in its perpetual re-use and misuse, 
its influence on successive presents; less interested in traditions than in the way in 
which traditions are constituted and passed on.”153 Relying on Nora, my study will 
Swason eds., “Introduction”, in Imagining the City: Memories and Cultures in Cape Town (Cape 
Town: Human Science Research Council Press, 2007), 9.  
150 Christopher Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments quoted in in 
Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 235-254.  
151 Christopher Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments quoted in in 
Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 235-254.  
152Pierre Nora, Rethinking France: Les Lieux de mémoire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) 
quoted in in Outi Fingeroos, “Karelia: A Place of Memories and Utopias”, Oral Tradition, 23/2 (2008): 
235-254. See also Pierre Nora, “The Era of Commemoration”, in L. D. Kritzman, ed., Realms of 
Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Volume III: Symbols (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), 609-37. Pierre Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History”, in L. D. 
Kritzman, ed., Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Volume 1: Conflicts and 
Division (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1-20. 
153Pierre Nora, Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory from  
www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/106.3  
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document how people remember the traumatic events of the political unrest in 
KwaShange, i.e. the history of what happened in KwaShange.  
 
Theories of memory are especially pertinent to the study of trauma. Evidence from the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work has an immediacy that could be missing 
from such reworked redemptive and master-narrative ‘constructions,’ as I have 
mentioned above in my literature review.  Readings in trauma and memory are 
especially important to my study which considers the nature of memory and the 
nature of healing. Phyllis Kosminsky, a clinical-psychologist dealing with grief 
counselling, speaks about the difficulties of healing in what she terms ‘complicated 
mourning’ situations.154 These are: violence, conflicted feelings or complication in 
regard to a death. These feelings may result in the inability to get past the ‘block’ to 
face the inevitability of such a death and therefore an inability to heal naturally. 
Healing may take time and movement through the usual sequence of grieving; denial, 
confrontation of the full range of feelings evoked and eventual acceptance and 
accommodation of the loss. She says of one of her patients, “People who witness their 
loved ones die a terrible death are often left with memories so vivid and unremitting 
that they can think of little else: not the person’s life, not their relationship with the 
person and all that they shared … This is the nature of traumatic memory – an image 
that seems to exist apart from time, with the potential to trigger old stores of 
emotional pain every time the image is recalled.155  
 
Time does not drain these images of their power. Nothing we say to ourselves 
and nothing anyone else says seems to help … because of the way the brain 
stores these memories, it can feel as if they are happening right now [her 
emphasis].156  
 
There is difference between ordinary and painful memory. Being in grief makes 
people to remember differently. Using the works of Sean Field157 and Kim Lacy 
154Phyllis Kosminsky, Getting Back to Life When Grief Won’t Heal (US: McGraw-Hill Books, 2007). 
155Phyllis Kosminsky, Getting Back to Life When Grief Won’t Heal (US: McGraw-Hill Books, 2007). 
156Phyllis Kosminsky, Getting Back to Life When Grief Won’t Heal (US: McGraw-Hill Books, 2007), 
23.    
157Sean Field, Lost Communities, Living Memories: Remembering Forced Removals in Cape Town 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 2001), see also Sean Field, “Remembering Experience, Interpreting 
Memory: Life Stories from Windermere”, African Studies 60, 1, (2001), 119-133.  
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Rogers,158 however, I shall restrict my discussion to the issue of painful memories in 
oral history. I shall not deal with grief per se because I am not equipped for that.  
 
In this dissertation memory is studied as a source of history and, in my last chapter 
(Chapter Ten), an object of investigation. The question may be asked, how I 
envisaged the link between history and memory. I would argue that history is a record 
of what happened and memory is how we remember what happened. This thesis looks 
into the history of what happened in KwaShange and the manner in which people 
remember these events and how these memories have affected them since then. 
People are better able to remember an event if they have an opportunity to tell others 
about it.159   
 
All research needs to be grounded experience and information before theorizing can 
take place. I have realized that historians and social scientists must venture to 
approach persons from whom they are ordinarily remote because of differences of 
age, lifestyle or experience, for interviews on sensitive issues, as it is only by doing so 
that data on matters concealed, or rarely discussed, will be revealed and made usable. 
The broader implications of my research are that history will be re-written on the 
basis of these revelations, and the process of establishing the history of the past by 
collection of data from oral sources will be validated as a research methodology. 
 
As formal interviews are my primary source, theory around memory and oral history 
will inform my approach to these interviews. Frisch160 and Portelli161 draw attention 
to the “theme” and “plot” of oral narratives162; “for all their considerable value, oral 
history interviews are not an unproblematic source. Although narrators speak for 
themselves, what they have to say does not.” There are obvious limits to the process 
of collecting oral history, because people may forget details and reconstitute their 
158Kim Lacy Rogers, “Memory, Struggle, and Power: On Interviewing Political Activists”, Oral 
History Review 15 (Spring 1987), 165-184.  
159Philippe Denis, Never Too Small to Remember: Memory Work and Resilience in Times of AIDS 
(Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 2006).  
160Michael Frisch, A Shared Authority: Essays on the Craft and Meaning of Oral and Public History 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990). 
161Alessandro Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral 
History (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991). 
162See also, Grele, J. Ronald, “Preface,” Envelopes of Sound: The Art of Oral History 2nd Edition 
(Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1985), viii. Hs book deals with the reconstruction of memories in oral 
history interviews. 
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tales. In other words, memory is continually being reconstructed. Nevertheless, if 
interviews are collected within a large group, some consensus should emerge.  
 
This study inserts into scholarship the Zulu perspective on trauma and indigenous 
methods used to deal with trauma. How do local people define and explain the 
experiences they went through? How are they dealing with the aftermath of violence? 
These are questions that are taken up in this study. Political trauma is not simply a 
collection of symptoms, as is often claimed163—in fact symptoms may not follow all 
traumas.164 Trauma associated with political conflict is largely about the destruction 
of individuals, families and the social and political structures of a society. The theme 
of psycho-social165 intervention has been explored by Sigmund Freud, who argues 
that in war people do not “sink so low as we feared, because they had never risen so 
high as we believed”. For Freud, violence is innate in human nature and finds easy 
expression in times of conflict.166  
 
Goldblatt and Meintjies argue that the violence of South Africa’s past has contributed 
to a climate of violence against women and crime in the country today.167 According 
to this view, violence generally continues for decades within the social fabric of 
societies which have emerged from conflict. Psycho-social studies stress the 
importance of thinking about trauma from both psychological and social perspectives. 
The term ‘psycho-social’ recognises that there is a close, ongoing interaction between 
an individual’s psychological state and his or her social environment168 Simpson and 
Rauch of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg169 
163See Brandon Hamber, “The Impact of Trauma: A Psychosocial Approach”. Keynote Address to the 
“A Shared Practice – Victims Work in Action Conference”, (Limavady: Northern Ireland, 7-8 April 
2004).  
164Brandon Hamber, “The Impact of Trauma: A Psychosocial Approach”. Keynote Address to the “A 
Shared Practice – Victims Work in Action Conference”, (Limavady: Northern Ireland, 7-8 April 2004). 
165See Radikobo Ntsimane, “Trauma, Resilience and Reconciliation: Sinomlando’ Psycho-Social 
Interventions in KwaZulu-Natal”, Archives News: National Archives and Records Services of South 
Africa 1 (2007), 31. 
166Sigmund Freud, Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (1915): The Standard Edition of 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol XIV (1914-1916). 
http://www.panarchy.org/freud/war.1915.html accessed 14 July 2008.  
167B. Goldblatt and S. Meintjies, “Dealing with the Aftermath – Sexual Violence and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission”, Agenda, 36, (1997), 7-17. 
168I. Agger, “Psychosocial Assistance during Ethno-political Warfare in the Former Yugoslavia”, in D. 
Chirot and M. Seligman eds., Ethno-political Warfare: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions 
(Washington: American Psychological Association, 2001), 305-318. 
169G. Simpson and J. Rauch, “Political Violence 1991”, in N. Boister and K. Ferguson-Brown eds., 
Human Rights Yearbook (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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have developed a concept of the “politicisation of everyday life,” which can be used 
in the consideration of the consequences of political violence.  
 
Most discussions of conflict that invoke culture discuss the influence of culture on the 
course of the conflict itself.170 This study will show a particularly Zulu cultural bias 
towards conflict, in the form of feuding and physical violence. ‘Culture of conflict’ as 
used in this thesis refers to the beliefs, attitudes and opinions of particular groups that 
those who disagree with them politically or on any other major issue are enemies and 
deserve to be destroyed. Such beliefs understandably influence the historical outcome 
of any conflict. It is possible to explain the conflict-related aspects of particular 
cultures as culturally specific, since the belief that conflict should inevitably find 
expression in violence is not universal. 
 
Despite differences between cultures concerning conflict and culturally specific 
practices and thought patterns, there are many commonalities in the occurrence of 
conflict worldwide. In order to contribute to a more universal understanding of the 
topic, these commonalities may profitably be compared to see if conflict occurs in 
particular cultures which favour, or ‘naturalise’, conflict as a mode of settling 
disputes. There is no doubt  that there are layers of behaviour and thought processes 
that form part of a culture of conflict, and these need to be recognized as causes of 
violent conflict. Most processes intended to resolve conflict, like the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), do not deal with the transition from violence to 
peace as a process of cultural change.171 In KwaShange, there are a number of 
conflicts that erupted before the political violence of the 1980s. My study will explore 
how the local people of KwaShange have been dealing with the ‘after the conflict’ 
years. In other words my study will look at the historical dimension of beliefs and 
behaviour concerning peace-making after conflict, like prayer-meetings and 
170See for instance Michelle LeBaron, “Culture and Conflict”, (UNHCR, July 2003); Michelle LeBaron 
and Bruce Grundison, Conflict and Culture: Research in Five Communities in British Columbia, 
Canada (Victoria, British Columbia: University of Victoria, 1993); Edward Hall, Beyond Cultures 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976); John Paul Lederach, Preparing for Peace: Conflict 
Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 94. 
171There is a lot of literature on this subject, see for example, Radikobo Ntsimane, “A Mirage Called 
Forgiveness: A Critique of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”, in P. Denis ed., Orality, 
Memory and the Past: Listening to the Voices of Black Clergy under Colonialism and Apartheid 
(Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 2000); Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, A Human Being Died That 
Night: A Story of Forgiveness (Cape Town: David Philip, 2003).  
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cleansing, and how these derive from Zulu culture. The prevalence of such rituals is 
shown by the way in which they have been taken up into African Christian churches, 
like the Zionist churches and the Zulu Christian Church. This study will show the 
historical dimension of such beliefs and behaviour. And it will, I hope, thereby 
contribute to fields that derive from a “culture of conflict”, namely the study of 
violence, trauma, memory, gender and conflict resolution.  
 
1.8 Brief outline of the chapters 
 
I have divided the thesis into four parts: Parts I, II, III and IV. Part I is divided into 
three chapters which are introductory, containing information that I believe is 
fundamental to an understanding of the chapters in Part II. Chapter One is the 
introduction, which sets the tone and scene of the thesis. I outline my arguments, 
undertaking a literature review and a brief outline of chapters. Chapter Two describes 
research methodology and methods, my research experiences in the community under 
study and my duals positions as a researcher (outsider) and participant (insider). 
Chapter Three is an auto/biographical narrative, focussing on my personal 
experiences of political violence and those of my parents and siblings. It gives reasons 
for selecting the topic and seating it in KwaShange.   
 
Part II of this thesis, which is also divided into three chapters, is dedicated to 
background and details of the violence.  Chapter Four gives background to the history 
of KwaShange as part of Vulindlela area, previously known as Zwartkop. This 
background material provides a foundation for the arguments that I raise in the thesis. 
The chapter also describes the physical background. I begin by describing some of the 
precipitating factors which could have been seen as contributing to the war. I describe 
the different clans that came to live in KwaShange from farms in Natal and Zululand 
and the relationships they had with each other. In Chapter Five I discuss the 
background to the violence in KwaShange, beginning by profiling community leaders 
who were at the forefront of the violence and how community members were divided 
and began to attack each other. I also outline the chronology of events in KwaShange 
starting from 1987. In Chapter Six I explain the wider politics that stood behind the 
conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s and show how provincial and national developments, 
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in particular the emerging tension between Inkatha and the ANC at the national level 
of leadership, changed the climate in KwaShange and fuelled violence. 
 
Part III is also divided into three chapters: Chapter Seven introduces the reader to the 
roles played by women in the violence. It focuses on women’s prophetic dreams and 
the effects these dreams had on the violence. Chapter Eight discusses the use of muthi 
in KwaShange during the violence as well as the community’s acceptance, under 
pressure, of practices which they disliked and of which they disapproved. Chapter 
Nine discusses the effects of this violence on young combatants, families and the 
community in general and tries to explain how successive generations are affected.  
 
Part IV is the concluding section of this thesis. It is divided into two chapters: Chapter 
Ten tries to answer the following questions: how do people remember this violence, 
where and when do they remember? Chapter Eleven summarises the findings of my 











The strengths and weaknesses of any research study depend mainly on its methodologies. For 
any study to be accepted, it is important that the methodology used is correct and appropriate 
– the subject or theme to be investigated should give direction to the methodology or 
methodologies to be adopted. The onus is on the researcher to clearly expound the methods to 
be employed. Crotty stresses that justification of the research methodology choice should 
relate to the theoretical perspective that underpins the research.1 Martin Marshal states that a 
choice of research methods to be employed in any study should be ‘determined by the 
research questions’ and nature of the study ‘not by the preference of the researcher.2 A good 
way to choose the best research methodology for any study is to look at the nature of the 
investigation, theme, and research questions the study intends to answer. If the research 
questions are more exploratory and investigative — asking how or what — they are usually 
best answered with qualitative or mixed methods. If the research question presents a 
hypothesis or a statement that needs to be proven right or wrong, then a quantitative 
methodology would generally be used.3  
 
This chapter discusses and provides the rationale for the choice of approaches. It elucidates 
the aim and objectives of the study and the critical questions the thesis aims to answer. It 
presents the philosophy this research subscribes to and the research methodologies adopted. It 
explains the research design, the strategies, the instruments, and the data collection and 





1 Crotty, M., (1998), The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process, 
Allen and Unwin, quoted from Deborah Levy, Qualitative Methodology and Grounded Theory in Property 
Research” (University of Auckland). 
2 Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice (Britain: Oxford University Press, 
1996) vol.13, 6. 




                                                          
2.2 Aim and objectives 
 
This investigation was concerned generally with recording and analysing the history of 
political violence in KwaShange, focussing the account it offers on the testimony of 
survivors, and its effects on the community members in the ensuing years.  
 
The objectives of the study were to: 
 
A. Present a historical overview of violence in KwaShange – describe what happened 
during the years of political violence;   
B. Record testimonies of the survivors of political violence in the area;  
C. Analyse the experiences of the KwaShange community members;  
D. Attempt to answer how the community members, families and individuals survived 
these traumatic experiences; and 
E. Record how they coped (or failed to cope) with their experiences, both then and 15 





In keeping with Martin Marshal’s stipulations, the nature of my investigation necessitated 
that I employ a qualitative rather than a quantitative research methodology.  
 
A basic distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is the methods used to 
collect, analyse and present information. Atkinson describes qualitative research as a form of 
social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experiences 
and the world in which they live.4 It presents information with words, in a descriptive 
narrative. It attempts to understand phenomena in ‘natural settings.’ “The aim of qualitative 
studies is to provide illumination and understanding of complex psychosocial issues and are 
most useful for answering humanistic “why” and “how” questions.”5 Qualitative research 
presents data as a descriptive narration and attempts to understand phenomena in ‘natural 
4Atkison, P. A, Coffey, A. J and Delamont, S, Key Themes in Qualitative Research (Walnut Creek, CA: 
AltaMira Press, 2003). 
5Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice (Britain: Oxford University Press, 
1996) vol.13, 6. 
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settings.’6 On the other hand, quantitative research utilises statistical results represented by 
statistical records and aims to “test pre-determined hypotheses and produce generalisable 
results. This method is helpful for answering more mechanistic what questions.”7  
 
The present study utilises the qualitative research method in order to understand the trauma 
the survivors of political violence in KwaShange experienced, then and now. Qualitative 
research was selected as the appropriate method for a study of this nature. It considers the 
meaning survivors of the violence attach to the violence they experienced and describes the 
lives of people of KwaShange, before, during and after the violence. How do local people 
define and explain the experiences they went through? How are they dealing with the 
aftermath of violence? The qualitative research method helped to understand the KwaShange 
people’s feelings and lived experiences.  
 
The nature of my research in KwaShange, a social inquiry that focuses on the way 
KwaShange survivors of violence make sense of their experiences and the world in which 
they live,8 dictated the research methodology. This study is somewhat ethnographic, in the 
sense that it is a scientific study of human social phenomena and a community. Through 
means such as fieldwork, my study includes more research techniques than just ethnography 
(observation).9  The study is necessarily a descriptive and interpretive case-study that is 
analysed through qualitative methods. The intent is to provide a detailed, in-depth description 
of political violence in KwaShange and how the everyday lives and practices of people were 
affected. 
 
I employed different approaches to gather information: action, participatory, ethnography, 
and grounded theory to analyse data.  
 
6Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice (Britain: Oxford University Press, 
1996) vol.13, 6.  
7 Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice (Britain: Oxford University Press, 
1996) vol.13, 6. 
8 Uwe Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research-fourth edition (London: Sage, 2009), quoted in, Atkison, 
P. A, Coffey, A. J and Delamont, S, Key Themes in Qualitative Research (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 
2003). 
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/content/BPL_Images/Content_store/Sample_chapter/9780632052844/001-
025%5B1%5D.pdf , accessed on 1 October 2012. 
9 www.DebtReview.co/Blouberg, accessed on 2 October 2012. 
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Action research and participatory approaches: even though these two approaches are not the 
same, their similar methods were integrated and applied in my research. The nature of these 
approaches required that I engage with the KwaShange community members in a democratic, 
equitable and liberating manner. This involved empowering the community, by inviting them 
to be partners in the research process.10 This approach required that the research be carried 
out by all involved parties. In this way, I focused on engaging KwaShange residents with 
open minds, whilst making every attempt to allow them to relive the events in their minds. 
This was an opportunity for everybody to participate in this historical study.  
 
Ethnography: The KwaShange community was studied in their ‘natural culture’ and setting. I 
took into consideration their context and environment. I spent many years, before embarking 
on my research observing how people behaved and talked about the violence of the 1980s – 
1990s. I attended a number of functions, funerals and local meetings, with the intention of 
listening to KwaShange people talking about the violence and how it affected them. This was 
necessary and helped me to prepare discussions, frame my research questions and identify 
some key respondents and role players.   
 
Grounded Theory: this theory was applied through the analysis of multiple stages of data 
collection and interpretation. I identified trends, patterns and categories from the collected 
data which I shared with members of the community, in order to engage with them and solicit 
their opinions on how to package the information. This made it necessary for me to 
continuously revisit the process, collect further data, and validate the data.  
 
2.3.1 Interpretive paradigm 
 
This study employed an interpretive approach which is consistent with the qualitative 
methodology described earlier, as opposed to positivist or objectivist approach. The positivist 
position is grounded in the theoretical belief that there is an objective reality that can be 
known to the researcher, if he or she uses the correct methods and applies those methods in a 
correct manner.11The nature of reality assumed by positivism is realism, whereby a reality is 
assumed to exist and can be objectively given – in other words, knowledge is objective and 
10 Cf. Paulo Freire The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972) quoted in Thenjiwe 
Magwaza et al, Freedom Sown in Blood: Memories of the Impi Yamakhanda: An Indigenous Knowledge System 
Perspective (Thohoyandou: Ditlou Publishers, 2006). 
11 Deborah Cohen and Benjamin Crabtree, “Qualitative Research Guidelines Project” (Princeton: RWJF, 2008) 
http://www.quarles.org/Cont-3440.html, accessed on 14 August 2012. 
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quantifiable. Positivism is concerned with uncovering truth and presenting it by empirical 
means.12 Interpretive researchers believe that reality consists of people’s subjective 
experiences of the external world; thus they may adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and 
the ontological belief that reality is socially constructed. Jerry Willis states that interpretivists 
are anti-foundationists,13 who believe there is no single correct way to, or method of, 
acquiring knowledge. According to Glen Aikenhead, the interpretive paradigm is 
underpinned by observation and interpretation. To observe is to collect information about 
events, while to interpret is to make meaning of that information by drawing inference or by 
judging the match between the information and some abstract patterns.14 Interpretation 
attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to them.15 
Thomas Reeves and John Hedberg explain that the ‘interpretivist’ paradigm stresses the need 
to put analysis in context. The interpretive paradigm is concerned with understanding the 
world as it is from the subjective experience of individuals. They use meaning (as opposed to 
measurement) oriented methodologies, such as interviewing or participant observation, that 
rely on the subjective relationship between the researcher and the subjects.16 
 
2.3.2 Ethical Considerations (see appendix one) 
 
Although I hold two positions in this thesis, that of a researcher and that of an informant, I 
have attempted to be as objective as possible by adopting a distanced stance in the research 
process. I have adhered to the Code of Ethics drawn up by the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Ethics Committee17 and the Oral History Association of Southern Africa.18 I also ensured that 
all those who helped me gather the data conducted themselves similarly. Such consideration 
12 Henning, E, van Rensburg, W and Smit, B, Finding Your Way in Qualitative Research (Pretoria: Van Schaik 
Publishers, 2004), p. 17. 
13 Jerry Willis, “A Recursive, Reflective Instructional Design Model Based on Constructivist Interpretivist 
Theory”, Educational Technology 35, 6, 5-23, quoted in uir.unisa.ac.za/…/05Chap%204_... 
14 Glen Aikenhead, “Towards a First National Cross-Cultural Science and Technology Curruculum”, (London: 
Ontario, 1997), quoted in uir.unisa.ac.za/…/05Chap%204_... 
15 Stanley Deetz, “Critical Theory and Postmodernism Approaches to Organisational Studies” in Deetz, S. et al., 
Handbook of Organisation Studies (London: Sage Publications, 1996), quoted in 
uir.unisa.ac.za/…/05Chap%204_...  
16 Thomas Reeves and John Hedberg, Interactive Learning Systems Evaluation (New Jersey: Educational 
Technology Publishers, 2003). 
17See Appendix Two (Consent Letter). 
18 For the code of conduct of OHASA (Oral History Association of South Africa) see    
http://www.ohasa.org.za/index.php?. See also Philippe Denis, “Ethics of Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. 
Ntsimane eds., Oral History in a Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).  
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of the Code of Ethics ensured the ‘safety’ of my participants. The ethnographic approach I 
employed invaded the lives of the informants19and they frequently revealed sensitive 
information.20 I used the principle of informed consent in this research, even though it has 
been criticised by some researchers.21 The principle proved vital during fieldwork because it 
gave people the option to discontinue their participation in the research if they felt it was 
invading their rights. I obtained written or verbal permission from all the interviewees before 
I undertook the interviews. In adhering to the principle of informed consent, I offered 
informants the option to decline to participate in the research and to withdraw from the 
research at any time should they so wish. 
 
As stipulated in the informed consent forms, maintaining confidentiality is a fundamental 
tenet of any research and an important ethical obligation for everyone involved in research 
projects. Disclosure of identities when privacy has been promised is unethical. In this thesis, 
therefore, when they requested it, I gave my interviewees pseudonyms in place of their real 
names, in order to protect their identities. The research material such as tapes and notes from 
this project will be deposited in the Killie Campbell Africana Library, to ensure that it is 
available for further research. The data will, however, be under embargo for a period of 
twenty years (2012-2032), to honour the promise I made to interviewees when I requested 
information from them.  
 
2.4 Data Collection Strategies  
 
The most common strategy for eliciting qualitative data is by interviews. During the 
interviews, I engaged in open discussions with the interviewees and tried to maintain a role 
which was, as far as possible, passive, receptive and not dominant. During all the interviews, 
I followed the principles of interviewing,22 asking closed and open-ended questions as 
relevant. The interviews were mainly unstructured and unstandardised, allowing interviewees 
19J. P. Spradley, Participant Observation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980).  
20John W. Cresswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (USA: SAGE Publications, 
1994), p. 163. 
21See, for example, John Arundel Barnes, Who Should Know What? Social Science, Privacy and Ethics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) and Fluehr-Lobban, “Informed Consent in Anthropology 
Research: We are not Experts”, Human Organisation, vol. 53: 1 (1994), 1-10. See also Appendix Two, example 
of Informed Consent Letter draft. 
22See C. Frankfort-Nachmias and D. Nachmais, Research Methods in the Social Sciences 5th Edition (London: 
Arnold, 1996). See also Benedict Carton and Louise Vis, “Doing Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane, 




                                                          
a high degree of freedom, as they were not limited to one-word answers or to respond only to 
pre-determined questions. In addition to this freedom, open-ended, non-directive interviews 
contained a minimum of control and were ‘open’ to new material and a change in the order of 
questions.23 Unstructured interviews are used in instances where the researcher has plenty of 
time and can follow up interviews at a later stage with the informants.24 The interviews took 
the form of informal conversation, which Michael Patton calls ‘[an] informal conversational 
interview’.25 This was inevitable, because most informants I interviewed knew me or my 
family members personally and the violence I interviewed them about I had experienced 
myself. In most cases, my informants did not regard our conversation as interviews,26 
because they sometimes asked me questions or requested me to remind them of some of the 
incidents. I used closed questions when I wanted exact information, e.g., how many wards 
there were in the area, and biographical information about the interviewee. 
 
“A tape recorder allows the interviewer to capture so much more than he or she could rely on 
memory”.27 Permission was requested from the informants to use a video and audio tape 
recorder in order to record the interviews. Written notes were taken, in case technical 
difficulties affected my research. Only in one instance was permission not granted: this was 
during the interview I had with one of the traditional healers at KwaMpande. I did not 
question why permission was denied, as I thought this would be inappropriate, and would 
show disrespect to my elderly informant. However, although it is useful, a tape recorder has 
shortcomings, for example sometimes tape recorder does not work properly, leading to a lot 
of information being lost, more importantly, some people feel uncomfortable express 
themselves if there is a tape recorder.  
 
 
23See C. Frankfort-Nachmias and D. Nachmais, Research Methods in the Social Sciences 5th Edition (London: 
Arnold, 1996); H. R. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 2nd 
Edition (London: Altamira Press, 1995); See also Benedict Carton and Louise Vis, “Doing Oral History”, in P. 
Denis and R. Ntsimane, Oral History in a Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa 
(University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008). 
John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (USA: SAGE Publications, 
1994), 163. 
24H. R. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 2nd Edition 
(London: Altamira Press, 1995); see also Benedict Carton and Louise Vis, “Doing Oral History”, in P. Denis 
and R. Ntsimane, Oral History in a Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008). 
25 Michael Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Method (London: Sage Publication, 2002).  
26 Michael Patton, Qualitative Research and Evaluation Method (London: Sage Publication, 2002). 
27S. J. Taylor and R. Bogdan, Introduction to Quantitative Research Methods: The Search for Meaning (New 
York: Wiley, 1984), p. 103. 
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2.5 Data Analysis Procedures28 
 
Both the taped interviews and the researcher’s notes were used to analyse the data. I 
transcribed each tape-recorded interview as soon as possible after the actual interview, when 
the discussions were still fresh in my mind.29 Miles & Huberman stipulate that data collection 
and data analysis must be, as far as possible, simultaneous processes in qualitative research.30 
Following their stipulation, I simultaneously analysed data and categorised the information 
received throughout the project. The data categorised was used as a catalyst for further data 
collection.  
 
2.6 Methods for Verification31 
 
Determining the accuracy of the findings and generalising from such findings is important in 
any study.32 This study aims at validity and reliability to achieve these aims. Validity “refers 
to the accuracy and trustworthiness of instrumentals, data, and findings in research”.33 
According to Bernard, nothing in research is more important than the concept of validity.34  
 
2.7 Sampling Method 
 
There are many different types of sampling researchers use in their research projects: 
systematic sampling, stratified sampling, quota sampling and convenience sampling. The 
most commonly used, however, in the fields of humanities and social sciences are random 
and purposive sampling. “A purposive sampling, also commonly called a judgmental 
sampling, is one that is selected based on the knowledge of a population and the purpose of 
28Philippe Denis, “Ethics of Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane eds., Oral History in  a Wounded 
Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).  
29See C. Frankfort-Nachmias and D. Nachmais, Research Methods in the Social Sciences 5th Edition (London: 
Arnold, 1996); S. Sarantakos, Social Research 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), 315. Benedict 
Carton and Louise Vis, “Doing Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane eds., Oral History in a Wounded 
Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008). 
30M. B. Miles and M. A. Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Sourcebook of New Methods (Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage, 1984). 
31Philippe Denis, “Ethics of Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane eds., Oral History in a Wounded 
Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008)  
32Johan W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (USA: SAGE Publications, 
1994), 163. 
33H. R. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 2nd Edition 
(London: Altamira Press, 1995), 38. 
34H. R. Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 2nd Edition 
(London: Altamira Press, 1995), 38. 
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the study. The subjects are selected because of some characteristics”.35 Random sampling is 
“a sampling technique where [researchers] select a group of subjects (a sample) for a study 
from a larger group (a population). Each individual is chosen entirely by chance and each 
member of the population has a known, but possibly non-equal, chance of being included in 
the sample.”36 
 
Martin Marshal stresses that choosing a study sample is an important step in any research 
project, since it is rarely practical, efficient or ethical to study the whole population. The 
selection of an appropriate method depends upon the aim of the study.37 He reasons that 
random sampling is not appropriate for qualitative studies. “…studying a random sample 
provides the best opportunity to generalise the results to the population but is not the most 
effective way of developing an understanding of complex issues relating to human 
behaviour”.38 Marshal recommends purposive sampling in qualitative research, stating that 
people are not equally good at observing, understanding and interpreting their own and other 
people’s behaviour. “Qualitative researchers recognise that some informants are ‘richer’ than 
others and that these people are more likely to provide insight and understanding for the 
researcher.”39 
 
The method that is used in the present study is purposive sampling. The study is concerned 
with the memories of political violence in KwaShange in the 1980s and 1990s. I deliberately 
chose to interview people who were involved in the violence. Members of families that were 
directly affected by this violence were interviewed, but also family members who were very 
young at the time of the violence or were yet to be born. The interviewees were males and 
females from different generations.  
 
The sample size of this study was not predetermined. I decided to stop sampling at the point 
which I found saturation of information. Michael Quinn Patton, quoted in Bradshaw and 
Startford, explains: 
 
35 Ashley Crossman, “Purposive Sample” http://sociology.about.com/od/type-of-samples/purposive-sample.htm, 
accessed on 14 August 2012.    
36 Valerie Easton and John McColl, Statistics Glossary. http://www.stats.gla.ac.uk/steps/glossary/sampling.html 
37 Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice Journal (Britain: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) vol.13, 6.  
38 Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice Journal (Britain: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) vol.13, 6. 
39 Martin N. Marshal “Sampling for Qualitative Research” in Family Practice Journal (Britain: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) vol.13, 6. 
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There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on what 
[the researcher] wants to know, the purpose of the [study], what is at stake, what will 
be useful, what will have credibility. […] what can be done with available 
information, time and sources. The validity, meaningfulness, and insights generated 
from qualitative research have more to do with information-richness and the 
observational/analytical capacities of the researcher than with the sample size. 
 
To answer questions that this thesis raised, I conducted interviews with selected residents of 
Vulindlela. My main focus was on the KwaShange inhabitants, particularly those who played 
leadership roles before and during the violence and those who were directly affected by the 
violence, such as perpetrators and/or victims. Most were helpful in answering my questions, 
but I recorded even the occasional refusal as significant. I do acknowledge the subjectivity of 
the responses acquired via this process, especially of close and deeply involved participants 
and those who were directly affected. I conducted 93 interviews in Vulindlela, mainly in 
KwaShange. 33 of these were those who were youth combatants during the period under 
study. 21 were those who were children and those who were born during and after the 
violence. The remaining 39 interviewees were males and females from different generations.  
 
In the process of investigating these primary sources, the sensitive nature of the issues at hand 
was considered, that is the painful memories of the violence. I was aware that people might 
be offended when they were questioned or reminded of the violence and I acknowledge that 
this was not an easy task, especially due to the fact that the violence they experienced was 
horrific. The memories were still fresh in some people’s minds and have left an indelible 
mark on their lives. However, my closeness to the community of KwaShange, where I was 
born and brought up, not only helped me to get the information, but also impressed on me the 
ongoing suffering that Vulindlela residents endured and of which I was a child spectator. My 
experience of the violence enabled me to develop an empathetic relationship with the 
interviewees. I was able to understand them and, in that way, to minimise the possibly 
harmful effects of the interviews. Through my close association with the area (since I was a 
survivor of the same violence), the area chief, local headmen and local councillors, I came to 
be trusted by many of the interviewees and was able to obtain the necessary information. In 
the case of members and the leadership of political organisations, I had to explain the 
significance of the research before I could interview them. I had worked with some of them 





A.C Munthali says, speaking a language similar to one’s informants is the major advantage. I 
concur with Munthali, the ability to speak IsiZulu, which is my mother tongue, enabled me to 
conduct interviews in my informants’ first language. I believe this made my informants 
comfortable during the interviews. All interviews were done in IsiZulu. I translated all 
interviews and incorporated into this thesis into English for the convenience of non-Zulu 
speakers. I believe, however, that even the most scrupulous translation has its limitations. In 
this case I found that IsiZulu words used by my informants which when translated into 
English lacked weight they carried in the original language. These were for the most part 
those which related to rituals and those describing emotional states. 
 
I also chose to use interviews with Nunu ‘Ngedlezi’ Mchunu, Moses Ndlovu and Chris 
Hlengwa in order to present the thinking of the principal movers behind the violence. I 
acknowledge that they have a particular perspective on this matter and that their testimonies 
are their own account and might not represent the unbiased story. Nunu Mchunu established 
the KwaShange branch of the Inkatha movement when it was still an internal wing of the 
banned ANC. Chris Hlengwa is a former policeman aligned to the UDF and the late Moses 
Ndlovu was a unionist and founder of the local branch of the UDF when this organization 
became the ANC’s internal wing, after Mangosuthu Buthelezi was accused of collaborating 
with the Nationalist government.  
  
2.8 Sources of Information 
 
Up to the point when the original information for this research was gathered, around the year 
2008, little scientific work had been done in KwaShange. My research project started in 2008 
and was completed in 2010 with a memorial, cleansing and reconciliation ceremony in 
November 2010 in Vulindlela. The readily available literature was in the form of primary 
sources: newspapers, oral sources, pictures and a few audio-visual records. To give the 
research a proper theoretical framework, I had to refer to the general literature on political 
violence, history and memory in KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa in general: I will cite 
books, articles, published and unpublished, academic and non-academic material, some 




2.8.1 Primary: Oral Sources 
 
My study covers the period from 1987, the year in which many scholars agree that 
confrontational violence started, to 2008. In explaining the incidents of conflict from 1987 to 
1996, the year which is generally thought (see literature review) to be when the violence 
ended, I present the viewpoints of Inkatha and the UDF in order to investigate as impartially 
as possible the supporters of the two political movements, to reflect as fully as is possible the 
perspectives of each on the escalating violence. The study relies heavily on interview material 
from community leaders of both Inkatha and the UDF – those who were directly and 
indirectly affected. In other words, this study will rely on the memories of survivors.  
Alessandro Portelli states that oral sources “tell us not just what people did, but what they 
wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did.” In 
other words, oral histories are sources with multiple layers of meaning that help historians 
investigate complex questions of memory, myth, experience, identity, narrative, power and 
the role of the historian in the construction of history. Commenting on oral history and 
autobiography, he believes that it tells us less about events, as such, than about their meaning. 
This does not imply that oral history and autobiography have no factual interest, but it often 
reveals unknown events or unknown aspects of known events and it always casts new light 
on unexplored sides of the daily life of the non-hegemonic classes.40 
According to Portelli, the credibility of oral sources is a different credibility from other 
sources such as written documents. The unique and precious element which the informant 
forces upon the historian, and which no other sources possess in equal measure, is the 
speaker’s or author’s subjectivity and involvement: therefore, if the research is broad and 
articulate enough, it becomes a cross-section of the subjectivity of a social group or class.41 
Oral sources may not add exact figures to what we know, for instance the number of 
casualties during the ‘Seven Days War’42 in KwaShange. Interviewees may not know the 
number of people who were involved in the war, but they tell a good deal about its 
40Alessandro Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art of Dialogue, London, (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1997), 49, quoted in Oral History Forum - Remembering Family, Analyzing Home: Special 
Issue on Oral History and the Family-http://journal.canoha.ca, accessed on 14 August 2012. 
41Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different” Oral History Reader, quoted in 
http://2012.hackinghistory.ca/2012/10/25/blog-5-different-credibility-understanding-the-psychological-
parameters-of-oral-history, accessed on 15 August 2012. 
42This term was probably invented by journalists, but is now generally used for the conflict. 
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psychological costs. Their testimonies make us feel the psychological cost of this ‘war’ for 
many people in KwaShange and how it caused their need and desire for revolution to be 
buried within the collective unconscious. 
The data from oral sources, especially the accounts of direct participants, will allow for a 
foundation on which an historical interpretation (supplemented, of course, by other sources) 
can be built, to measure the changes caused by the violence. Using the narrative data obtained 
in the interviews, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: What happened 
in KwaShange during the era of political violence? What were the precipitating and 
underlying causes of the political violence and how did these develop into specific incidents 
of violence? Did they show transmutation and how did they transmute from faction fights to 
political party activities? What were the outcomes? How did the aftermath of violence, 
including the way in which it was remembered, affect the community, its cohesion and the 
unity of families? How did it affect gender and inter-generational relations? What constitutes 
memories of violence in KwaShange? What are the effects of such memory on survivors’ 
behaviour in the post-violence period? How does this fractured, but recurrent, memory of 
violence affect actual behaviour? Is there a unique, local and Zulu perspective on violence 
and trauma?  
 
2.8.2 Primary: Archival Sources 
 
The data will also depend on archival sources in the following repositories in KwaZulu-
Natal: the Campbell Collections, the University of KwaZulu-Natal Archives, the Alan Paton 
and Struggle Archives, the Voortrekker Museum Archives and the KwaZulu-Natal Archives 
in Pietermaritzburg.    
 
I included newspaper accounts of events and stories pertaining to the violence, mainly 
because they gave a sense of how the vocabulary and the intensity of the violence in the 
Midlands developed and perhaps played a pivotal a role in shaping people’s perceptions of 
what was happening.  Many of these newspaper clippings are kept in the Alan Paton Centre, 
the Campbell Collections and the Natal Witness Library. They provide insights supporting 
one perspective or the other. These reports, however, suffer from defects, in that they tend to 
give extensive coverage to major events. For example, most cover massacres where there 
were many deaths and casualties, but they tended to overlook a number of what they regarded 
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as minor events, which might in fact have played a role in precipitating subsequent 
massacres. For many years they were censored under emergency regulations for many years, 
and thus recorded in many instances only the bare facts: for example they would report that a 
man was killed or a house was burnt down, without explaining the surrounding 
circumstances, or the political affiliations of victims or attackers. Their coverage of events in 
rural areas was incomplete and inadequate. It has thus been impossible to acquire all the 
relevant and desirable information regarding the violence.  
 
The Centre for Adult Education, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, compiled a 
database of the Unrest Monitoring Project, now deposited at the Alan Paton Centre. This 
database contains accounts of incidents of political violence in the Natal Midlands, including 
Vulindlela and KwaShange. The sources of these records are victims, witnesses, community 
activists, police reports, newspapers, South African Press Association (SAPA) reports, 
unionists and lawyers. 
 
Documentary primary sources used in this research include the TRC report, a video cassette 
on the violence in the Midlands43 and the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR) case files. The TRC held hearings in Pietermaritzburg in November 
1996 and the TRC report and documents related to it were used.  There is a plethora of 
affidavits and statements made by victims of political violence in the Midlands and recorded 
by PACSA (Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness). The Black Sash 
collected much information on this period in the form of affidavits and some of their 
information is kept at the Killie Campbell Africana Library. I also relied on documentaries on 
the Natal Midlands kept in the Msunduzi/Voortrekker Museum Library. Also used were the 








43COSAW, United Kingdom Video Production Company (a documentary called Killing Fields in Natal). 
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2.8.3 Secondary Sources: Literature Review (see Chapter One)  
 
The secondary literature helps to provide information on violence in general, even from other 
parts of the country with similar experiences to the Natal Midlands. This is important for the 
purposes of comparison and cross-pollination of ideas on the subject. In addition, secondary 
sources may provide other researchers’ perspectives, for example, on how muthi was 
employed against opponents during violence in other parts of the country and the continent.   
 
2.9 Auto/biography and Issues of Positionality 
 
There is a growing trend for researchers working in a diverse range of settings to view 
themselves as simultaneously being a subject (or the subject), as well as a researcher.44 “[…] 
the researcher may be a participant in the study, the researcher may keep a personal journal as 
part of the study, or the researcher may keep a record of their thoughts and feelings as part of 
the process of ensuring that the data generation and analysis is rigorous.”45 
 
I am aware, however, that earlier academic historical writings purport to be scientific and 
objective, as opposed to autobiographical life-stories, which are regarded as subjective and 
influenced by the vagaries of memory and the intentions of their authors.46 “Though history 
and autobiography both claim to tell true stories about the past, historians have traditionally 
rejected first-person accounts as subjective and therefore unreliable.”47 An opposite concern 
is raised by contemporary, progressive scholars like Robert Morrell, who make an important 
point:  
 
44Colleen Tenni, Anne Smyth & Carlene Boucher, “The Researcher as Autobiographer: Analysing Data Written 
About Oneself” The Qualitative Report, Volume 8, Number 1 March 2003 quoted in 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/tenni.html, accessed on 15 August 2012. 
45Colleen Tenni, Anne Smyth & Carlene Boucher, “The Researcher as Autobiographer: Analysing Data Written 
About Oneself” The Qualitative Report, Volume 8, Number 1 March 2003 quoted in 
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-1/tenni.html, accessed on 15 August 2012. 
46There is an interesting connection between autobiographical writing and History. Both purport to be non-
fiction; both implicitly grapple with memory, with truth and with objectivity and/or subjectivity.  I want to 
explore this connection in my PhD research to use a critical methodology from one to examine the other. 
47Jeremy D. Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005) 




                                                          
For some time, history has been searching for lost voices – those of workers, the 
peasants, the children, and most recently the subaltern. But there is another voice 
which historians have been less anxious to access – that of the writer him- or 
herself.48 
 
Arguments concerning self-study (autobiography) and ‘insider-outsider’ research have been 
addressed in several studies and disciplines in the social sciences and humanities faculties, 
particularly in disciplines like literature (in which field autobiographies are generally 
considered) and anthropology (insider-outsider research). History tends to undervalue 
autobiographies, because of their subjective nature, though not biographies, which are 
considered to be in the area of historical study. Here I concur with Robert Morrell’s assertion 
that “even an apparently objective document bears the distinctive and unique mark of its 
author and his or her past, predilections and disposition.”49  
 
The subject matter of this thesis is my personal odyssey: how I experienced the traumatic 
events of 1987-96, from the age of approximately eight, up until my early teens. This period 
of uncertainty and violence marked my life and affected my identity. Thus my thesis cannot 
be written without frequent reference to my historically-constructed self; the study is shaped 
by my own history and past experience. I feel that only when I have completed the study will 
I be able to grasp the nature of memory and its relationship to the violence-induced trauma 
that characterised the civil war that marred my childhood. Mine was a childhood that, in its 
interactions between parents, children and siblings, was echoed in many other families in 
KwaShange. Since I have the opportunity provided by the writing of a doctoral thesis, I shall 
use it to work towards understanding some of the effects of war on family-dynamics. That is 
why I shall, in this thesis, permit my own voice to be heard. My aim in the study, with its 
strongly autobiographical elements, will be to produce findings that will add an authentic 
dimension to existing knowledge of the experiences of violence in the Midlands. At the same 
time I hope that my work will help to justify the methodological use of self in research. 
The use of autobiographies as research–related documents started in the 1980s, when 
approaches to history and autobiography became more complex. Historians began to relate 
48Robert Morrell, From Boys to Gentlemen: settler masculinity in colonial Natal, 1880-1920 (Pretoria: Unisa, 
2001), preface, x. 
49 Robert Morrell, From Boys to Gentlemen: settler masculinity in colonial Natal, 1880-1920 (Pretoria: Unisa, 
2001), preface, x. 
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more personally to events that they had previously analysed from a critical distance.50 Jeremy 
Popkin explores this development, analysing the correlation between autobiography and 
history, using historians’ autobiographical accounts as sources for historical understanding.51 
He defines the links between history and autobiography as a way of reconstructing the past, 
approaching life-writing texts as a source for the knowledge of the historians’ experiences 
and professional positions.52  Juame Aurell elaborates: 
 
Autobiographical texts can also be used as a reference for comprehending the way 
historians construct our access to the knowledge of the past: the historical texts. In 
this way, we increase our understanding not only of history, but importantly, of the 
writing of history. Indeed, the practical and methodological links between history and 
autobiography are important: they share structural formulations that invite us to read 
them in conjunction, and decipher possible ways their enactments of events might be 
similar.53 
Aurell considers autobiographical texts as historiographical sources which comprehend 
personal lives and also, significantly, assume the obligation to discern the motives and 
processes that govern texts which are claimed to be purely historical. He reasons that a 
critical approach to life-writing enables the reader to examine to what extent the scholarly 
production of histories, as opposed to autobiographies, by historians, has been conditioned by 
personal experience. He writes: 
Historical texts have been influenced by both the general historical context and the 
personal story of the historian who wrote them – family background, childhood and 
50Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 1. 
51Jeremy D. Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), quoted 
in Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 1. 
52 Jeremy D. Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 
quoted in Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and 
Annie Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 1. 
53 Jeremy D. Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), 
quoted in Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and 
Annie Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 1. 
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adolescent experiences, intellectual information, and commitments to ideology or 
political movement.54  
Jaume Aurell attributes constructive criticism of historians’ academic autobiographies to 
Pierre Nora’s Essais d égo histoire, published in 1987. Aurell writes that Nora’s introduction 
of the documents challenges the principle that made historians “keep themselves out of the 
way of their work, disguise their personality behind their knowledge, barricade themselves 
behind their notes, flee from themselves into another epoch, express themselves only through 
others.”55 The effect of this was to create a new trend in historians’ autobiographical writing. 
Certainly there had been autobiographies written by historians, but their autobiographical 
texts were judged separately from overtly historical works, in which the author-historian laid 
claim to objectivity and distance.56  
Aurell feels that this epistemological context helps us understand the increasing number of 
historian-autobiographers who are more and more comfortable in assuming the role of 
authors of their own stories. Consequently, consciousness of the historian’s function as 
‘narrator’, rather than merely ‘recorder’, has grown significantly, heightening the analogies 
between historical and literary texts. Thus we find in historians’ autobiographies not only 
testimonies of their lives, but also data that explain their historical projects. For this reason, 
historians’ autobiographies must be examined to reveal information, not only about the 
context in which the historical texts are articulated, but also about how the writers’ 
ideological and intellectual convictions may have conditioned the methodological and 
epistemological nature of their texts.57A problem that may occur when reading 
autobiographies as historiographical sources lies in historians’ reluctance to reveal details of 
the course of their projects, a hesitation that reflects their preoccupation with rigour and 
objectivity.58  
54Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 1-2. 
55 Pierre Nora’s Essais d égo histoire quoted in Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical 
Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006). 
56 Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006). 
57Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29:3 (Summer, 2006), 3. 
58Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29: 3 (Summer, 2006), 4. 
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In telling the story of my childhood and that of my mother in KwaShange, and linking our 
experience to historical accounts of violence, I move necessarily across a spectrum that 
extends from academic autobiography to records of oral history. Though autobiographies 
which deal with important historical events may appear to be better historiographical sources 
than more purely personal life-writing projects, I reason that details of historians’ lives, 
isolated or disconnected from their academic careers, also provide valuable information for 
the creation of historical writings. My own study of political violence in KwaShange is 
clearly conditioned by my personal experience of that violence, as I myself recognise, years 
later, that my identity was similarly conditioned. 
Historians’ autobiographical writing furnishes information on their historical texts to different 
degrees. Clearly, these are autobiographies which deal with important historical events. Many 
such autobiographies are relatively recent and are reflections of the evolution of the social 
sciences during the second half of the twentieth century.59 Jaume Aurell states: 
During that period, the academic world increased its visibility and influence in 
Western culture; academics began to be public people, whose opinions on issues and 
activities beyond the classroom began to matter. One of the effects of this greater 
visibility is the reinforcement of the connections between academics’ personal and 
professional identities that validate the publication of an autobiography.60  
Like any other research methods, autobiographical writing has its defects, as literary scholars 
have emphasised. Michael Sprinker, in “The Writings of Nietzsche, the Precursor of Freud”, 
elucidates:  
If autobiography can be described as the self’s inquiry into its own history – the self-
conscious questioning of the subject by itself – then Nietzsche offers the most fearful 
warning for any autobiographical text: The danger of the direct questioning of the 
subject about the subject and of all self-reflection of the spirit lies in this, that it could 
be useful and important for one’s activity to interpret oneself falsely.61  
59Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29:3 (Summer, 2006), 4. 
60Jaume Aurell, “Autobiographical Texts as Historiographical Sources: Reading Fernand Braudel and Annie 
Kriegel”, Biography, 29:3 (Summer, 2006), 4. 
61Michael Sprinker, The Writings of Nietzsche, the Precursor of Freud, (1980), 334. 
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Sprinker further reveals that crucial Freudian ideas (particularly concerning repression) are 
related to Nietzsche’s fundamental insight. Drawing also on Vico and Kierkegaard, Sprinker 
associates autobiography with reflection and subjectivity and, in the case of Freud, with the 
silence surrounding repression.62 Following Mandel, we might indeed suspect the repressive 
nature of autobiographical silence, where “[the] ego has attempted to manipulate and distort, 
to prevent disclosure.”63 
“In qualitative research the role of the researcher as the primary data collection instrument 
necessitates the identification of personal values, assumptions and biases at the outset of the 
study.”64 “To be reflexive is to insist that researchers systematically and rigorously reveal 
their methodology and themselves as the instrument of data generation.”65 My perceptions of 
how this violence is remembered have been shaped by my personal experiences. Therefore 
my experiences and my personal ideology will shape my interpretation of this study. 
However, I believe that being away from KwaShange for more than 10 years, and being a 
trained historian, have given me a better knowledge of the subject being researched, the 
sensitivities involved and the ability to explore the topic objectively. The fact that my 
research was conducted amongst people with whom I share the language, and who come 
from the same region and have the same cultural identity, needs to be taken into 
consideration.  
 
“A person studying their own culture can be likened to a fish trying to describe the water.”66 I 
grew up in the same setting, in the rural area in which my study has taken place; because of 
this I felt connected to my informants, mainly because of our shared knowledge of the 
violence I am writing about, language and cultural identity, as we are all Zulu. I spent my 





62Michael Sprinker, The Writings of Nietzsche, the Precursor of Freud, (1980), 338. 
63Siegfried Mandel, Nietzsche and the Jews (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998).  
64John W. Cresswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (USA: SAGE Publications, 
1994), 163. 
65Jay Ruby, “Exposing Yourself: Reflexibility, Anthropology and Film”, in Kinesis Reports, 3:1 (1980), 153. 
66Peter Just and John Monaghan, Social and Cultural Anthropology:  Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 30. 
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2.10 The research’s dual positions: insider and outsider 
 
The problematization of an author’s position is not new and a number of authors have 
debated and attempted to address it.67 Abdi Kusow notes that ‘the insider-outsider debate in 
field research has recently been identified as one of the more important areas of research’ in 
the social sciences and humanities.68 I shall use my fieldwork as a survivor of political 
violence in the 1980s-1990s in the Natal Midlands to promote the argument of Sharan 
Merriam et al. that the categorisation of insider-outsider roles is rather the product of the 
particular situation in which a piece of fieldwork takes place and not necessarily due to the 
researcher’s status or character within a community.69 
 
Many authors have highlighted the significance for oral historians or researchers from any 
field of study, be it social or behavioural sciences, to explain their motivation for their 
research, especially for those utilising qualitative methodologies that require reflexivity.70 As 
part of their explanation of their role in the field interaction, these researchers frequently 
position themselves as either ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ to their research domain.71 In the 
previous section I alluded to the fact that this thesis is partly my autobiographical narrative. 
In Chapter Three I discuss my experiences of political violence as a child, and my family’s 
membership of the KwaShange community in the 1980s-1990s, and I explain my motivation 
for the study. In this section I clarify my position as a researcher and the role I occupy in 
regard to my doctoral research, including the  experiences that led me to consider myself to 
67 Ashforth, B. E., Kreiner, G. E., Fugate, M, “All in a day’s work: Boundaries and micro role translations, 
Academy of Management Review, (2000) 25, 472-491; Bartnek, J. M and Louis, M. R Insider/Outsider team 
Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1996); Coghlan, D and Brannick, T, Doing action research in your own 
organisation (London: Sage, 2001).  
68 Abdi Kusow, “Beyond Indigenous Authenticity: Reflections on the insider/outsider debate in immigration 
research”, Symbolic Interaction Vol 26, No. 4, 2003. 
69 Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416. 
70John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative and Quantitative Approach (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 
1994). See also Michael Crotty, The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research 
Process (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1998); Kim Etherington, Becoming a Reflexive Researcher: Using 
ourselves in Research (London: Jessica, Kinglay, 2004) and Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research and 
Evaluation Methods (3rd ed) (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002). See also Benedict Carton and Louise Vis, 
“Doing Oral History” in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane, Oral History in a Wounded Country: Interactive 
Interviewing in South Africa (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2008), 53. 
71Ann Bonner and Gerda Tolhurst, “Insider-outsider perspectives of participant observation”, Nurse Researcher 
9: 4 (2002), 7-19, quoted in Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider 
Status within and Across Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-
October 2001) 405-416. 
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be neither ‘inside’ nor ‘outside’ to my particular research domain.72 In this, I am building on 
the argument I made elsewhere,73 as well as a personal interview I had with Benedict Carton 
(Associate Professor of History, George Mason University), conducted in 2004.74  
The dichotomy of the insider and the outsider is relevant to my present study, particularly 
because of the centrality I have given to my account of the trauma I experienced as a child as 
a result of the Natal Midlands violence of the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter Three). It is 
equally important in my accounts of the interaction, empathy, knowledge and interpretation 
of the biographical narratives of my interviewees. I had set out to prove that the violence did, 
indeed, have traumatic after-effects and, certainly in my own and my family members’ cases, 
the insider-outsider continuum has served me well. This concept of insider and outsider has 
also influenced how knowledge of political violence has been, and is being, transmitted in 
community-memory, in indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) (which emphasise that people 
should record their own stories because they know better than those who do not ‘own’ the 
story). Consequently, a description of the experiences of political violence in Vulindlela 
might best begin with a discussion of the concept of insider-outsider and my position as 
researcher and where I locate myself, on the continuum between the two, or as either, or both. 
The usefulness of the insider-outsider distinction in this study depends, in part, on the extent 
to which one can define ‘being a member of the community’ or ‘not being a member of the 
community’,75 in other words, how clearly one can define ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in this 
community context. Sharon Merriam asks pertinent questions in this regards. “What does it 
mean to be an insider or an outsider to a particular group under study? Can women study 
men? Can Whites study Blacks?” To add on to these questions I ask, can the present self-
reflect on the past self and its changing position within this insider-outsider continuum?  
72 Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416. 
73Mxolisi Mchunu, “Are Community Sources of Knowledge”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane, Oral History in a 
Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (Scottsville: UKZN Press 2008). 
74Benedict Carton and  Louise Vis, “Doing Oral History”, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane, Oral History in a 
Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2008). 
75Mxolisi Mchunu, “Are Rural Communities Open Sources of Knowledge”, in P. Denis and R.  Ntsimane Oral 
History in a Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa (Scottsville: UKZN Press, 2008), 130.  
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Sharon Merriam et al. note that early scholars, mostly from the fields of anthropology and 
sociology, labelled themselves as either insiders or outsiders to their studies.76 They reason: 
This position, […] consists in having an ‘outsider’ writer who has ‘inside’ 
information about a group of people he or she is studying. Within this research 
paradigm, the researcher locates him or herself in the following ways: he or she 
obtains ‘inside’ knowledge from the people who are, of course, ‘insiders’ to their 
experience, tradition and community; then writes for a readership who has no ‘inside’ 
knowledge. As he does so, he invests in him or herself the authority to write about the 
people being studied, partly by claiming ‘outsider-objectiveness’, for it is assumed by 
such supposedly objective researchers that those studied do not possess sufficient 
objectivity regarding their specific reasons for doing things in a specific way. Further, 
the researcher or writer may even believe that his or her knowledge gives him or her 
authority or power over the people or tradition that he or she is studying.77 
Some recent discussions of the insider-outsider status have shown ‘the complexity inherent in 
either status, and have acknowledged that the boundaries between the two positions are not 
clearly defined.’78  
 
Drawing from my research experiences, I explore insider-outsider issues in terms of my 
positionality, power and knowledge and claim that my experience reflects a combination of 
insider-outsider status. Even though differentiations between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ in the 
humanities and social sciences have been influenced by particular political and cultural 
agendas, and have in recent years come under scrutiny by scholars who feel sidelined by IKS, 
it is important for me to evolve some kind of concept of membership of the community under 
study. Usually, insider-researchers are those who choose to study the group to which they 
belong, while outsider-researchers do not belong to the group under study. It is common for 
researchers using qualitative methodologies to study a group, organisation, or culture to 
76Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416 
77Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416     
78Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status Within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416See 
also my personal interview with Carton and Vis, 9 July 2004, and personal communication with Oscar Zondi, 
one of the custodians of the history of ‘Impi Yamakhanda’ [the Bhambatha Uprising], March 2005.  
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which they belong and, in doing so, begin the research process as an insider.79 Insider-
researchers are often intimately engaged with their research-domains and, unlike outsider-
researchers, would rarely be described as those who “parachute into people’s lives… and then 
vanish.”80  
 
Having dealt with my own story as a child-survivor of the political violence that took place in 
Vulindlela, KwaShange, the question this chapter aims to pose is: can I, as an adult who has 
lived elsewhere for many years, claim to be an insider? What does it mean to be an ‘insider’ 
and what does it mean to be an ‘outsider’? Do, I, coming from an academic environment, 
have an identity other than that of a KwaShange resident? If I use this theoretical discourse of 
insider-outsider then I am presumably an ‘outsider’ to the community I am studying. I am no 
longer the child I once was during the 1980s-90s violence. Alessandro Portelli explains: 
 
The fact remains however that today’s narrator is not the same person as the one who 
took part in the distant events which he or she is now relating. Nor is age the only 
difference. There may have been changes in personal subjective consciousness as well 
as in social standing and economic condition, which may induce modifications, 
affecting at least the judgement of events and the ‘colouring’ of the story. For 
instance, several people are reticent when it comes to describing forms of struggle 
approaching sabotage. This does not mean that they don’t remember them clearly, but 
that there has been a change in their political opinions in the line of their party, 
whereby actions considered legitimate and even normal or necessary in the past are 
today viewed as unacceptable and are literally cast out .… If the interview is 
conducted skilfully and its purposes are clear to the informant, it is not impossible for 
him or her to make a distinction between present self and past self, and to objectify 
the past other than now.81 
 
Here I admit that the ways in which my experience as an insider-outsider (that is, a witness of 
the events, who has, however, been away from the area for many years) influenced my choice 
79Ann Bonner and Gerda Tolhurst, “Insider-outsider Perspectives of Participant Observation”, Nursing 
Researcher, 9: 4 (2002), 7-19. See also Jaqui Hewitt-Taylor, “Insider Knowledge: Issues in Insider Research”, 
Nursing Standard, 16 46, (2002), 33-35.  
80Nikki Gerrard, “Some Painful Experiences of a White Feminist Therapist Doing Research with Women of 
Colour”, in J. Adleman ed., Racism in the Lives of Women (1995), 55-64. 
81Alessandro Portelli, “The Peculiarities of Oral History”, in History Workshop Journal 12:1 (Oxford University 
Press: 1981), 96-107; doi:1093/hwj/12.1.96.  
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of research topic, the scope of my study, my access to informants, the collection and analysis 
of data, and the maintenance of my integrity as a researcher. I concur, however, with 
Ashforth et al. that the insider-outsider dichotomy is simplistic and is unlikely to be 
applicable to all researchers. They suggest that, instead, the role of the researcher is better 
conceptualised as a continuum, rather than as an either/or dichotomy.82 My role in all my 
writings, and more specifically in terms of my PhD fieldwork, is neither that of an insider nor 
an outsider, and this positioning has maximised the advantages of each, while minimising the 
disadvantages.83 
 
Sharon, B. Merriam et al. warn us that “as researchers, we cannot stand outside the larger 
society and activities such as “science” or “objective research” are striated with procedures 
for minimizing the presence of the researcher in the research product.” My recognition of this 
dilemma is integral to questions about my own position in relation to my academic target 
group. When I, as a researcher, enter the field as an insider, one whose biography (gender, 
race, class, sexual orientation) gives me a ‘lived’ familiarity with the researched community 
and tacit knowledge informs my research interpretation and output, I am in a different 
position from one who enters the research field as an outsider, or who does not have intimate 
knowledge of the researched community. Consequently, my research interpretation and 
output is affected by my past intimacy with community members and my eye-witness status 
in the past.84 
 
2.10.1 Understanding the complexity of my position as a researcher  
  
To reiterate, despite describing the differences between the supposedly diametrically- 
opposed positions of insider-outsider, along with their underlying epistemologies, I 
considered myself to be neither an insider nor an outsider in the context of my doctoral study. 
I subscribe to the argument that the insider-outsider dichotomy is simplistic and that neither 
term adequately captures the role I occupied throughout my own field of research. Rather I 
82 Ashforth, B. E., Kreiner, G. E., Fugate, M, “All in a day’s work: Boundaries and micro role translations”, 
Academy of Management Review, (2000) 25, 472-491 
83 Ashforth, B. E., Kreiner, G. E., Fugate, M, “All in a day’s work: Boundaries and micro role translations”, 
Academy of Management Review, (2000) 25, 472-491 
84 Sharon, B. Merriam at al, “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and Across 




                                                          
found myself in a constantly-changing continuum between the two positions.85 I see that it is 
necessary to be conscious of these issues and to apply them to myself as a researcher. 
Vigilance is the key to this process, so as not to be ‘swallowed’ up by either status and lose 
one’s position or perspective.  
 
I acknowledge that my personal experiences influenced my decision to research the 
KwaShange political violence; my experiences also influenced the way I chose to research 
this topic. For some researchers, the motivation for their choice of topic results from a 
combination of experiences.86 For myself, it began in the very early hours of 9 July 2004. I 
was interviewed by Benedict Carton,87 for one of the Sinomlando Centre’s projects. This was 
the first time I noticed how important the subject of political violence in KwaZulu-Natal was 
to me. I felt uncomfortable being selected to be interviewed and felt that others in my family 
and community should have been acknowledged before myself. After all I was only a child at 
the time, certainly affected by the violence, but yet not suffering as much as those around me. 
I was not a combatant and did not know much of the causes of the civil war. It is for this 
reason that I consider myself both an insider and an outsider to the experience I researched. 
Yet it was my own and my mother’s experiences, some of which I describe in the third 
chapter, that influenced my decision to research the topic. It was my lack of understanding of 
what I had lived through as a child, my longing for the more secure life of my early 
childhood and my grieving for lost friends and relations that motivated my research. 
 
 In the following section, I discuss the ensuing development of the study. 
 
The recruitment of informants can be difficult when the researcher occupies the position of 
outsider, largely because the researcher must first establish trust and rapport with the group. 
Unlike outsider-researchers, I did not struggle to recruit traumatised informants. As a result 
of being ‘silenced’ by those around them, the survivors of violence were keen to ‘voice’ their 
experiences to someone who was willing to listen, even if I did not share aspects of their 
experiences. My position as an ‘outsider’ was far more apparent in my attempts to recruit and 
85 Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416 
86K. White, “Maintaining Meaning in Life: The Central Challenge for Palliative Care Practice”, PhD thesis, 
(Sydney: University of Sydney, 2000). 
87 Benedict Carton is a History Professor at the George Mason University in the United States of America.  
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interview the main perpetrators of the violence. Interviews with them were formal and 
shorter. 
 
Insider-researchers have a tendency to rely primarily on informants with whom they are 
familiar and feel most comfortable. However, I knew only three of the traumatised 
informants and had previously met three of the combatants. Familiarity with three of the 
survivors affected the interview with one of them. Although I did not ask her to do so, she 
used the respectful third person form to me, as though I was a stranger, rather than someone 
she knew who just happened to be interviewing her. Upon looking at the transcript and tape, I 
became aware that the informant’s brother had tried to act as an officious censor of what she 
said.”88  While the informants were keen to know why I was interested in the research topic, 
they were not interested in the motivation for my research. Some seemed to assume I was an 
outsider, as they said things that they probably would not have said to someone who was a 
part of the community. For instance, when I broached the subject of cannibalism and muthi 
(magical medicine), which I knew as an ‘insider’ was integral to the war, they became 
defensive and angered by what they thought was an outsider’s ghoulish curiosity. This 
curiosity was, in fact, motivated by insider knowledge of the importance of ukugqaba 
(doctoring) – they thought that I had no right to such secret, insider information. Though I 
was an insider in the conflict, I was an outsider in the case of certain kinds of information, 
because I was not old enough, nor did I possess the qualifications of an inyanga (traditional 
healer). It is considered culturally taboo to discuss these matters with non-participants. This 
was no surprise to me, because I had experienced a similar reluctance in the descendant of 
Bhambatha Zondi’s inyanga to even entertain questions.  Our multiple identities, in terms of 
demographic characteristics, as well as our role in the research, impact upon data collection, 
in terms of what is ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ and what is considered ‘important’ and 
‘unimportant’.89  
 
88Valli Kalei Kanuha, “Being Native versus Going Native: Conducting Social Work Research as an Insider”, 
Social Work  45 (2000), 439-447. 
89Regina Langhout, “Where am I? Locating Myself and Its Implications for Collaborative Research”, American 
Journal of Community Psychology 37 (2006), 267-274, quoted in Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “Power and 
Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and Across Cultures”, in International Journal of 




                                                          
 Indeed, being ‘in the middle’ made me more aware of the dangers of either an insider or 
outsider stance and constant questioning of community dynamics and values, as would befit 
an outsider. Insistence on the research process was essential during the data collection and 
analysis procedures, as well as adherence to processes recommended for qualitative 
researchers.  
 
How would I describe my experiences in my middle ground position between insider and 
outsider? I am not the same person I was in 1987, when I was a child of ten, although I feel 
sympathy for this self that once was. This sympathy draws me to the insider end of the 
continuum. At the same time I am not fully an outsider, because even though my present-day 
maturity and historical knowledge would make me shift to an outsider position, the fact is 
that to this day something can happen in my life that can spark a reaction to a trauma relating 
to my childhood experiences and push me back into the insider position. Conscious of the 
dichotomy of the insider-outsider position, I must constantly monitor my reactions and 
observe my responses, so as to position myself in the middle.  
 
The fact is that as an outsider I have to police myself to retain objectivity as an academic, to 
ensure that I am not ‘swallowed’ up by memories of past pain. My insider status also informs 
my interaction with my informants. I find that I know when not to pursue issues such as 
profound trauma and accept that I am sworn to secrecy on matters such as who is responsible 
for having killed whom during the violence. Many of the informants are my relatives and 
former neighbours and an insider such as myself works at a more profound level than an 
outsider researcher. Only an insider would know one of my overriding feelings:  my longing 
for the community life that pre-dated the civil war; the friends that are no longer there; and 
happy moments like the performances of my father’s isicathamiya group. In the present, there 
are more serious consequences than this nostalgia of which I speak and that many others 
experience. Many of my informants, who suffered long terms of imprisonment for killings 
associated with the political violence, have never been able to get employment and their 
wives are bitter and angry.  
 
My insider cultural value system prescribes that one does not divulge family issues to an 
outsider. I knew a UDF informant who had served a jail sentence because his brother used his 
gun in attacking Inkatha youth at the time of the violence. Although I knew the story, as well 
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as the resulting family tension, I could not pursue this line of inquiry because of the cultural 
injunction of silence.  
 
Through this research experience I have learnt that ‘the research partnership between an 
insider and an outsider would balance the advantages of both positions, while minimising the 




90 Sharon, B. Merriam et al., “ Power and Positionality: Negotiating Insider/Outsider Status within and Across 
Cultures”, in International Journal of Lifelong Education, Vol 20, No 5 (September-October 2001) 405-416. 
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Chapter Three 




In this chapter I shall explore inter-subjectivity and interpretive authority in life-history 
research, through the case study of my mother, Jabulile Mchunu, and myself. I examine 
the ways in which individuals frame their autobiographical accounts in relation to the 
public discourse available to them.1 I shall highlight the relationship between interviewer 
and interviewee2 and reflect on how sharing my initial interpretation of my experiences 
with my mother altered our relationship,3 since she was aware of and approved my 
research, and affected the final outcome. I shall also foreground my feelings about the 
research project and analyse the manner in which our relationship, both within and 
outside the interview setting, shaped the study as a whole. This chapter will not focus on 
great incidents or historical moments, but on the multitude of ‘small emotional and 
psychological effects’4 that stemmed from my mother’s and my experience of the 
political violence. In other words, it will try to answer these questions: how did this 
‘abnormal’ situation of war affect everyday life; how did this ‘imprint the mind and soul’ 
of the ordinary KwaShange community member? And what happened to those who were 
children at the time? In this chapter, I shall therefore attempt to do many things: Firstly, I 
shall describe the process of doing research when violence has partially disrupted, or 
even obscured memories, which must be revived by the researcher. Secondly, it is about 
1Ben Jones, “Telling Family Stories: Interpretive Authority and Intersubjectivity in Life History Research”, 
Journal of Contemporary History, University of Sussex, vol. 7 (2004), 1. 
2Philippe Denis, Never Too Small to Remember: Memory Work and Resilience in Times of AIDS (Cluster 
Publications, Pietermaritzburg, 2005). See also Sean Field, “What Can I Do When the Interviewee Cries?” 
Oral History Strategies for Containment and Regeneration, in P. Denis and R. Ntsimane eds., Oral History 
in a Wounded Country: Interactive Interviewing in South Africa, (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 
2008). 
3Kim Foster, Margeret McAllister and Louise O’Brien, “Coming to Ethnography: A Mental Health Nurse’s 
Experience”, International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 4, 4 (2005),1. 
4This type of research into oral sources, as Alessandro Portelli reminds us, “tell us not only what people 
did, what they wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they did […]”, 
in other words, oral histories are sources with multiple layers of meaning that help historians investigate 
complex questions of memory, myth, experience, identity, narrative, power, and the role of the historian in 
the construction of history. 
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how to research a traumatic event that one had experienced oneself. Thirdly, this chapter 
will investigate the influence the past has had on the present and the memories of 
violence which survive today. By reflecting on myself, I will explain the effects of the 
violence on many of the children in the Natal Midlands.  
 
My research has taken place fifteen years after the end of violence in the province, and 
the children who experienced this violence are now adults. Some have their own families. 
I shall argue that the impact of any war is felt beyond the immediate survivors and can 
become part of the identity of those who survived, particularly those who were children 
at the time. 
  
In this chapter (and the rest of this thesis), I acknowledge newspaper-articles and 
monitors’ warnings. I will attempt to reveal what happened to the children who 
experienced the violence. I am one of them and I shall analyse my story and supplement 
it with testimonies from neighbours of my age to find some commonalities of experience, 
psychological effects and conclusions. Children of the violence did not understand the 
genesis of the war. What they knew was gleaned from fearful mothers, from siblings and 
from actual experiences of hunger, fleeing, hiding and panic. They became orphans, or 
were abandoned. The newspaper reports of the time predicted their identity crisis. My 
question is, what happened to these children? The violence started when I was eight and 
only subsided when I was fifteen. I could be considered ‘lucky’ in having retained my 
mother and my home. Through my autobiographical narrative and analysis of my close 
association with my mother, I tell of my experiences and my survival, but at what cost? 
My teenage years were marked by anger and distrust. During my early university years 
my family sent me to a diviner and traditional healer who concluded that I was spirit- 
possessed (amandiki).5 It was only on my becoming a re-born Christian that some of the 
stress lifted, but even today I am considered arrogant.  
 
5For details on the topic of Amandiki and possession see, Julie Parle, “States of Mind: Searching for Mental 
Health in Natal and Zululand, 1868-1918.” (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007). 
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There is a second category of ‘children’ of violence, youths –izinsizwa age (from fourteen 
to twenty); those were differently affected: they were instigators, party members, 
‘soldiers’, if you like. It is important to see what happened to them, and I deal with them 
in Chapter Nine.  
 
Often in the case of war-torn societies, where the conflict has continued or has broken out 
sporadically for years, these behaviours may eventually become accepted and may be 
common to large portions of the population, and may be considered cultural phenomena. 
Adam Curle noted, regarding societies torn by civil conflict that “alienation has tended to 
escalate into post-traumatic stress syndrome. Violence generally continues to exist within 
the social fabric of societies coming out of conflict for decades to come.” 6 Goldblatt and 
Meintjies argue that the violence of South Africa's past has contributed to a proliferation 
of violence against women and children in the country today.7 Psychosocial studies stress 
the importance of thinking about trauma from psychological and social perspectives. The 
term ‘psychosocial’ recognises that there is an ongoing interaction between an 
individual's psychological state and his or her social environment.8 Simpson and Rauch 
of the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in Johannesburg9 have 
developed a concept of the “politicisation of everyday-life,” which can be used in the 
consideration of the consequences of political violence.  
 
3.2 Autobiographical Narrative 
 
In this section, I outline how I came to use autobiography as a narrative inquiry exploring 
my own experiences of being a child growing up in KwaShange, KwaZulu-Natal, in the 
1980 - 1990s civil war between Inkatha/IFP and UDF/ANC supporters. I discuss my 
6 Adam Curle, Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Violence (Oxford: Jon Carpenter 
Publishing, 1995). 
7Beth Goldblatt and Sheila Meintjies, “Dealing with the Aftermath – Sexual Violence and the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission”, Agenda, 36 (1997). 7-17.   
8Inger Agger, “Psychosocial Assistance during Ethno-political Warfare in the Former Yugoslavia”, in D. 
Chirot & M. Seligman eds., Ethno-political Warfare: Causes, Consequences and Possible Solutions 
(Washington, USA: American Psychological Association, 2001), 305-318. 
9G. Simpson and J. Rauch, “Political Violence 1991”, in N. Boister and K. Ferguson-Brown eds., Human 
Rights Yearbook (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
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experiences and identify techniques I found useful in preparing for my research into the 
history and memories of violence and trauma in the area. 
 
This section does not focus on verifiable facts and events, but on personal experiences of 
the violence in the civil war, that arguably affected many other persons to a greater or 
lesser degree. It is the inside story of KwaShange, told by two of its survivors, namely, 
my mother and myself. I remind the reader that this chapter is not focusing on the great 
incidences of historical moments, but on small emotional and psychological effects that 
stem from my experience.  So the question remains: how did this abnormal situation of 
civil war affect everyday life and how did this ‘imprint the mind and soul’ of the ordinary 
KwaShange community member? It is not easy to answer this question, especially for a 
historian; probably psychologists have better ways to investigate these matters. That is 
why I have opted to use myself and my mother as examples of reactions to such stress. 
Through my observation of my mother and the interviews I have had with her, I can 
conclude that she went through a traumatic time and she was psychologically affected. 
 
Most of what I describe here did not take place in the public eye. Nor did my experience 
relate only to the death and suffering of men (talking from a patriarchal society’s 
viewpoint) who fought heroically to fend off attack in KwaShange. Neither is it about 
prominent men who founded local UDF or Inkatha branches and acted as ‘war lords’ or 
organised vigilante groups that perpetrated the violence in the area. Rather this is about 
sacrifices and emotional agony and its psychological impact on unrecorded victims, who 
were invariably women and children. It was easy for the ‘outsider’ to get the wrong 
perception of the daily lives of these people, and perhaps pity those who were 
courageously fighting for survival. For little did observers know of the attempts and 
fights for existence which raged among women and children during the civil war. This 
was an unrelenting struggle for life itself, on the part of parents, for their own lives and 
for their children. 
 
Many factual accounts concerning this violence will be dealt with in the chapters of my 
thesis. Here facts will be significant only as far as they are part of both my mother’s and 
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my own experience and how we affected each other. Even though the KwaVulindlela 
violence has been researched by many scholars, the view from the angle of parent and 
child has not been given enough attention. This is crucial for a study like mine, where the 
effects of political violence in KwaShange on the memories of survivors for the period 
1987-2008 are being explored, because it gives first-hand accounts of life during that 
period, making my mother and myself primary sources which provide windows into the 
past. I am trying to understand and explain through the words and images of ordinary 
people, like ourselves, who experienced it. This window is important for historians 
because, unlike scholars studying contemporary people and societies (psychologists, 
sociologists and anthropologists), historians cannot use direct observation to prove their 
arguments and are dependent on testimonies. 
 
3.3 How I (as a child) understood my mother’s experiences 
 
I shall view the times through the experience of my mother, a domestic worker who still 
had to attend work despite the horrors at home. My world was ‘coloured’ by my parent; I 
watched her for confirmation of the experiences of war and yet often found myself even 
more perplexed than before. By writing from her perspective I have accessed memories 
and understanding I would otherwise not have come by. As a qualitative research 
method, autobiography and biography are useful for making connections between 
researcher and other interviewees, deepening interpretive analysis of common and 
differing experiences, and producing knowledge drawn from compassionate 
understanding and rigorous reflection.  
 
3.3.1 Theatre of the Mind: Living in a violent era and area 
 
It is always a challenge to ‘paint a picture’ of an incident or to describe one’s feelings to 
another person in an objective way, let alone to illustrate another person’s subjective 
perspective. I will describe my mother’s social context, as a woman living through a civil 
war in the 1980s-1990s in the greater rural district of Vulindlela.  
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Imagine a domestic worker: my mother, Jabulile MaMadlala Mchunu, who was working 
for Afrikaner-families in Pietermaritzburg. She came from rural KwaShange which is 25 
kilometres away from the city. She worked six days a week, from Monday to Saturday, 
travelling back-and forwards daily. It was 16h00, time for her to go home to KwaShange. 
Her employer gave her a lift to the bus stop, because walking in the street alone was 
dangerous. She arrived at the bus stop (East Street in Pietermaritzburg). This was where 
all those who lived in the crown areas10 of Vulindlela commuted to and from the city. 
She noticed that only a few people were waiting for buses to go back home. This had 
become the norm, because people opted to stay at their respective employers’ places to 
avoid commuting, and on this day there were almost no women. Only people who had to 
go to town urgently did so at that time. My mother waited for a 17h00 bus which arrived 
on time. She eventually got onto a bus with a lot of men. These men were forced to return 
home; there was a war going on and they had to patrol to protect the area at night. They 
had to release those who had been patrolling during the day. Whilst she was still waiting 
at the bus stop, she heard that many women and children had already left KwaShange and 
fled for their lives, because a message had come that Inkatha would attack the area that 
same night.  
 
In telling me later, she exclaimed, “ngaphelelwa asonzwaneni! ngicabanga izingane 
zami. (I just lost the little energy I had, thinking about my children)”. My mother was not 
sure if the bus would reach KwaShange. There were many reasons why this might not 
happen. Firstly, this bus could be stoned when passing Edendale. Even although 
Edendale was UDF aligned area, it was dangerous to go through, because ‘amaqabane’ 
(comrades) stoned any bus that passed through Edendale going to ‘ngaphezulu’ (the 
higher ground of the Midlands), as almost all villages described as ngaphezulu were IFP-
strongholds. There IFP supporters attacked anybody who was not obviously of their 
party. (My home area of KwaShange was under Chief Shayabantu Zondi, who refused to 
10‘Crown areas’ are still common terms for the people living in them; here the reference is to the upper 
regions or ‘ngaphezulu’ of greater Pietermaritzburg. I believe the word originated from when the province 
of Natal still fell under British rule. The ‘crown’ was a reference to the English queen Elizabeth II or her 
father, George VI. Once South Africa became a republic such land would have become State lands.  
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allow his people to become UDF party supporters; hence it was singled-out for attack by 
Inkatha in an attempt to displace these UDF supporting families.) So UDF people in 
Edendale, in support of KwaShange would stone any bus passing by, even though the bus 
could well contain persons from the latter area. Usually, KwaShange buses would be 
accompanied by an Edendale car to allow them safe passage. Secondly, this same bus 
could be stopped by Inkatha people in Mvundlweni, the area opposite KwaShange, 
another strong IFP area. These were known to be merciless killers of UDF supporters. 
My mother had had the experience of being in a minibus that was shot at in Mvundlweni 
that the same morning, and the person who had been sitting next to her was injured by a 
bullet. Many people lost their lives in the area of Mvundlweni. Lastly, this bus was in 
danger, also because police patrols could think it contained people returning from a rally 
somewhere – potential trouble-makers. The police were known for wasting no time to 
shooting to kill.  
 
Luckily that day my mother arrived home safely at almost 17h45. She was safe, but 
fearful. It was quiet with no people moving around. You could hear a dog barking from 
afar, but see no fire-smoke, no-one leading a normal life, or cooking. People had gone to 
seek refuge somewhere far from the area. Others were hiding. One could hear a whistle 
as a warning of possible attack – comrades communicating with each other from different 
parts of the area. Women and children had been instructed to move out of the area, but 
those who had nowhere to go, were hiding.  
 
My mother often claimed that throughout this time, “the only thing that I was concerned 
about was your whereabouts [children]:  Nathi, you [myself], Siyabonga and Khomby.” 
She would come home only to find the younger children waiting for her arrival. Anything 
could have happened on her way back home. As the oldest of the three younger children, 
I would be filled with anxiety for her to return. I could not think of what I would have 
done without her, and yet some children were left orphans. “I did not expect to find your 
older brothers anyway, kwakuliwa, kuchitheka igazi [they would have been in the 
patrolling impi].” My elder brothers had gone. She did not know where they were, but 
wherever they were, they were patrolling and they had weapons to defend the area from 
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Inkatha-attackers as well as from policemen, who often came as a ‘third force’.11 My 
mother on her return would pace up and down, locking the house and surrounding 
rondavels and preparing herself and the younger children for another night in the nearby 
forest. Her eyes would be full of tears, but she was not crying. Later she explained, “I had 
to be brave because if I showed fear, all of you would cry, and I would not know how to 
control myself either.” She would tell her children, “Let us go, everything will be fine 
after all, tomorrow we will sleep in our home and nothing will happen to us.” When my 
mother said this, I, as a child, did not understand what was really happening, and did not 
know who to talk to because my mother was too anxious, her body was there but her 
mind was miles away. I did not know where my father was, but subsequently, I realized 
that he had stayed at work because there was no transport from town to KwaShange. I 
was unsure whether to believe my mother’s promises that “things would get better”, 
because she had been saying this for some time, but it never happened. To me as a child, 
she was not telling the truth and I felt afraid, at the time and later felt angry. Perhaps I 
would have preferred to have been told the truth. I loved my mother and I wanted to 
believe her, even though what she was claiming sounded contradictory to what was 
happening. Yet when I did not believe her, I felt guilty and it was like I was betraying her 
in some way that I could not fully explain.  
 
My mother was also anxious about her two elder sons who were, as I have explained, 
patrolling. She knew that they were angry with her because she worked for the ‘dogs’ 
(amabhunu, Boers as they were called at that time) who oppressed black people. The 
context was the UDF’s policy to “make South Africa under the Nationalist Government 
ungovernable.” My mother explained, “The reason why I was so scared was because it 
had happened to other neighbours, whose children turned against them [parents]; people 
had ‘gone mad’.” My mother eventually went to sleep in the forest with her three 
children; her employer gave her three sleeping bags to sleep in the cold outdoors. She got 
up in the morning of the following day, not too early, because Inkatha would attack the 
11This term is generally used to describe the Nationalist state police who killed black people mainly in 
Townships and rural areas. In KwaShange they assisted Inkatha combatants to attack UDF supporters. For 
details on this on State Police collaborating with Inkatha, see TRC report www.doj.gov.za/trc_frameset.htm 
(last accessed on 14 February 2011). 
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village early in the morning: she could not leave the forest before 4h30 at the earliest. She 
eventually left the forest with us children at 4h30, because she had to catch the bus at 
5h30 in order to go to work. Her explanation was, “One had to respect the employers 
because I knew that I would need their assistance one day, so I had to pretend that things 
were normal.” She was not sure if she would reach work, because the bus might be 
attacked in the dangerous neighbouring Inkatha area. So the stressful journey of the 
previous day was repeated. She left us children in fear, because we were not sure if 
everything would go well at school. At this time there were few children at school as 
many had left the area. It was not a normal situation, teachers that we knew were no 
longer there and our primary school was in danger because it had Inkatha children and 
UDF children. Each organisation wanted to come and look after its party members’ 
children.  
 
One day my mother came back in the afternoon to hear that her uncle had been stoned to 
death by UDF boys in the area. They accused him of being a spy and having a 
relationship with Chief Shayabantu Zondi, who was an Inkatha leader. My mother could 
not go to see her uncle’s body because she was afraid that she would be killed next. As 
she locked herself in her room, crying, she heard the news that her uncle’s wife had been 
killed too. This aunt had threatened to mention the killers’ names to the police, as she 
knew the people who came to kill her husband, some of whom were blood relatives. The 
aunt’s family had a mentally disabled daughter aged 25 at the time. She had slept with 
her dead parents the whole night because she did not realise that they were no longer 
alive. My mother’s later comment was, “I remember myself losing my mind, the whole 
night I could not sleep, and I was shouting ‘blessed are those who are dead’.” In her 
anger and frustration she decided not to go to the forest. That night she decided to sleep 
in her own house. She explained, “If I am to die, I would like to die with my children in 
my house.” 
 
This narrative is but one story of my mother with her children in the area of KwaShange; 
there are many other women in this and surrounding areas who experienced similar 
ordeals. I have only described what I saw of my mother at the time and what she tells me 
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now. This is individual and collective memory, added to my knowledge of historical 
events in the area at the time. When I embarked on this study, I had already conducted 
ten interviews with people, who were children at the time, and who described what they 
went through in the civil war. When questioned about what they felt about their parents’ 
states of mind, almost all described their parents as people who had ‘lost it’. Two sisters 
described their mother’s condition as “needing psychological therapy”, but other family 
members described her as being ‘possessed by spirits’ ‘twasaring’ (they thought she was 
being called to become a sangoma). Others thought their mother was at the initial stage of 
ukuhlanya (madness).  
 
3.4 My Personal Experiences and Memories of Violence 
                 
My memories of childhood are swamped by political violence. I only remember bits of 
my life up to eight years old: my first day at school, how I missed home. I ask myself, 
what I missed when I went to school. I think it was childhood games, playing with clay 
and mud, building houses and wire toy cars. We would escape from home to a small 
stream, known as iNembe, to swim. Along with my siblings, I was always happy because 
we knew that after working hours my mother would come back from work with slices of 
bread, with jam, and occasionally with fruit and cakes. These were good memories but 
they were short-lived because the political violence started in 1987. I was then in 
Standard two (Grade four) in Henley Lower Primary School. I was only ten years old. I 
was the seventh child in a home of nine. I had five brothers and three sisters. 
 
 My father was working for the University of Natal, Agriculture Department, and my 
mother was a domestic worker. My father’s second wife was living in KwaShange some 
distance from us. She was unemployed. My grandmother, who was a pensioner, my aunt 
and her three children, and my eldest sister with her two small children stayed with us. 
Not far from home were my paternal uncles, my father’s brothers. They had their own 
nuclear-families. Our neighbours were my maternal uncles and aunt, while other 
neighbours were close family-friends, who had come to the area of KwaShange at the 
same time as my grandparents in the 1960s.  
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From 1986 when I was in standard one (grade three) at school, we did a subject called 
ubuntu-botho. I liked it most because it meant that we stopped normal classes, and we 
joined together with groups from other classes and we sang. I remember there was a song 
that I liked that went, “Uphilela ntoni wena, uShenge uyasiphilela isizwe” (What are you 
living for; Shenge (Buthelezi, leader of IFP) lives for the nation.) We would sing these 
songs even at home. One of my paternal uncles used to enjoy it and encourage us and 
sing these songs along with us. He often came to school to meet with our principal and 
teachers, but we did not know what it was about. But we felt important that our uncle 
knew the principal. In retrospect, from my interviews with him, I realised that as a leader 
of the local Inkatha, he was campaigning for the teachers to join Inkatha. 
 
In 1987 there was a serious tension between my parents and this ‘Inkatha’ uncle. We 
were warned to stop going to his home, but no explanation was given. My grandmothers 
interceded and calmed down the situation, but still my parents were not happy when we 
played at my uncle’s house. In the same year, there was a group of young people who 
gathered at school every Friday afternoon for meetings. On these occasions, they would 
come out and sing slogans on the road, persuading people to join Inkatha. I still 
remember some of the songs: ‘joyini, joyina, joyina Inkatha. Inkatha leyo eyesizwe’ (join, 
join, join Inkatha, Inkatha of the Nation.) We as children would follow them and sing.  
 
One day my mother came back from work to find my elder brother and I had attended 
one of these meetings. She reprimanded us severely and warned us to never again go to 
such gatherings. Later I realised that she may have known more about the political 
situation and I found out that the tension between my parents and my uncle stemmed 
from his attempts to persuade them to join Inkatha. It was at such meetings that the first 
violent conflict of 1987, which I shall explain below, was discussed. This led to the 




Inkatha Youth on the March, KwaShange, 198712 
 
Later that year, I remember, it was cold. It had been raining the whole night; this was the 
time of the 1987-floods. In the morning I was seated near the fire in my maternal uncle’s 
house, opposite our own home. Through the door, I saw a number of yellow police cars 
struggling to move on the muddy road. Outside were my mother and my aunt, who were 
talking in low voices, almost whispering. I could not hear what they were saying. All I 
remember is my mother calling me to go home with her. Once at home, she instructed all 
of us not to go anywhere. My elder brothers were all at home that day. It was indeed a 
strange day: I had never seen such quiet people in my life. Worries were written in 
everybody’s eyes. Outside, it was silent: everybody was indoors. All that I could see of 
KwaShange was still - the bad weather probably contributed. It was a strange 
atmosphere.  
 
12 Courtesy of the KwaZulu-Natal Museum (Natal Museum), Pietermaritzburg.   
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KwaShange, picture taken on 26 September 198713 
 
When my grandmother, in the silence, broke into loud praying, I realised that something 
had gone wrong. Secret talks between my mother and my elder brothers worried me. That 
day marked the beginning of the end of my childhood, and that of many of my age group. 
I heard in the prayer of my grandmother that some people had been killed. I remember 
feeling deeply disturbed but not knowing the whole story. It only became clear when 
another aunt, who was close to the house where Inkatha youth had gathered to plan an 
attack on UDF supporting homes (particularly that of Hlengwa) came and explained. This 
house had been attacked. She had heard the whole event and saw flames and heard guns 
and she was completely panic-stricken, especially because most of the boys who had died 
were her husband’s extended Zondi family members.  
 
 
13 Courtesy of Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository. This picture was taken by a member of South African 
Police on 26 September 1987. It shows the homestead where thirteen Inkatha Youth was attacked and 
killed by the UDF supporters.   
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Pictures of the massacre, 26 September 198714 
 
 
14 These images were taken by members of SAP in 26 September 1987, “KwaShange Massacre”.  
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From 1987 until 1990, the area of KwaShange changed completely. Many people that I 
had known since I was still small were no longer there - either they had died or relocated 
without us knowing. We would wake up in the morning and hear that so-and-so family 
was no longer in KwaShange, and no-one could tell us children where they had gone. The 
same thing happened with my paternal uncle, the one who knew the school principal. We 
heard in the morning that he had fled, but nobody knew where his family had gone into 
hiding. His sons, who were our close family members and friends, had gone, and that 
meant we would never see them again. I remember how I desperately missed them at 
evening prayers. By that time I understood that there was a war between UDF and 
Inkatha. We were obviously UDF and they were Inkatha. Between 1987 and 1990, 
killings were daily activities. The UDF was ‘cleaning-up’ the area and any person who 
was suspected of being an Inkatha supporter was attacked and killed and his house burnt. 
Almost everyday, we would receive threats from Inkatha neighbouring areas that 
KwaShange would be attacked. People were ‘on the run’ all the time. I remember that as 
children we were trained by our older brothers to make petrol bombs for self-defence. We 
were told to hold up plastic bottles at arm’s-length and they would aim and shoot at them. 
Later I realised that this was to toughen us, to become young combatants in order to 
defend our home. During this period we often were woken up at night or early in the 
morning, and had to run into hiding at a moment’s notice, so we slept fully-clothed, even 
down to our shoes. 
 
These things continued until 1990 when the greatest horror started - the “Seven Days 
War.” I was in standard five (grade seven). I was entering adolescence at that time and I 
was aware of what was happening in the area and neighbouring areas. My understanding 
of politics started when Mandela was released from prison in 1990. I remember my 
brothers and sisters talking about it and we heard the news on the radio. At that time I 
thought, “Shoo! This person is obviously a white person and he is so important!” I went 
to our neighbour to watch television, because I was so interested. I remember there were 
drops of rain and obviously it rained in Auckland Park as well, because the news reader 
said “kwaXhosa imvula isho ukuthi kunama thamsanqa”’ (drops of rain mean luck in 
Xhosa belief). This happiness preceded a great horror for KwaShange.  
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It was on the 27th of March 1990 when Inkatha attacked the area of KwaShange and 
many other areas. It had been raining for a few days and the Msunduzi River was 
overflowing. It was still early in the morning and we had just woken up. One of my 
cousins came to tell us that there was going to be an attack. When the message came, 
many people left their homes and moved away from near the road to hide in the forest. 
My mother, myself and two younger siblings left late and it was not possible for us to run 
far. As we were running, bullets were flying over our heads, and we knew that if we 
heard a gun-shot, we had to lie down on our stomachs; it was safer that way. My mother 
realised that if we continued running, we would be killed by the bullets. She decided that 
we should hide in the nearby stream. The Inkatha people were only two minutes away 
from us and we could hear them swearing at us “Sizonithola Maqabane ****15 yonyoko, 
elamanqamu namhlanje” [We are going to catch you, Maqabane **** of your mothers, 
today is your last day]. We hid in the stream from approximately 6h00 until 
approximately 23h30. 
 
Whilst we were in the stream, many things happened. Firstly we were joined by a woman 
of my mother’s age. She was followed by her dog which was drawing attention to us, 
causing tension between my mother and the owner. My mother wanted her to get rid of 
her dog, but the owner did not know how. Later the police helicopter flew over us 
intending to force us to leave the stream, so as to be seen by Inkatha people who were 
only a few minutes away from where we were hiding. We could hear the latter talking 
and shooting of bullets; we could smell the houses burning. Police sprayed ‘tear gas’ on 
us; at that time - I did not know that it was tear gas. I remember praying, a frightened 14-
year-old, and longing for the bank to open and bury me, my mother and my siblings. I 
was longing to die naturally rather than be killed by the Inkatha people. Whilst we were 
being tear-gassed, we saw grass and trees by the stream moving, where we were hiding, 
so somebody was coming towards us. It was in fact an old woman, our neighbour, but I 
had already concluded that some people had figured out that we were in the stream, so 
they came to ‘finish’ us. To me as a teenager, this tear-gassing was an answer from God. 
I thought He heard my prayer and this was the process of dying, as by then I was fearful 
15 Swear word was used, I have chosen not repeat the word in this thesis, it is derogatory and misogynistic.   
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that everyone was dead - my grandmothers, my elder brothers, and my sisters. Somehow 
the knowledge that there was a person - not a power but a person - named Jesus, who 
could see, hear, and answer my prayers gave me the hope that I needed to get beyond that 
night. By night time, we knew that things had calmed down, but we did not know where 
to go because we thought that our house had been burnt. The neighbour that had joined us 
later in the stream suggested that we go to the local church. She had heard that there were 
people who had gathered there. We sat in the church for a few hours until 2h30. Nobody 
was prepared to risk going home. Many old people, children and babies who had gathered 
in the church walked the many kilometres to Edendale where we sought refuge.  
 
My mother encountered many severe challenges and hardships. In my early years my 
mother was virtually a single parent and who was often distressed and did not know what 
to do; her mental suffering often caused great hardship to those around her. She had the 
burden as the senior woman of giving hope to the family that was steadily disintegrating. 
Many times she had to deal with my elder brothers who kept complaining that they lived 
in bad conditions, dropping-out of schools because of our uncle who started the violence 
in the area, with the result that they were jailed during the state of emergency. My early 
childhood is filled with memories of terror at physical and emotional violence, yet also of 
tenacity and a will to live. This was however, also the dawning of my faith. I remember 
praying earnestly for the first time when I was eleven years old. My mother's uncle had 
been killed, stoned to death by KwaShange UDF youths, who accused him of being an 
Inkatha informer. My mother came back from work worried; her heart was broken 
because she was not sure if my elder brothers were part of those who had attacked her 
uncle. It was common for UDF people to ask the relatives of a person who was about to 
be attacked, to kill their relatives if they belonged to a rival political group. I recall that at 
the time my brothers would come home in drunken rages, were using muthi, meaning 
they were probably forbidden to talk to women. I was afraid for my life, and for the life 
of my mother and younger siblings, and so in desperation I cried many tears. 
My life is different now - as I write this I am sitting in one of the oldest and most 
prestigious, academic institutions in South Africa, the Campbell Collections of the 
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University of KwaZulu-Natal. I am altered in other ways too: I am taller, fatter, and 
richer than I was when I was 10 to 14. I have more debt, but I am also ‘reborn’, I now 
have a wife and children, I have a Masters degree and am writing a doctoral thesis. I am 
also happier, more grateful, and much more privileged. Remembering what I lived 
through to get to this point helps me to savour these moments and experiences. They 
cannot be taken for granted! Even though my life is different, I am still the same in 
essence, but I remember my past and long for a better future. I still enjoy adventures and 
love to pray. My memory makes me more resilient. God has never forsaken me - God 
heard my prayer when I was 11, and when I was 14 in the stream and He still hears my 
prayer today. 
3.5 Effect of violence on children and mothers: an overview 
 
The political upheaval of the 1980s - 1990s in the Midlands tore whole communities and 
families apart—from Vulindlela to Edendale to Howick. Entire generations had grown up 
in the midst of brutal armed conflicts. Children as young as ten observed, and others were 
involved in wars as either victims or perpetrators of violence. This was because some 
were forced by circumstances to get involved and fight to defend their communities.  
Children have, of course, always been caught up in warfare. They usually have little 
choice but to experience, at least, the same horrors as their parents—as casualties or even 
combatants. When they have to sleep in forests, hide in the streams at night, and when 
food runs short in refugee camps, it is children who have been hardest hit, since their 
growing bodies need steady supplies of nutrients. The trauma of exposure to violence and 
brutal death has emotionally affected generations of young people for the rest of their 
lives. One woman in Pietermaritzburg commented on her experience of political 
violence: 
 
I am bitter that all my children died within a short space of time in this (tragic) 
way. They respected me. And one of them was supporting the family, but I am 
thankful that they are now free from these times of hatred and distrust. I am also 
free from an endless life of fear, fearing for their safety. Nonetheless, it is still a 
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horrible experience to be a parent of any black family: in these days (speaking of 
the then civil war) our male children are being slaughtered.16 
 
Newspapers at the time reported that children as young as ten years were killing people in 
the Pietermaritzburg areas, and it was feared that the war was spawning a generation of 
hardened killers. This observation resulted in community leaders  calling for the urgent 
establishment of rehabilitation programmes for the thousands of children who were 
‘roaming wild’, witnessing brutal mob murders, copying their elders and playing violent 
games.17  
 
 By this time, schools were affected by the lack of teachers. Many teachers were reported 
to be seeking employment somewhere else (especially those from rural Vulindlela), 
where people belonged to the Inkatha movement, while teachers who taught in these 
schools came from Edendale and Imbali, and belonged to unions that were affiliated to 
COSATU and the ANC. Large numbers of children were reported to be on the run and 
others were abandoned by parents who fled in fear of their lives. According to the 
Council of Churches that met in the Midlands, children had been “so badly traumatised 
they [might] never recover.” “We are deeply concerned about children who have been 
drawn into the violence. Some are only eight years old”, said Reverend Ben Nsimbi, a 
Methodist minister from Georgetown, a township in the Edendale valley. Many children 
were seriously damaged psychologically: some reacted by becoming fearful but others 
turned highly aggressive. By that time, children less than ten years old were emulating 
their parents and adopting violence as an exciting new game (like stabbing, verbally 
abusive insults, destroying property, using vulgar terminology and petrol bombing). 
Reverend Musa Zondi commented then, saying, “[…] their future is being permanently 
paralysed by what they are learning now.”18  
 
The violence disrupted normal family life and destroyed the fabric of society. At the most 
impressionable and sensitive age, children got used to seeing people being brutally killed. 
16Sunday Tribune, 21 February 1988. 
17Sunday Tribune, 21 February 1988. 
18Interview of Sunday Tribute with Rev. Musa Zondi of Inkatha, Sunday Tribune, 21 February 1988. 
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They were being subjected to things they should never have experienced at that age. Mr 
Musa Zondi compared the situation in Pietermaritzburg with those in Beirut and Northern 
Ireland, “where you see children throwing stones even though they don’t understand the 
conflict”. Peter Kerchhoff, organiser for the Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social 
Awareness (PACSA), said that children were being psychologically traumatised and 
undoubtedly needed care. Others were proposing rehabilitation but there was doubt 
whether the rehabilitation programmes would work while violence and injustice 
continued. There was a need to end the violence first. 
 
“The children are scared because they can see the adults are scared. People really do not 
know what is happening,”19 said one woman in Elandskop. This woman was suffering 
the anguish of being a parent in a troubled area. Many people were frightened, especially 
at night, “when a knock at the door could set your heart racing.”20 Families had taken to 
sleeping in the veld for fear that their homes would be set aflame in the night. The 
woman in Elandskop said she had taken three young children, whose parents left them in 
the care of relatives as they worked in other areas, to her employer’s home where they 
had stayed for a week until things had calmed down in Elandskop. Many children were 
getting lost in the ensuing confusion and some were being sent to relatives in more 
peaceful areas. The numbers of children who were being killed in the turmoil are largely 
unrecorded. The plight of children amidst that turmoil was an area of grave concern to the 
monitors.21 
 
A thirteen year old boy from Edendale said he had left home (presumably the crown rural 
area of Pietermaritzburg) about three months before when political tensions had 
prompted him to take to the streets with his friends. 
 
 I had to make a choice between my friends, who are politically active in 
organisations such as UDF, and the traditions of my family. My father is a chief 
19Anonymous informant interviewed by Sunday Tribune journalist in Vulindlela, 21 February 1988. 
20Anonymous informant interviewed by Sunday Tribune journalist in Vulindlela, 21 February 1988. 
21Reports from the 24-hour Monitoring Group of the Midlands Crisis Relief Committee - 25 March to 28 
July 1990” is available in the Alan Paton Collection in Pietermaritzburg. 
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and an Inkatha member. I have no fight with either organisation but even 
friendships become political and at home my loyalties were continually 
questioned. It was easier to leave although this has meant quitting school.22 
 
 In a statement issued by the institute for clinical psychology in September 1988, 
psychologists expressed concern that the damage to people resulting from the unrest 
would impair mental health for generations. 
 
3.6 Literature review on violence and its impact on children 
 
In the course of my research, I have found that academic and journalistic articles written 
on the political violence’s effect on children.23 All these authors agree that violence had 
negative impact on families; as a result children were seriously affected. To mention a 
few of these works: a report compiled by John Aitchison entitled “Political Violence in 
the Natal Midlands: Reports from the 24-hour Monitoring Group of the Midlands Crisis 
Relief Committee- 25 March to 28 July 1990”24 is available in the Alan Paton Collection 
in Pietermaritzburg. Matthew Kentridge focused on political violence in 
Pietermaritzburg.25 Philippe Denis concentrated on the political violence in the area of 
KwaNxamalala.26 Few authors have highlighted the role of inter-generational tensions, 
with young people more inclined to take a militant line and elders upholding traditional 
22Sunday Tribune, 21 February 1988. 
23See John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, The role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization, ed., in Ran Greenstein 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. S. Stavrou, “Underdevelopment: Natal’s Formula for 
Conflict”, Indicator SA 7/3 (Autumn 1990), 52-56.  Anthony Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in 
Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1990); Rupert 
Taylor and Mark Shaw, “The Natal Conflict”, in John Brewer ed., Restructuring South Africa (London: St. 
Martin Press, 1994), 35-52; A Johnston, “Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal”, in W. Gutteridge and  
J. Spence eds., Violence in Southern Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 78, 107. Anthea Jeffery, The Natal 
Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997). 
24See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars 
of the 1990s”. 
25Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
26Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-
1992)” 64-94, Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24 - 25. 
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tribal authority.27My previous research in KwaShange looked into the issue of 
generational tensions and relationships between fathers and sons.28  
 
As I have shown, much academic research has been done on political violence in the 
Natal Midlands, but very little of this work reflects on the experiences of children. It was 
in newspaper reports that reference is made to the status of children at the time of civil 
war. There are predictions that “[Children’s] future is being permanently paralysed by 
what they are learning now […]” Of the contemporary writers, only Denis, who was 
dealing with AIDS and grief in general, related his findings to the immense social 
disruption of the civil conflict.29 One result of the civil war and its attendant social 
breakdowns has been the AIDS epidemic. Denis’s book tells of the work done among 
AIDS orphans in KwaZulu Natal through the use of ‘memory boxes’, which aim to build 
greater resilience in children and child-headed households, where both parents have been 
lost to AIDS. The Memory Box-project allows the children and their care givers to make 
use of narrative (story-telling) to recount the memories that they have of their parents 
(both the good and the bad). It allows them to articulate, analyse, understand, and move 
through these memories. In doing so, the children are given a far greater resilience to 
cope with their past, make choices in their present life, and form a new future. I will deal 
with this issue in detail in a separate chapter. 
 
 
27See Guelke, “Interpretation of Political Violence during South Africa’s Transition”, 248. For a study of 
young people involved in political violence in Natal, see Ari Sitas, “The Making of the ‘Comrades’ 
Movement in Natal, 1985-91”, Journal of Southern African Studies 18/3 (September 1992), 629-41. See 
also Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of 
Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)” in T. Shefer et al eds., From Boys to Men: Social 
Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2007); see also Catherine 
Campbell, “Learning to Kill?: Masculinity, the Family and Violence in Natal”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 18/3 (1992)”, 614-28.  
28Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of 
Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer et al eds., From Boys to Men: Social 
Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2007).  
29Philippe Denis, Never Too Small to Remember: Memory Work and Resilience in Times of AIDS 
(Pietermaritzburg Cluster Publications, 2005). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
In this autobiography, I have attempted not to edit out references to my emotions. My 
autobiography gave me space to constitute myself in more complex terms. I hope the 
reader will detect any exaggerations of the sort that have been argued by Michael 
Sprinker and others.30 As traumatic as the experience of which I speak was, I hardly think 
it an area of self-aggrandizement.  
 
30 Michael Sprinker, The Writings of Nietzsche, the precursor of Freud, (1980), 338. 
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Chapter Four 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KWASHANGE AS PART OF 





A number of authors have written about Natal and Zululand, of which Vulindlela, 
formerly known as Zwartkop, was later a part.2 There is consensus amongst historians 
and anthropologists that the Midlands had occupants even before ‘the white men 
came.’3 Some historians have published the recent history of the area and given more 
attention to Vulindlela than Natal and Zululand.4 Beside these historical writings, 
some authors have written novels about the Midlands.5 However, none of these 
1The ‘Z’ was no doubt softened to an ‘S’ when the early Voortrekkers of the 1840s, who named the 
mountain, changed from High-Dutch or Netherlands to Low-Dutch or Afrikaans. The indigenous name 
for the mountain is Mbubu. Mbubu is the name of the grass used in the roof of Zulu huts or rondavels. 
2John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in John Laband and Robert Haswell eds., 
Pietermaritzburg,1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal 
Press, 1988);  see also John Laband and Paul Thompson, “The Reduction of Zululand, 1874-1904,” in 
Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest eds., Natal and Zululand from the Earliest Times to 1910: A New 
History (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1989), 223. See also John Lambert, Betrayed 
Trust: Africans and the State in Colonial Natal (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1995), 36. 
John Laband and Robert Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City 
(Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1988), 18-21. Adam Kuper, “The ‘House’ and Zulu 
Political Structure in the Nineteenth Century”, Journal of African History, 34 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), 469-487. Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: Civil War in Zululand 1879-
1884 (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1994). Trevor Wills, “Segregation, Separation and 
Desegregation: Pietermaritzburg since 1910”, in B. Guest and J. Sellers eds., Receded Tides of Empire: 
Aspect of the Economic and Social History of Natal and Zululand Since 1910 (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of Natal Press, 1994). Colin Webb and John Wright, The James Stuart Archives, 1-5 
(Durban, Killie Campbell Africana Library and Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1975-
2001).  
3A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, As They Were before the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter 
and Shooter, 1949); see also John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell, 
(eds.) Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of 
Natal Press, 1988) and T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town, T. V. Bulpin) 341. See 
also interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 10 July 2008. 
4Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala 
(1987-1992)” 64-94, Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25. See also Mxolisi Mchunu, 
“Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in 
Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. Shabalala and R. Buikema eds.,  
From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society,  (Cape Town, 2007) 
5Sibusiso Nyambezi, Inkinsela yaseMgungundlovu (The Rich Man of Pietermaritzburg) (Shuter and 
Shooter, 1961). This novel was written by Nyembezi in 1961, and is set some years earlier in rural 
northern Natal. The rich man of Pietermaritzburg tells the story of a con man coming from 
Pietermaritzburg and trying to cheat the locals in rural Nyanyadu, in the Dundee area of northern Natal. 
The central characters are the family of Zeph Mkhwanazi, his son, daughter and his wife, maNtuli. 
They have been selected by Ndebenkulu for a scam which he hopes will cheat many of the locals out of 
precious herds of cattle. It is the younger, more educated, people who see through Mr Ndebenkulu first. 
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historians, anthropologists and writers of historical novels have written about the 
history of KwaShange location. KwaShange was a single area falling within the 
Vulindlela Magisterial district of KwaZulu.6 The area received an influx of people 
after the Native Land Act of 1913 and again after the Group Areas Act of 1950.7 This 
latter act, declaring that different population groups were to live in separate 
geographical areas, was formally implemented in Pietermaritzburg in 1960, through a 
series of proclamations.8 Segregation between African and white colonists, however, 
was deeply rooted in a long history of dispossession of land rights from Africans, 
beginning with the Native Land Act of 1913.9 Trevor Wills points out that 
accountability for the apartheid city of today does not simply lie with the post-1948 
authorities.10 By the time of the implementation of the Group Areas Act, Africans 
mostly lived beyond the Pietermaritzburg city borders. In terms of forced removals, it 
was the Indian population of the city that was most severely affected.11 However, 
Africans were not unaffected. Those living in the Hilton area were forced to move to 
‘designated African areas’, such as Vulindlela, leaving land and homes that had been 
in their families for generations.12  
 
I have always wondered why KwaShange, in particular, is called by many older 
residents “Isigodi sokuphola” (The Valley of Peace). This appellation is also given to 
Their natural respect for their elders is tested by Ndebenkulu’s patronising manner and rudeness and 
they cannot help being amused by his name (which means the one endowed with long lips), and his 
protruding tooth. And they are suspicious of his get-rich-quick schemes (this book became a SABC TV 
and radio drama). See also Kenneth Bhengu, Uphuya waseMshwathi (The Poor Man of Mshwathi) 
(Shuter and Shooter, 1983). This book is about migration from a rural environment to the city. Bhengu 
was a Zulu writer of historical novels that focussed primarily on aristocratic Zulu culture.  
6Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: A Study of the Changing Patterns of fatherhood 
of Three Generations of Zulu Fathers and Sons in KwaShange, Inadi, Vulindlela area of 
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal from 1930s to the 1990s”, MA thesis (Durban, UKZN, 2005). 
See also John Laband and Robert Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an 
African City (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1988), 18-21. 
7Trevor Wills, D. Davis and R. Haswell, Maritzburg after the Group Areas Act (Pietermaritzburg, 
University of Natal, 1987), 296.   
8Trevor Wills, D. Davis and R. Haswell, Maritzburg after the Group Areas Act (Pietermaritzburg, 
University of Natal, 1987), 296.   
9Mahomed Moosa Motala, “The Group Areas Act and the Effect of the Proclamations made in 
Pietermaritzburg Environs”, (Paper presented at ‘The Group Areas Conference, held in 
Pietermaritzburg on 28 and 29 January, 1961).   
10Trevor Wills, “A Study of Intra-Urban Residential Mobility in Pietermaritzburg, 1970-1972”, MA 
thesis, Geography (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal, 1976). 
11Mahomed Moosa Motala, The Group Areas Act and the Effect of the Proclamations made in 
Pietermaritzburg Environs (Paper presented at ‘The Group Areas Conference’, held in Pietermaritzburg 
on 28 and 29 January, 1961).   
12Beverley Haddad, “African Women’s Theology of Survival: Intersecting Faith, Feminisms and 
Development”, PhD thesis (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN, 2000). 
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the whole area of Vulindlela. When asked why this area is so called, the collective 
local knowledge of the elders is that many of the clans and families inhabited the area 
while fleeing from their areas of origin because of wars or faction fights, while others 
were escaping from farms because of the strict labour-tenancy laws imposed by white 
farmers on them in 1913.13 For most people who live there now, and who lived there 
in 1990, the area of Vulindlela is a new home, where refugees can find peace. The 
irony of this name has continued to puzzle me: ‘Isigodi sokuphola’. How can this area 
now be associated with peace? It was the area from which violence and civil war 
spread during the 1980s and 1990s and engulfed the entire district. Did refugees 
fleeing from unrest elsewhere bring with them their initial penchant for rebellion 
against conditions elsewhere? Did the violence occur because few families had 
longstanding ties to other families in the area? These are themes I shall explore.  
 
In conducting research in the area, I have concluded that the phrase: Isigodi 
sokuphola, as applied to KwaShange, is an ideal scenario, but one that those displaced 
there may never attain in reality. Those fleeing there were not to find the peace they 
desired. The history of the area extends from battles that affected all Zulus, nationally, 
to small localised tensions that affected neighbours and kinship groups only. They can 
be grouped as follows: 
 
• The Mfecane or, as many historians now prefer to call them, the wars between 
indigenous peoples and, at times, the Voortrekkers, in the early to mid- 
nineteenth century. 
• The intrusion of the Voortrekkers into Natal and the Transvaal and conflicts 
with the British (c1830-40s). 
• The British annexation of the Colony of Natal and Shepstone’s “Location 
system” and proclamation of “Zwartkop” (mid-19th century). 
• The Native Land Act (1913) and the administration of “Native” areas with 
chiefdoms and customary law. 
• The apartheid era (1948–1994) and the establishment of the homelands of 
KwaZulu, circa 1975-199414, which included the migrations and clan faction 
13Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. Interview with Manciza Zondi, 
KwaShange, 15 March 2010. 
14KwaZulu was a homeland or Bantustan that did not take ‘independence’. 
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fights (c.1960s); the establishment of the Inkatha Movement (c.1970s); the 
armed-struggle (c.1980s) between the UDF and the ANC (c.1980s-1990s). 
• The first democratic elections of 1994 and the years of democracy. 
 
This chapter will give details of these epochs and how they affected the KwaShange 
area, with the object of determining the roots of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s 
within this complex history, where there has been ceaseless unrest, despite the search 
by the residents for refuge and peace. 
 
The area called KwaShange in the Location of Zwartkop only came to be named in 
the early 1900s. This chapter seeks to give the background to the history of 
KwaShange, much of which is unrecorded. I shall start by giving the background of 
the Zwarkop Location and how the area was before ‘the white men came’.15 For this I 
depend on an oral interview I had with Sungubeza Madondo, fourth generation 
descendant of Nobhiyane Madondo, King Shaka’s diviner16 and with Manciza Zondi, 
the only living descendent of the section of the Zondi clan which left Ngome, near 
Greytown, before the Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906.17 This group came to the area, 
later called Edendale, in the 1820s, but were relocated to Zwartkop, in the Inadi area, 
which is part of Vulindlela district today.18 I also depend on an interview I had with 
an elderly woman, MaZamisa Shange, who was married to a son of the first Shange 
clan, which moved to Zwartkop in the early 1900s when escaping from Ngomankulu 
(near Richmond) because of faction fights.19  
 
In the light of the above, I concur with Beverly Haddad20, when she says that the 
Vulindlela area history is unrecorded. I quote from her PhD thesis: 
15Phrase borrowed from A. T. Bryant A, The Zulu People, As they were Before the White Man Came 
(Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1949). 
16Interview with Sungubezi Madondo, Entembeni, 11 April 2010. 
17Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
18John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
19Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. Interview with Senzosenkosi 
Mkhize, Richmond, 10 April 2010. 
20For details of the geographical and social study of the area of Vulindlela, see Beverley Haddad, 
“African Women’s Theology of Survival: Intersecting Faith, Feminisms and Development”, PhD 
thesis, (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN, 2000) and Sinomlando Centre, Oral History project in which some 
parts of Vulindlela district are discussed. See also Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: 
A Study of the Changing Patterns of Fatherhood of Three Generations of Zulu fathers and Sons in 
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People of Zwartkop Location have no written history. Their history remains in 
the hearts of those who live there and increasingly in the spirits of their 
ancestors! Geographically and socially it epitomises the South African context 
where the forces of colonialism, racism, and apartheid raged unabated until 
1994. Their untold histories are one of subjugation and control and suffering 
as they struggled to ensure their children survived.21 
 
Scholars who have explored the history of Natal and Zululand agree that there were 
people living in Zwartkop before the arrival of colonists. Before this area became 
Pietermaritzburg, it was called Mgungundlovu.22 The word is stated to have been 
interpreted by Henry Francis Fynn, one of the first pioneers in Natal, as “the place of 
the elephant.” This was a reference to the Zulu king Dingane, one of whose kraals had 
borne the name. T. V. Bulpin described Mgungundlovu in the 1800s as full of misty 
hills that ‘are beautiful and gently and as full of moods as the face of a maiden’.23 
 
The story of the human beings who settled among these hills is varied - full of 
humour, achievements, personal tragedies, hopes, trials and disappointments. 
‘Let us roam at will among these midlands hills and watch the human play 
enacted in their green setting, for it provides both a diversion and a study of all 
the good and ill of which man’s nature is capable.’24 
 
Some accounts of the history of the Mgungundlovu area portray the area as if it had 
never been occupied. John Wright made the following observations about 
Mgungundlovu, of which Zwartkop was later to become a part:  
 
(T)he intrusion of Boer pastoralists into the region of the Drakensberg in the 
late 1830s, the emergence of the Republic of Natalia, and the establishment of 
KwaShange, Inadi, Vulindlela area of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s to the 1990s”, 
MA thesis (Durban: UKZN, 2005). 
21Beverley Haddad, “African Women’s Theology of Survival: Intersecting Faith, Feminisms and 
Development”, PhD Thesis (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN, 2000). 
22T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town: T. V. Bulpin), 341. See also John Wright, 
“Before Mgungundlovu”, B. Haddad, “African Women’s Theology of Survival: Intersecting Faith, 
Feminisms and Development”, PhD thesis (Pietermaritzburg: UKZN, 2000). 
23T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town: T. V. Bulpin), 341. 
24T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town: T. V. Bulpin), 341. 
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Pietermaritzburg as its capital, have too often been seen as having occurred in 
a demographic and political vacuum.25  
 
Voortrekkers penetrated into a region that had largely been depopulated by the 
Mfecane wars in the 1820s.26 Most historical accounts describe the dealings from 
1837 onwards of the Voortrekkers with the Zulu kingdom to the north of the Thukela 
River and with the British hunter-traders at Port Natal.27 Bryant lists numbers of clans 
coming from this very area. They were pushed out by the Mfecane and the 
Voortrekkers moved into that vacuum.28 When the Mfecane destabilisation had 
subsided these clans returned to reclaim their land and Shepstone placed them in 
locations, some of which had the same peoples again.29   
 
The existing recorded history pays little attention to the interaction that took place 
between Voortrekkers and local African communities in this area, or to the prior 
25John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband  and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
26 Thompson Leonard, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press,1990). 
27Reins M.J. de Haan, Mission on the Margin: A Case Study on Reformed Mission Prospects in 
eNkumane, KwaZulu-Natal (Dorpspruit: Cluster Publications, 2010). See also John Wright, “Before 
Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an 
African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
28The story of the Mfecane is controversial; even today historians who studied the event have not 
reconciled the contradicting views about the turmoil. Fynn, who was close to Shaka, claims on no 
evidence whatsoever that Shaka slaughtered a million people. Such exaggeration suited colonial 
notions of black self-destructive violence; the idea that the region had been depopulated by Shaka 
gelled with settlers’ desire for uncontested land. The image of a landscape littered with human bones, 
launched by Nathaniel Isaacs, persists as a melodramatic icon of Shaka’s reign, even into the most 
respected of modern histories, such as Leonard Thompson. Similarly, the early historian George Theal 
arbitrarily upped the number of dead to two million. These exaggerations spawned the concept of the 
Mfecane (usually translated as the crushing): the notion that Shaka had been solely responsible for an 
explosion of aggression which sent neighbouring tribes scattering and marauding over most of the sub-
continent. The Mfecane became the historiographical sibling of the Great Trek: where the tribes 
displaced by Shaka had ended up provided the basis for Bantustans (areas allocated under apartheid to 
black people). The issue of depopulated land has long been exploded as myth (see Shula Marks in 
History Today, January 1980. Andrew Duminy and Bill Guest eds., Natal and Zululand from the 
Earliest Times to 1910: A New History (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1989), xxix, 489 
state that Caroline Hamilton and John Wright, in their revisionist study of Mfecane theory analyses 
historical figures such as Shaka. The controversy concerning the intensification of the conflict over 
resources is articulated in various ways by such writers as M. Gluckman, J. D. Omer-Cooper and Jeff 
Guy, but remains unresolved.  
29Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, 7: The Native Reserves of Natal 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2-3. A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, as they were before 
the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1949). See also Colen Webb and John 
Wright, The James Stuart Archives, 1-5 (Durban, Killie Campbell Africana Library and 
Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1975-2001). 
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history of these communities.30 The testimony of Mancinza Zondi, a surviving 
descendent of Mancinza Zondi (father of Bhambatha Zondi, the ‘rebel’ leader of the 
1906 Uprising, who lived at Engome, Greytown), confirms Bryant and Wright’s claim 
that there is evidence that the region which is now called Pietermaritzburg and 
Edendale did have resident African peoples ‘before the white men came.’ The 
establishment of a Voortrekker community in Pietermaritzburg can be set in the 
context of local history, rather than exclusively in the white settlers’ version.  
 
Wright observes that the valley of the Msunduzi, where Pietermaritzburg now stands, 
and the area to the west and south, was occupied by a group of Nqondo chiefdoms. 
According to some traditions, the section of the Nqondo who lived on the site of the 
city and in its immediate environs (like Edendale) was since about 1820 under a 
woman chief named Machibise ka Mlithwa, or kaMlifa (according to my informant, 
she was a daughter of Dlaba)31, her name survives today as the designation for part of 
Edendale.32  
 
Wright states that towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
nineteenth, the struggle for supremacy among large African states emerging north of 
the Thukela was intensifying. From time to time the southward flight of refugee 
communities brought these conflicts to the attention of the inhabitants of Natal, but 
until the late 1810s they remained largely undisturbed by the political events taking 
place in the regions across the river.33 
 
In about 1819, the victory of the Zulu under Shaka over the Ndwandwe of Zwide ka 
Langa sent large numbers of refugees spilling across the Mzinyathi (Buffalo) River 
into northern Natal. The Bhele and Zizi inhabitants of this region fled southwards 
through the Natal Midlands into East Griqualand and beyond, breaking up the 
chiefdoms which they encountered. A year or so later a large group of Thembu fled 
30A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, as They were before the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter 
and Shooter, 1949). 
31Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
32John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988), see also  
T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town: T. V. Bulpin), 341. 
33John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988), 15. 
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from the lower Mzinyathi, where they escaped subjugation under the Zulu, and forced 
their way through the Midlands and southern Natal across the Mzimkhulu. Soon 
afterwards their former neighbours, the Chunu, followed suit. A short while later, 
chiefdoms in the northern Midlands, also driven by fear of the Zulu, formed a military 
alliance and fled in a body through the already shattered communities to the south.34  
 
It was not until after the death of Shaka in 1828 and the establishment of a new Zulu 
regime under Dingane that a few small communities began to re-establish themselves 
in central and southern Natal. Predominant among them was a group of Nhlangwini, 
under Fodo ka Nombewu.35 These people had originally lived between the lower 
Mtshezi and Mpofana Rivers, but had fled during the upheavals of the early 1820s.36 
In the course of nearly a decade of struggling for an existence in southern Natal and 
East Griqualand they had managed to preserve their cohesion as a group better than 
most other refugee groups had. By 1830 they had settled on the middle reaches of the 
Mkhomazi River and were trading ivory with the British hunter-traders who had been 
operating from Port Natal (later Durban) since 1824.37 In the early 1830s they came 
under the hegemony of the Zulu king Dingane who, to avoid conflict with the British 
traders at Port Natal, was withdrawing his garrisons and cattle posts from the 
coastlands south of the Thukela and, to compensate, was beginning to extend effective 
Zulu authority over parts of the interior of Natal. In 1835, when Captain Allen 
Gardiner visited Fodo at his great place, Dumazulu, the Nhlangwini chiefdom 
numbered several thousand inhabitants.38 
 
34John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988).  
35 T. V. Bulpin, Natal and the Zulu Country (Cape Town, T. V. Bulpin), 341. See also A. T. Bryant, 
The Zulu People, as they were before the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 
1949). John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 
1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988).  
36A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, as They Were before the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter 
and Shooter, 1949). John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., 
Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal 
Press, 1988).”, and Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
37A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, as They Were before the White Man Came (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter 
and Shooter, 1949).  
38Siyabonga Mkhize, Uhlanga LwaSembo: The History of the Embo People (Durban: Just Done 
Production, 2007), 35. See also A. T. Bryant, The Zulu People, as They Were before the White Man 
Came, (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter and Shooter, 1949). John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. 
Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
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Two smaller groups which established themselves in the southern Midlands in the 
early 1830s were a section of Mpumuza under a regent, Yenge kaNontshiza, who 
acted for the young chief Nobanda kaNgwane; and a section of the related Nxamalala 
(Zuma) under Lugaju kaMatomela.39 Fear of the Zulu under Dingane had led them to 
separate from their respective parent chiefdoms, whose territories both lay near the 
confluence of the Mooi and Thukela Rivers, and to migrate southwards together. 
After many vicissitudes they found a refuge among the forests of the Zwartkop 
region, where they became tributaries of the Nhlangwini.40 In those years a section of 
the Fuze tribe, under Madlenya kaMahawule, was allocated land by Fodo near what is 
now Boston, after a succession dispute had impelled them to leave the Fuze territory 
near Greytown. Slightly later arrivals were the Zondi (or Nadi), who moved from near 
the Mooi-Thukela confluence for reasons which are not recorded. Under their chief, 
Dlaba ka Nomagaga, they were settled by Fodo in the Zwartkop region near their 
genealogically junior relatives, the Mpumuza. A hundred and fifty years later, all four 
of these groups still have a presence in Vulindlela.41 
 
The area which was later to be called Vulindlela had its place in Zulu history. About 
30 kilometres from Pietemaritzburg city there is a valley called Ntembeni; part of the 
original Zwartkop, that included KwaShange. In the Ntembeni valley there is the 
grave of King Shaka’s isangoma [diviner] and on the west of Ntembeni there is an 
area called KwaMpande [the Place of Mpande], named after Shaka’s half-brother, 
King Mpande. 
 
 I have made the point that the area which will be my focus in this study is one which 
was settled, in the not very distant past, by refugees from conflicts elsewhere. I shall 
now give a detailed account of one such refugee and his family who settled there, 
after a traumatic conflict and a long pursuit by enemies. His story was available to 
39Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala 
(1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25. See also John Wright, “Before 
Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an 
African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988), and Interview with Manciza Zondi, 
KwaShange, 14 March 2010.  
40John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
41Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala 
(1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25. See also John Wright, “Before 
Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-1988: A New Portrait of an 
African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988).   
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me, because his descendants survive and recounted it to me, but it may be seen as 
representative of the backgrounds of many present-day residents in the area. The tale 
goes that King Shaka was sceptical of diviners, for whom he had developed distrust. 
When there was drought in Zululand, the toll of disease and death caused massive 
social and economic dislocation, which impelled Shaka to take a hard line against 
diviners who idly blamed others for natural catastrophes. According to Mpitikazi, 
“Shaka took the blood of a beast and sprinkled it in the doorway in his isigodlo during 
the night, without being seen by anyone.”42 This act was intended to put diviners to 
the test. The next morning, he ordered his izinduna [head men] to gather all doctors 
and people of the land at the capital, Bulawayo. As Mpukane recounted, the diviners 
“smell out people in various directions.” Only a few doctors, Mleku, Mbube, Mehlo 
and Nkuna, led by Nobhiyane Madondo, were exceptions. In their metaphoric jargon, 
they concurred that the sprinklings of blood were not “the work of a man”, but that of 
“the heavens”.43 They were held in high repute for correctly ‘smelling-out’ the king as 
the culprit. The rest of the diviners were executed, in full view of the masses, as a 
deterrence.44  
 
This is a commonly known tale in the history of Shaka and the Zulu nation, yet it 
sounds more like myth than fact. It may well be an event that never happened or a 
story that was told by the colonial writers, wanting to show that Shaka was cruel to 
his people because the story ends when Shaka killed all the diviners who told lies 
about who had splattered the blood. The story, however, ceases to sound like pure 
myth once one meets the descendents of King Shaka’s diviner and listens to the story 
of Nobhiyana Madondo, as told by his fourth generation descendent.45 And seeing the 
grave of Nobhiyana Madondo deep inside the forests on the mountain of Ntembeni in 
Vulindlela makes the tale sound factual. The family tells that the former KwaZulu 
chief minister and champion of the Zulu language and culture, Chief Mangosuthu 
42Colin Webb and John Wright eds., The James Stuart Archives, 1, (25 July 1919), 9.   
43Colin Webb and John Wright eds., The James Stuart Archives, 1, evidence by Mpukane: 18 March 
1909, 331. (Italicized in the original). ‘Man’ implied any ordinary person, including a wizard. 
‘Heavens’ was used as an expression for Shaka.  
44Collen Webb and John Wright eds., The James Stuart Archives, 1, evidence by Nongila: (19 
February, 1903), 195.  
45Interview with Sungubezi Madondo, 14 April 2010. 
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Buthelezi, was eager to see the grave of the ‘hero’, whom he had heard about from his 
royal family and he decided to unveil the tombstone in 1983.46  
 
Anger that Nobhiyane alone had prevailed caused a plan to assassinate him to be 
made. This was the beginning of the flight of Nobhiyane and his family. He sought 
refuge in Mvoti near Greytown. After a short period, his enemies found that he had 
settled in Mvoti, and they resumed their hunt for him. This resulted in Nobhiyane 
fleeing from Mvoti to Mtshezi, near Estcourt, to where his enemies followed him. He 
and his family landed in Mgungundlovu, in an area that later became Ntembeni. 
When Nobhiyane and his family sought refuge in Zwartkop he built two homesteads, 
one in the Ntembeni area, where his descendents are still living and where he is 
buried, and the other homestead in Nadi, which was later occupied by the Zondi clan 
from Ngome near Greytown. It is said that Nobhiyane built two homesteads because 
he did not want his enemies to find him easily.47  
 
 
Photograph of the grave with tombstone inscription: “A memorial to Nobhiyana 
Madondo, the celebrated diviner of King Shaka’s days.”48 
46Interview with family members of the Madondo clan, Ntembeni, 14 April 2010. 
47Interview with Sondubezi Madondo, Ntembeni, 14 April 2010. 
48This memorial was unveiled by the honourable Prince Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, chief minister of 
KwaZulu, president of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe and patron of the Bureau for Zulu, Language and 
Culture, on 12 November 1983. The erection of this memorial was financed by a contribution from the 
Bureau for Zulu Language and Culture and the descendants of Nobhiyana Madondo. 
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In Vulindlela there is a village still called KwaMpande, named after King Mpande. 
Two versions are given by informants as to why the area was named after this king. 
The first is that the Zondi clan arrived in the area during Mpande’s reign. The clan 
had had a long relationship with the Zulu royal house. The naming relates to the 
Zondi clan honouring Mpande at the time of settlement.49 The second version of the 
naming is that chief Langalibalele of the Hlubi clan was in hiding in what was then 
Zwartkop. He had refused to submit to the Zulu monarchs, thus making Mpande his 
adversary.  The story goes that Mpande’s warriors went there with the aim of 
attacking Langalibalele, who was hiding there. The area was then named after 
Mpande, because his troops settled there for a short period of time, hiding in caves 
and along river banks, waiting to ambush Langalibalele and his people. I find it 
difficult to accept this version. There is recorded evidence, in at least four records50, 
that there was tension between the Hlubi nation under Langalibalele and the Zulu 
nation, caused by the strength and independence displayed by the Hlubi nation. The 
amaHlubi, whose historical name was imiHuhu, were historically the largest clan in 
south east Africa.  
 
In Bishop Colenso’s records, taken during the trial, Langalibalele’s son, Mango, 
testified that “Langalibalele said he was King, and could not obey the [to attend a 
magistrate’s court] summons”51, while in John Wright and A. Manson it is reported 
that ‘as early as 1852, when only in his mid thirties, Langalibalele sent an envoy in to 
Pietermaritzburg to remind Shepstone (the Governor) that he was a great and 
influential Chief (read King) who resented having to put up with threats from the local 
magistrate.52 There were fears that Langalibalele’s general defiance, his independence 
and possession of firearms, were a security threat to the Colony’s white community. 
Rumour was that Langalibalele was collecting guns for the purpose of planning a 
rebellion. Given his prominence, it was a threat the British could not take lightly. 
Learning of the intention of the colonial government to attack his tribe and arrest him, 
49Interview with induna Khulekani Hadebe, KwaMpande, 24 April 2010. Interview with Chief 
Sondelani Zondi, KwaNkosi, 25 April 2010. Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 
2010. 
50T. V. Bulpin, The Annals of Natal, 141, see also A. T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal 
(chapter 7), 147, see also N. Herd, The Bent Pine (Ravan: 1976), 2. 
51Jeff Guy, The View Across the River: Harriette Colenso and the Zulu Struggle against Imperialism 
(Cape Town: David Philips Publishers: 2003). 
52John Wright and A. Manson, “The Hlubi Chiefdom in Zululand-Natal: A History” (Ladysmith, Natal: 
Ladysmith Historical Society, 1983), x, 94. 
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he planned his escape with some of his troops. This act was to be considered by the 
colonial administration as an act of treason. Langalibalele was exiled to Cape Town 
until 1887, when he was allowed to return to Natal and resettle in the Zwartkop area 
under some form of house arrest. History records that Mpande was the king of the 
Zulu nation from 1840 to 1872. By the time Langalibalele was under house arrest in 
Zwartkop in 1887, Mpande was no longer king. Because of this fact, the first version 
sounds more accurate. These were the first noted cases of the area being a refuge for 
peoples fleeing from elsewhere, thus getting the name of Valley of Peace. Their 
descendants, as I shall show, retain some of the fears and distrust of others which they 
inherit from their ancestors. 
 




53See attached map (Zwarkop 4669), which shows the KwaShange area in relation to neighbouring 
areas, roads, railway line and Msunduzi River, copied from Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, 
Natal Regional Survey, 7: The Native Reserves of Natal (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957). 
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KwaShange is still a largely rural area, about 25 kilometres from Pietermaritzburg, in 
the Midlands of the province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. KwaShange is a small 
village in the Inadi part of the Vulindlela area, falling under the jurisdiction of Chief 
Sondelani Zondi. This area was one of the earliest of the Natal locations, gazetted by 
Lieutenant-Governor West on 7 April 184954. It was named Zwartkop. 
 
Historically, the first location in Natal (Natal at this early date was a colony of 
Great Britain. Zululand was the area across the Tugela River toward the 
coast.) was the ‘Zwartkop’ location near Pietermaritzburg, which was 
demarcated in November 1846 for about 8, 000 Zulus, 3, 000 of whom were 
under chiefs who were “original occupiers of the localities.”55 
 
The proclamation was the result of the Natal Native Commission of 1846-7, under a 
policy that became known as the ‘Shepstone Policy’, one that was “criticized for 
having gathered the Natives together, and left them to stagnate under a re-created 
tribalism.”56 Because of economic restraints, Shepstone “made the best of things.” To 
quote the Natal Regional Survey:  
 
Having no officers to rule, he [Shepstone] rebuilt the shattered tribes and ruled 
through their chiefs. Inevitably he recognised Native customary law. By the 
1850s the pattern of Reserve policy in Natal was fixed, the part of the 1846-7 
Commission in it being the acceptance of the principle of large but scattered 
and the sitting of some of the more important among them.57 
 
Around the 1970s, the Nationalist government instituted their homeland policy, and 
the area then became known as the Vulindlela Magisterial District, under the 
KwaZulu administration, stationed in far-away Ulundi. The Zulu homeland 
government of the apartheid era refused to take independence. After South Africa’s 
54Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: The Study of Changing Patterns of Fatherhood 
of Three Generations of Zulu Fathers and Sons in KwaShange, Inadi, KwaVulindela Area of 
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s to the 1990s”, MA thesis (Durban: UKZN 2005), 5. 
55Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, 7: The Native Reserves of Natal 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3-4. 
56Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, 7: The Native Reserves of Natal 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2-3. 
57Edgar Harry Brookes and Nathan Hurwitz, Natal Regional Survey, 7: The Native Reserves of Natal 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3-4. 
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first democratic elections in 1994, the area was once again absorbed into the province 
of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
It needs to be stated that any rural area falling under a chief was, until the 
promulgation of the South African Constitution in 1996, and still is to an extent, 
subject to African customary law (formerly termed the Natal Code), which covered 
the laws in the locations of this province (before 1975 these areas were termed 
Locations if they fell within the borders of Natal and Reserves if falling within the 
area of Zululand). These laws are essentially those of traditional Zulu culture itself, 
although there have been notable amendments.  
 
KwaShange has remained predominantly rural, and the population comprises both 
Methodists, who were historically associated with the mission at Edendale58, and who 
are still termed amaKholwa (Believers), and those who regard themselves as largely 
traditionalist Zulu, subject to a chief and his izinduna [headmen]. N. J. van Warmelo’s 
1933 survey lists these initial inhabitants of Nguni or Zulu origins as the Zondi, 
Ximba (Mlaba), Mafunze (Ngcobo) and Nxamalala (Zuma).59 The family surname is 
given in brackets after the relevant clan name. 
 
Speaking of Edendale and its surroundings, McClendon has some interesting 
observations of what problems the area of Vulindlela has had to contend with, over 
time: 
 
Just over the ridge from that relatively comfortable pocket [Edendale Mission] 
lie the densely packed ‘township’ (black suburb) areas in the Edendale valley. 
That area is one of many sites in the province (KwaZulu-Natal) of a decade- 
long war in the late 1980s and early 1990s and involving a complex mix of 
58See Marc Epprecht, “Health, Environment and the Racialisation of Space in 
Pietermaritzburg/Edendale, 1880-1950: Revisiting the ‘Sanitation Syndrome’”, unpublished article (7 
April 2010); Sheila Meintjies, “Edendale 1850-1906: A Case Study of Rural Transformation and Class 
Formation in an African Mission in Natal”, PhD thesis (University of London, 1988). 
59N. J. van Warmelo, “A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of South Africa (Pretoria, Louis 
Trichardt Annual Report, 1933); see also Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of 
the Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25. 
See also John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds. Pietermaritzburg, 
1838-1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
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struggles over political allegiances, culture, gender, generation, wages and 
state repression.60 
 
The Edendale area is vital to the understanding of politics and happenings in 
neighbouring KwaShange and greater Vulindlela, not only because the Zondi clan, 
under whom the area of KwaShange falls, first resided in Edendale before they moved 
to the Crown lands of Mgungundlovu. Some of the KwaShange people sought refuge 
in Edendale during the violent unrest of the 1980s and 1990s, especially during the 
‘Seven Days War’ (the conflict between Inkatha and the ANC in 1990 in the 
Midlands). The hospital and refugee camps served as a locus for peace monitors, 
politicians, church activists and help-groups. The Edendale road forms part of the way 
to KwaShange from Pietermaritzburg and Edendale Hospital is to be seen on the left 
of this road. The hospital was founded in 1954, when the major apartheid laws were 
being passed. It served Africans and Indians who, in terms of these laws, could not be 
cared for at Grey’s Hospital, which was for whites only. 
 
Andreas Pretorius founded Edendale in 1846, having his farm there, according to the 
Dutch system of land-ownership. The Rev. James Lindley then bought it in 1855 in 
order to establish a Methodist Mission Station. The area, however, was previously 
occupied by Africans who were probably still there in the mid-nineteenth century, 
despite the dislocations of the early to mid-nineteenth century. What is certain is that 
by the time of the settler occupation of the 1840-50s, Edendale was known as 
Machibisa, named after the Zondi Chief’s daughter, Machibisa. It was perhaps the 
suitability of the land for cattle which made Andreas Pretorius lay claim to the land 
following the Voortrekker take-over after the battle of Ncome in 1838. After the 
British occupation and defeat of the Voortrekkers in 1842 and when Rev. Lindley 
bought the farm for an American Board Mission, Christian Africans also bought much 
of the Edendale land.  
 
As one passes Edendale, the drive is up a steep hill; just before reaching 
KwaMnyandu village, on the right, there is a SAPPI forest and in the middle of the 
forest is Henley Dam. This is a significant site in KwaShange history, because a large 
60Thomas McClendon, Genders and Generations Apart: Labour Tenants and Customary Law in 
Segregation Era South Africa, 1920s-1940s (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2002). 
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number of men from the area worked there, looking after the dam and the forest. This 
is where a number of bodies of people who were drowned in the Msunduzi River 
during the violence were later found. In this same forest a number of the political 
battles took place. The dam and forest separates KwaShange and a part of greater 
Edendale, a valley called Esigidini [the valley]. 
 




Since the early twentieth century Vulindlela has been divided into four tribal areas 
(izizwe): Mpumuza, Inadi, Mafunze and Nxamalala. According to Zulu custom, each 
area has a ruling lineage. Mpumuza’s and Inadi’s chiefs are Zondis; Mafunze’s is an 
Ngcobo and Nxamalala’s is a Zuma. The two Zondi chiefs were Inkatha members; 
Zuma was an ANC member. In the late 1980s and early 1990s all four areas were 
61John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
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under the influence of Inkatha, but  included pockets of UDF affiliates in places such 
as KwaShange, Mphophomeni and Mthoqotho.62 
 
The rule of chiefs remains influential in the present era, despite some limitations. If 
men wish to obtain land in KwaShange they must go to the local induna, who will 
refer the claim to the chief, who authorizes the area a man can occupy with his 
homestead. This applies to Zulu male homestead heads, even those coming in from 
outside the area. This ground is not owned by the man himself but he has the usufruct.   
 
During my field research I have come to recognise that the  history of KwaShange 
remains in the ‘hearts’ of its residents  and, more especially, it resides in the spirits of 
their ancestors, in their graves. The descendants of early residents often possess 
knowledge of the history of the area, which is otherwise inaccessible to the living. I 
had the privilege of interviewing the two most senior local residents of KwaShange 
from the two most prominent clans, Zondi and Shange, namely Manciza Zondi and 
MaZamisa Shange. Zondi is 90 years old and is illiterate and blind; his father died at 
the age of 125 in 1986. His knowledge is not based on what he read from history 
books but is information that has been passed on from one generation to the next. And 
MaZamisa Shange is also approximately 90 years old. She married young into the 
Shange clan and is also illiterate. These two surnames are powerful because the Zondi 
people were owners of the land in the late nineteenth century and were predominant in 
Vulindlela, even before the ‘white men came’. The area of KwaShange was named 










62Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala 
(1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25. 
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4.3 The Zondi people in Zwartkop 
 
I quote from my interview with Zondi, who was discussing the relocation of the Zondi 
clan from Ngome near Greytown to Zwartkop: 
 
My father’s name was George. We are descendents of Mancinza ka Jangeni. 
Mancinza was the father of Inkosi Bhambatha Zondi of Ngome. My 
grandfather was Mzimba, the son of Dlaba, who left Ngome even before the 
well-known ‘war of the heads’ [Bhambatha Uprising] took place. Before the 
uprising started, tension between the Zondi people in Ngome and white people 
was already high. That is why my great-grandfather, Dlaba, left and settled in 
a place called Mhlathikazi. They did not stay long there before white people 
started provoking them and they moved again. By that time it was clear that 
there was going to be a war between colonials, farmers and the Zondi people. 
Dlaba, my great-grandfather, and some of his extended family, decided to 
move far way from other family members like Bhambatha, who was clearly 
ever ready to fight against white people.63 
 
Zondi spoke of Dlaba moving away from Ngome before 1906, the year associated 
with the ‘Bhambatha Rebellion’. Even if Dlaba moved away from Ngome before 
1906, his departure did not necessarily precede the arrival of the Voortrekkers of 
1838. It was more likely that Shepstone settled the Zondi at Zwartkop. Even the 
naming of the area after Dlaba’s daughter, Machibisa, does not indicate that his 
people arrived before Pretorius. The informant makes an emotive claim, not 
necessarily supported by facts. 
 
The Zondi people today believe that their ancestors left Ngome before the Bhambatha 
Uprising of 1906. Before the Bhambatha Uprising there was already tension between 
Bhambatha and colonial officials. Dlaba and his household relocated, leaving Ngome 
and relocating to Mhlathikazi. Even there, in Mhlathikazi, the Zondis under Dlaba did 
not stay long, since they resented the poll tax, which had to be paid in money, and 
therefore forced some of the people to seek employment in the colonial economy. The 
63Interview on 14 March 2010 with Mr Mbongeni Zondi, translated by me from the original Zulu. 
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Zondi left Mhlathikazi and resettled in an area today called Machibisa in Edendale. 
When Dlaba died, his daughter Machibisa acted as the chief of the clan. She and her 
warriors fought a number of battles and succeeded in defeating chiefs who wanted to 
take advantage of her because she was female. Later the Zondi people under 
Machibisa were displaced or removed by the colonial government officials and people 
of Swazi origin were placed there, which is why even today you will find Msimangs, 
Mzolos and Smelanes there. Zondi people were relocated to Ngaphezulu (higher 
grounds or mountainous areas, called Crown Lands). The timeframe of Machibisa’s 
reign is vague and the oral accounts of elderly people are understandably imprecise. 
There is almost nothing about her in literature except the mention of her name by 
John Wright.64 
 
The names of the Nadi chiefs who reigned from when the Zondi clan moved to 
ngaphezulu Zwartkop, are listed below. This information was provided by Mancinza 
Zondi and confirmed by other Zondi clan members who reside in KwaShange. 
 
The first chief was Mzimba. There is a school, Mzimba Primary School, in the area on 
the other side of the Msunduzi River from KwaShange, named after Chief Mzimba. 
His son, Mhlola, succeeded him. Mhlola reigned for a long time. Upon his death, his 
son, Dlokwakhe, took over as chief; he was not the legitimate heir, genealogically 
speaking. Apparently Zwelakhe was supposed to succeed Mhlola, but due to the fact 
that he was exiled, he was overlooked. The Zondi people disputed the succession in 
this case, and even today the Chief’s homestead is called eMbangwani (Place of 
Dispute).65 
 
64John Wright, “Before Mgungundlovu”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., Pietermaritzburg, 1838-
1988: A New Portrait of an African City (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988). 
65Inkosi yokuqala uma besuka kwaMachibisa kwaba uMzimba. Emva kwaMzimba kwathatha 
uMhlola, owabe eyindodana yakhe. Waphatha kahle uMhlola kwaze kwaba uyafa kwathatha indodana 
yakhe uDlokwakhe. Ngokomthetho, uDlokwakhe kwakungamele abe yinkosi. Owayeyinkosi u 
Zwelakhe. UZwelakhe wadingiswa wayiswa eMaMpondweni ngoba belwile noMqanjelwa. 
UMqanjelwa wayezalwa inkosikazi uMhlola ayemthathe kuqala, wabe esethatha inkosikazi ezozala 
inkosi u Zwelakhe. Babe sebebanga-ke, balwa-ke kwafa abantu- kulwa abantu bakwa Zondi bodwa 
kubangwa ukuthi ubani ozoba inkosi. Yikhona phela ikomkhulu kuthiwa iseMbangweni. Wabe 
esedingiswa-ke uZwelakhe, wayiswa endaweni okuthiwa isemaMpondweni. Udingiswa nje usembulele 
uMqanjelwa. Lapho-ke kwabe sekubekwa u Dlokwakhe.  
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There is another version of why he was exiled, according to the Shange old woman, 
Mazamisa, who happened to know the history of KwaShange.  Zwelakhe fornicated 
with his sister. It was a disgrace, a taboo. The Shange people say that the Zondi clan 
were ashamed to tell the truth because they would be embarrassed, whilst the Zondi 
clan say that the Shange clan discredited the Zondi clan because they were interested 
in the position. They wanted the chieftaincy to be given to one of them. Shange’s 
version is convincing.  
 
Dynastic quarrels have continued until the recent past and in the period of ANC – IFP 
conflict a chief called Shayabantu, whose legitimacy was also disputed, is known to 
have caused violence in Vulindlela, as he was responsible for collecting funds to build 
the KwaZulu parliament in Ulundi. This caused a lot of problems in the area. This 
speaks to his political association with the Inkatha, to retain his ‘illegitimate’ position. 
He attacked people in KwaShange and other areas that were UDF aligned (see 
Chapter Two). 
 
4.4 The Shange clan 
 
The Shange people arrived in Zwartkop in the early 1900s. They originally came from 
Ngomankulu near Richmond, named after the mountain Ngomankulu across the 
Umlazi River. Shange was a prominent clan in the area, but there were other clans, 
such the Mkhizes. In 1906 there were disputes between two Mkhize factions, when 
Inkosi Skhukhukhu Mkhize fought with Inkosi Tilongo Mkhize. Inkosi Tilogo was 
supported by Mguquka, whilst Skhukhukhu was supported mainly by the Shange 
clan. Skhukhukhu was the loser in this conflict and the Shange clan realised that they 
had no future in Ngomankulu, so they fled.66  
 
66In 1906 Mnukwas was the leader of Chief Mguquka Mkhize’s warriors. He was captured and 
sentenced to many years in prison for his involvement in the Impi YaseMbo, a war between the Embo 
clan and the Mabhoyi people (Mabhoyi area comprised of different clans: Shange, Mchunu, Ngubane 
and a few Mkhize people were there). This war coincided with the Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906. 
Many Mkhize warriors hid in the caves in the area called Gudlintaba, but Tilongo was imprisoned in 
1906 and this ended the Embo war. The Shange clan had already left the area and they never returned 
after Tilongo’s imprisonment.  
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Three senior Shange men went around looking for a place where they could take 
refuge.67 They approached the Zondi chief at the time in Zwartkop, Mhlola, giving 
him an account of what had happened to their clan – the battle with the Mkhize clan. 
The Shange people were given land on the other side of the Msunduzi River in the 
Nadi area. The area thus came to be called KwaShange which means “the place of the 
Shange.” 
 
When they arrived in this part of the Inadi area there was only one homestead, that of 
the Mkhize. My informant reasoned that this area should have been called 
KwaMkhize, rather than KwaShange, but she said that when the Shange clan was 
allocated this piece of land, the three men returned to Ngomankulu in Richmond to 
fetch all the members of the Shange clan, who then relocated to Zwartkop. The name 
of the Shange homestead was Endabeni. Because the Shange clan was in the majority, 
the area was named KwaShange. Soon after that, another person from the Msane clan 
arrived from Mafunze and he and his family were given land in this area, KwaShange. 
 
4.5 The KwaShange headmen 
 
Although I have placed the KwaShange Location indunas in order of succession, I 
have not included the dates, as nobody knows them for certain.  
 
Nzwakele was the first induna or headman when the Shange clan first arrived in 
Swartkop. 
• When Nzwakele died, his son Mhlazane Shange took over the position. After 
his death, the Zondi chief deployed his adherent from a neighbouring area 
(Mvundlweni) to act as KwaShange headman. The chief trusted no one from 
the Shange clan to take over as headman after Mhlazane, because Shange 
people were ambitious and wanted to be independent from the Zondi 
chiefdom. This nominee, Zuma, acted for two years. 
67My interviewee could not remember the names of these three man, except that of his father-in-law, 
who was one of the three men. His name was Mhlezane Shange. In my interviews with other people in 
the area, two other prominent names appear: Kufakakuceli Shange and his brother Nzwakele Shange. 
From this I deduce that the three men were Mhlazane Shange, his father Nzwakele and his brother 
Kufakakuceli. (She probably refused to mention his name because, according to the custom of 
hlonipha, or Zulu respect culture, daughters-in-law do not mention their in-laws by name.) 
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• After that period, Msane, who had come from Mafunze, was given the 
position of headman. 
• When Msane died, Ndawonde was appointed to succeed him. Ndawonde was 
known to be very strict and fought with other clans. When he took over, he 
tried to change the name of the area from KwaShange to Ndawonde’s Kraal. 
For many years, the area had two names, KwaShange and Ndawonde’s Kraal. 
In this period, chief Zondi sent some of his clan to KwaShange to reside there 
to ensure that the area did not become independent from the Zondi 
chieftainship. 
• After Ndawonde’s death, the position of induna reverted to the Shange clan. 
Dukuza Shange succeeded Ndawonde. 
• After Dukuza’s death, Masondilika Shange took over the position. 
• He was succeeded by his son Mbokodo, who was a drunkard. He was recalled 
unceremoniously from the position. 
• Mbokodo’s younger brother, Skhosiphi Shange, took over the position.  
• Phineus Ngubane was the next induna. He reigned until the beginning of the 
political violence of the 1980s and 1990s. In 1987, as induna, he no longer had 
the power to maintain discipline and order in the area. He himself was directly 
affected by the political violence of the 1980s. In 1987 his wife was found 
stabbed to death and her mutilated body was found lying in the cattle kraal.  
 
After Ngubane, no one wanted the position because there was ‘nothing to look 
after - people had gone mad and violence was rife.’68 For a short period a 
KwaShange businessman, Zondi (who owns stores in KwaShange), acted as the 
induna, but because of the violence, he resigned and the position was vacant.  
 
• In 1990s, after the Seven Days War, two senior men were appointed by the 
chief to share duties of induna: Shange and Mbanjwa.  
• In 2008 Mbanjwa passed away and Shange stepped down as headman and 
the current headman, Mabhoyi Madlala, was appointed. 
 
68Interview with Mvunyelwa Ngubane, KwaShange, 8 March 2009. 
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My interviewees are from families who originated outside the area. Some of them 
settled in Inadi during the 1800s. Some moved from white-owned farms in Midlands 
areas such as near New Hanover and Howick, while others came from Greytown and 
Vryheid. When I did my Masters research, all interviewees gave as their reasons for 
moving that they thought they had poor economic prospects as farm tenant labourers 
and hoped for an improvement in their family fortunes by obtaining work in the cities 
of Pietermaritzburg and Durban.  
 
It ought to be emphasized that the labour tenants who lived on white farms had no 
land rights, worked hard, were often (but not always) brutally treated and, until 
recently, were often paid no, or very meagre, wages. Usually a tenant had rights to 
work some land and graze cattle in exchange for labour (his own and that of his 
children) but no security of tenure. Tenant labour was appreciated by some Africans, 
because it allowed them to stay on the land, but often this was determined by 
increasing demands of farmers for more and more labour from the households head’s 
families. This was one of the reasons why young men left to seek paid labour in the 
cities. 
 
Currently, unemployment rates in the area of KwaShange are high and some members 
of the community have been retrenched, which adds to the problem. Most older 
women are housewives and part-time crop farmers, leading a life that is rural and 
largely traditional, while some obtain work as domestic workers. Very few people in 
the community are professionals and those that are work as teachers, nurses and 
police officers. Children stay in the rural areas and attend local schools, although 
some attend schools outside the community and later go to tertiary institutions.  
 
Zulu-dominated rural areas are known for faction fights between residents and 
neighbouring clans. In the KwaShange area the people of neighbouring Polela, the 
Dlamini group, have always been antagonistic to the Zondi from Zwartkop and from 
time to time fighting has erupted. The fights relate to access to and control of land. 
The more recent settler families are also subject to political conflicts and tensions. 
The incoming Mchunu, for instance, were in conflict with the established Ndaba 
family from the 1960s to the 1980s. The Ndaba, also called Mhlungwini, from the 
Estcourt area, mocked the Mchunu, saying they are ‘country bumpkins’ and 
 123 
‘outsiders’ or amakula (coolies), whereas those who were there since the area was 
established are referred to as Amarashiya (Russians) and are regarded as ‘more 
traditional’.69 Even today in KwaShange there is a section called kwaMnanayi, a 
derogatory term for Indians. Another section is KwaGudlintaba. This name came with 
the Shange clan; the place where they lived in Richmond before they sought refuge in 
Zwartkop was Gudlintaba. They named the section where most ‘original’ KwaShange 
people are situated, Gudlintaba. This is where die-hard traditionalists are found, 
mainly Zondis and Shanges. In 1987 most people who were aligned to Inkatha came 
from this section and relocated elsewhere in fear of their lives. Most people in the 
KwaMnanayi Section were associated with the UDF. The Mchunus were supported in 
these fights by the Ndlovu and Madlala, who had emigrated with them from New 
Hanover during the 1960s. The worst clash between the Mchunus and Ndabas took 
place at a shebeen [drinking-spot] known as Gomorrah, in Edendale Township. The 
traditional clans’ conflicts which I have described above lent bitterness to the party 
political conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
These clan faction fights were characteristic of the KwaShange area, as they still are 
in Msinga, but during the period of the late 1980s to 1990s they were eclipsed by the 
political unrest and the struggle against the Nationalist apartheid regime. This unrest 
was known locally as ‘civil wars’ between the UDF supporters and Inkatha 
supporters. The ready use of weapons was characteristic of both kinds of conflict. 
 
I have argued in this chapter that violence was a normal feature of life in the Midlands 
of Natal. Historically, Natal, of which Vulindlela (once Zwartkop) was part, has been 
structured around violence. Structural violence, repression and coercion were the 
central features of the era before colonialism and continued under apartheid. Violence 
embedded itself into every facet of our society and shaped the nature of state power. 
While political violence was not a new phenomenon, what happened in 1987 in 
KwaShange was different from anything that had preceded it.70  
 
69Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala 
(1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu History (2007), 24-25(2006-7), 64-94. 
70Jacklyn Cock, “The Feminist Challenge to Militarism”, Agenda 36, “No to Violence” (Agenda 
Feminist Media: 1991), 27-39. 
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During the unrest of the 1980s-1990s, according to the understanding of the media 
media and political analysts, the UDF was conducting the main struggle against the 
apartheid regime, while the Inkatha movement, which was associated with the ethnic 
grouping of the Zulu, was considered to be reactionary, in collusion, to an extent, with 
the Nationalist government. However, there were in fact no clearly defined political 
motivations for belonging to either of these parties within the community of 
KwaShange and this exacerbated the ‘civil war’ situation. Matthew Kentridge, in 
Unofficial War, describes this situation as one of violence that dominated the media 
reports: stories of murder, dispossession and the displacement of people were 
frequently published.71 KwaShange is known by black people in the Pietermaritzburg 
area as a place notorious for such violence; it was named ‘Slaughter House’, because 
people were slaughtered like animals there. This particular conflict expressed itself in 
















71Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1996). 
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Chapter Five 
 






It is generally known that tension between Inkatha and the UDF started in the early 
1980s in the Midlands.1 Random attacks and killings took place, but the seriousness 
of these attacks became apparent only on 25 September 1987, a date which marks the 
start of organised and large-scale violence in KwaShange.2 Newspapers and 
electronic media reported the events. The incident is known as “The KwaShange 
Massacre”, but locally even today it is referred to by the community as Ulwesihlanu 
Lwezibhelu, (Friday of Killings). This incident was to precipitate the wider fighting in 
Vulindlela. Thirteen Inkatha Youth Brigade members attending a meeting in a house 
were killed by a group, including three off-duty police officers, in KwaShange, 
Pietermaritzburg.”3 The Vulindlela and Midlands violence was so bad that John 
Wright declared that “it was probably the worst since the ‘Bhambatha Rebellion’ of 
1906.”4 At the first ANC national conference within the country, at the University of 
Durban-Westville in 1991, KwaShange was used as a case study in the discussion of 
the ‘political violence that had taken place inside the country for almost two 
1The history of political violence in the Natal Midlands is documented in the transcripts of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission victims’ hearings held in Pietermaritzburg between 18 and 21 
November 1996: www.doj.gov.za/trc/trcframeset.htm. 
2See for instance Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 24 June 2005; Interview with Nunu 
Mchunu, KwaShange 13 August 2008; Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 14 August 2008.  
Interview with Bhekithemba Mbanjwa and group interviews I had with a significant number of 
informants, KwaShange, 12 March 2010. These interviewees confirmed what is documented in a body 
of literature that deals with the history of violence in KwaZulu-Natal, see for instance,  Anthony de 
Villiers Minnaar, Conflict and violence in Natal/KwaZulu: historical perspectives (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1990); Rupert Taylor and Mark Shaw, “The Natal Conflict”, in John 
Brewer ed., Restructuring South Africa (London: St. Martin press, 1994), 35-52; Alexander Johnston, 
“Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal”, in William Gutteridge and J. E. Spence eds., Violence in 
Southern Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 78-107. See also John Aitchison, ‘The Origins of the 
Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 
Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. John 
Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal Midlands 
1987-1989”, MA thesis (University of Natal, 1993), 114. See also Metthew Kentridge, An Unofficial 
War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), 35-40. 
3 http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology 
4John Wright, “Background of Political Violence: Pietermaritzburg Region 1987-8 in Pietermaritzburg 
since 1838-1988”, in J. Laband and R. Haswell eds., A New Portrait of an African City 
(Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1988), 221-2. 
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decades.’5 After 1987 there were many court cases that attracted a number of people 
in KwaShange who were either aligned to Inkatha or the UDF. All these court cases 
took place in Pietermaritzburg, which is why there are instances quoted in this chapter 
where supporters of these two movements brought the war into the City centre. UDF 
and Inkatha supporters would meet in court for hearings. After the hearings they 
would attack each other at bus stops, mainly at the downtown bus stops in East Street 
and Retief Street. 
 
This chapter is based mainly on the interviews I had with informants in KwaShange: 
It contains first-hand accounts of attacks and counter-attacks in the civil war during 
the period under review. This provides windows into the past for readers who are not 
familiar with the civil war and its results. I shall refer to secondary sources such as 
newspaper articles that reported events in KwaShange and violence that took place in 
Pietermaritzburg itself, related to the KwaShange unrest.  
 
Much information related to the 1980s-1990s violence in KwaZulu-Natal, and South 
Africa in general, has not been recorded. This was probably one of the largest and 
longest ‘black on black’ conflicts of the twentieth century. It has been argued about 
and analysed, both before and after democracy was attained in South Africa in 1994. 
It continues to excite the imagination of those that did not experience it, because it 
was full of paradoxes (for instance, the struggle was by blacks against white 
domination but the violence was ‘blacks against blacks’). Another fascinating factor 
about this violence was the weapons used, probably for the first time in the history of 
‘black fighting against another black’, machine guns and petrol bombs were. Not all 
weapons, however, were new. Old-fashioned methods of fighting battles were used: 
the use of muthi and ‘doctoring of wars’ overshadowed the war (even though it was 
not generally known and is still a taboo subject in KwaShange).6    
 
In this chapter, I attempt to be consistent in dating all the events, taking them from 
secondary resources such as news reports, so as to date events mentioned by eye-
witnesses and involved informants, who, in most cases, have forgotten the exact time, 
5See Appendix, extract (transcribed by Mxolisi Mchunu) from the “The Violence Commission” at the 
ANC conference that met to formulate an adequate response to this counter-revolutionary war. 
6See Chapter Eight.  
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but have not forgotten the time of the day when these events occurred in KwaShange. 
Again, I have not given numbers of deaths and casualities, because not all those who 
died or were injured during the KwaShange violence were counted.7  
 
Violence in KwaShange appeared spontaneous and reactionary. Attacks were not 
usually strategised, as they were invariably defensive, unlike in an official war 
situation, with insurgence and counter-insurgence and trained national armies.8 
Attacks would start when people were in town, at home cooking, in the forests getting 
firewood or at the river washing clothes. But due to the fact that people were aware 
that these surprise attacks took place anytime of the day and at any location, they were 
always ready to run or fight. It is impossible, however, to do full justice to the 
recording of KwaShange events, because there were so many, taking place almost 
every day from 25 September 1987.  
 
I give a brief chronological background in this chapter.  I shall begin, however, by 
profiling the ring-leaders who were regarded as instigators of the violence in 
KwaShange. 
 
7John Aitchison, “Numbering the Dead: The Course and Pattern of Political Violence in the Natal 
Midlands 1987-1989”, MA thesis (University of Natal, 1993), 114.  
8For an overview of the interpretations of political violence in Natal, see Andrian Guelke, 
“Interpretations of Political Violence during South Africa’s Transition”, Politikon 27:2 (2002), 239-54; 
William Beinart, “Political and Collective Violence in Southern African Historiography”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies 18:3 (September 1992), 455-485; Alexander Johnston, “Politics and Violence 
in KwaZulu-Natal”, 82-90. There are also case studies that have been published on many areas in 
KwaZulu-Natal such as the Midlands, see Nxamalala study, Philippe Denis, “Indians versus Russians: 
An Oral History of the Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1992)” Journal of Natal and Zulu 
History (2007), 24-25(2006-7), 64-94. KwaShange study, Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu 
Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-
1991)”, in T Shefer, K. Ratele, A. Strebel, N. Shabalala and R. Buikema eds., From Boys to Men: 
Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town, UCT Press, 2007), 
Edendale, Nkosinathi Gwala, “Political Violence and the Struggle for Control in Pietermaritzburg”, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 15:3 (April 1989), 506-524. Mpumalanga, Debby Bonnin, 
“Claiming Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in KwaZulu-Natal”, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 26:2 (June 2002), 301-316; Debby Bonnin, “Legacies of Political 
Violence: An Examination of Political Conflict in Mpumalanga Township”, Transformation 62 (2006), 
59-83. Pietermaritzburg, Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in 
Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990). For Durban studies, see Douglas Booth and 
Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the Spatial Dimension of Black Resistance and Political Violence in South 
Africa: The Case of Durban”, Urban Geography 9:6 (1988), 629-53; Doug Hindson, Mark Byerley and 
Mike Morris, “From Violence to Reconstruction: The Making, Disintegration and Remaking of an 
Apartheid City”, Antipode 26:4 (1994), 323-50. Molweni, see S. Stravrou and A. Crouch, “Molweni, 
Violence of the periphery”, Indicator SA 6:3 (Winter 1989), 46-50.; S. Stavrou, Underdevelopment: 
Natal’s Formula for Conflict”, Indicator SA 7:3 (Autumn 1990), 52-56.  
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In a discussion of politics in KwaShange, Vulindlela, the names of prominent men 
who may have been instigators or at the centre of the conflict cannot be ignored. Their 
involvement in the struggle was wider than the KwaShange area. Yet the happenings 
in KwaShange resulted in their participation in the broad politics of the region, then 
Natal and Zululand, now KwaZulu-Natal. 
  
I shall start by giving notes taken by myself, gleaned from interviews with four ring- 
leaders and from newspapers of the period of the violence in KwaShange. The 
interviewees were Nunu ‘Ngedlezi’ Mchunu, Chris Hlengwa, Moses Ndlovu and 
Philippe ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe.9 These men’s political activities were central to the 
civil unrest of the 1980s-1990s and thus important to an understanding of my topic. 
My interviews with Moses Ndlovu took place whilst I was doing my Masters 
research.10 He was not interested in talking about my research into fatherhood, but 
hijacked my interviews to tell stories of political violence in KwaShange; hence I 
added a chapter specifically about the interconnectivity of violence and discipline to 
my Masters thesis. This was a timely interview, because when I started working on 
my PhD project, Ndlovu had died. This means that there are gaps in my interviews 
with him which I cannot close. In regard to ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe, I was unable to 
track his whereabouts after he fled from KwaShange during the violence and nobody 
knows if he is still alive or not. I relied upon his interview with The London Times in 
1988.11 However, I was able to conduct interviews with Nunu ‘Ngedlezi’ Mchunu and 
Chris Hlengwa and asked both about Ndlovu and Thabethe. My interview with 
Mchunu was particularly fruitful, as he related of his recollections of the times and I 
regard these discussions as invaluable insights into the violence. 
9These names were mentioned by all interviewees who participated in this study and appear here with 
the consent of the individuals. 
10Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect and Ethinicty: A Study of the Changing Patterns of 
Fatherhood of Three Generations of Zulu Fathers and Sons in KwaShange, Inadi, Vulindlela Area of 
Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s to the 1990s”, MA thesis (Durban: UKZN, 2005).  
11John Fisher Burns, “Black versus Black in South Africa”, The New York Times, 21 January, 1988, 5-
7. http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/21/world/black-vs-black-in-south-africa p5. Accessed on 23 
March 2009. 
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I did not profile many other people who were prominent in KwaShange politics. I was 
unable to do them justice, as I failed to find data on them in published material 
(probably because it does not exist) or could not set up interviews with them. These 
include the late Chief Shayabantu Zondi (Nadi chief before the current chief, 
Sondelani Zondi) and late induna Guvaza Khanyile. Neither Chief Zondi nor induna 
Khanyile was resident in KwaShange, but their names are linked to almost every 
incident of violence and they must be considered amongst the instigators of the 
political violence. Others include  young ring-leaders who were known as most 
troublesome and strong fighters: Bhoyo Hlophe (UDF), Mlungisi Ngubane (Inkatha), 
Mathi Ngcobo (UDF), Lindiwe Ngcobo (UDF), MaZondi Maphumulo (UDF) Seni 
Mhlongo (UDF), Tana Zuma (Inkatha), Nurse Mchunu (Inkatha), Ntongo Thusi 
(UDF) and Mzi Zuma (Inkatha).12 
 
Of the four ring-leaders I profiled, Ndlovu and Thabethe lived only a kilometre 
apart.13 So did Mchunu and Hlengwa. Ndlovu and Thabethe became political rivals, 
but were once good neighbours, belonging to one church, played for one soccer team 
and exercised together as young men of KwaShange. They shared jokes; their 
children attended the same school.14 Mchunu and Hlengwa were once best friends. 
All these families shared and exchanged gifts, like mealies, amadumbe and sweet 
potatoes; they enjoyed each other’s harvests, itself a culturally valued 
interdependence in a community. My interviews will give insight into the breakdown 
of this community into civil war.15 
 
 
12Interview with Moses Ndlovu (2006), Nunu Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa (2008). In all interviews 
done in KwaShange for this study, names of these men and women were mentioned as people who 
were at the fore-front of violence in KwaShange. 
13Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 10 August 2006. 
14Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 10 August 2006. See also interviews with Nunu Mchunu, 
KwaShange, 14 March 2008, and with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. 
15The theme of division in communities because of political violence in the 1980s-1990s has been dealt 
with in a number of studies. For instance, Debby Bonnin questioned why communities in Mpumalanga 
turned against each other because of their different political parties; see Debby Bonnin, “Space, Place 
and Identity: Political Violence in Mpumalanga Township, KwaZulu-Natal, 1987-1993,” PhD thesis 
(Wits University, 2007). See also Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 2007). Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas Cannell, Indians 
versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-1993) (Pietermaritzburg, 
Cluster Publications, 2010), investigated how political violence divided the Nxamalala community that 
once lived together in harmony. 
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The rivals Ndlovu and Thabethe are representative of party factionalism, which was 
further divided along union lines, e.g. COSATU and the United Workers’ Union of 
South Africa (UWUSA).16 Mchunu and Hlengwa represented the local factions, 
Inkatha and UDF, respectively, in KwaShange. The population of Vulindlela (of 
which KwaShange formed one sub-area) was comprised of peoples from different 
regions, e.g. farms near New Hanover, Greytown, Estcourt and Crammond.17  Ndlovu 
and Thabethe, along with Mchunu and Hlengwa, reflect the localized nature of 
township politics in the era of violence. Moreover, Inadi, of which KwaShange was 
part, fell under the chieftainship of Shayabantu Zondi, who was aligned to Inkatha.18 
These four men actively participated in the political activities of their political 
movements at provincial and national level. In KwaShange, UDF-aligned residents 
were at war with the Inkatha-aligned residents who rallied under the Zondi chief who 
was in sympathy with Ulundi. Inkatha received support from the Nationalist 
government, while the UDF formed the ANC in exile’s inner wing in the struggle 
declared in June 1986.19  
 
16For details on the history of the formation of these two Unions, see John Aitchison, “The Origins of 
the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal”, 51. He states that COSATU managed to gain considerable 
sway over the black working class, including migrant workers in Natal. Large numbers of Inkatha 
members were to become loyal COSATU supporters. It explains the infatuation of organised business 
interests in Natal and elsewhere with Inkatha and its state-funded clone, UWUSA. 
17For details on the history of KwaShange and the home bases of many interviewees, see Chapter Four, 
“Historical Background of KwaShange.”  
18Interview with Nunu Mchunu, Moses Ndlovu and Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange (2006-2008).These 
men confirmed that Chief Shayabantu Zondi of Inadi was a leader of Inkatha in Vulindlela; other 
authors called the Chief the “staunch supporter of Inkatha” see Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and 
Thomas Cannell, Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala (1987-
1993) (Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 2010), 10. Nunu Mchunu who was an ally of the late 
Chief, mentioned that “Ulundi (capital of Zululand) expected Chiefs and izinduna (headmen) to 
comply with the Act that stated that they had to be leaders of Inkatha in their respective places: Chief 
Shayabantu Zondi had no option (but to lead Inkatha in Vulindlela)”; see also Zulu Chiefs and 
Headmens’ Act (8 of 1974), KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, quoted in Gerhard Maré and Georgina 
Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance. 
(Johannesbuurg: Ravan Press, 1987), 230.  
19Powers in State of Emergency (1986-1990). A State of Emergency is a governmental declaration that 
may suspend normal functions of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, alert citizens to change 
their normal behaviour, or order government agencies to implement emergency preparedness plans. It 
can also be used as a rationale for suspending rights and freedoms, even if guaranteed under the 
Constitution. Such declarations usually come during a time of natural or man-made disaster, during 
periods of civil unrest. Many authors have written on the ‘State of Emergency’ of 1987 and the bias 
shown by the Nationalist government towards Inkatha supporters.  John Aitchison, “The Origins of the 
Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, Ran Greenstein ed., The Role 
of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization, (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 64; see also 
Detainees Aid Committee. Detention Under Three Emergencies: A Report on the Natal Midlands, 
1986-1989. Pietermaritzburg: Detainees Aid Committee, 1989). 
 131 
                                                 
My interviews with these four men made me realize that KwaShange was the centre 
of the initial clash which led to the ramifying violence in the greater Vulindlela area 
and to the “Seven Days War” in March 1990. These happenings were merely part of a 
conflict that reflected the politics of the country as a whole. 
 
5.2.2 Moses Ndlovu20  
  
Moses Ndlovu was born on 19 June 1944 at Swayimane in the Otto Bluff area, near 
Pietermaritzburg. His parents were farm tenants. He attended primary school in 
Crammond and later was faced with racial oppression and exploitation when, at the 
age of 14, he was forced to work on the farm, according to the tenant-labour system of 
the times.21 He was embittered by his experiences and deliberately drove the farmer’s 
cattle onto the railway line in front of an oncoming goods train. They were killed or 
maimed, which led to him and his family being expelled from the farm.22 
 
Ndlovu then relocated to Pietermaritzburg, KwaShange location. He enrolled at a 
local school where he studied until he reached standard eight. He was forced to leave 
school after his father’s death, and he then had the duty, as the eldest son, to look after 
his siblings and his mother.23 He was employed at Meadow Feeds in 1962. In 1963 he 
moved to a newly built industrial area in Hammersdale, where he worked until 1972. 
Here he was exposed to trade unionism.24 When he was recruited into the ANC, his 
initial assignment was trade union work, mobilizing workers into trade unions. 
Among the highlights of his unionist career were the well-remembered 1973 strikes in 
Durban.25 He worked closely with Barney Dladla and Alec Erwin in the Trade Union 
20For details on Moses Ndlovu’s experiences and involvement in political violence in the Midlands see 
Lou Levine ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War, Through Stained Glass Windows:  Moses 
Ndlovu- KwaShange (PACSA, 1999), 63. 
21Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. Jabulani Sithole has conducted 
interviews with many old ANC and COSATU leaders in KwaZulu-Natal. He mentioned that many 
young men of his age joined unions later because of their experiences on farms, author’s conversation 
with Jabulani Sithole, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 11 June 2010.  
22See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. See also Lou 
Levine ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War Through Stained Glass Windows: Moses Ndlovu-
KwaShange (PACSA, 1999), 63. 
23Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005.  
24Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
 See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. 
25Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
 See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. 
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Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC). In 1975, he was tasked to do the 
underground work of identifying suitable young men and women within the trade 
union structures who could be sent abroad for military training.26 Ndlovu worked in 
his original home of KwaShange, recruiting mainly young males.27 He also recruited 
youth in other places in Natal and Zululand. This brought him closer to seasoned 
unionists and ANC leaders such as Harry Gwala, Mathews Meyiwa, Alpheus 
Mdlalose and William Khanyile.28 
 
During his work as an underground operative he evaded the dragnet of the apartheid 
security police until Harry Gwala and Azaria Ndebele ordered him to co-ordinate 
transport for families of his comrades who were standing trial in Pietermaritzburg in 
1976-1977. He was banned from 1977 until 1981 and prohibited from being in the 
company of more than three people at one time.29 
 
When his banning order expired, Ndlovu had an opportunity to contribute to the 
formation of the trade union COSATU structures in the Natal Midlands Region, in 
1985. He joined forces with Jay Naidoo, Johnny Makhathini, Kenneth Dladla, Theo 
Nene and Pat Horn and began to organize workers into unions under COSATU. When 
the executive decision was taken that sector-based affiliates of Fosatu should be 
established, Ndlovu and Makhathini contributed to the formation of almost all the 
Pietermaritzburg-based trade unions that subsequently became affiliates of COSATU. 
He organized workers as far away as Ladysmith and Cato Ridge.30  
 
At the height of violence in Natal, Ndlovu provided leadership. He led the formation 
and co-ordination of Self-Defence Units (SDUs) in the greater Vulindlela area. As a 
result he was subjected to constant harassment by the national security police and 
26Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
 See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. 
27Interview with 10 men who were recruited by Moses Ndlovu in KwaShange, 13 September 2008. 
Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange 11 August 2005. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, 
KwaShange, 15 March 2008.  
28Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
29Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. Interview with Dumisani Lushozi, 
former ANC Ward 4 Councillor, KwaShange 21 January 2008. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, 
KwaShange, 11 March 2008. See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 
February 2008. 
30Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. See also http:// 
www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. 
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Inkatha vigilantes.31 Nunu Mchunu of Inkatha said Ndlovu was regarded as the ‘most 
“rotten potato”, which is why KwaShange received more attention from state security 
police and Inkatha leadership, locally and provincially.32 Ndlovu not only witnessed 
the killing of his friends, but he was to experience the pain of the murder of his 
daughter by vigilantes in KwaShange. 33 
 
5.2.3 Nunu Mchunu, commonly known as ‘Ngedlezi’34 
 
Mchunu was singularly instrumental in the conflict in the KwaShange area: he was 
connected with the Inkatha Movement and participated in national strife, as well as in 
KwaShange conflicts.35 He represented more than 3 000 members of the Natal 
Provincial Administration (NPA) union.36He was imprisoned in 1987 under the State 
of Emergency, on the grounds that he was the source of the turmoil of KwaShange, 
which spread to neighbouring areas.37 
 
Mchunu was born in 1942 on a farm near New Hanover in Mshwathi.38 When he was 
still young, he left the farm because he felt that farm life, with its enforced labour-
tenancy, was stifling his ambitions. Standard five was the highest grade available in 
the Melville Primary farm-school. When farm dwellers’ children completed Standard 
five, they were expected to work full-time on the farm. Mchunu sought employment 
off the farm, first in Greytown and then in Pietermaritzburg. The younger Mchunu, 
despite being banned from the farm, nevertheless kept visiting the farm at night to see 
his parents and siblings.  The clash between Mchunu’s father and the farmer became 
31Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005.  
See also http:// www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=5618, accessed on 4 February 2008. 
32Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange 14 March 2008. 
33Interview with M Ndlovu, KwaShange, 17 October 2005), See also African National Congress 
website: www.anc.org.za and Lou Levine ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War Through Stained 
Glass Windows: Mr Moses Ndlovu-KwaShange (PACSA, 1999), p. 63. 
34For a brief history of the Mchunu family in KwaShange, see Mxolisi Mchunu, “Discipline, Respect 
and Ethnicity: A Study of the Changing Patterns of Fatherhood of Three Generations of Zulu Fathers 
and Sons in KwaShange, Inadi, Vulindlela Area of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal, from the 1930s 
to the 1990s”, MA thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 2005. 
35Interview with Nunu Mchunu, Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 2005-2008. 
36Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008.  
37Interview with Nunu Mchunu, Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 2005-2008. 
38For details on the history of uMshwathi see Kenneth Bhengu, Uphuya waseMshwathi (Poor/Pauper 
man from Shwathi) (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1983). 
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intolerable in 1964 and in 1965 the entire Mchunu family moved to KwaShange.39 
Mchunu is my uncle and my own family moved from New Hanover to KwaShange. 
While my uncle was working in Pietermaritzburg for the NPA, he joined the workers’ 
union and began to be politically active.40 He remembers that he met with many 
“highly educated” people who had read leftist literature. These people had a great 
influence on him. He also read newspapers, particularly Ilanga lase Natali, which 
“broadened his mind” and politicized him. He learnt that there was a political 
movement (the ANC) that was opposing the bad treatment of black people by whites 
and he started attending these meetings:    
 
 We eventually left the farm and when we went to Pietermarizburg, I got 
employment in town and I understood that there was a party that was fighting 
against the white men’s regime. At that time, I hated white people. I began to 
understand politics in Pietermaritzburg and I became part of the organization 
that was fighting against black men’s oppression. That was the ANC. I joined 
the African National Congress because it was fighting for black people. We 
used to attend meetings in Pietermaritzburg Town Hall – and police would 
come and harass us. I remember the day Mandela was caught by the police. 
We had a meeting with him in a place known today as Retief Street. We had 
gathered on that day to burn our passes. Police came and they asked where our 
passes were and they shamboked [whipped] us. I will never ever forget that 
day of my life.41 
 
Mchunu had difficulty in remembering details of this period of his life: the hall he 
mistakenly called the City Hall was probably a ramshackle hall called ‘People’s Hall.’ 
This is a place where the early ANC who worked for black liberation had their 
meetings. Nearby this ‘People’s Hall’ in Retief Street there was a bookshop and 
restaurant where the ‘highly educated’ people that influenced Mchunu bought ‘leftist 
literature’. These discussions introduced Mchunu to politics. 
 
39Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
40Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
41Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
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Mchunu recalls names of people who attended these meetings and who were 
prominent: Moses Mabhida, Harry Gwala, Agrippa Ngcobo, ‘Mfenendala’ Xaba, 
Mtimkulu, Nhlangulela and Sithole (from Snathingi in Edendale), who was a well-
known teacher in the Natal Midlands.42 Mchunu recalls that sometimes the South 
African Police would come and beat them during these meetings. As the situation 
intensified, some left the country into exile, but others remained.  
 
Both Moses Ndlovu and Mchunu attended these meetings; they knew each other 
because they came from the same area, but they were not close. Both alluded to the 
fact that discussions at the ‘People’s Hall’ were mainly about mobilizing people in 
their local areas and educating them about the struggle against the Nationalist 
Government.43 There were meetings where they had to appoint leaders for the ANC. 
They recalled that sometimes there was infighting and battles for positions. These did 
not include Mchunu and Ndlovu. 
 
Both Mchunu and Ndlovu recalled that in their meetings at the ‘People’s Hall’, the 
emphasis of discussions was on the significance of a national movement, to take part 
in the organization that was engaged in the class struggle, and the trade unions which 
were more concerned with shop-floor programmes. They acquired a clearer idea of 
what was really happening on a political level and joined the trade union movement.44 
 
Moses Ndlovu and Nunu Mchunu came from the same school of thought; I believe 
that they were amongst those whom Harry Gwala, who taught communism, called 
‘vanished friends’. They were never to be as prominent as other leaders in the ANC. 
In the 1960s, both Mchunu and Ndlovu recalled a meeting addressed by Mandela in 
Pietermaritzburg, the last meeting Mandela had before his capture: he was caught by 
the South African Police near Howick. The Nationalist regime was harsh on people 
who participated in these kinds of gatherings and in 1960 the ANC, PAC and SACP 
42Listening to Nunu Mchunu, I realised that Mr Sithole played a crucial role in his political life and 
career. My attempt to trace who this Sithole was, was a failure. Jabulani Sithole, lecturer in History at 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Pietermaritzburg, assumes that this could be the Sithole who was a 
teacher in Edendale. 
43 Interview with Nunu Mchunu, 14 March 2008. Interview with Moses Ndlovu, August 2005. 
44Interview with Nunu Mchunu (11 March 2008) and Ndlovu (26 October 2005). See also Tony Karon, 
An Interview with Harry Gwala, Pietermaritzburg, Dambuza (1 August 1989). 
(www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/...043.../int19890108.043.049.pd accessed on 11 April 2009. 
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were banned. Mchunu recalls that many people he knew, who used to attend meetings 
at the ‘People’s Hall’, disappeared, perhaps jailed or exiled. “This was the most 
difficult time. I then realized that life was difficult, I decided to withdraw my 
participation. Many people who had been recruited to the ANC just disappeared.”45  
 
To the question “Why did you then join the Inkatha movement?” Mchunu answered: 
 
Many people who were members of the ANC faced a difficult time. Many 
went into exile in places like Mozambique, Lusaka, Angola and Swaziland, 
because the state police were looking for them. The government had decided 
to ban organizations that challenged the state. Many people I met and got to 
know when I first arrived in Pietermaritzburg went into exile. I contemplated 
escaping the country but it was still difficult for me. I had a farm mentality. I 
feared for my life, I decided to withdraw myself and not associate with 
political groups.46  
 
Some of those who remained in the country heard that there was another organization 
that was going to be an ‘internal wing’ of the ANC. Mchunu recalls that Sithole and 
Nhlangulela came to him and told him about ‘the movement that ‘umntwana wakwa 
Phindangene’ (Buthelezi, often called ‘the prince of Phindangene’) had started and it 
was going to fight for black people’s rights like the ANC. In other words, Inkatha was 
going to be ‘the internal wing of the ANC’ and it was going to negotiate with the 
Nationalist government. “The Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement did not 
claim to be the sole and authentic representative of the Black people of South 
Africa.”47 It claimed that its aim was to use a multi-strategy approach for a united 
non-racial democratic country. Its formation was a result of a need for a black 
democratic force to come to pick up the gauntlet of the black liberation struggle.48 
From the first State of Emergency, and the bannings after Sharpeville in the1960s, 
there had been no significant organized black political activity.  
 
45Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
46Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
47Interview with Nunu. Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
48 http://www.ifp.org.za/History/history.htm; see also Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An 
Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance. (Johannesbuurg: Ravan 
Press, 1987). 
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Wave after wave of repression by the South African Government had, by 
1975, left black politics in disarray. At the time of Inkatha’s launch in 1975 
the names of ANC leaders Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govern Mbeki, 
Moses Mabhida and others including PAC leader Robert Sobukwe were being 
whispered in quiet corners. Dr Buthelezi, from the beginning, spoke of them in 
his speeches and even quoted them, which was a punishable offence. He raised 
questions of their release and made their release conditional to any dialogue 
with the white racist Nationalist Party regime.49 
 
This was the Inkatha Movement under Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Mchunu attended 
Inkatha meetings in Ulundi with some men from Pietermaritzburg and, when they 
met, they were told to encourage people in their home areas to publicize Inkatha. 
Mchunu declared: 
 
That is how I became a member and leader of Inkatha in KwaShange. I visited 
people door-to-door telling them about this movement. Some liked it while 
others did not care much because they were apolitical. I began to mobilize, not 
only in KwaShange, but in other areas as well.50 
  
Mchunu joined Inkatha because he knew that it had been the ANC’s suggestion that 
Chief Buthelezi start the movement. To him it was the kind of movement that he 
sought, because he did not want to go into exile or to prison. Some men that he had 
recruited for the ANC in KwaShange were already in prison because of the State of 
emergency, like Kubheka, known as ‘Ibh’lamani’, who later became an Inkatha ‘war-
lord’ in KwaShange. When Khubeka was freed from prison, Mchunu persuaded him 
to join Inkatha and to assist him to mobilize members of the community to join. In 
1975 Buthelezi set up the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement after 
receiving the consent of the ANC in exile.  
 
49 http://www.ifp.org.za/History/history.htm; see also Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double 
Agenda (London: Zeb Books).  
50Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
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Inkatha was formed at a time that allowed the organization to articulate its mission 
through the language of Black Consciousness51 and black identity, in such a way that 
it avoided open conflict with the Nationalist Government, which had rejected non-
racialism.52 Inkatha challenged the government in a less radical manner than more 
radical parties. Buthelezi claimed:  
 
I wanted democratic forces emerging in South Africa to accept a multi-
strategic approach and offer to work in harmony with the ANC Mission in 
Exile. In 1974, when I set about gathering leaders together to establish Inkatha 
in 1975, I set about doing so with the clear intention NOT of subverting the 
ANC Mission in Exile – but of proving to them that democratic opposition to 
apartheid and non-violent tactics and strategies were still possible.53 
 
Aitchison noted that Inkatha legitimised itself as an authentic expression of the 
(largely ANC) tradition of inclusive Black nationalism through negotiations carried 
out with the ANC and the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, as well as through 
Buthelezi’s connections with the ANC and Mandela. Its language of non-violence was 
aimed at business interests and foreign powers intent on constructive engagement.  
 
Black Consciousness, in spite of its positive, identity-building character that 
did much for psychological liberation, contained within it a wellspring of 
resentment that later was to develop within Inkatha into a distrust of leftist 
white, Indian and any black radicals associating  with them in either group. 
Cultural liberation as a means of raising political awareness within a 
repressive apartheid environment lost its discrimination once Inkatha and its 
leader Chief Buthelezi had established its strong identify as ‘at one’ with the  
51Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of 
Loyal Resistance  (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 230. 
52John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization, 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47. See also Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for 




                                                 
traditional tribal chiefdoms long used by the apartheid regimes ‘divide and 
rule’ policies.54 
 
Mchunu, Nhlangulela, Sithole (from Edendale) and Kubheka became staunch Inkatha 
members and attended meetings in Ulundi. To the question of what Inkatha leaders 
discussed in Ulundi, Mchunu answered:  
 
In Ulundi we discussed nothing but how to strengthen the struggle in the 
country and to ensure that those who were in exile be allowed to come back. 
We called these people by names: Mandela, Mbeki, Sobukwe, Oliver Tambo, 
Mabhida and others. All of what was discussed was that Chief Buthelezi 
should talk and reason with the white government of the time to treat black 
people with respect. We discussed that we needed to embark on a constructive 
and passive struggle for freedom and we would encourage each other to 
mobilize support in our areas so that the government could see that all black 
people were concerned and not just a few people who were in leadership. 
 
 Mchunu confirmed that Buthelezi refused to negotiate with the Nationalist 
government and to accept homeland ‘independence’.  
 
I can tell you, we discussed nothing but how to get the government of the 
Nationalists to listen to the majority of people of South Africa and release 
ANC leaders who had been jailed and to un-ban the organizations that were 
banned. That is why Mangosuthu Buthelezi refused to enter into talks with the 
Nationalist government unless the political prisoners were released. Later as 
there was tension between Buthelezi and ANC leaders in exile, we [as Inkatha] 
were then attacked in our areas [by UDF, the new ‘internal wing’]. It became 
the subject of our discussions; all leaders including myself reported that we 
were being attacked either verbally or physically by young people in particular 
and those who believed that Buthelezi had betrayed the African National 
54Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and South Africa 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); see also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and 
“KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
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Congress. We agreed that we are not going to ‘fold our arms’ but we were 
going to defend ourselves from the attacks. That is how this violence problem 
started in many areas, including this one of KwaShange.55 
 
Mchunu mentioned that he attended Inkatha meetings in Ulundi before the 
relationship between Buthelezi and the ANC in exile became bitter. He was annoyed 
by what the ANC in exile were doing to promote the struggle, and more so by 
proposed sanctions. He agreed to strengthen the Inkatha Movement in KwaShange in 
preparation for complete independence from the ANC and the UDF. He had 
connections with Inkatha leaders in other areas, who met frequently in Ulundi. 56 
 
Some people recruited by the ANC, and who had participated in the meetings at the 
‘People’s Hall’, did not go into exile but there are no records that they joined Inkatha. 
I asked Mchunu why they did not join. He replied that some people decided not to get 
themselves involved in politics because their lives were in danger. They believed that 
the government would turn against Inkatha as the ANC was already banned.57    
 
Ndlovu’s responsibilities, however, at the time of the formation of Inkatha, suggest 
that he had either been conscientised to the leftist view of the armed struggle or had 
no time to actively participate in Inkatha activities because he was tasked to do 
underground work for the ANC. He had been given the responsibility of identifying 
young people within the trade union who could be recruited and sent abroad for armed 
force training. Soon after the formation of Inkatha, in 1977, he was banned.58 Clearly, 
however, there was no tension between Ndlovu and Mchunu at that time.  
 
5.2.4 Chris Hlengwa 
 
Chris Hlengwa was a KwaShange policeman in 1987. He was born in Estcourt on a 
white-owned farm, but his parents left because of the terrible conditions they were 
living under. The Hlengwa family came to KwaShange when there were still few 
55Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
56Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
57Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
58Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 26 October 2005. 
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residents in the area. Hlengwa grew up in KwaShange, went to school nearby in 
KwaMpande. Later he went to Mzimba School, named after the Zondi chief, where he 
completed standard eight. He was then employed by the South African Railways 
Police. In the mid-1980s, these police were incorporated into the South African Police 
(SAP). Shortly after the violence started in KwaShange, Hlengwa played an important 
role in preventing the violence from escalating. He said: 
 
As police, we were called to many areas in Vulindlela and other parts of the 
Natal Midlands to mediate between UDF and Inkatha people who were 
fighting. I used to get disconcerted by Inkatha members who mercilessly killed 
UDF supporters. I used to be annoyed by some of my white colleagues but 
more so by black police who killed black people in townships like 
Hammersdale and Imbali.59  
 
Some UDF people such as Moses Ndlovu and Harry Gwala knew Hlengwa’s feelings 
about the situation; his relationship with them became stronger and he took it upon 
himself to defend the UDF from Inkatha assault, in conjunction with the SAP. 
Hlengwa’s anger towards Inkatha was noticed by Chief Shayabantu Zondi of 
Vulindlela, an Inkatha leader. Later in 1987, Hlengwa and about 11 other men in 
KwaShange were found guilty of killing 13 Inkatha members who were ‘planning to 
attack UDF supporting families.’ I shall go into more details concerning this incident 
in the next chapter. 
 
5.2.5 Phillip Thabethe, commonly known as ‘Makhekhe’ 
 
This interview, “Black vs. Black in South Africa,” took place between Thabethe and 
the Times newspaper in 1988. 
 
One man with a bitter grievance against the UDF is Phillip Thabethe, a 40-
year-old driver for the bus company that serves many of the 300,000 blacks 
living in the Edendale region. The UDF militants mounted an all-out assault 
on Thabethe and his family after he began organizing at the bus depot on 
59Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 12 March 2008. 
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behalf of the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). The union 
was an Inkatha affiliate that was rival to the more powerful labour affiliated 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
Thabethe claimed he was on his bus in September 1987 when a man in the line at the 
door opened fire on him. To the monitors of the violence he showed scars on his chest 
of eight bullets from a Soviet-made Tokarev automatic pistol. His driver's licence, in 
his shirt pocket at the time, had four holes where bullets had passed through. Thabethe 
underwent weeks of surgery before going home to KwaShange. While he was 
recuperating, 10 days before Christmas 1987, gunmen killed his twenty-year-old son 
as he walked to a local store. Six days later, while Thabethe was at the hospital, about 
50 youths surrounded his home and set it on fire. His wife, his mother and another son 
were killed.60 
However, at the offices of the Pietermaritzburg Association for Christian 
Social Awareness, which aimed to alleviate suffering in the townships, a 
Black welfare worker described the bus driver, Thabethe, as “one of the top 
Inkatha killers” and said he had been involved in many slayings of people with 
UDF affiliations, but when the accusation was repeated to Thabethe by 
Monitors he claimed: “I cannot be a killer. I do not have a gun.” 
Inkatha's chief representative in the region, Vusumuzi Mvelase, produced a 
sheaf of affidavits that the Movement’s members had presented in court, 
seeking injunctions against further attacks from the UDF. The applications 
dealt with fire-bombings and shootings directed at Inkatha officials in the 
Pietermaritzburg and Durban areas, attacks that Mvelase said arose from 
attempts by the UDF, dating from 1985, to supplant Inkatha as Natal's pre-
eminent black group.61 
 
 
60John F. Burns, “Black versus Black in South Africa”, The New York Times, 21 January, 1988, 5-7. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/21/world/black-vs-black-in-south-africa p5. Access on 23 March 
2009. 
61John F. Burns, “Black versus Black in South Africa”, The New York Times, 21 January, 1988, 5-7. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/21/world/black-vs-black-in-south-africa. Access on 23 March 2009. 
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5.3 “Izinkunzi Ezimbili Esibayeni Esisodwa” (“Two bulls in one 
kraal”)62: The Breach between Mchunu and Ndlovu 
 
Mchunu was one of Chief Zondi’s councillors from 1980 and was responsible for 
peace and order. Smoking on public transport was not allowed, but some people 
would ignore the rule and smoke. It was Mchunu’s responsibility to call those people 
to order. He instilled discipline mainly in young people who were ‘disrespectful’ in 
their behaviour within the community.63  
 
As much as I was doing my job – assigned to me by the community, there 
were people who hated me for working for the community. Some would 
deliberately do things which were really out of order in my presence – because 
they wanted to provoke me; they knew that I would not keep quiet. But from 
1983, I was undermined and it looked as though there was a campaign to 
challenge my authority. One of the people who were causing me trouble was 
Moses Ndlovu and many young people who were in one way or the other 
connected to him.64 
 
During our interview in 2005, Ndlovu commented on Mchunu as a community leader: 
 
Mchunu was using his authority as a community leader to campaign for a 
political movement. He was very cruel to those people he deemed were not 
interested in his movement. Mchunu and I were in a war, so, I was not 
ashamed to tell people not to take him seriously. It would have been better if 
he did justice, but he was biased. 65 
 
Mchunu was one of the leaders in a large community Zionist church, which had 
members who came from neighbouring areas of KwaVulindlela. He was not really a 
62This is a Zulu saying that was used by some of my interviewees in KwaShange, who observed 
tension that was going on between Mchunu and Ndlovu. They were regarded as peers who were 
equally intelligent, strong and influential. They were likened to two bulls in one kraal (kraal being 
KwaShange area) and traditionally, it is not done; you do not put two bulls in one kraal because they 
fight. One elderly woman felt that it was not right for Mchunu and Ndlovu to be residents of 
KwaShange, both of them- she felt that one should have been elsewhere. 
63Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. 
64Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. 
65Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 26 October 2005. 
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church person, but he wanted to influence people and many people who belonged to 
the Zionist church were members of Inkatha.66 Ndlovu followed suit: he took a senior 
position in the Presbyterian Church in KwaShange.67 
 
As I said, there was a war between myself and Mchunu. This was triggered by 
the fact that Inkatha leadership and supporters in other areas were treating 
UDF supporters unfairly; in fact our members were being brutally killed in 
Johannesburg, in Transvaal and many other areas. Arrogance and attitude 
displayed by Inkatha leadership nationally compelled us to prevent Inkatha 
from spreading to every corner of our society. In our UDF and COSATU 
meetings it was agreed that we needed to stop Inkatha’s influence and do 
anything that would counteract them […]. Can you imagine if I allowed him 
[Mchunu] to do as he pleased? This area would not be what it is today. 68 
 
In 1984, KwaShange built the first secondary school (Mtholangqondo School). For 
years there had been no secondary school in the area. KwaShange had a lower 
primary school and a higher primary school. In 1982, the latter school introduced 
standard six and this was the foundation of the first KwaShange secondary school. 
But because they had no school buildings, they used the higher primary school 
premises until 1985, when standards six, seven and eight moved to a newly built 
secondary school named Mtholangqondo Junior Secondary. Mchunu was appointed 
the first chairman of the school committee. Some people were unhappy about this 
appointment, but his influence was irresistible in the community.69 
 
In 1987, school children, influenced by Ndlovu’s canvassing amongst the youth in the 
UDF, began to be ill-disciplined, being insolent to teachers. There was tension 
amongst the learners themselves: some wanted Mchunu to be on the school 
committee, while others wanted him removed because he was an Inkatha leader as 
66Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 11 April 2010. 
67Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 11 April 2010. 
68Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 26 October 2005. 
69Interview with Moses Ndlovu, and Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 2005-2008. 
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well as a community leader.70 This was also because Mchunu was known to be very 
harsh on undisciplined youths.71 Ndlovu said: 
 
That was the only strategy we could use to stop Mchunu. He was very 
influential in the community. I, together with my team, mobilized a few boys 
and told them to cause chaos and make sure that they made school 
ungovernable. By that time Mchunu had won many teachers in all our local 
schools to join Inkatha. 72 
 
This created tension between school children, so that teaching and learning had to 
stop. One day in 1987 there was a serious fight in school, where children from UDF- 
supporting homes fought with children whose families were Inkatha supporters. The 
latter were chased away and told to go home and tell their parents to pack their 
possessions and leave KwaShange. The UDF learners refused to attend classes and 
the school principal, Clement Mathonsi, sent some children to call the Chairman of 
the school, Mchunu, to address students. 
 
I refused. I said they must tell the principal that I am not coming; I feared that 
the children were going to kill me. I had heard that the plan was to kill me. 
Because one of my daughters was a learner in the same school, she heard from 
friends of hers that it was the day to kill me. Instead, I went to KwaZondi store 
(where there was public telephone) and I phoned the police.73 
 
Ndlovu commented:  
 
I was not a home that day, I was at work, but one of my boys [UDF 
supporters] phoned me at work and he told me that a police helicopter came to 
the school and it was the first time in our area a helicopter landed. Nobody 
knew who had informed the police – but we suspected that Mchunu had called 
the police. It was a shock because we had hoped that he was going to go to the 
70Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange 11 April 2010. 
71Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange 11 April 2010.  
72Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008; Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 26 
October 2005. 
73Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
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school to talk. Mchunu was a person who never feared anyone – he had 
unbelievable bravery. We were sure that he would go to school and try to stop 
the chaos and my boys would ‘deal’ with him then. 74 
 
Not surprisingly, on 25 September 1987, 13 youths of KwaShange, mainly learners 
from the Inkatha- supporting families, were attacked by UDF supporters and killed. 
They were buried in a mass grave in the school yard. In 1988, Mchunu resigned from 
the chairmanship of the school and Ndlovu succeeded him. 
  
Philippe Denis, drawing on his personal collection of recorded interviews, in his 
submission to International Amnesty, noted that the local spark for conflict between 
the two camps was the strike at the BTR SARMCOL factory in Howick, which 
started on 30 April 1985. There had been an earlier stoppage in March over 
management’s prolonged delays in recognising the Metal and Allied Workers Union 
(MAWU). In contrast, after its formation in May 1986, UWUSA was recognized 
immediately at the same factory. In retaliation for the strike of 1985, the entire 
African workforce was dismissed. The factory management started to recruit ‘scab’ 
labour soon after the strike started. This inevitably led to conflict. A successful 
Pietermaritzburg stay-away on 18 July 1985, endorsed by FOSATU and the UDF, 
was called on behalf of the strikers and was followed by a consumer boycott of white-
owned shops. By the end of August a survey conducted by the Pietermaritzburg 
Chamber of Commerce showed an average fall-off in black trade of between 60 and 
70 per cent, some of it brought about by young UDF comrades.75 The boycott was 
denounced by the Inkatha-supporting Inyanda Chamber of Commerce. On 12 January 
1986 Buthelezi instructed all Inkatha members and supporters to be prepared to 
mobilize workers against the newly formed COSATU. Because of this, Mchunu and 
Makhekhe made public announcements, in KwaShange and neighbouring areas that 
people should dissociate themselves from COSATU, since it was bringing confusion 
into society.  
 
74Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 26 October 2005. 
75John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72.  
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A 200-strong Inkatha group was bussed into Mpophomeni Township (the home of the 
SARMCOL strikers) on the evening of 5th December 1986. Some KwaShange Inkatha 
leaders were amongst them. Mchunu recalled this incident, but never admitted that 
some KwaShange Inkatha leaders were part of the group. They abducted four 
COSATU officials and members in Mpophomeni, assaulted them and executed three; 
one managed to escape. The Inkatha group was then escorted out of the township by 
the police. Within a day or two at least three of the perpetrators were arrested, after an 
investigation by the Howick police. They were ordered by a high-ranking police 
officer to release the accused. The inquest in March 1988 found that nine Inkatha 
members (against whom there have as yet been no prosecutions) were responsible for 
the murders. One of those named was Vela Mchunu who, together with about 200 
other Inkatha men, had received SADF Special Forces military training.76 Vela 
Mchunu was arrested in the early 1990s and tried under another name for a taxi-
related double murder, but was acquitted. The Attorney-General of Natal, Tim 
McNally, refused to bring him to court for the Mpophomeni killings.77  
 
Police were present throughout Mpopomeni and KwaShange, searching for guns, but 
they went to the homes of known UDF supporters. Hlengwa’s, Ndaba’s and Zondi’s 
homes were searched. The police would take any weapon they found in these 
households; the next day Inkatha supporters could then attack easily. During the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission hearings in Pietermaritzburg in 1996, the Nationalist 
government’s Secret Police’s Eugene De Kock indicated some of what was happening 
in the Natal Midlands and the role the police played in exacerbating the situation. 





76Interview with four KwaShange former policemen who followed and observed what was happening 
in Howick/Mpophomeni. C. Hlengwa, S. Zondi, M. Goge and N. Msane, KwaShange, 25 September 
2008) See also J. Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election 
Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s 
Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003),  47-72. 
77John Aitchison, “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 
Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 73. 
78John Aitchison’s testimony during the Truth and Reconciliation Hearing in Pietermaritzburg, see 
www.doj.go.za/trc/hrvpmb/pmb. 
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5.4 August 1987: The Day for Moses Ndlovu 
 
In August 1987 there was a meeting at KwaShange Higher Primary School and 
everybody, including children as young as ten years old in KwaShange was forced to 
join Inkatha. At this meeting, Chief Shayabantu Zondi was the chairperson; on stage 
were local top Inkatha leadership: Guvaza Khanyile (the local induna), Nunu 
Mchunu, P. Thabethe, Kubheka and Mlungisi Ngubane (a youth activist). Ndlovu had 
been forced to come to the meeting. He was asked to explain his actions since 1979; 
why had he acted as a ‘traitor’ and been ‘disrespectful’ to Chief Buthelezi and the 
KwaZulu Government.  
 
Despite the pressure, Ndlovu did not answer the questions: not only was he being 
bullied, but in other school halls community members were being forced to pay R5 
(five rands) for Inkatha membership cards. This forced membership of Inkatha in 
KwaShange was a result of an instruction from Inkatha that everybody in Vulindlela 
must be a registered member of Inkatha. Aitchison writes: 
 
[…] there were now daily reports of a heavy Inkatha recruitment drive backed 
by threats and coercion. Apparently in many Vulindlela areas a final date of 4 
October was proclaimed, by which time everyone had to have joined Inkatha. 
Conventionally, it is here that the Midlands war can be said to have begun.79 
 
In retrospect, I have found that this was the day that Inkatha had planned to kill 
Ndlovu publicly.80 They wanted to show the community members that were reluctant 
to join Inkatha what was ‘coming to them.’ Ndlovu was questioned why he associated 
himself with COSATU, that had treated Chief Buthelezi with contempt and he was 
instructed to resign.  
 
Ndlovu said he was an employee of COSATU and could not quit because he would 
not know how to support his family. Inkatha leader and induna Guvaza Khanyile told 
79John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 59. 
80Interview with anonymous former leader of Inkatha in KwaShange, 17 February 2009.  
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Moses Ndlovu that Inkatha would see to it that his family did not suffer because of 
that. Hlengwa’s account of the meeting is as follows: 
 
I arrived late to that meeting because I had been working night shift. I 
remember well that day; it had been raining the day before (Saturday) so it 
was muddy. The school hall was packed and the road to the school was full, 
almost every community member was there, it was indeed a sad day. People 
were scared. We were all terrified. When I arrived at the school hall, Moses 
Ndlovu was standing in the front (Kwakungadlalwa) the man was crying 
literally. Moses Ndlovu had been forced by a group of men to attend the 
meeting. And he was being forced to ‘lead by example’ and take membership 
of Inkatha. And there was a heated debate where many were questioning Chief 
Zondi and Ngendlezi (Mchunu) as to why they were forcing them to join 
Inkatha and others were asking what they are going to gain by joining Inkatha. 
Phakathi, senior man of KwaShange, upon my arrival, raised a hand and asked 
me ‘as a policeman – a person who understands law’ to answer some of their 
questions. The question was: is it correct for Nkosi Zondi and Ngedlezi 
Mchunu to compel them to join Inkatha? What does the law say? My answer 
was ‘No, nobody should be forced to join any organization.’81  
 
Chief Zondi and Chris Hlengwa became arch enemies from that day. The following 
day, Chief Zondi saw Hlengwa walking by the road in KwaShange and threatened 
him. He tried to beat him but Hlengwa took out his gun and Chief Zondi ran away. By 
that time Hlengwa requested protection from the police, which he received for about a 
month. When the white station manager heard that Hlengwa was UDF, he withdrew 
the police that were looking after Hlengwa’s home and children. 
 
State police started harassing UDF supporters in KwaShange: some UDF supporters 
were taken away by the SAP for a number of days and beaten. Police in plain clothes 
used to come with a white taxi, with the sign ‘DAMBUZA’. Some white police would 
wear brown make-up so as not to be recognised by people in KwaShange. In the same 
year Inkatha youth started recruiting, ‘toyi toying’ in KwaShange, forcing people to 
81Interview with C. Hlengwa, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
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join Inkatha and going to surrounding areas like Vulisaka. These youths frequently 
met in the Senior Primary in KwaShange and in one instance they met at Mzamweni 
High School, across the Msunduzi River. That day in August 1987 they were planning 
one of their attacks. The UDF leaders in KwaShange were aware of this meeting and 
organized themselves. With the assistance of Harry Gwala, they managed to get a 
Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK) soldier to come to defend homes that were going to be 
attacked.  
 
We realized that waiting for them would make it difficult for us to prevent 
them. The best thing was to corner them where they met because we were sure 
that they had some weapons. Inkatha-trained police were going to accompany 
them, so we decided to go to the school and we shot them.82  
 
Aitchison’s version of the story is that the COSATU leader, Alfred Ndlovu, borrowed 
an AK 47 from an MK member and attacked an Inkatha group in Vulindlela and 
wounded several people. 83 Seven youths were permanently paralyzed because of this 
attack. Others were killed later because of the same political violence. 
 
The Daily News report about the KwaShange incident of August 1987 stated: 
 
About 12 complainants and potential court witnesses had been killed, or their 
houses burned down, in the past year in KwaShange, Pietermaritzburg, the 
regional court was told yesterday. The witness, Captain A. Upton, of the 
Unrest Unit here, said that intimidation was so bad that even bereaved people 
were scared to be seen near the police. Other potential witnesses who had 
made a statement to lawyers later denied having made it. This fear of reprisal 
made it very difficult to prosecute perpetrators of political crimes here. 
Captain Upton was testifying at the regional court trail of Mr. Alfred Ndlovu 
(38), second national vice-president of the Transport and General Workers’ 
Union and regional chairman of COSATU. He faces charges of terrorism and 
two attempted murders, one arising out of the wounding of 13 youths aged 
82Interview with anonymous, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
83Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 12 March 2008. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of 
the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., 
The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 58. 
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from 10 to 17, and a 22-year-old man, at Vulisaka [KwaShange] in August last 
year.84  
 
Many people I interviewed in KwaShange remembered this incident and say it was 
the first time they had heard the sound of a gunshot. The MK soldier used an AK 47 
and left many KwaShange youth wounded.  
 
I have argued elsewhere that ‘the so-called black-on-black violence did not start in the 
streets, in streams and forests of our country, but it was engineered in state offices.’85 
The Nationalist government was guilty of aggravating and even engineering the 
confrontation between black people: The rupture that developed between the ANC 
and the Inkatha Movement in 1979 provided a useful occasion for government to 
aggravate the conflict. Much publicity was given to what was described by the 
government, and portrayed by the State media, as ‘black on black violence.’86 One of 
the established strategies of the regime was to use divisions to maintain their rule. 
Inkatha was seen as relatively pro-Nationalist, with Buthelezi opposing sanctions and 
receiving funding for military and police training.87 The UDF was formed in 1983 to 
oppose the tricameral system imposed on South Africa.88 It identified all participants 
in a Nationalist government structure as an enemy.  
 
Through 1986 the UDF, as the ANC internal wing, had started boycotts of businesses 
and used intimidation to compel unwilling black participants to observe them. 
Municipal transport in Pietermaritzburg was targeted. Strikes and labour actions were 
used to increase pressure on the Nationalist government. In his interview, Ndlovu 
said, “we were instrumental in organizing the strikes; many young men from my area 
[KwaShange] would participate in the strikes, but when we came back, we would face 
84Daily News, 23 August 1988. 
85Speech by May Mashego-Mkhize presented at the conference: Remembering Political violence in 
KZN 1987-1990, conference hosted by Msunduzi/Voortrekker Museum, 25-26 March 2010. 
86John F. Burns,  Special to the New York Times, Published: Thursday, 21 January 1988, 3. 
87John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94.  See also Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An 
Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1987), Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
88Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal 
Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987). See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands 
War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of 
Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 
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challenges, anger, hatred from our neighbours who were anti- UDF and COSATU.”89 
Chief Zondi and the Inkatha leaders in KwaShange, Mchunu and Kubheka, when they 
attended Inkatha meetings in Ulundi, reported that Moses Ndlovu and his supporters 
were a bad influence in Vulindlela.90  Throughout 1984 and 1985 the spectre of the 
‘necklace killing’ came into its own. Many people identified as being in the 
opposition camp or informers were killed by means of this ‘necklace’: a car tyre was 
placed around the neck of a victim, petrol dowsed on it and the victim set alight. The 
intention was to terrorize those who supported the Nationalist government. Particular 
areas were targeted to be used to test the ‘necklacing system’. It was agreed at a 
meeting that took place in Durban that KwaShange was one of the places that was 
going to be a ‘testing ground’, simply because it was the only area under a chief that 
had a large UDF following. All those who opposed the UDF were perceived to be 
informers in the area and would be targeted. Ndlovu, however, cautioned that Inkatha 
leaders in KwaShange were very strong and feared. The UDF/COSATU supporters 
could not face Inkatha leaders there, particularly not Mchunu, who had a track record 
of ‘slaughtering’ his opponents. The idea of testing ‘necklacing’ in KwaShange was 
thus not a success.91 
 
News reached Mchunu that he was going to be killed by ‘necklacing’: 
 
When I heard that, at first I did not believe that my neighbours would want to 
do such a cruel thing to me. One senior woman came to me at night and told 
me that I must go, because I was going to be burnt. She had heard a plan being 
made to attack me. I started hunting those people she mentioned. I went to 
Moses (Ndlovu) and I told him: Ngizokuninyisa, ngizonibamba nonke [a 
deliberate insult]; one by one. I then started looking for them, even in town in 
Pietermaritzburg. Every time they saw me, they would run away and I would 
run after them and they failed to kill me and we heard that they killed a lot of 
Inkatha people in Hammersdale, using a similar method.92 
89Interview with Moses Ndlovu, Ashdown, 2007. 
90Interview with Moses Ndlovu, Ashdown, 2007.  Nunu Mchunu confirmed this in an interview with 
him in 2008. 
91Interview with Moses Ndlovu who attended the UDF/COSATU secret meeting in Durban in 1986, 
where the national leadership of UDF and COSATU recognised KwaShange as their base in rural 
Vulindlela and agreed to offer all support needed to sabotage rivals, Inkatha in particular and the state. 
92Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 11 March 2008. 
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The regional government structures in Natal were the Natal Provincial Administration 
and the KwaZulu Homeland Government. The South African government imposed 
order in the Provincial Administration section of Natal through the SAP force, but left 
the maintenance of law and order in the homeland of KwaZulu to Buthelezi, who was 
then Chief Minister and Minister of Police.  The uprising that took place in 1985 and 
1986 in the Cape, the Free State and the Transvaal was easily identified as an 
attempted UDF or ANC in exile revolution; this was termed ‘the armed struggle’. In 
Natal and KwaZulu, the police force, in which Inkatha was influential, was the 
legitimate authority. It is clear from the interviewees who supported Inkatha in 
KwaShange and other areas in Natal and KwaZulu that the UDF uprising was 
interpreted as an insurgency against the authority of KwaZulu, and the person of 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and not a struggle against the South African Government 
Regime, with all its oppressive apartheid laws. Ndlovu commented (and Hlengwa 
concurred with him): 
 
What confused us as members of the UDF is that Inkatha members saw UDF 
as their enemies, but in fact our struggle was directed towards the Nationalist 
government. We had no intention to fight with our fellow blacks.93  
 
Aitchison alluded to this when saying that the UDF and the ANC were depicted as 
‘terrorists’ and communists rather than the freedom fighters they were later to be seen 
as.94 Mchunu said: 
 
The terrorism activities of the UDF and ANC supporters, especially in areas in 
northern Zululand, where they used to cross the borders and come to put some 
bombs and kill people, we [Inkatha] realized that we had to wage a war 
against these people. In fact we saw this as contempt towards umntwana 
wakwaPhindangeni. It would have been a cowardly act to remain silent whilst 
‘terrorists’ undermined our leader. At that time, my people and I were crazy; I 
hated a smell of iqabane [comrades]. I used to kill them; to me killing became 
my daily activity in KwaShange. I could not control what was happening in 
93Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 2005 
94John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 
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other areas but it angered me to hear about our people [Inkatha supporters] in 
other areas being killed by the terrorists [UDF/ANC] and I made it my mission 
to avenge in KwaShange.95  
 
In all these attacks police would come into KwaShange, but instead of taking Inkatha 
supporters to prison, they would enter UDF-supporting homes, take all weapons that 
were available and send all strong males to jail for no apparent reason. This would 
open doors for Inkatha supporters to attack UDF people.96 Aitchison claims that: 
 
The Nationalists thus evidently engineered a state of ‘low intensity warfare’, 
which intention was to keep atmosphere between the UDF and Inkatha tense, 
but at the same time they were concerned about the economy of the region and 
the country as a whole. It was not intense enough to destroy the economy of 
the region.97 
 
From 1987 until 1990 this ‘low intensity warfare’ was maintained. The leadership of 
the UDF and Inkatha was drawn into this divide-and-rule strategy.98 The followers, on 
the whole, were unaware that they were being used as pawns in the political struggle 
for power.99 Allegations of a “Third Force” proliferated; John Aitchison argues that 
there were three “Third Forces”:  
 
The government had its police and military, which operated clandestinely to 
undermine its opponents and the de Kock and Malan trials have exposed these 
elements. The second of the three forces was the ANC in exile, with its 
training camps inside and outside the country, and their public proclamation to 
make the country ungovernable. The third of the three forces was that of the 
95 Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
96 Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 15 March 2008; Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 
KwaShange, 11 August 2005. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and 
“KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 
97John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 
98Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005.  
99In retrospect, Moses Ndlovu, Nunu Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa agreed that supporters of the UDF 
and Inkatha at the grassroot level knew very little about violence. Leaders of the movements were 
fighting for power using their followers. Interviews with Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa and Nunu 
Mchunu, KwaShange, 2005-2008. 
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Inkatha Freedom Party, where camps were established inside the country and 
on the borders. Here, with the collusion of the South African Defence Force, 
their members were trained in insurgency and counter-insurgency. All three of 
these third forces were well armed and trained to destabilize, kill and destroy 
their opponents. The South African Police, especially in Pietermaritzburg, 
particularly the Riot Unit, under the command of Major Terreblanche, who 
was then in charge, were used as a tool to implement the National Party’s 
policy of divide-and-rule.100 
 
Needless to say, police measures were primarily intended to undermine the UDF, as it 
was a front for the ANC. Government powers under the State of Emergency, from 
1986 to 1990, legalized murder and abuses. Detention without trial was used widely 
against UDF members, whereas only a few Inkatha members were imprisoned.101 
 
 
5.5 Summary of events in KwaShange leading up to the 1987 
violence102 (See Appendix Three) 
 
 
100Interviews with Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa and Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange 2005-2008. 
101Personal Communication with John Aitchison, (UKZN, 2009), Interview with Nunu Mchunu, 
KwaShange, 2008, Christ Hlengwa, KwaShange, 2008 and Moses Ndlovu, Ashdown, 2005 see also, 
Gerhard Maré, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa (London: Zed Books, 1993) and Mzala, Gatsha 
Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books. 1988). 
102There is an important literature on the struggle against apartheid, covering the period from the 1960s 
to the 1980s, see, for instance, Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict 
(Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1997), 1-2. Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief 
with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). Both these authors’ works are biased towards their 
political movements’s views, Jeffery’s views are pro-Inkatha, whereas Mzala’s views are pro-ANC in 
exile, but their works add value and are of vital importance in the history of the struggle against the 
apartheid regime from the 1950s to the 1980s. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands 
War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of 
Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94; 
Jeremy Seekings, The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), Robert Morrell, John Wright and Sheila Meintjies, “Colonialism and 
the Estlablishment of White Domination, 1840-1890”, in R. Morrell ed., Political Economy and 
Identities in KwaZulu-Natal: Historical and Social Perspectives (Durban: Indicator Press, 1996), 33-
63; Gerhard Maré, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa (London: Zed Books, 1993). Gerhard Maré 
and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal 
Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Tim Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983). 
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5.5 1987, A turning point: events leading to the “Seven Days War” of 
1990 
 
Political analysts reviewing the political violence in Natal and Zululand accept that 
1987 was a turning point in the struggle for liberation. Writing about this period, 
Aitchison states that the beginning of 1987 saw a hardening of the confrontation 
between Inkatha vigilantes and UDF youth organisations.103 In this section I list 
crucial happenings of 1987. I will mention only the events that were particularly 
referred to by interviewees, or noted in secondary sources such as newspapers and 
books. A former Inkatha leader in KwaShange (who wishes to remain anonymous) 
still has a notebook in which his daughter recorded much of what was discussed in 
meetings, especially in 1987. I was privileged to get some specific dates of some 
instances from these notes. KwaShange was once a very dangerous area; even 
journalists were fearful of reporting what was happening there. Police themselves 
were scared because KwaShange had a number of community members who were 
policemen and who fought to defend their area. This fact made other policemen fear 
for their lives. There were many instances where police were called to mediate in 




Mchunu and Dlamini, as Inkatha leaders in KwaShange, called a general meeting of 
Inkatha members in the area. Members had to bring their children with them. Mchunu 
also invited Chief Shayabantu Zondi, explaining in an interview, “Our intention was 
to show the Chief that we had recruited a lot of people in the area.”104 The Chief gave 
Mchunu and Dlamini a goat from his kraal, thanking them for “a job well done” and 




103John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57. 
104Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 August 2008. 
105Interview with group of informants in KwaShange, this information was confirmed by Nunu 
Mchunu, 12 March 2010. 
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February 1987 
 
There was a meeting for Inkatha leadership in Vulindlela at Henley Combined School 
in KwaShange. This “was well attended by leaders from all structures of Inkatha; it 
was agreed that before the end of the year everybody (from the age of seven upwards) 
in KwaVulindlela must have joined Inkatha – we set a date that before the end the 
year everybody would be expected to have been a card carrying member of the 
movement.”106 Aitchison records that there was a final date set of 4 October in many 
Vulindlela sub-areas, by which time everyone had to have joined Inkatha. The date of 
4 October vies with 25 September as the start of the Midlands civil war.107  
 
KwaShange was the first area in Vulindlela to launch the recruitment campaign.108 
Every Friday after school KwaShange youths met at the Henley Combined School 
hall and discussed Inkatha issues, encouraging each other to recruit family members. 
They used to march in KwaShange, chanting Inkatha slogans and singing struggle 
songs and force everybody they met to join them. About 52 youths who refused to 
join were severely beaten.109 When I interviewed some of those who were injured and 
hospitalised, all mentioned the harsh treatment they received at Edendale Hospital. 
They were told by nurses that if they continued ‘rejecting’ Inkatha, they would not be 




Inkatha youths began a door-to-door recruiting campaign. They began beating those 
who refused to join Inkatha. Taking an Inkatha membership card became 
106Interview with Tana Zuma and Mzi Zuma, KwaShange, 13 October 2008. See also M. Mchunu, 
Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 August 2008. 
107 John Aitchson, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 58-59. 
108 Interview with Moses Ndlovu and Nunu Mchunu. See also John Aitchison,  “The Origins of the 
Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s 
Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 
109These figures were given by informants who admitted to have forgotten some events; some caution 
is advised in the interpretation. 
110See transcribed interview with a group of informants in KwaShange. See also Bhekithemba 
Mbanjwa’s, Sizwe Ndlovu’s, So Ndlovu’s, Themba Maphumulo’s, Nkilili Ndlovu’s testimonies. Dr 
May-Mashego Mkhize confirmed that staff in Edendale hospital swore that they would not ‘undermine 
umntwana wakwa Phindangene (chief Buthelezi)’, but Dr Mashego-Mkhize refused to take that oath 
when she started working in Edendale as a doctor.  
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mandatory111 and the Inkatha motto was “if you are not for us or with us you are our 
enemy.”112 A significant number of homesteads were identified by Inkatha youth 
members as needing attention from Inkatha to enforce membership. Amongst these 
were the Hlengwa family, the Mchunu family (relatives of Mchunu, who was the 
Inkatha leader in the area) and the Ndlovu family.113 
 
Towards the end of April 1987 
 
Inkatha youth openly killed Latu Ngubane, a young man considered to be brilliant at 
school. He was doing Standard 8 at Mzamweni High School and was killed because 
he declined the position of Inkatha Youth Brigade secretary. When he arrived home 
and mentioned that he had been forced to accept the position, he was reprimanded, 
and his parents declined the appointment. He was stabbed in front of his parents and 
killed.114 
 
The Hlengwa family members were most wanted by Inkatha warlords. To get 
protection, Chris Hlengwa, a policeman, asked for police protection. In April his 
homestead was put under police protection.115 He explained, “I asked for protection, 
when they asked me why, I said I am a member of Inkatha and UDF youths are 
threatening to attack my family […].”116 Hlengwa had to ‘protect the truth’ (that he 
was in fact a member of the UDF) because he knew that if he mentioned that he was 
associated with the UDF, they would not give him a police guard.117 
 
111Taken from Nsizwa Makhaye’s notes, Chief Shayabantu Zondi told Inkatha leaders in Vulindlela 
that it was not optional to be a member of Inkatha for people living under his leadership. Chief Zondi 
said this repeatedly even in compulsory Inkatha meetings in KwaShange; see Interview with Chris 
Hlengwa, KwaShange, 14 August 2008. 
112This was confirmed by Nduduzo Ndlovu, who was a member of Youth Brigade but later became a 
member of the UDF in KwaShange. 
113Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 14 August 2008. This was also confirmed by group of 
informants I interviewed in KwaShange, 12 March 2010. Ndoda Ndlovu was part of Inkatha Youth 
Brigade that listed these homesteads that had to be attacked. He later went to spy on Inkatha and 
mentioned that Inkatha was preparing itself to attack these homestead. 
114Interview with Khonzi Ngubane, Donda Ngubane, KwaShange, 12 March 2010 this was confirmed 
by Nunu Mchunu and group of informants in KwaShange, 12 March 2010. 
115Interview with Chris Hlengwa, Bhekithemba Mbanjwa, Mancinza Zondi, Sizwe Ndlovu, 
KwaShange, 12 March 2010. 
116Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 14 August 2008. 
117There is an important body of literature on state police colluding with Inkatha; below I discuss 
instances where police openly sided with Inkatha against UDF supporters. 
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May 1987 
 
A Sizanani MaZulu Transport bus driver was shot when he came to collect other bus 
drivers in KwaShange to report for work. The gunshot was heard at 4h00 but nobody 
knew what was happening because the sound of shooting was common in the area. At 
about 9h30, the bus was seen at a bus stop; the engine was still running and from the 
doors of the bus blood was dripping. Children seeing this ran to report to their parents 
and it was discovered that the bus driver had been shot.118 Killing bus drivers was an 
Inkatha campaign that took place all over Vulindlela.119 Aitchison associated these 
killings with the Pietermaritzburg workers’ stay-away called by COSATU and UDF 
in 1987 to protest against the whites-only elections. Many people heeded the call from 
COSATU and the UDF and did not go to work. That was to be a considerable defeat 
for Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi, who had urged his supporters to campaign against a 
stay-away. Inkatha blamed the success of the stayaway on the Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (TGWU), whose striking bus drivers effectively made it impossible 
for many workers to get to work, even if they wanted to. It may have been a 
consequence of this that many bus drivers, including the one who died in KwaShange, 
were killed.120 
 
Also in May, Chief Shayabantu Zondi noticed that the Hlengwa homestead was under 
police protection. He went to the police station in Plesseslaer where Hlengwa worked 
and challenged the police decision to protect Hlengwa’s homestead, stating that 
Hlengwa had lied when he said he was a member of Inkatha and threatened by the 
UDF. Thus on 15 May police protection was withdrawn from the Hlengwa family. 
Also on 15 May, Chris Hlengwa threatened to kill a youth activist, who had come 
118Interview with Bhekithemba Mbanjwa (2010), Moses Ndlovu (2005) and Nunu Mchunu (2008). It 
was alleged that Mlungisi Ngubane and ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe, who was a bus driver himself, were 
behind this killing. It is important to mention that as much as they were never found guilty of this 
because there was not enough evidence to link them to the incident. During those days, if the public 
alleged you to have committed a crime, they did not care whether there is evidence on not, they killed 
you. That was the case with Mlungisi and Thabethe; they were most wanted after this incident by their 
rivals. 
119For details see Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1990), 35-40. Kentridge recorded in detail the tension among bus drivers in 
Pietermaritzburg. 
120John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57-58. 
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with Chief Shayabantu Zondi to tell the policeman who was on duty guarding 
Hlengwa’s homestead to leave. 
 
By the end of May, Chris Hlengwa was attacked by Chief Shayabantu Zondi and his 
bodyguards, namely the Zulu Police (ZP), in full uniform. Hlengwa was walking on 
the road when the Chief’s car passed him. When he realised that it was Hlengwa; he 
reversed the car, got out and threatened him so that Hlengwa drew the official gun he 
was carrying. On this occasion, Shayabantu Zondi ran back to his car and drove away. 
 
6 June 1987 
 
On this day, an important meeting in KwaShange took place at Henley Combined 
School. The meeting started at 9h00 and lasted until after 18h00. It was a very cold, 
rainy day and every person from the age of 10 upwards, including the elderly, who 
were sick and in wheelchairs, were ordered by Chief Shayabantu Zondi to attend the 
meeting. The Chief threatened that anyone who did not come to the meeting would be 
forced to leave the area of KwaShange. Children would be beaten and the families’ 
houses burnt.121  
 
Moses Ndlovu was instructed to come to the meeting, as he was a member of the 
KwaShange community. He was present when Chris Hlengwa arrived at the meeting; 
Inkatha leaders were questioning him as to why he was working for COSATU. Seated 
on the stage of the hall were Shayabantu Zondi, Guvaza Khanyile (Headman), Nunu 
Mchunu, Dlamini, ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe and Kubheka. Ndlovu was in tears as the 
leaders were trying to force him to resign from COSATU. He refused, saying 
COSATU was paying him; if he resigned how would he support his family? The 
Chief and his Inkatha men promised Ndlovu that if he resigned Inkatha would support 
his family. He asked about his other benefits, such as his pension. The Chief stood up 
and said he must resign no matter what and all these other needs would be taken care 
of by Inkatha.122  
 
121Interview with a group of informants in KwaShange, 12 March 2010, this was confirmed by Nunu 
Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa respectively.  
122Interview with Chris Hlengwa (2008), Nunu Mchunu (2008) and Moses Ndlovu (2005). 
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A KwaShange senior man by the name of Phakathi asked Chris Hlengwa as a 
policeman to explain to the delegates if it was legal for Chief Shayabantu Zondi to 
compel people to join Inkatha. Chris Hlengwa said “legally speaking, people should 
not be coerced to join any political movements, but it should be a choice of 
individuals.”123 Phakathi stood up and lifted up his stick and said “if my son was still 
alive, we’d start fighting now.”124 He then left the meeting, along with many other 




In August 1987 there was a report that Inkatha youths were on a recruitment 
campaign in KwaShange and other neighbouring areas, campaigning for Inkatha. 
They were mandated by Chief Shayabantu Zondi and the KwaShange leader, Nunu 
Mchunu.126 This KwaShange Inkatha Youth Brigade went across the river to meet in 
a school (Mzamweni High).127 UDF supporters in KwaShange were “fed-up with this 
nonsense” and organised “somebody to sort Inkatha youth that were troublesome in 
the area.”128 The Inkatha Youth Brigade was attacked at Mzamweni School. 
Aitchison recorded that on the same occasion, a COSATU leader, Alfred Ndlovu, 
borrowed an AK47 from an Umkhonto we Sizwe member and attacked an Inkatha 
group in Vulindlela, wounding several people. He was later arrested and convicted for 
the offence.129  The Daily News reported: “Man fired AK47 at singing children”. 
 
The report continued: 
 
123Interview with C. Hlengwa, Zama Phakathi and a group of informants in KwaShange, 13 March 
2010. 
124Interview with C. Hlengwa, Zama Phakathi and a group of informants in KwaShange, 13 March 
2010. 
125Interview with C. Hlengwa, Zama Phakathi and a group of informants in KwaShange, 13 March 
2010. 
126Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, (2008).  
127Interview with Nunu Mchunu (2008) and Chris Hlengwa (2008). Many other informants in 
KwaShange remembered this event. It still exists in many people’s minds because it was the first 
emotionally and psychologically disturbing major incident that left a number of youth in KwaShange 
permanently paralysed. 
128Interview with group of informants in KwaShange, 12 March 2010. 
129John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 58. 
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A man had fired short bursts with an AK47 rifle into a group of singing school 
children, it was said in a witness’s statement handed into court yesterday. The 
children began screaming and running in all directions, the statement said. The 
gunman had told the witness that he had “come here to help supporters of the 
United Democratic Front in the fight against Inkatha”. The statement, made to 
a policeman by a witness, was handed in during the Regional Court trial of Mr 
Alfred Ndlovu (38), second national vice-president of the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union and regional chairperson of COSATU. Ndlovu is 
charged with the attempted murder of the children, and attempted murder of a 
bus driver colleague.130 He had pleaded not guilty to all the charges. The 
witness said in a statement that Mr Ndlovu had driven a gunman and two 
others to and from the Emzamweni School where the shooting occurred, to 
shoot Mr Joseph Mabaso, an Inkatha Youth organiser, and others who were 
having an Inkatha meeting at the school.131 
 
This event led to a number of attacks. One informant said, “The KwaShange I had 
known for many decades came to an end [with this attack].”132 There were many 
killings of people who were suspected Inkatha supporters and who might be witnesses 
in court. In August, more than 50 homesteads or families aligned to Inkatha “packed 
and left the area at night; they came back accompanied by police to demolish their 
mud-built houses; most families who fled were descendents of the Zondi clan who 
had originally been sent to ‘oversee’ KwaShange area in the early 1900s.”133 I quote 
further from the Daily News concerning the court-case findings: 
 
About 12 complainants and potential court witnesses had been killed, or their 
houses had been burned in the past year in Pietermaritzburg police district, the 
regional court was told. The witness, Captain A. Upton, of the Unrest Unit [in 
Pietermaritzburg], said intimidation was so bad that even bereaved people 
were scared to be seen near the police. Other potential witnesses who had 
130See Chapter Five, Makhekhe Thabethe’s profile: John F. Burns, Special to The New York Times 
(Thursday 21January 1988), 3. 
131The Daily News, 16 April 1988. The newspaper only reported the court case but not the event; as I 
mentioned earlier, KwaShange was not a ‘user-friendly’ area for journalists, police and researchers. 
132An informant who wanted to remain anonymous because she still fears for her life even today, 20 
years after the violence.  
133Interview with Manciza Zondi, Chris Hlengwa and group informants in KwaShange, 10 March 2009. 
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made a statement to lawyers later denied having made it.  This fear of reprisal 
made it very difficult to prosecute perpetrators of political crimes […] Captain 
Upton was testifying at the regional court trial of Mr Alfred Muntu Ndlovu 
(38), second national vice-president of Transport and General Workers’ Union 
and regional chairman of COSATU. He faces a charge of terrorism and two of 
attempted murder, one arising out of wounding 13 youths aged from 10 to 17, 
and a 22-year-old man, at KwaVulisaka (KwaShange) in [August 1987].134 
 
In this case many families from KwaShange whose children attended the school that 
was attacked were present at the court case and some were witnesses, but because of 
the tension in KwaShange they feared for their lives, because UDF supporters had 
already started killing all potential witnesses. The situation was so bad that every day 
at least one person would be killed. Captain Upton was testifying in support of an 
application made by State counsel, Mr Peter Blomkamp, that a witness should be 
allowed to give evidence in camera. The witness, number 3, said he wanted to give 
evidence in camera because the “UDF and COSATU have said that if one of us 
betrays another he will be killed. By betray I understand any person who informs or 
testifies in a case.… If one of a group is arrested he must not testify. If people know I 
am testifying my family will be placed in danger.”135 
 
03 September 1987  
 
On this day the Mbanjwa family was targeted by Inkatha vigilantes. Mbanjwa was 
working in Johannesburg, seldom coming home. The family used to sell basic 
foodstuff, including sorghum and other types of beer to supplement Mbanjwa’s 
salary; many KwaShange men used to gather in this family home to drink. One of the 
Inkatha warlords, Mlungisi Ngubane, who was a close relative of the Mbanjwa 
family, visited the family and asked two sons to join Inkatha. They refused, on the 
basis that they did not understand what Inkatha was going to do for them, and were 
scared that their parents would punish them if they participated in political activities. 
After a week, Mlungisi Ngubane went back and demanded that Mbanjwa’s family 
home fly the Inkatha flag; Mbanjwa’s sons would be responsible for unfurling the flag 
134Daily News, April 16, 1988. 
135Daily News, April 16, 1988. 
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every morning and taking it down at night. He told them that if they did not do this it 
would mean that they were UDF supporters. The Mbanjwa family refused to do as 
Ngubane had instructed them.136 On 18 September, at about 23h30, the Mbanjwa 
family was attacked by Inkatha vigilantes, who burnt the house and shot Bhekithemba 
Mbanjwa in the leg.137  
 
Also on 18 September, the Zibula family was attacked and a six-month-old baby 138 




Some of those involved in the attacks were caught by UDF supporters. They took 
them to headman Makhathini and instructed him to take them to the police station. 
They also gave evidence to the headman, that the young men had been involved in the 
attack. The headman took the instruction from the UDF supporters and the attackers 




The Inkatha youths were released from the Plessislaer police station. UDF leaders in 
KwaShange went to the police station and enquired as to why the youths were 
released. They claimed that they did not receive an answer. They vowed in front of 
the police that they were going to take the law into their own hands. 
 
 
136This family harassment was quoted by all men who were involved in the 25 September KwaShange 
Massacre as one of the reasons why they were very upset with Inkatha. 
137Interview with Bhekithemba Mbanjwa, 12 March 2010, Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 13 August 
2008, Chris. Hlengwa, KwaShange, 14 August 2008.  
138Winnie Zibula survived the violence, but she has permanent scars on her body from burning and 
stabbing that took place when she was only six months old. She is not in a position to talk about what 
she feels about it now. She has a lot of ‘emotional scars’, as well, because of this event. 
139Chris Hlengwa had come home late from work. As he was walking from the bus stop, two 
kilometres away; he saw flames and as he went closer heard that there were people crying. He rushed 
home to alert the group of men from KwaShange, he had organised himself to look after his homestead 
after the withdrawal of police protection. He asked these men to accompany him to where there were 
burning houses and screaming voices. When he arrived, the Zibula and Mbanjwa homes were burning. 
The attackers were still on the scene. Hlengwa shot with one bullet. The attackers ran away but 
Hlengwa and his team were able to catch one of the attackers. He named all of those who had been 
there burning the Mbanjwa and Zibula houses.  
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22 September 1987  
 
On 22 September, the Thusi family was attacked by Inkatha vigilantes, who burnt 
their house and injured the children. The reason why the family was attacked was that 
this homestead was close to the bus stop and most Sizanani MaZulu Transport (SMT) 
bus drivers used to have lunch in this house.  
 
25 September 1987 
 
The date 25 September is listed on the world-wide web as a day of historic 
importance to South Africa. It is recorded as the KwaShange Massacre Day. Overall, 
September was the most stressful month in Natal and KwaZulu in 1987 and even 
more so in KwaShange: The whole month of September is associated in the minds of 
my KwaShange interviewees with Cyclone Demonia140. These floods were seen as a 
sign of the beginning of the period of crisis. Researchers on the political violence in 
the Midlands have associated the feuding in the Midlands with these floods; Aitchison 
says the exact relationship of the floods to the violence in Vulindlela and Edendale 
that followed is a matter of considerable debate.  
 
These floods damaged houses in Vulindlela and Edendale. Allegations made by 
Ndlovu, which Mchunu denied, were that Inkatha were making offers of relief and 
assistance to flood victims conditionally on their joining the movement. Matthew 
Kentridge says that even the mayor of Pietermartzburg, Mark Cornell, criticised 
Inkatha for making political capital out of the floods. The flood relief was probably 
subverted to the recruitment drive for the D-day of 4 October, when all inhabitants 
had to either join Inkatha or leave the area. The UDF reported the recruitment drive 
was encountering strong resistance. For confirmation of these contentions one needs 
to refer to interviews with Mchunu, Chris Hlengwa, Ndlovu, Aitchison and Kentridge: 
 
It was in the Pietermaritzburg region that the many early tussles between the 
Inkatha movement and the rising power of the United Democratic Front 
140Torrential rains which caused floods that left a number of families in Natal and KwaZulu without 




                                                 
(UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) took place 
and where open warfare broke out in September 1987. It was also in this 
region that some of the subterranean activities of agents and surrogates of the 
South African state came to their most deadly fruition as they attempted to 
reverse or neutralise the democratisation of South Africa.141  
 
In his book, Kentridge claimed that the KwaShange massacre took place on 16 
September 1987 and that the youths were ambushed.142 The fact of the matter is that 
the youths died on 25 September 1987. For details I refer to my interviews with 




Hlengwa’s niece, Nobuhle Ngubane, a card-carrying member of the Inkatha Youth 
Brigade in KwaShange, visited her uncle Chris Hlengwa and told him of the meeting 
of the Inkatha Youth Brigade in one of the homesteads in KwaShange, in which a 
plan for attacking his homestead (and three other prominent community members’ 
homesteads) was mentioned. His house was to be burnt and everybody in the house to 
burn inside. She warned him to run for his life with his family and pleaded with him 
not to mention that she had disclosed this information to him. However, Hlengwa did 
not run, but prepared himself for a fight. He organised some older men to camp at his 
home. 
 
25 September 1987143 
 
At approximately 22h00, another well-known member of the Inkatha Youth Brigade 
in KwaShange, Ndoda Ndlovu, went to Hlengwa’s homestead. He went to tell him 
that he had just left a meeting where The Youth Brigade was planning to attack 
141Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), 35-40. 
John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political 
Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57-58. 
142Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
143Information provided by a number of informants in KwaShange, including, Chris Hlengwa (2008), 
Nunu Mchunu (2008) and Moses Ndlovu (2005). 
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Hlengwa’s home and other targeted homes that day. He told Hlengwa and the group 
of men camping in Hlengwa’s place that induna Guvaza Khanyile and other 
prominent Inkatha leaders in the area were part of the plan to attack the homesteads, 
but he (Guvaza Khanyile) had just left to get more guns and reinforcements from 
Bhobhonono and Sweetwater. He warned them not to sleep in the house that night. 
 
Hlengwa’s men decided that they were not going to wait for Inkatha to attack because 
they realised that they might not be able to protect themselves or retaliate because 
Inkatha had powerful machine guns. They decided to attack Inkatha first. Hlengwa’s 
men divided into three groups: two groups went with Ndoda Ndlovu to the homestead 
where the Inkatha youths had gathered and one group remained in Hlengwa’s 
homestead to protect Hlengwa’s family and many others that had been identified by 
the Inkatha youth. At 23h00 Hlengwa’s men arrived at the Ngubane homestead, 
where the Inkatha youths had gathered. The youths had put on a gas cylinder for light, 
because there was no electricity in KwaShange in the 1980s. One of Hlengwa’s men 
standing outside locked the door of the house in which the Inkatha Youth Brigade had 
gathered and started shooting and throwing stones. One of the bullets hit the gas 
cylinder and it exploded. 
 
Just after 12h00, Mchunu arrived at the scene when the house was still burning and he 
describes what he saw: 
 
I will never forget what I saw that night, I arrived at the scene, many were 
already dead, but one was hanging out the window of a burning house, he had 
been shot, the bottom part of his body was burning and he was crying. Phetha, 
his father, who was a policeman, arrived just after me. I asked him to help me 
to help his son but Phetha refused, asking what was he doing there at night 
because he was supposed to be home? That boy died before he reached 




144 Interview with Nunu Mchunu KwaShange, 14 March 2009. 
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The Citizen reported: 
 
The house was encircled by Hlengwa’s men and stones were thrown, breaking 
windows. Shots were fired and a door smashed in. When the youth[s] tried to 
barricade the doorway a fire was started. More shots were fired into the 
house.’ Those who sought to escape from the blazing house were struck down 
one by one. The screaming of those that remained in the house ceased only 
when a gas bottle exploded, ‘producing the final holocaust’. Five of the youths 
died from severe burns, six [died of] burn and stab wounds, one of pneumonia 
associated with burns, and one of head and stab wounds. Most of the bodies 
were unrecognizably scorched, with shin bones and skulls showing through 
their skin.145  
 
26 September 1987 
 
The next day, a number of SAP vehicles went to the scene where the killing had taken 
place. Bullets that had been shot there were identified as being from a gun issued to 
Hlengwa as a policeman. Hlengwa’s homestead was surrounded by more than 100 
policemen, mainly white, all fully armed and with guns cocked to fire. Police arrested 
Hlengwa and went to look for other people who were suspects, like Sakha Ndaba and 
Babayi Ndlovu. 
 
In the case of Sakha Ndaba, when police arrived in the morning, they requested him 
to get his assegai and shield and he brought it, still blood-stained from use at the 
massacre of the night before. This was enough evidence to indicate that he was indeed 
involved in the attack. This was a shock to his wife, who later (2008) said “When he 
arrived home around 2h00 that night, he never mentioned a thing to me. He just 
joined me and slept as if nothing had happened. I only knew what had happened when 




145The Citizen 28 September 1987. 
146Interview with MaSibisi Ndaba, KwaShange, 13 June 2009. 
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28 September 1987 
 
On 28 September, Nunu Mchunu was taken into prison by police under the State of 
Emergency Act. He had been found with a gun in his home and was accused of being 
the instigator of violence in KwaShange that had affected many other areas in 
Vulindlela. He was put in the same cell as his UDF and trade unionist arch enemies 
from KwaShange. 
 
I remember how they insulted me that night, 11 people against me. They 
showed me a very sharp, glittering knife and they said that night was my last 
night; they were going to kill me. […] I said to them I was not going to die 
alone, at least one of them was going to die with me. They waited for me to go 
to sleep but I refused. I stayed awake until morning when the police came to 
check us. The policeman was shocked to see that I was put in the same cell 
with UDF people. He took me to another cell with AZAPO prisoners.147  
 
28 September 1987 
 
On this day, ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe, a member of UWUSA (an Inkatha-affiliated 
union), and bus driver, was shot (allegedly by another KwaShange bus driver who 
belonged to COSATU). The New York Times reported:  
 
Thabethe, an Inkatha loyalist, claimed he was on his bus in September 1987 
when a man in the line at the door opened fire on him. To the monitors of the 
violence he showed scars on his chest of eight bullets from a Soviet-made 
Tokarev automatic pistol. His driver's license, in his shirt pocket at the time, 
had four holes where the bullets passed through.148 
 
2 October 1987 
 
On 2 October the funeral of the thirteen Inkatha Youth Brigade members killed in the 
massacre of 25 September took place at the youths’ school, the Mtholangqondo 
147Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 2008. 
148See Chapter Five, Makhekhe Thabethe’s profile, for details. 
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Secondary School. Chief Buthelezi, Velaphi Ndlovu and many other leaders of 
Inkatha were present. 
 
The local Inkatha leadership invited every KwaShange community member to take 
part in the funeral. They said everybody should come to the funeral whether they 
belonged to UDF or Inkatha. The provincial Inkatha leadership (including Sichizo 
Zuma, the Chairman of the Harewood branch of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, and 
Jerome Mncwabe and Abdula Owetha, both Inkatha town-councillors in Imbali) 
claimed that they wanted to discuss ‘peace and how to prevent similar deaths in the 
future.’ They mentioned that the national leadership of the movement would be 
present. Many people who were known UDF supporters had gone into hiding for that 
weekend, but a significant number of people who were not Inkatha members, but 
sympathised with the bereaved families, attended the funeral.  
 
After the funeral, some Inkatha leaders in KwaShange called community members 
aside, as if they were going to have a separate meeting. Inkatha started encircling all 
these members, particularly those that had not joined Inkatha; 149 a voice was heard 
shouting “baphakathi” as when Dingane killed Boers: when the first trekkers arrived 
in the territory of the Zulu King Dingane, he invited them to his headquarters in 
Umgungundlovu and called upon his amabutho (warriors) to kill them, crying 
'Babulaleni abathakathi' (‘Kill the witches’). The UDF leadership in the Midlands 
had warned its members in KwaShange and Vulindlela in general to leave the area 
during the funeral weekend: those who had no plans to flee had to remain vigilant that  
Inkatha ‘must not invite us to the funeral to smash us.’ Luckily, on this occasion 
police intervened and nobody was hurt inside the school premises.’150 Outside the 
school premises, Inkatha waited for the police to leave and then attacked UDF 
supporters. More Inkatha attacks and burning of houses in KwaShange followed, 
especially houses of those people who were known to have taken part in the attack 
that led to the death of the youths.  
Ndlovu’s house was burnt and all KwaShange people who had attended the funeral, 
but who had not joined Inkatha, were beaten; some were stabbed in the presence of 
149Bearing in mind that the Inkatha motto at that time was: ‘If you are not for us, you are against us.’ 
150Interview with survivors (some of whom inisisted that they remain anonymous) of this incident in 
KwaShange, 14 June 2009. 
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the Inkatha national leadership. Among those who received gunshot wounds were 
Babayi Ndlovu and S’thayi Ndlovu.151 
 
03 October 1987 
 
The next day, the UDF leadership in KwaShange had a secret meeting which started 
at 21h00. They met at Makhura’s Tuck-shop, which had been closed from Friday, 1 
October. The following issues were discussed: 
 
• How to support those who had been taken to jail for killing the 13 Inkatha 
Youth Brigade members. 
• How to protect and financially support families, wives and children; all these 
men were bread-winners in their families. 
• How to ‘clean-up’ KwaShange (by chasing away all Inkatha-supporting 
families). 
• A list of all the Inkatha ‘ring leaders’ that were to be killed in the next four 
weeks was drawn up. On top of the list were Nunu Mchunu, Dlamini, 
‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe, Chief Shayabantu Zondi and Guvaza Khanyile. 
 
Present at the meeting were Mathi Ngcobo, Cija Ngcobo, Ntaksi Ngcobo, Khabza 
Ngcobo, Thulani Ndlovu, Sayi Zondi (policeman), Shosa Zondi and three ‘comrades’ 
sent by Mhlabunzima Maphumulo from Table Mountain, and three representatives 
from Nxamalala and Mthoqotho. Three MK soldiers from Angola were supplied to 
KwaShange and could be expected to be on the UDF side. Harry Gwala had requested 
MK soldiers from the ANC in order to counter-attack state police who supported 
Inkatha attacks on UDF people.152 
October 1987 
 
In October, fighting intensified in KwaShange and after the resolution taken at the 
UDF meeting Inkatha supporters were being ‘forcibly removed’, meaning that they 
151Interview with survivors (some of whom inisisted that they remain anonymous) of this incident in 
KwaShange, 14 June 2009. 
152Interview with Thulani Lushozi and two anonymous members of the KwaShange community and 
ex- MK solders, 14 March 2008.  
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were forced to leave within 48 hours. Others were given a maximum of three hours to 
pack and leave the area. About 80 Inkatha-supporting homesteads left the area of 
KwaShange in two days. Those who tried to resist were killed. Sworn revenge for the 
imprisonment of Chris Hlengwa and other UDF men, because of their part in the 
massacre of 25 September, meant that the KwaShange UDF began to attack not only 
the immediate Inkatha supporters but those in neighbouring areas which had given 
refuge to those who had been forced to leave KwaShange: thus the areas of Mpande, 
Upper Gezubuso, Mvundlweni, Bhobhonono, Elandskop and Mpumuza were under 
attack. UDF militants tried to convert youths in these areas to UDF. The whole area of 
Vulindlela was affected. As a result, people from KwaShange became the arch- 
enemies of all those in surrounding areas.153 
 
Talking about this month in 1987, Matthew Kentridge said:  
 
Vulindlela, UDF supporters and Inkatha members were being killed at a rate 
of 2 to 1. Defence committees staffed and run by comrades and activists began 
to operate in Vulindlela. Inkatha was reported to be losing support in many 
areas. Attention turned from urban areas to rural chieftaincies – traditional 
Inkatha strongholds. But even there Inkatha support was no longer guaranteed. 
The pattern continued throughout November and December.154  
 
According to Moses Ndlovu, the leader of COSATU in KwaShange and the 
Midlands, these attacks in all of KwaShange’s neighbouring Inkatha-aligned areas, 
prompted the UDF and COSATU to form a de facto alliance. The two groups 
consulted one another as regards policy and strategy, but maintained separate 
organisational structures. This alliance co-ordinated a ‘peace talks’ strategy, 
contacting the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce, which offered to play the role 
of ‘honest broker’. Ndlovu admitted that it was just pretence; “we wanted peace 
during the day but used machine guns at night.”155 Kentridge recorded that Inkatha 
contacted the Chamber with a similar request. The Chamber tried to set up a meeting 
153Interview with So Ndlovu and Thulani Lushozi (former MK soldiers and KwaShange community 
members), See also appendix: interview with group of informants in KwaShange.  
154Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), appendix. 
155Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 2005. 
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with both parties. COSATU, meanwhile, sent a legal team to Pietermaritzburg to 
investigate complaints against the Inkatha warlords for assault, intimidation and 
murder.156  
 
Dlamini ‘iBhlamani’ was attacked and stoned to death at approximately 16h30 on a 
Monday. A group of 15 young men were sent to ambush him. When he was just about 
to enter his homestead, they started throwing stones. One of my UDF interviewees 
who wished to remain anonymous, explained: 
 
 We knew that he had a gun and there was no way we could have killed him 
by stabbing or shooting because he was known to be using muthi. Many 
attempts had been made before [to kill him] but all failed because he would 
just disappear. We send strong young men who were prepared to lose their 
lives. It took them about 10 minutes to knock him down, and then they 
finished him when he had fallen. They had to cut his throat just to make sure 
that he was dead because anything could happen [in regard to dealing] with 
him – because of  the kind of muthi he used, he could rise and kill us!157  
 
Late October 1987 
 
Local informants reported that in late October 1987 a white Nissan E20 kombi with 
the name “DAMBUZA” emblazoned on it was seen around KwaShange. This kombi 
was full of white passengers and was seen to watch Dlamini’s and Nunu Mchunu’s 
homesteads, In the following days, weeks and months the same kombi came back to 
arrest people who were regarded as strong UDF supporters (and, for the most part, 
those who were known to have been involved in killing Dlamini). The kombi became 
known as DAMBUZA: the men in the kombi arrested many men and women (the 
latter for interrogation). Later it became clear that these were plain-clothes policemen, 
known to be killing UDF supporters. Late in October, during the day, these police 
shot and killed Khabza Ngcobo. On that occasion, they were reported to have come in 
156Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), appendix.  See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran 
Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: 
CASE, 2003), 57-58. Moses Ndlovu confirmed this, the legal team went to KwaShange in a ‘fact- 
finding mission.’ 
157 Interview with Zethule Dlamuka, KwaShange, 24 August 2009. 
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a private car with darkened windows. It is believed that there was someone 
(presumably an Inkatha supporter) in the car who knew Ngcobo and asked the 
policemen to shoot him. 158 
 
The situation in Vulindlela and Edendale had compelled the Nationalist Government 
to send the SAP there in order to ‘bring about peace.’ Pretoria-based riot policemen 
were despatched to Pietermaritzburg and stationed at Oribi. Brigadier Kotze, 
Divisional Commander of the SAP, said, “There is no need to worry […] the situation 
is normal and under control.” This was the response of the Government to the 
numbers of refugees who began fleeing from rural areas into urban townships and 




KwaShange comrades carrying coffin to the victim’s family cemetery160 
 
More than a hundred policemen (black and white) were present to monitor the 
situation and see that there was no violence at Khabza’s funeral in 1987. Chief 
Shayabantu Zondi arrived at the funeral with his body-guards. UDF supporters at the 
158Interview with group of informants in KwaShange, 24 August 2009. 
159Interview with group of informants in KwaShange, 2009. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of 
the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s 
Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57-58, the role of the state police interfering and 
defending Inkatha is generally known and recorded in history books that cover this period in the 
Midlands. 
160 Photo taken by Cedric Nunn, courtesy of KwaZulu-Natal Museum 
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funeral attempted to grab him. The intention was to kill him with bare hands like in a 
traditional cattle killing. For muthi use, people had to be killed by hand, not with a 
gun or knife. The SAP protected the Chief. The crowd started insulting him, telling 
him that he was thin and extremely dark in complexion, because they were no longer 
giving him their monies. They told him that he was banned from KwaShange.161 
Chief Shayabantu Zondi and Nunu Mchunu were taken by police to jail for inciting 
violence in Vulindlela, but after two days they were released from prison. 
 
The KwaShange UDF leaders attended prayers for peace in Pietermaritzburg and tried 
to find a means of ending violence in the Vulindlela area. Speakers at the service 
emphasised that there was no need for black people to fight one another and stressed 
that they should be fighting against the real enemy, namely the racist regime. The 
Inkatha leaders were not present at the service.162  
 
Inkatha warlords from Imbali were seen in KwaShange with David Ntombela and 
Chief Shayabantu Zondi, accompanied by some of the Inkatha Youth Brigade. They 
severely beat learners at Mtholangqondo Secondary School in KwaShange. Moses 
Ndlovu, through the COSATU legal team, launched a strategy aimed at forcing the 
police to investigate complaints against Inkatha warlords.163 Kentridge records that on 
2 November papers were served relating to three applications for Restraining 
Interdicts against Inkatha warlords, including David Ntombela, induna and chairman 
of the Vulindlela Inkatha branch, Sichizo Zuma, chairman of the Harewood branch of 
the Inkatha Youth Brigade and Jerome Mncwabe and Abdula Owetha, both Inkatha 
town-councillors in Imbali. All of these denied the allegations against them. Interim 
Interdicts were granted and the cases referred for oral evidence.164 
 
 
161Interview with Mduduzi Mchunu, Mabhengwane Bhengu and Zibuse Madlala, who were present at 
the funeral, KwaShange, 2 February 2009. 
162Interview with Moses Ndlovu 2005. See also Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the 
Conflict in Pietermaritzburg  (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990), appendix and John Aitchison, “The 
Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s 
Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57-58. 
163Interview with Nelly Ngcobo, Sipho Khanyile confirming Moses Ndlovu’s testimony. 
164See Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg  (Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1990) and John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., 
The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 57-58. 
These ‘warlords’ were troublesome everywhere even in KwaShange they came to cause chaos.  
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December 1987 
 
In December a bus carrying KwaShange people from a peace rally held at Edendale’s 
Wadley Stadium was stoned in Mvundlweni and two people were killed. Moses 
Ndlovu had been tasked to report back on peace talks that were supposedly taking 
place between the UDF and Inkatha in KwaShange, amongst other peace-talks around 
the Midlands aimed at normalising relations between the UDF and Inkatha.  
 
It was reported that about 10 000 people attended the rally at Wadley Stadium 
convened by the UDF and COSATU. Activists reported back on peace talks and 
called on supporters to stop fighting. The corresponding Inkatha rally in KwaMkhulu 
(Chief Shayabantu’s homestead) was poorly attended. KwaShange UDF members 
were blamed, even by Chief Buthelezi, for having intimidated and blocked roads 
leading to Chief Shayabantu’s place. The second round of peace talks was held, but 
Inkatha refused to proceed unless UDF and COSATU repudiated an article calling for 
the destruction of Inkatha which appeared in Inqaba Yabasebenzi, the official journal 
of the Marxist Workers’ Tendency. David Ntombela claimed that KwaShange 
COSATU leader, Moses Ndlovu, was behind the article, and therefore implicated 
provincial COSATU leaders. The UDF and COSATU protested that they had nothing 
to do with the article and also distanced themselves from the article. Inkatha refused 
to accept this and peace talks broke down. This was the reason that, in KwaShange 
and other UDF-supporting areas in Vulindlela, traditional leaders lost what little 
respect they still possessed. 
 
In KwaShange, UDF supporters appeared to have gained the upper hand, as a 
significant number of their members had had military training with the ANC in exile. 
Ties between KwaShange and Nxamalala, a neighbouring area, were very strong at 
this stage and the residents there began to support the UDF. Inkatha supporters and 
leaders who were driven out of KwaShange fled into neighbouring areas like Mpande, 
Bhobhonono, Mvundlweni, Elandskop and Mpumuza.  
 
At about the same period, Kentridge reports, in the rural areas of Vulindlela, the 
authority of the chiefs was undermined and Inkatha was forced onto the defensive. 
This signalled a reversal of traditional patterns of political control in the area. The 
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police deployed a squad of 150 Kitskonstables in the area.165 Two further Interdict 
Applications were brought by COSATU against Inkatha. Aitchison’s figures for the 
year show that in 1987 altogether 397 people died, of whom 126 were known to be 
UDF supporters and 62 were known to be Inkatha supporters. There were 895 
occurrences of political unrest in Edendale and Vulindlela, although the death rate 
was also high in Imbali, Slangspruit, Ashdown and Mpumalanga. An informant who 
wished to remain anonymous recalled: 
 
‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe’s homestead was attacked at about 10h00. The intention 
was to capture Thabethe himself, because he had been on night-shift (as a bus 
driver), so we believed that he would be home sleeping, but we missed him; he 
had just left with Mchunu. 
In this attack about six people, including Thabethe’s wife and children, were burnt to 
death in their house. Of this attack, the New York Times reported:   
Thabethe underwent weeks of surgery before going home to KwaShange to 
recover. While he was recuperating, ten days before Christmas 1987, gunmen 
killed his twenty-year-old son as he walked to a local store. Six days later, 
while Thabethe was at the hospital, about fifty youths surrounded his home 






165The TRC report goes into detail concerning the collusion between state police and specially trained 
‘police’ and the Inkatha attacks on UDF/ANC supporters.  See also Anthony Minnaar, “The ‘Third 
Force’: In Retrospect”, in C. Schutte, I. Liebenberg and A. Minnaar eds., The Hidden Hand: Covert 
Operations in South Africa (Pretoria: Human Science Research Council, 1998), 58. Piers Pigou, “The 
state and violence: What has the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Found?”, in Ran Greenstein 
ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 
222-253.  See Testimony and public submission by General Magnus Malan before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 7 May 1997.  See also testimonies of SANDF members at Armed Forces 
Hearings in October 1997. Steyn’s investigation was initiated by De Klerk, following the discovery of 
documentation at DCC headquarters after a raid in November 1992 by investigators from the 
Goldstone Commission.  
166See Chapter Five, Thabethe’s profile for details. 
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January 1988 
 
On 31 January Inkatha had a prayer rally at Mbangweni, Chief Shayabantu’s 
homestead, which is opposite and three kilometres from KwaShange. This meeting 
was called by the Chief himself, who reported how distressed he was about the fact 
that “some of his people had turned against him.” He said that KwaShange was the 
first area to “complain about him” and they had tried several times to kill him, often 
showing no respect for him. He claimed this included the Inkatha leader, Chief 
Buthelezi. On this day provincial Inkatha launched ‘Operation Clean-Up.’ Here local 
Inkatha leaders were pressured to drive non-Inkatha members out of KwaShange or 
kill them. After the rally, vigilantes, escorted by the police, attacked KwaShange and 
killed two people; UDF with the help of Harry Gwala’s Edendale supporters, 
managed to fight back; Inkatha and the SAP gave way.  Their attempt to ‘clean up’ 
KwaShange was thus a failure.167  
 
After this event there were reports of police collusion with Inkatha against the 
KwaShange UDF-COSATU. Moses Ndlovu himself and his two sons escaped when 
they were attacked in day-light by uniformed police, escorted by Inkatha warlords. 
This police collusion with Inkatha was reported in other areas: Nxamalala, Tafuleni 
and Gezubuso. Commenting on this, Kentridge says that police were authorised by the 
Nationalist Government Minister of Law and Order, AdrianVlok, who said, “Police 
will face the future with moderates and fight against radical groups.” The Inkatha 
Institute, a sociological research unit based in Durban, released a report which 
claimed that unemployment, rather than political antagonism, was the real cause of 
the conflict. The report was endorsed by Chief Buthelezi, who blamed the violence on 
apartheid.168 This KwaShange attack prompted the president of the UDF, Archie 
Gumede, to again call for peace. Chief Buthelezi responded by saying Gumede 
supported the ANC and that peace talks would therefore be futile. Buthelezi also 
declared that he wanted talks to be held between national, rather than local, leaders.169 
 
167Interviews with groups of informants in KwaShange and Inkatha aligned informants in Mvundlweni. 
168Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), appendix. 
169Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990), appendix. 
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February 1988 
 
In February 1988, a group of Inkatha people, led by Mlungisi Ngubane, who had been 
displaced from KwaShange,170 attacked and injured KwaShange people at a bus stop 
in Retief Street in downtown Pietermaritzburg. They were arrested and charged with 
public violence. This was later altered to the lesser charge of constituting an illegal 
gathering. They received light and suspended sentences. Further Interdict 
Applications were brought against Inkatha warlords, but these were hampered by the 
murder of some of the applicants and witnesses on the eve of the hearing of the 
applications. Interim Interdicts were granted and the cases deferred until August 1988 
for oral evidence to be heard. Supreme Court judges became concerned about the 
situation and called in the Attorney-General, demanding to know what was being 
done about prosecuting the perpetrators of violence. Other judges complained that the 
Interdict Applications were wasting the court’s time. David Ntombela, an Inkatha 
warlord cited as one of the respondents in several of the interdict applications, 
threatened to shoot the COSATU official, Moses Ndlovu, after a court hearing; 
Ntombela received a warning concerning his threats, from Mr. Justice Booysen.171 
 
A delegation of women from KwaShange, Mnyandu, Vulisaka and Nxamalala joined 
another group of women from Greater Edendale and visited the offices of the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in Pietermaritzburg to complain about police 
involvement in an attack on 31 January. After further allegations of police collusion 
with Inkatha, a police spokesman, Brigadier Leon Mellet, said, “it is not the duty or 
the policy of the police to side with political groupings.” The mayor of 
Pietermaritzburg, Mark Cornell, called on the SADF to send troops to halt the 
violence, but was told by the Minister of Police that the SAP was ‘up to the task’.172 
 
According to Moses Ndlovu, the Chamber of Commerce in Pietermaritzburg was 
assisting in facilitating peace between Inkatha and the UDF. Because of the 31 
January incident, in which police and warlords attacked KwaShange, the Chamber of 
170Most wanted warlord even today in KwaShange. Some families say they want him dead or alive 
because of hurt he caused in the 1980s. 
171Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 2005. See also Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 
Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990). 
172Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
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Commerce peace-facilitators were sceptical of Inkatha’s commitment to peace, and 
told the media that Inkatha was not committed to non-violence in the Midlands, 
quoting what had happened in KwaShange as an example.173   
 
Kentridge records that Chief Buthelezi demanded an explanation from the Chamber 
of Commerce for remarks attributed to the managing director of the Chamber, Paul 
van Uytrecht, who had told a reporter on the New York Times that he was not 
convinced of Inkatha’s commitment to the peace process. The Chamber repudiated 
these comments, but Buthelezi remained dissatisfied. The Chamber continued to push 
for another round of peace talks, but on 10 February, UDF activists were detained, 
including the UDF regional secretaries, Thami Ngwenya and Martin Wittenberg. The 
detentions scuppered any hopes of further talks. The police were accused of 
undermining the peace process and the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf 





Severe conflicts took place between KwaShange and neighbouring areas, where 
people who had been displaced from KwaShange were staying. Almost every day 
KwaShange was attacked. A SAP mobile station was placed in KwaShange in March 
1988. The attacks intensified despite the police presence in the area. Four police 
searches took place in March, in which police confiscated ammunition, guns and any 
kind of weaponry. About 150 youths were taken to prison for being found in 
possession of home made fire-arms, in March alone. After each search and 
confiscation of weapons by the SAP, Inkatha would attack the area of KwaShange the 
following day and the police would do nothing to prevent the activities of these 
Inkatha warlords. Shayabantu Zondi was seen several times openly having meetings 
with the SAP stationed in KwaShange. 
 
173Interview with Moses Ndlovu (2005) and Nunu Mchunu (2008). 
174Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
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It is recorded that 300 Kiskonstables (instant-constables)175 were deployed in 
KwaShange at the beginning of March. The men had been recruited in Natal and 
trained in Cape Town, but some were from KwaShange: Tana Zuma, Mlungisi 
Ngubane, Mzi Zuma and others. There was dismay among township residents, who 
said that the Kiskonstables were simply Inkatha vigilantes in police uniforms.  
 
A group of women from KwaShange joined groups of women from various 
Pietermaritzburg areas affected by these Kiskonstables’ activities and went to see the 
Attorney-General of Natal, to express fears that these men would use their newly 
acquired rank to exact vengeance. The Attorney-General was non-committal. The 
police declared that recruits were not screened as to their political affiliation, but 
while Inkatha members could be policemen, supporters of the UDF were 
unacceptable, as it was described as an “extremist organisation.” Activists claimed 
that many of the Kitskonstabels were known criminals and some even had cases 
pending against them (like Mlungisi Ngubane, who had criminal and murder charges 
brought to court against him by families in KwaShange). 
 
In mid-March, interim Interdicts were granted against Inkatha warlords, including 
Chief Shayabantu Zondi. At the inquiry into the severe assaults on KwaShange, UDF 
members who had participated in the Sarmcol strike and in the deaths of the three 
COSATU supporters killed in Mpophomeni in December 1986, the examining 
magistrate found that a number of Inkatha members were responsible for the murders. 
The matter was referred to the Attorney-General for prosecution. At the inquest, 
David Ntombela arrived armed; his firearm was confiscated during the course of the 
proceedings. On 21 March, the police rounded up all the UDF supporters they could 
find in KwaShange and in Mnyandu, Gezubuso and other UDF strongholds in Nadi, 
and detained them briefly. On the same day the Minister of Defence and his Deputy, 
as well as the Minister of Police and his Deputy, were taken on a tour of Vulindlela, 
including KwaShange.  
 
 
175These were Inkatha supporters, who were recruited by the apartheid state agent. They were un-
trained ‘policemen’ rather they were alleged to be ‘hitmen’ that killed UDF supporters in townships 
and rural areas.  
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April 1988 
 
April was yet another ‘black month’ in KwaShange: the Durban Supreme Court 
declared two former policemen guilty of the murder of 13 Inkatha Youth Brigade 
members in September 1987. The judge found mitigating circumstances in the fact 
that the men had feared an attack by the group and had pre-empted this by attacking 
first. They were sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. Of Hlengwa’s trial it was 
reported: 
 
 In the KwaShange killings, a policeman worked together with UDF 
supporters to attack Inkatha. In the massacre that ensued, thirteen community 
Inkatha members were “methodically executed without a shred of mercy.”176  
 
The UDF young people recommitted themselves to fighting Inkatha. Headman 
Makhathini was attacked on a Friday at about 1h00. He was stoned to death and his 
throat cut in front his wife and mentally disabled daughter. His wife was also killed 




Buthelezi met Inkatha leaders in the Midlands and instructed them to stop the 
violence, threatening to dismiss Inkatha members who continued with violent 
activities. The Inkatha Central Committee decided to suspend three KwaShange 
Inkatha members (Thohlo Ndlovu, Tito Nxele and Tozama Magubane) accused of 
using violence for political ends. This happened after Buthelezi was refused a visa by 
the Austrian authorities, who were concerned about his role in South African 
politics.177 
 
An Inkatha member, Mlungisi Shabalala, was sentenced to death for the murder of 
Mgayo Miya, a UDF member. Jerome Mncwabe, also Inkatha, appeared in the 
Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court on three charges of murder. Although the victims 
176State v. Hlengwa and others, transcript of judgment by Mr. Justice N.S. Page, Natal Provincial 
Division of the Supreme Court, Pietermaritzburg, 11 April 1988, 775, 777.  
 
177Interview with Nunu Mchunu (2008) and Moses Ndlovu (2005). 
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were shot in the back, the judge accepted Mncwabe’s claim that he acted in self- 
defence, and he was acquitted. His co-accused, Nkosinathi Mncwabe, was found 
guilty of culpable homicide and sentenced to five strokes and one year’s 
imprisonment, suspended for four years. UDF supporters who attended the court case 
were furious and fought with Inkatha members. Two KwaShange Inkatha members 




Two stay-aways were called by COSATU; KwaShange, Mnyandu and Vulisaka UDF 
supporters marched to Edendale, but were attacked by Inkatha supporters who were 
accompanied by police in Mvundlweni. Nevertheless, both these strikes were well 
supported by workers. KwaShange youths, together with Edendale youth, waited near 
Georgetown for buses transporting Inkatha commuters and stoned the buses. The 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP) called on the police to prohibit a rally in Sweetwaters 
organised by the Inkatha Youth Brigade, alleging that Inkatha youth intended to 
attack Nxamalala, Mthoqotho and KwaShange. Inkatha claimed it was merely a 
meeting to discuss strategy and dismissed residents’ fears that anyone who failed to 
attend would have to ‘face the consequences’. There was intense fighting in 




A number of school children at Mzamweni and Mtholangqondo Schools in 
KwaShange were shot and injured by Kitskonstabels. The pupils had protested against 
the presence of the police on the school grounds. These school protests were taking 
place in many schools in Edendale and Ashdown: Kitskonstables had been deployed 
in a number of schools. A delegation of women went to the PFP offices to ask for a 
meeting to be set up with the police. Subsequently the Kitskonstables were almost 
entirely withdrawn from KwaShange schools. 
 
The police released a number of detainees from Vulindlela; a number of these had 
been taken from KwaShange, allegedly for causing violence. Many of them had 
severe restrictions placed on them, designed to prevent them from engaging in any 
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further political activity. In Vulisaka and Gezubuso, residents fled from their homes to 




The violence in Vulindlela intensified. Brigadier Buchner attributed this to the re-
infiltration of the area by youths and activists who had previously been kept in 
custody by police. Moses Ndlovu, the KwaShange Cosatu leader, ascribed the 
upsurge of violence to another forced recruitment drive by Inkatha in Vulindlela. Five 
people were killed and a bus carrying KwaShange UDF supporters was burnt at a 




Fifteen KwaShange women who had been victims of Inkatha warlords’ attacks 
participated in the hearings of oral evidence against Inkatha in Pietermaritzburg. 
Amongst these women were Ntongo Thusi, Nana Thusi, Sibongile Mdlalose, 
Thulisile Khanyile and Nomaswazi Ngubane. A Complaints Board, under the 
presidency of a retired judge, was established to monitor the situation. All those found 
responsible for acts of violence by the Board would be referred back to their 
organisation (the UDF or Inkatha) for discipline. Moses Ndlovu says that before the 
process of hearing oral evidence against Inkatha warlords could be completed, 
COSATU and Inkatha signed a Peace Accord. The Accord led to tension between 
COSATU and UDF comrades in the Midlands, as the latter were not signatories of the 
agreement because of the restrictions placed on the UDF by the government in 
February. UDF comrades also complained that they had not been consulted by 




In October there were reports of over 20 000 refugees in the Greater Pietermaritzburg 
Area alone. There were also reports of fighting in and around Retief Street in 
Pietermaritzburg, where KwaShange commuters were fighting with Elandskop 
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Inkatha members. The majority of deaths were caused by fighting in Mpumalanga 




Three young men, Mathi Ngcobo, Thulani Zondo and Duka Makhathini, UDF 
supporters, were wanted by Chief Shayabantu Zondi and Inkatha warlords. They 
announced that they wanted them dead because they had attacked and killed Inkatha 
members in Ezibomvini and attempted to kill the chief’s headman, Guvaza Khanyile. 
The young men were given refuge by Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo of Maqongqo. 
Late in November, Chief Maphumulo was summoned to Ulundi to answer an inquiry 
into the administration of his area, following complaints from Inkatha members that 
Maphumulo’s policy of non-alignment in the war meant that UDF refugees were 
settling in the Table Mountain area and living together with Inkatha members.  They 
also claimed that he had sent people to support the UDF in KwaShange in 
Vulindlela.179 Maphumulo refused to attend the inquiry, as he claimed that the 
directive he had received was vague and ambiguous. There were reports that Inkatha 





Fighting between KwaShange UDF supporters and Inkatha at Retief, East Street and 
West Street bus stops in Pietermaritzburg intensified after 15 people were killed at a 
vigil in a house at Trust Feeds, New Hanover. The UDF accused Inkatha members at 
Trust Feeds of this killing and of attempting to kill two young men from KwaShange, 
who had been sent to assist the UDF at Trust Feeds. Chief Buthelezi threatened to sue 
anyone, particularly Moses Ndlovu, who suggested that Inkatha members were 
responsible for the murders. He claimed that the dead people were in fact Inkatha 
members, although survivors and relations of the dead people denied this.  
178Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990) See also Debby Bonnin, “Legacies of Political Violence: An examination of Political 
Conflict in Mpumalanga Township”, Transformation 62 (2006), 59-83.  
179This was probably the reason why, in 1990, during the ‘Seven Days War’, Nyavu people assisted 
David Ntombela to attack KwaShange in particular. 
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Also in December, shopkeepers in Retief Street, Pietermaritzburg, complained that 




There was further fighting between residents of KwaShange and Mvundlweni. The 
police continued to harass KwaShange residents. A number of people were found 
dead in the area and police stationed in KwaShange were always suspects, but nothing 
was done to investigate these cases. Inkatha members attacked and killed four 
KwaShange women at a bus stop near Gezubuso. A deputation of KwaShange 
women, joined by Nxamalala, Gezubuso and Mnyandu women, went to the PFP 




Clashes occurred between UDF and Inkatha vigilantes under the command of 
different warlords throughout Vulindlela. The regional director of the PFP in 
Pietermaritzburg, Radley Keys, accused an Inkatha warlord of having murdered up to 
25 people between February and March. The Zulu Police (a Zululand government 
force) in KwaShange and Inkatha denied this. The police released a number of 
detainees, including UDF secretary, Skhumbuzo Ngwenya, following a hunger strike. 
The regional secretary of the Transport and General Worker’s Union, Alfred Ndlovu, 
was, however, found guilty of terrorism and sentenced to eight year’s imprisonment 




Winnie Mandela visited KwaShange at the behest of Moses Ndlovu and Harry Gwala. 
This was a secret visit, never publicised: she told young men who had been camping 
never to allow traitors and government agents and spies to use KwaShange as their 
‘playground’. 
 
Later in the month, Nelson Mandela sent a cordial letter from the Victor Verster 
Prison, near Paarl, to Chief Buthelezi. Mandela called for national unity in the 
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struggle and peace in Vulindlela and in the Pietermaritzburg townships. Chief 
Maphumulo, a strong ally of the KwaShange UDF, also called for peace and 
petitioned the State President to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry into the 
causes of violence. Chief Buthelezi condemned the petition and opposed the idea of a 
judicial commission. The Minister of Law and Order, Vlok, also dismissed the call.180  
 
Towards the end of April, 30 people were killed in one weekend in the Vulindlela 
areas of KwaShange, Ezibomvini, Elandskop, Bhobhonono, Mthoqotho and other 
districts. The escalation of the rate of killings galvanised the conflicting parties into 
making fresh calls for peace. COSATU and the UDF said that they shared a “common 
view and commitment to a mass movement for peace” with Inkatha and called for a 
peace conference to be convened by church and community leaders.181 Chief 
Buthelezi proposed a peace plan involving a massive media campaign in the 
townships. Vlok reiterated his view that UDF and COSATU were responsible for all 
the violence in the region and announced an increase in police personnel and 
equipment, a move that had been discussed with Chief Buthelezi during a recent visit 
to Ulundi.  
 
The peace talks were bogged down before they could begin, since Chief Buthelezi 
demanded that the talks be held at Ulundi, while COSATU and the UDF wanted a 
neutral venue, such as Durban. Although Chief Buthelezi had said to Archbishop 
Hurley (Roman Catholic Church leader) that he would be prepared to “go to the ends 
of the earth if needs be” to stop the violence, he now declared he had no intention of 




A number of UDF and COSATU high-ranking officials in the Midlands and 
Vulindlela, including the president, Archie Gumede and Moses Ndlovu of 
180Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
181Lindiwe Ngcobo worked for UDF offices; this was also mentioned by Moses Ndlovu of COSATU. 
See also Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1990). 
182Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
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KwaShange, were under virtual house arrest, thereby making it almost impossible for 




The peace negotiators agreed on an agenda for a top-level peace conference to be held 
at some overseas venue and attended by the presidents of Inkatha, the UDF, COSATU 
and the ANC. The plan was endorsed by all parties, but did not get off the ground as 
Inkatha accused the ANC of ‘dragging its feet’ over the proposals.183 
 
A ‘hit squad’ consisting of police members and operating from a red Husky mini-van 
was seen in many UDF aligned areas, Nxamalala, KwaShange, Mthoqotho and 
Edendale, assaulting and abducting UDF comrades. In KwaShange they abducted 
three boys between 18 and 21 years of age, shot them and threw their bodies into the 
nearby Msunduzi River. In September-October peace talks between Inkatha and the 
UDF and COSATU in the Midlands failed. 
 
October –November 1989 
 
An interim interdict was granted to KwaShange activists, restraining the members of 
the police ‘hit squad’ from further assaulting or abducting them. On the same day, one 
of the activists, Thulani Ngcamu, was briefly detained by the squad and interrogated.  
In November there was sporadic violence in KwaShange, as small groups of UDF 
comrades and Inkatha supporters clashed with each other. However, the worst of the 
fighting occurred in Mpumalanga and Hammarsdale.  
 
5.7 Precipitating causes of the ‘Seven Days War’ 
 
The Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini, convened a meeting of the nation at King’s Park 
Stadium in Durban. The convention was attended by 70 000 people. The king 
complained that he, Chief Buthelezi and the Zulu nation had been spurned by the 
recently released leaders of the ANC, because they had been excluded from 
183Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1990). 
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homecoming celebrations. Later, Walter Sisulu responded by saying that all were 
welcome and the celebrations were open to anyone who wished to attend. He also 
accepted an invitation to hold talks with the Inkatha leadership on the question of 





Two unofficial commissions of inquiry into the Pietermaritzburg violence were 
convened: one under the auspices of Chief Maphumulo and the other under the 
auspices of local church groups. A number of people, some from KwaShange, gave 
testimony to the commissions. The most significant feature of December was the 
intensity of fighting in the squatter camps of Inanda near Durban, giving rise to the 





Violence between KwaShange people and Mpande Inkatha warlords continued. These 
attacks were worsened by the massacre of 10 people at Wartburg, where a number of 
Inkatha warlords were among those killed. Inkatha supporters from Mpande then 
began to attack Nxamalala and KwaShange communities, probably to show solidarity 




In his speech at the opening of parliament, the State President, F.W. de Klerk, 
unbanned the ANC; a few days later, Nelson Mandela was released after 27 years in 
prison. The ANC stated that the resolution of the conflict in Natal was a priority for 
all parties. Walter Sisulu, leader of the internal wing of the ANC, toured 
Pietermaritzburg towards the end of the month and met the Inkatha secretary-general, 
Oscar Dhlomo. On 25 February Mandela addressed a rally of 125 000 people at 
King’s Park Stadium in Durban and made conciliatory remarks about Inkatha and 
Chief Buthelezi, praising their opposition to apartheid over the years. Mandela also 
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called on his followers to throw their weapons into the sea. “Close down the death 
factories now,” he said. 
 
There was an immediate upsurge in violence between the UDF in KwaShange and 
Inkatha in neighbouring areas. Towards the end of the month, the focus was on 
Vulindlela and Chief Maphumulo’s chieftaincy, Table Mountain; UDF authority was 
slipping and Inkatha was becoming increasingly powerful in the area. Many refugees, 
including some KwaShange youths who had fled to Table Mountain in the early 




March 1990 was the high-water point of the war in terms of deaths, surpassing 
January 1988, with its death tally of 162. Violence escalated around Pietermaritzburg, 
despite Mandela’s call for peace. In contrast to the reconciliatory tone of Mandela’s 
speech, Chief Buthelezi in his opening speech to the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly 
verbally attacked the ANC and the UDF, explicitly blaming the latter for starting the 
war and keeping it going over the years. Inkatha held a rally on 25 March at King’s 
Park Stadium, attended by 8 000 people. A few days later, Inkatha launched a 
sustained attack in the Pietermaritzburg region, which amounted to a full-scale 
invasion of UDF strongholds in Edendale and Vulindlela. A feature of the attack was 
the very large size of the armies (up to 3 000 impi, or regiments were reported) and a 
large number of guns were in evidence. Fatalities were high, with 35 people killed in 
a single day and over 80 in a week.  
 
Within days 11 500 refugees were being accommodated in makeshift camps in 
Pietermaritzburg. Eyewitnesses claimed that David Ntombela was pivotal in co-
ordinating the Inkatha offensive. 
 
This upsurge in violence dominated local media for over two weeks and received 
much coverage overseas. Chief Buthelezi repeated his claim that the instigators of 
violence were the UDF, COSATU and the ANC. Inkatha also claimed that the current 
attack was in retaliation for the stoning of Inkatha buses by UDF comrades. The UDF 
responded by saying that the retaliation was out of proportion to the stoning and that 
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the scale of the invasion was so large that it must have been prepared well in advance. 
There were many reports of the SAP colluding with the Inkatha attackers and police 
dispersed a peaceful march of unarmed women on the Plessislaer police station in 
protest at police involvement in the attacks. At the height of the fighting, Chief 
Buthelezi announced that he and Nelson Mandela would address a joint rally in 
Taylor’s Halt, the heart of the war zone. Mandela then withdrew from the rally, 
saying that he had never given his agreement and arguing that a joint rally at such a 
time could lead to a bloodbath in the stadium.  
 
The Black Sash called for the deployment of troops in the Natal townships, saying 
that the police had lost all credibility and that only the army could restore control.  
 
These circumstances led to the ‘Seven Days’ War’ of 25 to 31 March 1990.184 I have 
given the details of the escalating violence of this protracted civil war between the 
UDF/ANC and their trade union allies and Inkatha and their allies, the SAP and the 
forces of the Nationalist Government, to demonstrate the complexity of antagonisms 
on both sides. The balance of the war kept changing in favour of one side or the other 


















184For details on the ‘Seven Days War’ see Lou Levine ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War 
Through Stained Glass Windows (PACSA, 1999); Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of 
Conflict (South African Institute of Race Relations, 2007) and Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial War: 
Inside the Conflict in Pietermaritzburg (Cape Town: David Philip, 1990). 
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This chapter seeks to understand the broader politics that stood behind the conflicts of 
the 1980s-1990s in Natal and Zululand.1 It will explain how provincial (and national) 
developments, in particular the emerging tension between Inkatha and the ANC at the 
national level of leadership, changed the climate in KwaShange and fuelled violence. 
This is necessary to understand the pivotal role of an area such as KwaShange in the 
political struggle, because evidence reveals that what took place there was invariably 
connected to what was happening in other localities of the province and in the 
liberation struggle nationally. For example, the KwaShange violence cannot be 
discussed without reference to the 30 April 1985 trade union strike at the BTR 
Sarmcol factory in Howick. Moses Ndlovu lived in KwaShange and was deeply 
involved in union activities at Sarmcol.2 On 5 December 1986, the KwaShange 
1Authors agree that what was at play in Natal and Zululand was related to the national struggle for 
black liberation. This is covered in Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 2007). See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands 
War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of 
Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
2Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 March 2005; Interview with Nunu Mchunu, 
KwaShange, 14 March 2008. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. The 
Sarmcol strike of 1986 was seen as one of the major events marking the beginning of confrontation 
between the UDF and its allies COSATU and Inkatha; see also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the 
Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 
Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
Debby Bonnin, “Class Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands, 1940-1987: The Case of the 
BRT Sarmcol Workers”, MSocSc thesis (University of Natal, 1987), 164-165; Jeremy Baskin, Striking 
Back: A History of COSATU (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1991), 14; International Defence and Aid Fund for 
Southern Africa, ‘Repression and Resistance’, Apartheid: The Facts (London: IDAF, 1991), 102; 
Personal communication with Philippe Denis, Scottsville, 27 March 2010.  Personal communication 
with Jabulani Sithole, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 17 June 2010. For details on the 
history of workers and struggle against oppression see T. Karis, C. Carter and G. M. Gerhart eds., 
From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964, 3, 
(Stanford: Hoover International Press, 1977), 358-364; Tom Lodge, Black Politics since 1945 
(Johannesburg: Ravan, 19830), 196; D. McShane, M. Plaunt and D. Ward, Power! Black Workers, 
Their Unions and the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), 32; 
Sibongiseni Mkhize, “Contexts, Resistance Crowds and Mass Mobilisation: A Comparative Analysis 





                                                 
 
Inkatha leaders, Mchunu, Kubheka and Thabethe, accused the Mpophomeni union 
members of disrespect and lack of discipline. They went to these workers’ homes, 
forcing them to join Inkatha and to respect the KwaZulu government laws against 
participating in strikes. They forced them to stop associating with Moses Ndlovu.3  
The Inkatha leaders complained that the Sarmcol workers introduced outside 
influences of unions linked to the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) into the KwaShange community.4 I offer this example to argue that 
KwaShange’s political violence cannot be explored in isolation from the political 
rivalries in Natal, Zululand and South Africa in general. 
 
6.2 Broader political tensions and its effects on KwaShange 
 
In this section I discuss the national and provincial tension that led to regional tension, 
so as to give an understanding of the genesis of violence in KwaShange and why it 
was to start in KwaShange, specifically. 
 
Many authors have written about the political violence in Natal and Zululand in the 
1980s and 1990s and its effects on local communities in the province.5 Some of these 
works contain material which was recorded concurrently with the violence, while 
other works were written from hindsight. Most of these authors agree that the violence 
3Interview with Bheki Mbanjwa, KwaShange, 26 October 2008; interview with a group of seven men 
who preferred to remain anonymous and who participated in the attack on Sarmcol strikers, 
KwaShange, 26 October 2008. 
4Nunu Mchunu, admitted that he and other members of Inkatha wanted to instil discipline into 
KwaShange youth (KwaShange, 14 March 2008). For details on how issues of discipline contributed to 
violence in KwaShange, see Mchunu, M. “Discipline, Respect and Ethnicity: A Study of the Changing 
Patterns of Fatherhood of Three Generations of Zulu Fathers and Sons in KwaShange, Inadi, 
Vulindlela Area of Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal from the 1930s to the 1990s”, MA thesis, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 2005; Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and 
Intergenerational Conflict in the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer, 
K Ratele, A. Strebel N. Shabalala and R. Buikema eds.,  From Boys to Men: Social Constructions of 
Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2007).  
5 See John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars 
of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. S. Stavrou, “Underdevelopment: Natal’s Formula for 
Conflict”, Indicator SA 7/3 (Autumn 1990), 52-56. Anthony Minnaar, Conflict and Violence in 
Natal/KwaZulu: Historical Perspectives (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1990); R. 
Taylor and M. Shaw, “The Natal Conflict”, in John Brewer ed., Restructuring South Africa (London: 
St. Martin Press, 1994), 35-52; A. Johnston, “Politics and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal”, in W. 
Gutteridge and J. Spence eds., Violence in Southern Africa (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 78 107. 
Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: Sixteen Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of 




                                                 
 
started in 1987.6 In my oral interviews I was able to attain specifics like dates of the 
incidents from the journal interviews of two interviewees, Moses Ndlovu and Nunu 
Mchunu. I regard them, as first-hand witnesses, as more reliable than the memories of 
bystanders.  
 
When Mchunu and Ndlovu and other members of the ANC attended meetings at the 
‘People’s Hall’, they were all instructed to recruit and mobilize their community 
members to ‘resist white supremacy’ and the abuse of black people. Ndlovu and 
Mchunu recruited members of the KwaShange community. This continued until 1975, 
when Inkatha was formed. After many meetings in Ulundi, Mchunu and other men 
who had remained in the country were encouraged to continue recruiting people to 
join Inkatha, as it was the ‘ANC internal wing’. 
 
Beside the long relationship between the ANC and Inkatha, there were other elements 
in common between the two movements: Both these movements were formed as a 
response to white colonial power and the exclusion of the indigenous African 
majority.  
 
In 1975, Inkatha, founded in 1923, was revived by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, but the 
ANC in exile suggested that he revive its internal wing; Thabo Mbeki drafted the first 
constitution of Inkatha, saying he was “not worried about what the movement was to 
be called, as long as there was this movement that was going to mobilize people 
inside the country.”7 Many people, like Mchunu, who had been active in the ANC, 
felt it was still appropriate that they mobilize people to join Inkatha, as it was the 
‘ANC in disguise anyway.’ 
 
Some ANC members did not participate in Inkatha activities and meetings. Moses 
Ndlovu and others were deeply engaged with the ANC in exile. It is questionable why 
6For historical background on provincial and national politics, this chapter will depend on the works of 
Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of 
Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987) and Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a 
Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
7Personal communication with Mwelele Cele, Manager of Killie Campbell Africana Library, 14 
August 2008; see also Shula Marks, The Ambiguities of Dependence in South Africa: Class, 




                                                 
 
Moses Ndlovu was not involved in the Inkatha revival in 1975. At this time, Mchunu 
was recruiting people in KwaShange to join Inkatha. Mchunu and Ndlovu’s agendas 
were not opposed: both movements shared the same constituency. 
 
What disrupted this working relationship and common understanding between the 
ANC and Inkatha and how did it affect KwaShange? There were many factors, but the 
first shock to many Inkatha people took place during Robert Sobukwe’s funeral, 
where Umuntwana wakwa Phindangene (Mangusuthu Buthelezi) was ill-treated by 
people who were at the funeral.8 
Mchunu referred to this incident at Graaff-Reinet on 11 March 1978. Buthelezi 
attributed his ill-treatment to “some misguided youths who did not understand the 
respect and camaraderie between all those fighting in the liberation struggle (and) did 
not think that I should have attended the funeral.”9 It is clear that there were already 
differences between struggle leaders in exile (ANC and PAC) and Inkatha within the 
country. Buthelezi defined 1978 as a period of “political uncertainty and confusion.”10 
Moses Ndlovu inferred that many people, particularly the youth, felt that Buthelezi’s 
participation in the KwaZulu Government as its Chief Minister was hindering the 
struggle against apartheid.  Even a well-known struggle veteran, and the most 
influential church leader at the time, Desmond Tutu, called those that had chased 
Buthelezi away from the funeral, “a new breed of young people with iron in their 
soul.” This was contrary to what Buthelezi had said about these youths, characterizing 
them as “thugs.”11 
On that day, their blindly fervent and violent attacks threatened my life, 
forcing me to leave our brother Mangaliso's funeral. I have always regretted 
that and have carried a very heavy burden in my heart. By being made to 
leave, I never had the opportunity to deliver my condolences and offer my 
8Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 12 March 2008. 
9Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, “Robert Sobukwe’s Memorial Lecture/Commemoration”, March,     
1997 (20 years after his death). 
10Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, “Robert Sobukwe’s Memorial Lecture/Commemoration”, March, 
1997 (20 years after his death). 
11Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, “Robert Sobukwe’s Memorial Lecture/Commemoration”, March, 




                                                 
 
tribute to a man whose life rang true to the meaning of his name: “man of 
wonders.”12 
This created confusion amongst the Inkatha leaders who frequently met in Ulundi. 
Mchunu mentions that they did not know who the enemy was, any longer. One day in 
1978, after one of these Ulundi meetings, Mchunu met with Ndlovu in KwaShange. 
He recalled, “I went to ask him to join hands with me and explain to our people that 
Inkatha is working for people; it is not an enemy to our leaders in exile.” Mchunu’s 
fear was that what had started in Graaff-Reinet would spread and they would fail to 
control it. Ndlovu refused, without giving his reasons to Mchunu, and continued 
doing what the ANC in exile had requested him to do: recruiting young men and 
women. This refusal created confusion, as Mchunu did not know whether they “were 
still pulling together or they were pulling in different directions.” 
It is agreed that political violence in KwaZulu-Natal started in 1987, but my 
informants in KwaShange believe that there was tension before public conflict and 
harassment occurred within KwaShange in 1979.13  
 
In 1979 the top leadership of Inkatha, particularly Chief Buthelezi, became estranged 
from the leader of the ANC in exile, Oliver Tambo.14 In their interviews, both 
12Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, “Robert Sobukwe’s Memorial Lecture/Commemoration”, March, 
1997 (20 years after his death). 
13Interview with Moses Ndlovu, Nunu Mchunu, Chris Hlengwa, former combatants in KwaShange, 
KwaShange, 2005-2008. See also Fr. Tim Smith, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Victim 
Hearings, Pietermaritzburg, 19 November 1996, quoted from 
http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_11.htm, Smith was a Roman Catholic Priest in 
Elandskop, Vulindlela, he testified in the TRC that from 1984 he started helping UDF members to 
escape as they were fearing for their lives; see also Philippe Denis, Radikobo Ntsimane and Thomas 
Cannell, Indians versus Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in Nxamalala 1987-1993 
(Pietermaritzburg, Cluster Publications, 2010), 33; Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social 
Awareness (PACSA) recorded testimonies of political survivors in the Natal Midlands. The testimonies 
show that violence started long before 1987 in KwaShange, see for instance Moses Ndlovu’s testimony 
in Lou Levine ed., Faith in Turmoil: The Seven Days War, Through Stained Glass Windows: Moses 
Ndlovu- KwaShange (PACSA, 1999), 63. 
14This tension between Inkatha and the ANC in exile has been explored in a number of studies, notably; 
Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2007); Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha 
and South Africa; Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda; see also C. McCaul, 
“Towards an Understanding of Inkatha Yesizwe. Dissertation Series, Number 2. Johannesburg: South 
African Research Service/Development Studies Group, 1983) University of Witwatersrand; Nkosinathi 
Gwala and Blade Nzimande, “Class Alliances in the Struggle Against Inkatha”, South African Labour 
Bulletin 13, 3 March 1988; R. W. Johnson, interview with Walter Felgate, Focus, (9 January 1998), 20 




                                                 
 
Mchunu and Ndlovu told me that 1979 was a year during which difficulties between 
Inkatha and the ANC emerged. There had been a series of meetings between 
Buthelezi and the ANC in exile, aimed at ironing out a relationship which was 
‘steadily but surely’ going sour. After four years of sending emissaries abroad, the 
time seemed ripe in 1979 for a top-level meeting between Inkatha and the ANC. The 
first such meeting took place in Stockholm in the early part of that year. This meeting 
was used to establish a summit conference between Inkatha and the ANC Mission in 
Exile, which took place in October 1979. Tambo attended the meeting, which was 
chaired by Dr A. H. Zulu, the Speaker of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly.15 
Buthelezi later reflected on why he went to London: 
 
I went to London determined to seek reconciliation and determined to bring 
about a working relationship between the ANC Mission in Exile and Inkatha. I 
was aware of the fact that Mr. Oliver Tambo was having difficulties with some 
elements of his organization. Those with a firm commitment to violence did 
not want any evidence that non-violent strategies were viable in South 
Africa.16 
 
This probably was the reason why Ndlovu in KwaShange never got himself involved 
in Inkatha activities. In all his discussions with the ANC Mission in Exile, Buthelezi 
insisted that Inkatha should remain Inkatha; and that it should remain committed to 
black popular will, which expressed itself in Inkatha’s massive membership, which 
had doubled in 1977 and doubled again in 1978. Inkatha interpreted this huge increase 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 260, Felgate describes Buthelezi as being “quite thrilled” that he had 
obtained meeting [with Oliver Tambo  Buthelezi’s objective was to break the myth of the heroic 
exiles]. “He took tapes of his own meeting in Jabulani so they could hear applause and he tried to show 
them [ANC leaders in exile] by these means that he had mass support inside the country. See also John 
Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization, 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 49.  
15 http://www.ifp.org.za/History/history.htm. Gerhard Maré, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa 
(London: Zed Books, 1993); Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s 
Inkatha and Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: 
Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988); Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of 
Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 2007).  




                                                                                                                                            
 
in membership as a vote of confidence in the movement and a rejection by black 
South Africans of the armed struggle.17 
 
By the time the 1979 London meeting between Inkatha and the ANC Mission 
in Exile took place the militant elements in the ANC could no longer be 
controlled by Oliver Tambo. After the London meeting, for the first time in his 
career, Mr. Tambo began criticizing Buthelezi and Inkatha publicly. He had 
sided with those in his ranks who saw Inkatha as a threat … the London 
meeting would prove to be a pivotal point in the relationship between the two 
organizations.18  
 
As these ANC-Inkatha meetings were happening, regional leaders of both the ANC 
and Inkatha were briefed. Mchunu agreed that in their frequent meetings in Ulundi, 
Inkatha lower level leaders were briefed on all the latest developments.19 The ANC in 
exile, as well the ANC members in South Africa, knew about their discussions.20 
 
Mchunu recalls 1979 as the year in which Ndlovu started mobilizing people against 
Inkatha. “He went to all families and school teachers and youths I had recruited to 
join Inkatha and he told them that Inkatha was not the ANC and it was not fighting for 
Black people but Inkatha was ‘selling’ Black people to the whites.”21 Mchunu 
believes that there are no other known reasons that could have led to Ndlovu’s 
campaign against Inkatha, except the disagreement between Buthelezi and the top 
17 John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization, 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 49.  
17 http://www.ifp.org.za/History/history.htm. Gerhard Maré, Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa 
(London: Zed Books, 1993); Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s 
Inkatha and Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987).  
18John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
19Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
20Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, 
KwaShange 15 March 2008. For details on these accounts, see John Aitchison, “The Origins of the 
Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 
Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 
Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2007).  




                                                 
 
ANC leadership in exile.22 Clearly, the tension between the ANC in exile and the 
Inkatha leadership reached the lower levels of leadership. The clashes between the 
‘ring-leaders’ and the escalating violence in KwaShange was a reflection of what was 
happening nationally and provincially. When Inkatha met in Ulundi, these matters 
were on the agenda, but the leadership encouraged regional leaders to be ‘calm but 
not to stop recruiting for Inkatha.’ Hostility between Mchunu and Ndlovu commenced 
when they started to campaign against each other in one small area. This divided the 
community, as many people believed Inkatha to be the internal wing of the ANC. 
Ndlovu told me that “Mchunu was a strategist and very good at recruiting; he had 
enough time to campaign for Inkatha because he was not playing a leading role in a 
labour union and he was not sought after by police of the state.”23 But Mchunu denies 
this, saying that he was in fear of the police because Inkatha was “indeed a threat to 
the state […]. It is not true that I had time to mobilize because I had no other 
responsibilities, I was a leader of more than 3 000 workers in the NPA.”24 
 
Amongst those who were recruited by Mchunu was Philippe ‘Makhekhe’ Thabethe, 
Kubheka, who had been in the ANC, and many others. Chief Shayabantu Zondi also 
joined Inkatha and used to attend Inkatha meetings in Ulundi along with Mchunu.25 
Ndlovu meanwhile recruited Chris Hlengwa (who had been Mchunu’s family friend), 
Sayi Zondi, Ngudla Msane and Mathuba Goge, all of whom were members of the 
SAP living in KwaShange and were all implicated in the “KwaShange Massacre of 
1987”, during which Inkatha-aligned youth were burnt to death in an ‘ill-fated’ 
disciplinary court conducted by UDF men.26  
 
The ill-treatment of Buthelezi at Robert Sobukwe’s funeral in 1978, and the breach 
between Buthelezi and Tambo in exile, made Inkatha regional leaders realize that 
22Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
23Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
24Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
25Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
26Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005; Interview with Nunu Mchunu, 




                                                 
 
things were not normal. They deduced from this situation that they were all going to 
be treated with disrespect.27  
 
By the early 1980s Buthelezi was clearly less concerned with being seen to be 
supportive of his former liberation movement allies in exile. A final break is 
often identified as coinciding with the 1979 meeting with the ANC in London 
at which Buthelezi quite obviously made a claim for political independence. 
There are differing accounts of the meeting, with the ANC portraying 
Buthelezi as being unreasonable and Inkatha claiming that their leader refused 
to be a pawn of the ANC.28  
 
Throughout this period there were signals that Buthelezi was taking an increasingly 
hard-line towards any black radicals who contradicted him and there were by then 
many adherents of the Black Consciousness Movement coming out of universities.29  
 
The behaviour of unionists also tended to give offence to Buthelezi, who did not like 
being manipulated by some of the intellectuals30 leading the independent union 
movement in Durban, who had ideas regarding Buthelezi’s political role which they 
sought to impose on him.31 In contrast with the working class black unionists, he got 
on well with white business leaders. This coincided with the formation of the UDF in 
1983, in an atmosphere saturated by suspicion between Inkatha and the left.32 Ndlovu 
recalled that there were rumours that Archie Gumede, the national and Natal UDF 
27Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of   
the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., 
The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 
Anthea Jeffery, The Natal Story: 16 Years of Conflict (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 2007).  
28John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
29See interview between Felgate and R. W. Johnson (Focus, January 1998), 20, in Buthelezi: A 
Biography (South Africa: JB Publishers, 2003). 
30John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72. 
31John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange 11 August 2005. 
32Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005; John Aitchison, “The Origins of the 
Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 




                                                 
 
leader, would arrange meetings with Buthelezi to come to an understanding. But 
political conditions made such mediation impossible and the attempt was abandoned. 
In the interim Inkatha was concentrating its activities in Natal and Zululand.33 
 
Mchunu’s campaign in KwaShange started after the Sobukwe incident. He recalls that 
this event made him start manufacturing home-made guns, an activity for which he 
was later to be jailed. He distributed these firearms to Inkatha followers in 
KwaShange and neighbouring areas.34  
 
I remember one night, very late, I heard a knock on my door, I did not open 
the door, I thought it was UDF guys who had come to kill me. I just kept quiet 
and waited for them to push the door by force. I had already prepared myself 
that I was going to kill all of them. The knock continued but I did not open. 
After a long time I heard voices, it was not UDF people but it was whites’ 
voices, when they came back and knocked again, I opened the door; it was 
police looking for guns. They had been told that I am the one who made and 
distributed guns in the area. The police searched my house for more than an 
hour, they couldn’t find anything. They cornered me with questions, coercing 
me to show them my guns and I refused, saying that I had no gun. When they 
were just about to give up, one Boer (Afrikaner) policeman kicked my small 
‘isigqiki’ (headrest), I had made my isigqiki and put a small hole underneath 
and that is where I kept the guns and many others were buried outside in my 
yard. The police kicked the isiqgiki and heard that there was something in it, 
and that is how they got my gun and they took me (into custody). They drove 
with me the whole night looking for all other people who were suspected to 
have guns.35 
 
By 1980, in KwaShange there was hostility between Mchunu and his supporters and 
Ndlovu and his. This hostility was not yet obvious because few people were 
33Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
34Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 15 March 2008; Interview with Chris Hlengwa, 
KwaShange, 14 March 2008;  Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 




                                                 
 
politically minded, but Ndlovu and Mchunu were aware of what would be the results 
of these tensions at the top leadership level. 
 
Another factor that contributed to the tension between Inkatha and those who opposed 
it was that in 1983 Ulundi was made the capital of KwaZulu and all people under 
traditional leadership of chiefs had to contribute financially toward the building of 
Ulundi. Only KwaShange refused, as far as I can see, to pay the requested 
contribution toward the building of Ulundi. There, some people objected to the 
building of Ulundi and rejected Inkatha itself; “how is Inkatha going help us”? They 
asked. “Why should we pay for a building miles and miles away from us?” Chief 
Shayabantu Zondi was tasked with collecting the funds in areas under his jurisdiction 
in Vulindlela, but the community of KwaShange refused to pay. Ndlovu was singled 
out for leading the campaign to refuse. 
 
Tensions grew between those who paid the contribution and those who did not. This 
is the time when Chief Shayabantu Zondi “lost his dignity” amongst other members 
of the KwaShange community and this was confirmed by Ndlovu and Mchunu. 
Mchunu and Inkatha, in general, were annoyed by this action, because they felt “this 
was disrespect to Mntwana wakwaPhindangene (Buthelezi) himself”, a man who was 
“the hope of the blacks in South Africa” At that date Natal and KwaZulu were, as 
today, essentially a black province and it is likely that some, both Blacks and whites, 
genuinely thought that a multiracial region, free of apartheid, was a possibility.36  
 
6.3 The history of liberation struggles in Natal and Zululand  
 
I cite the following incidents of violence in Natal and Zululand and attempts to bring 
about peace, and the struggle throughout the Province, because in the following 
chapters I will refer to them frequently.  
 
36Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange 14 March 2008. See also Gerhard Maré and Georgina 
Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: 




                                                 
 
Mchunu (Inkatha) and Ndlovu (UDF) state that since the 1960s, when many ANC 
leaders went into exile and others were imprisoned, South Africa has never been the 
same, particularly in Natal and KwaZulu. John Aitchison expressed similar sentiments 
about the period from the 1960s, when Nelson Mandela had a meeting in 
Pietermaritzburg and was caught by police officers in Howick. Aitchison feels that the 
violence which engulfed the state was always associated with the province of Natal 
and Zululand, of which Pietermaritzburg was the centre.37 KwaShange was the first 
rural area to strongly oppose Inkatha and the UDF in the area took up arms against the 
Movement. Later they were followed by Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo’s people 
eMkhambathini. This was the start of the civil war of the 1980s-1990s.  
 
Natal and Zululand, from 1996 unified as KwaZulu-Natal, had long been associated 
with African liberation struggles. Battles took place in the province between the Zulu 
and the British in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. The earlier Battle of Income (Blood 
River), between the Voortrekkers and the Zulu, took place in 1838. During the 
Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906 Zulu people rose against the colonial Natal 
government. In 2006, former president Thabo Mbeki described Chief Bhambatha as a 
leader who fought for liberation and tried to change people’s lives for the better.38 
The current president of the ANC and the Republic of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, has 
several times referred to umlando wezimpi zakwaZulu, [the history of Zulu wars], 
particularly the Bhambatha Rebellion, as events that inspired him to join politics.39 
The first president of the democratic South Africa, Nelson Mandela, described 
KwaZulu-Natal as a place where the struggle for liberation originated; hence he chose 
to cast his vote in 1994 in KwaZulu-Natal, at Ohlange Mission School, established by 
John Langalibalele Dube, who became the first president of the ANC. In the 1960s, 
when the ANC was banned, it was led by a Zulu, Chief Albert Luthuli.  
 
37Personal communication with Nunu Mchunu and Moses Ndlovu. See also John Aitchison, “The 
Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran 
Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: 
CASE, 2003). 
38Thabo Mbeki, “Isikhumbuzo senkosi Bhambatha”, Greytown (Ngome), 12 June 2006. 
39 See also SABC documentary on Jacob Zuma, ‘from rural Inkandla to Union Buildings’ shown on 




                                                 
 
In northern Zululand, black political resistance was, to some extent, less 
confrontational. This can be attributed to the fact that there were two significant 
political movements: Inkatha, under the leadership of Buthelezi, and the independent 
black trade union movement. Umntwana wakwaPhindangene, as he was 
affectionately known, Chief Buthelezi was the hereditary chief of the Buthelezi clan 
and had opposed the imposition of Bantustan independence for the scattered areas of 
tribally owned land that officially made up the Zulu homeland.40 He had in the 1970s 
gained control of the KwaZulu legislative assembly and had avoided any serious 
confrontation with the Nationalist government.  
 
A number of Nationalist government security officials and agents, however, saw 
controlling Buthelezi’s activities as very important. Some black government 
supporters were within Inkatha’s ranks, for example M. Z. Khumalo, a government 
Department of Information agent, who became Chief Buthelezi’s personal secretary 
and the go-between with the police and the army. In the mid-1960s it was clear that 
the security police distrusted Buthelezi, as he had been an ANC supporter and 
Mandela had visited him when ‘on the run.’ According to Racaza, there was anecdotal 
evidence that there was a plan to assassinate Buthelezi. Nevertheless, by the early 
1980s, it was obvious that government agents who had formerly maligned him had 
revised their opinions and were using his strengths and weaknesses to their own 
advantage. During the late 1970s, Buthelezi and Inkatha gathered considerable 
support in the province.41 It was hoped that this would keep the region stable in the 
aftermath of the Soweto Riots of 1976 and inhibit the growth of radical oppositional 
politics.42 This was never the case: the ANC in exile had already called for an armed 
struggle. The UDF was already successfully mobilizing the youth and the spiral into 
civil strife was accelerating.43 Inkatha had been unprepared for the revival of the anti-
40Scholars generally agree that Chief Buthelezi resisted the introduction of the Bantustan, see also 
Buthelezi: A Biography. Mzala, in Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed 
Books, 1988), came with a contrary argument, saying that Buthelezi, by virtue of serving under the 
National Party government, was accepting this Bantustan policy of the then government.   
41R. Racaza, A Global Perspective on Low Intensity Conflict: Total War at the Grassroots Level. 
(Quezon City: Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc 1987), 18. 
42John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003). 




                                                 
 
apartheid mobilization that occurred in 1983 with the formation of the UDF.44 A 
brutal attack on students by Inkatha at the University of Zululand in October 1983 
was an indication of already deteriorating relationships. The 1980s saw a 
consequential decline in support for Buthelezi at national level.45 This exposed what 
had always been an ambiguity between Buthelezi and his Inkatha Movement, who 
were in essence Zulu, and the ANC, which was multi-ethnic. Inkatha’s emphasis on 
Zulu ethnic identity showed that the regional stress had become the more powerful 
force.46  
 
The rise of vigilante groups associated with Inkatha, conflict between the UDF and 
the Black Consciousness Movement, conflict between Inkatha and the trade union 
movements, and the lack of tolerance of any opposition by the KwaZulu/Inkatha 
authorities, led to conflict in the region.47 
 
Conflicts engendered by these factors led to skirmishes between Inkatha and the 
UDF-supporting youth. COSATU members took part in rent and bus boycotts, as did 
members of civic associations. In October 1983, at the opening rally of the UDF in 
Edendale, a wounded and bandaged student from the Ngoye campus of the University 
of Zululand told of the attack on hostels by Inkatha supporters in which five people 
were killed and many assaulted and wounded. Conflict in Natal escalated in the 
Durban region, where skirmishes, in which Inkatha supporters and UDF and 
COSATU supporters attacked each other, increased from 1983 to 1985. This was, in 
part, a result of the attempts to incorporate the townships of Hambanathi, 
Lamontville, KwaMashu and Umlazi into KwaZulu, as well as resistance to rent and 
44Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2008. 
45John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War and KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), see also Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton An Appetite for Power: 
Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), Mzala, 
Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
46John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94; Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton An Appetite for 
Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and the Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); 
Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
47John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 





                                                 
 
transport fare increases and school boycotts.48 During the same period, prominent 
self-appointed squatter settlement leaders in the areas to the north of Durban, 
particularly in Lindelani and Inanda, became overtly pro-Inkatha and were involved in 
violent attacks against UDF supporters in both squatter areas and more established 
townships.49  
 
In 1983 and 1984 a number of youth organizations affiliated to the UDF in 
Pietermaritzburg and Hammarsdale areas were involved in fights between Inkatha and 
the UDF.50 In November 1983 there was a major clash in Imbali involving nearly a 
thousand people and in Mpumalanga, in which Inkatha Youth Brigade members 
clashed with UDF supporters and set a bus ablaze.51 In mid-1985, the pro-UDF civic 
association in Imbali was intimidated by aggressive threats from Inkatha.52 The extent 
of growing Inkatha antagonism towards the UDF can be seen in Buthelezi’s 
announcement in December 1985 that the UDF was a front for the ANC and that any 
UDF members in the KwaZulu civil service would be fired. On Christmas Eve 1985, 
many UDF-aligned township dwellers around Pietermaritzburg turned off their 
electricity and in rural areas such as KwaShange adults did not go to work and school 
children did not go to school in protest against the State of Emergency’ This was a 
clear sign that Inkatha did not have unanimous support in the townships and some 
rural areas. 53 
 
48Paulus Zulu, “Durban Hostels and Political Violence: Case Studies in KwaMashu and Umlazi”, 
Transformation 21 (1993), 1-23. 
49Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the Spatial Dimension of Black Resistance and 
Political Violence in South Africa: The Case of Durban”, Urban Geography 9/6 (1988), 629-53; Doug 
Hindson, Mark Beverley and Mike Morris, “From Violence to Reconstruction: The Making, 
Disintegration and Remaking of an Apartheid City”, Antipode 26/4 (1994), 323-50. 
50Debby Bonnin, “Claiming Spaces, Changing Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in 
KwaZulu-Natal”, Journal of Southern African Studies 26/2 (June 2002), 301-316; “Legacies of 
Political Violence: An Examination of Political Conflict in Mpumalanga Township”, Transformation 
62 (2006), 59-83. 
51John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. See also Debby Bonnin, “Claiming Spaces, Changing 
Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in KwaZulu-Natal”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 26/2 (June 2002), 301-316. 
52Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. 
53Interview with Christ Hlengwa, Moses Ndlovu and Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 2005-2008. See also 
John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 
1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 




                                                 
 
The 1980s were characterized by black school-goers identifying themselves as a site 
of struggle against apartheid and there were many school boycotts. Inkatha moved 
repressively against such school-based activism in the Pietermaritzburg region in 
1980 and this alienated many young pupils from the movement. In 1983 a number of 
school-based demonstrations and boycotts took place in the Pietermaritzburg and 
Hammarsdale areas and were met with police repression.54  
 
Students were also the victims of Inkatha vigilante groups, set up in the Midlands 
townships with the blessing of local sympathizing councillors and the police, 
ostensibly to halt crime and gangsterism. In 1985, student leaders in the Sobantu and 
Imbali townships of Pietermaritzburg were assaulted and even killed by vigilantes. 
There were retaliatory youth attacks on vigilantes.55  
 
Conflict in itself does not result in fissure, nor does political tension inevitably lead to 
killing.56 What transpired in the court indictment in November 1995 against Magnus 
Malan and others, and evidence led during the trial in 1996, show that what had long 
been assumed as a hidden hand behind the Natal conflict was indeed true.57  
 
According to the indictment, Buthelezi approached the South African military 
in 1985 for help with information, protection and military capacity. He needed 
it because the supporters of the ANC planned to neutralize him (though this 
threat seems to have been discovered by the security services and may well 
have been largely disinformation). General Tienie Groenewaldt, chief director 
54John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. See also Debby Bonnin, “Claiming Spaces, Changing 
Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in KwaZulu-Natal”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 26/2 (June 2002), 301-316. 
55Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 15 March 2008. Interview with Moses Ndlovu, 
KwaShange, 2005. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: 
The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South 
Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. 
56John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. See also Debby Bonnin, “Claiming Spaces, Changing 
Places: Political Violence and Women’s Protests in KwaZulu-Natal”, Journal of Southern African 
Studies 26/2 (June 2002), 301-316. 
57John Aitchison, “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The 




                                                 
 
of military intelligence, allegedly gave Buthelezi’s shopping list at a meeting 
on 25 November 1985 to General Malan and it was eventually agreed that the 
SADF would provide him with a contra-mobilisation capability, an offensive 
capability and an intelligence capability.58  
 
Some 200 Inkatha soldiers were secretly trained in the Caprivi Strip. One of their first 
actions was the murder of four trade unionists in Mpophomeni.59 Another, a month 
later, was the KwaMakutha massacre, when 13 women and children at a prayer 
meeting in a UDF official’s house were murdered by a kombi load of AK47-wielding 
Caprivi ‘graduates’ who, allegedly, had demanded a chance to practise their new 
skills.60 Alongside increasing Inkatha’s military capacity was the development of an 
even more secret network of bases, from which the security police would go out to 
abduct and then torture, cross-examine and put to death or co-opt ANC underground 
operatives.61 It was only in March 1997 that TRC investigators, on the basis of 
evidence from amnesty applicants, began to unearth the bodies of executed victims on 
farms rented by the police near Pietermaritzburg, Camperdown, Verulam and a 
number of other sites. The Vlakplaas base of Eugene de Kock in the Transvaal was 
not unusual, but part of a wider security infrastructure for the elimination of the 
government’s political enemies. The founder of Vlakplaas was Brigadier Jack 
Buchner, who arrived in Pietermaritzburg to head the security police in 1987. In 1989 
he was appointed Commissioner of the KwaZulu Police and moved to Ulundi until his 
departure in late 1992. 62 
 
58John Aitchison,  “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ren Greenstein ed., The 
Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 73-94. 
59Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange. Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange. 
60John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94; Douglas Booth and Mlandu Biyela, “Exploring the Spatial 
dimension of Black Resistance and Political Violence in South Africa: The Case of Durban”, Urban 
Geography 9/6 (1988), 629-53; Doug Hindson, Mark Beverley and Mike Morris, “From Violence to 
Reconstruction: The Making, Disintegration and Remaking of an Apartheid City”, Antipode 26/4 
(1994), 323-50. 
61Malan’s evidence quoted in John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-
Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in 
South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE 2003), 73-94. 




                                                 
 
The beginning of 1987 saw a hardening of the confrontation between the Inkatha 
vigilantes and the UDF youth organisations, particularly in the KwaShange area of 
Vulindlela, Imbali Township in Pietermaritzburg, and in Mpumalanga, an industrial 
township at Hammarsdale, halfway between Durban and Pietermaritzburg. Vigilantes 
invaded schools and armed groups were often bussed into areas in recruitment drives. 
From March to August the death toll began to rise in the Pietermaritzburg region.63 
On 5 and 6 May 1987 90 per cent of Pietermaritzburg workers responded to the call 
from COSATU and the UDF for a stay-away, in protest against the whites-only 
elections. That seemed to be a defeat for Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi, who had urged 
his supporters to campaign against a stay-away. Inkatha blamed the success of the 
stay-away on the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), whose striking bus 
drivers effectively made it impossible for many workers to get to work even if they 
had wanted to. 64 
 
Other factors increased the manifestations of this national conflict in KwaShange. In 
September 1987 there were devastating floods that destroyed hundreds of houses in 
KwaShange, Vulindlela and greater Edendale. The relationship of these floods to the 
violence that followed is a matter of considerable conjecture. It was popularly 
believed that people in the Umsunduzi River Valley were so frustrated by the damage 
caused by the floods that when Inkatha launched a coercive recruiting drive, it was the 
last straw and they fought back. Another suggestion is that corruption in the 
distribution of flood relief aid led to anger directed at Inkatha and KwaZulu structures 
and, in turn, led to resistance to recruitment. 
 
By the end of October Inkatha had lost control of much of Edendale and the centre of 
conflict moved to Vulindlela, where UDF comrades were making gains. By the end of 
December there was heavy fighting in Vulindlela and tribal leadership was in 
disarray.65 There was large-scale detention of UDF youth (nearly 400 in December) 
and a growing number of reports about Inkatha leaders (dubbed ‘warlords’ by their 
63Interviews in KwaShange with unnamed informants. 
64Interview with Nunu Mchunu and Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange. 
65John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 




                                                 
 
critics), who were alleged to have engaged in acts of violence with impunity from 
arrest and prosecution.66 The only public attempts to halt their activities were the 
interdicts brought against them by the legal firm Cheadle, Thompson and Hamson, 
acting for COSATU. At the end of 1987, many young UDF comrades felt a flush of 
victory at having beaten Inkatha. The next year was to disappoint them. It was 
impossible for them to take on both Inkatha and the state, locally personified in the 
figures of David Ntombela, a KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member from 
Vulindlela, and Jack Buchner.67 
 
At the beginning of 1988 the Vulindlela tribal authorities were in disarray, with chiefs 
and indunas no longer performing their official functions, and agricultural work was 
seriously affected. Some 79 people were killed in the area in January. The extent of 
the disruption and fear in the region can be seen in the fact that at one stage there were 
no children in the pediatric section of Edendale Hospital, as parents were too scared to 
leave their children there. Large numbers of refugees sought refuge in safer areas or 
were accommodated in domestic servants’ quarters in white Pietermaritzburg.68  
 
An Inkatha counter-attack named “Operation Doom”, or “Operation Cleanup”, had 
started. The UDF were disabled by the massive detentions and savage police reaction 
to any gathering. Police provided what in effect was back-up to Inkatha forces, so that 
they could move and fight with impunity. With this support, Inkatha was able to 
restore much of its control in the Vulindlela area. There are reports of police handing 
over captured comrades to Inkatha or tribal authorities, who then killed them (as in 
the well-documented case of 13-year-old Makithiza Ndlovu, killed on 1 January 
1988). Inkatha also seemed to be increasingly well-armed. January ended with an 
Inkatha invasion of Ashdown, allegedly facilitated by the security forces, who 
66Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 11 August 2005. See also John Aitchison, “The Origins 
of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein 
ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 
47-72; 73-94. 
67John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. Interview with Moses Ndlovu and Nunu Mchunu, 
KwaShange. 
68John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 




                                                 
 
allowed an enormous meeting of 15 000 Inkatha supporters to take place nearby, at 
which the crowd was allegedly incited to attack the UDF and COSATU.69  
 
The police established bases in the Edendale and Vulindlela areas, complaining about 
the difficult terrain of the areas, especially at night, but believing they could now 
contained the unrest.70 Heavy police reinforcements, including KwaZulu police, in 
Vulindlela and 150 ‘kitskonstabels’71 were deployed to the ‘hot-spots’. Many of them 
were Inkatha supporters with records of involvement in previous acts of violence.72  
  
As the civil war worsened, the number of refugees moving into towns and other areas 
increased. As many women, like my mother, were domestic workers in 
Pietermaritzburg, they moved with their children to stay with their employers. 
Schooling was disrupted by the resignation of many teachers, Mtholangqondo, for 
example, the high school of KwaShange, was heavily affected by this, because almost 
all teachers who taught there were from outside the area of KwaShange and “were not 
prepared to risk their lives, because the area was boiling.”73 Scholars were refused 
entry into schools (or were too afraid to attend), after a card system was instituted as 
some Department of Education and Training Schools. Many KwaZulu Department of 
Education and Culture school refused to accept non-Inkatha pupils. There were 
reports of a large drop enrolment in schools near Pietermaritzburg and intermittent 
interruptions of schooling continued in the first half of 1988. In February, the 
collusion between the police and Inkatha received official blessing, when the Minister 
of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, presenting a trophy to the Pietermaritzburg Town 
Hill police station, said: 
 
Police will face the future with moderates and fight against radical groups. 
Radicals, who are trying to destroy South Africa, will not be tolerated. We will 
69John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. 
70Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange. 
71 ‘Instant’, i.e. emergency trained, constables armed with-pump action shotguns. 
72John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: The Pre-election Wars of 
the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South Africa’s Democratization 
(Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 47-72; 73-94. Also interview with Hlengwa, KwaShange. 





                                                 
 
fight them. We have put a foothold in that direction, and we will eventually 
win the Pietermaritzburg area.74 
 
By March 1988, Vlok’s police had averted the danger of total UDF victory, with the 
‘kitskonstabels’, massive detentions and round-up of youths, which took place, for 
example in Ashdown, where 259 were detained, and Sobantu with 218 detentions on 
21st March.  
 
What all this meant was that Natal in the late 1980s was divided into ‘no-go’ areas, 
under control of one or other of the contending parties. Within greater Edendale, 
Inkatha had lost control of the urban townships around Pietermaritzburg (except for a 
few small pockets), but with police support had regained control of the abutting tribal 
area of Vulindlela. Inkatha was also increasingly heavily armed. Although emergency 
rule was extremely repressive and large numbers of UDF members were detained, in 
June there were huge COSATU and UDF organized stay-aways in the region. The 
long, low-level civil wars started to impact on UDF refugee groups, mainly in schools 
and church halls in Edendale, and this allowed Inkatha ‘warlords’ a time to rally their 
forces. The conflict spread to more rural tribal areas, with a politicisation of what may 
originally have been tribal factionalism. In September 1988 there was an abortive 
peace mediation attempt made in the establishing of an Inkatha and COSATU Joint 
Complaints Adjudication Board, its jurisdiction limited to Pietermaritzburg and 
Vulindlela. The murder of Nicholas Kwilili Duma of Imbali, a witness to the 
Complaints Adjudication Board, led to COSATU’s withdrawal from the Board on 8 
May 1989.  
 
This COSATU withdrawal, according to Moses Ndlovu, had negative effects. It was 
like pouring petrol onto a small flame of fire. It made the Vulindlela political violence 
worse.  The situation was already bad, but after the withdrawal of COSATU, the 
violence escalated. Hope for peace disappeared and we knew what that meant for 
areas like KwaShange, Nxamalala and other areas that were UDF aligned. 
 
74Adriaan Vlok quoted in John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War” and “KwaZulu-Natal: 
The Pre-election Wars of the 1990s”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in South 








DREAMS AND VISIONS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 





Zulu traditions, beliefs and practices form a network of customs that are passed orally 
from generation to generation and are often accepted without question.1 It is difficult 
to trace the origins of these beliefs, as, like many other aspects of Zulu life, they 
reflect an amalgamation of the belief structures of different groups. For the most part, 
Zulus have strong religious beliefs, traditions and customs and the area in which they 
are strongest is that of dreams, prophecies and visions. For instance, many Zulus 
believe that dreams and visions are an important part of human life and communicate 
messages to living people from uNkulunkulu or uMvelingqangi (God)2 and the 
ancestors.3 
 
Belief in dreams and visions, however, is not exclusively Zulu, but is found in all 
cultures. In 1925, the psychoanalyst, Carl Jung, who had toured north-east Africa, 
recalled a conversation he had about dreams with an African traditional healer: “I 
remember a medicine-man in Africa, who said to me almost with tears in his eyes: 
‘We have no dreams anymore since the British are in the country.’” When Jung 
attempted to find out why the British colonial presence had caused Africans to stop 
1 David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
2The African concept of God, uNkulunkulu or uMvelingqangi, was debated by missionaries who 
arrived in Natal: Anglican Bishop John William Colenso and the Anglican missionary Henry Callaway 
became embroiled in an argument over whether the Zulu had any indigenous understanding of a 
supreme being that was similar to the Christian God. Colenso found that they did, identifying two Zulu 
terms, uNkulunkulu (the “Great-Great-One”) and uMvelinqangi (the “First Out-Comer”), which he 
found equivalent to Yahweh and Elohim of the Hebrew Bible. Disagreeing, Callaway found that the 
Zulu had no indigenous understanding of God, arguing that uNkulunkulu was actually understood as 
the original ancestor of the Zulu people. In accounts of the Zulu religious system, this controversy 
persisted, with some commentators arguing for an indigenous Zulu concept of God and others arguing 
that a Zulu ancestral religion adopted such a concept from the Christian missions. By situating this 
question in the colonial context, however, we discover a range of Zulu interpretive strategies being 
deployed along a contested, but expanding, frontier of British influence and control. Under these 
conditions, people least affected by these changes tended to regard uNkulunkulu as the original ancestor 
of their political grouping, while people whose political autonomy had been destroyed interpreted 
uNkulunkulu as either the original ancestor of all humanity or the supreme being of the world. See 
Jennifer Weir, “Whose uNkulunkulu?”,  Africa: Journal of International African Institute 75:2 (2005). 
3 David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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dreaming, the traditional healer replied, “The District Commissioner knows 
everything […] God now speaks in dreams to the British and not to the medicine-man 
[…] because it is the British who have the power.” From this conversation, Jung 
deduced that, for Africans, “Dream activity has emigrated.”4 According to Jung’s 
biographer, Frank McLynn, the diviner’s point was that Africans were unable to 
dream under colonial conditions because the European colonial administrator did all 
the dreaming for them, since “power speaks to power.”5 Certainly, this inability to 
dream, this dream-loss, represented ‘a spiritual crisis within the most intimate 
interiority and personal subjectivity of people living under oppressive colonial 
conditions.’6 This dream-loss was reflected in broader social, economic and political 
realities within which indigenous people lived during the colonial period. 
Dreams and visions are part of the common religious heritage of Christianity, Islam, 
Judaism and other religions.7 Throughout the Old Testament dreams and visions seem 
to possess equal spiritual authority: “If anyone among you is a prophet, I will make 
myself known to him in a vision, I will speak to him in a dream.”8 For the indigenous 
peoples of Africa, according to Mbiti, it was not so much a case of converting to 
Christianity, as of adapting the Christian message to their traditional values and 
religious beliefs.9 
 
Dreams and visions are sometimes retold and even recorded: they are interpreted 
intratextually, intertextually or contextually.10 Hence, I shall argue in this chapter that 
researchers, through studying dreams and visions of their research subjects, gain 
another ‘window’ into their period of study, since dreams and visions are indicators of 
what the dreamer – and probably his society – had reason to fear. For instance, during 
4Carl Jung quoted in David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and 
Religion in Nineteenth-Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9. 
5Frank McLynn, Carl Gustav Jung: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press: 1997), 282. See also 
Burleson Blake, Jung in Africa (New York: Continuum, 2005), David Chidester, Dreaming in the 
Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-Century South Africa (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 2. 
6David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9. 
7Patricia Cox Miller, Dreams in late antiquity: Studies in the imagination of a culture (Princeton: 
University Press, 1994), 37. 
8New International Version (NIV), Numbers 12:6). 
9John Mbiti, African Religions and Philosophy (London: Heineman, 1969), 2–3, quoted from David 
Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-Century 
South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
10David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 17. 
 216 
                                                 
the colonial period, dreams revealed a changing world in which indigenous people 
would undergo dispossession and displacement, as well as a disruption of their 
traditional lifestyle.11  
7.2 Examples of prophecies during the colonial and apartheid periods 
In other communities – nineteenth century Xhosa life is an example – dreams have 
been powerful historical forces. Nongqawuse’s vision, which inspired and preceded 
the disastrous cattle killing, almost spelt disaster for the Xhosa people in the 1800s. 
As a young girl she claimed to have received a message from the ancestors that 
almost led the Xhosa people to commit suicide. She saw the faces of her ancestors 
appearing in a pool. They told her that they would drive all the white settlers out of 
the country. A huge wind would come up and blow all the settlers into the sea. But 
first, as an act of faith to prove their belief in the world of the spirits, the Xhosa would 
have to kill all their cattle and destroy all their crops. Xhosa religion taught that the 
ancestors appreciated a sacrifice of cattle because that was a man’s most valued 
possession. Those who refused would be turned into frogs, mice and ants and would 
be blown into the sea by a mighty whirlwind.12 
Close to our own times, prophecies, dreams and visions have continued to provoke 
debates. Credo Mutwa (renowned Zulu diviner and prophet), in an exclusive 
interview in Drum magazine stated:  
Nontetho, a 1930s prophetess, […] was locked up in a Pretoria mental hospital 
where she eventually died, a sad, lonely old woman. She was not mad. This is 
the same woman who foresaw a great black leader who would rule over us a 
short period. She called the leader Mandla. Could she have referred to 
Mandela who, after 27 years in prison, led the nation for only five?13 
11David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9. 
12Jeff Peires, The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-57, 
(Johannesburg, 1987), 31-2. See also Tlou Makhura, “Missionary and African Perspectives on the 
Politics of Witchcraft among the Xhosa and Zulu Communities in 19th Century Cape and 
Natal/Zululand”, unpublished article (WISER), 1. 
13Exclusive Interview with Credo Mutwa, Drum magazine, 1 July 1999. Archived at Drum magazine 
where Mutwa made his predictions. The full story appeared in the magazine's July 1, 1999, issue. 
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Then there was Thokozile Magwaza, who predicted violence in Richmond, 
Shobashobane and many other KwaZulu-Natal trouble spots, long before it became 
front page news. Drum magazine recorded that Magwaza had warned King Cyprian, 
the then Zulu monarch, Zwelithini’s father and predecessor, about looming violence 
among his subjects. “But she was ridiculed from one side of Zululand to the other.” 14 
Mutwa says, “[…] When the sun marries the moon [an eclipse], it usually precedes 
some disaster or other.” During one such period, he warned the apartheid architect, H. 
F. Verwoerd, that he saw a bayonet hanging over his head. Verwoerd dismissed the 
vision as nonsense, saying only blacks died by knives. Shortly afterwards he was 
fatally stabbed in parliament.15 
In 1999, Thabo Mbeki was assuming the reins of power, but Mutwa predicted he 
would not see out his term in office. His prophecy was fulfilled in June 2008, when 
Mbeki was asked to step down by the ruling ANC. Mutwa also predicted the energy 
crisis and power cuts that swept through southern Africa.16 
Dreams and visions have often served as warnings, guides and sometimes indications 
of a condition or state of anxiety of the mind. They have been great mysteries to 
interpret, but are also regarded as treasures, especially when taken up into religious 
texts such as the Bible.17 Pharaoh’s prophetic dream of the seven years of plenty, 
followed by seven years of famine, 18 is an excellent example of a dream that is both 
prophetic and reflects the anxieties of a ruler. In Zulu culture,19 dreams and visions 
14Exclusive Interview with Credo Mutwa, Drum magazine, 1 July 1999. Archived at Drum magazine, 
where Mutwa made his predictions. The full story appeared in the magazine's July 1, 1999, issue. 
15 Exclusive Interview with Credo Mutwa, Drum magazine, 1 July 1999. Archived at Drum magazine 
where Mutwa made his predictions. The full story appeared in the magazine's July 1, 1999, issue. 
16New Zimbabwe.com has exclusive access to the archived Drum magazine, where Mutwa made his 
predictions. Here is the full story as it appeared in the magazine's July 1, 1999, issue. 
17Interview with MaNgubane Ndlela, KwaShange, 14 March 2009. 
18See Genesis 41, Old Testament, King James Version.  
19Many authors have dealt with the subject of Zulu culture and religion: Axel-Ivan Berglund, Zulu 
Thought-Patterns and Symbolism (London, C Hurst, 1976), see also Eileen Jensen Krige, The Social 
System of the Zulus (London: Longmans Green, 1936); Preston-Whyte 1987; David Chidester, Word 
and Light: Seeing, Hearing, and Religious Discourse (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 212–
275); David Chidester, Savage Systems: Colonialism and Comparative Religion in Southern Africa 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 116–172. Irving Hexham, Texts on Zulu Religion: 
Traditional Zulu Ideas about God (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1987); De Heusch, Sacrifice in 
Africa: A Structuralist Approach. O’Brien Linda, Morton Alice, (eds) (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1985), 38–64. Michael Lambert, Ancient Greek and Zulu Sacrificial Ritual: A 
Comparative Analysis (Numen, 1993), 293-318. John Lambert, Betrayed Trust: Africans and the State 
in Colonial Natal (Scottsville: University of Natal Press, 1995). Brian Du Toit, The Isangoma: An 
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have often served another purpose: they have been seen as a link to the mysterious 
space that separates man from uNkulunkulu.20  
Dreams and visions make up a culturally defined means of communication, between 
the living and the ancestors or God, and have a strong impact on their community’s 
conceptions of reality. Even rationalists, with little or no religious belief, do not deny 
that anxiety dreams, for example, are part of the common experience of many people. 
I shall reason that dreams and visions are influenced by socio-economic and political 
factors in a particular society. Through dreams and visions, one can gain an additional 
and unique access to the period studied: dreams and visions in KwaShange affected 
and influenced the political history of the area. They reflect the deeper fears and 
hopes of the times in which the people of Vulindlela lived, before and during 
dispossession, displacement and trauma. The dreams which I shall discuss are those of 
women, relatively powerless, but aware of the signs of coming conflict and seeking 
influence in their group. I shall claim that these dreams were a clear reflection of the 
extent of the psychological affects this violence had on the KwaShange populace. The 
dreams were not symptoms of any primitive mentality. They were situated within the 
violent disruptions of an apartheid zone and during the time of an armed struggle.  
In the case of KwaShange, individuals had dreams that affected the history of 
violence in the area. I shall suggest in this chapter that historians, especially those that 
conduct research into the lives of people who have faith in the prophetic powers of 
dreams, should cite dreams and visions because they are part of, and influential over, 
most Zulus’ lives and religions. They have historically been instrumental in, for 
example, the naming of a child and have given direction to communities as to who 
should be a chief or headman. The latter are of particular note among members of the 
Shembe church, where there is a direct link between dreams and the elders of the 
Adaptive Agent Among Urban Zulu. (Anthropological Quarterly 1971) 44/2, 51-65. Harriet Ngubane, 
Body and Mind in Zulu Medicine: An Ethnography of Health and Diseases in Nyuswa-Zulu Thought 
and Practice (London: Academic Press, 1977); Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and 
Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005); Caroline 
Hamilton, Terrific Majesty: The Powers of Shaka Zulu and the Limits of Historical Invention (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1998); Norman Etherington, “Missionary Doctors and African Healers in Mid-
Victorian South Africa”, South African Historical Journal, 19 (1987), 77-91. Thomas McClendon, 
“The Man Who Would Be Inkosi: Civilising Missions in Shepstone’s Early Career”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 30:2 (2004), 339-358. 
20Interview with MaNgubane Ndlela, KwaShange, 14 March 2009. 
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church considering the next leader, as in the case of the appointment of Vela Shembe 
to the leadership.  
7.3 Dreams and visions: examples from the interviewees 
Memories of political violence in KwaShange abound in stories about prophetic 
dreams and visions that people, mainly women, experienced during the period of 
violence, particularly in the early period. For the period of the violence under study, 
there is a plethora of information shared with me by my informants in KwaShange on 
dreams and visions, which largely emanate from ordinary members of communities 
whose lives were affected by the unrest. Dreams were influential in the Vulindlela 
communities – and for that reason alone deserve attention.  
I shall use the oral history contained in my interviews with residents to gain access to 
the period of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal of the 1980s-1990s, as it is crucial for 
understanding what was happening in the minds of community members during this 
period. The sharing and telling of these dreams and visions lead one to appreciate the 
reaction of community members, since such accounts contributed to the atmosphere 
of fear and dread, confirming that the residents were indeed living in abnormal times.  
 
I shall discuss five dreams experienced by women in the period 1985-1990 and 
recorded by me in 2008-2010. The dreamers and narrators of these dreams were 
women in KwaShange, who claim that they had these dreams and visions before the 
violence started and during the violence. Only those dreams or visions for which the 
dreamer herself gave a meaningful interpretation, and which had previously been 
communicated to others, were recorded.21 The aim of this chapter is to analyse the 
content of the dreams and visions. Content analysis22and sociological 
21The research was conducted within a participatory paradigm. The data presented are qualitative in 
nature and were mainly collected in Vulindlela by means of interviews and oral histories carried out 
since 2009. As an insider, I have an advantage of understanding where my interviewees come from 
with these dreams and visions, but I am also aware of the fact that I am faced with a great disadvantage 
in respect of my attempts to obtain some degree of understanding of individuals’ dreams and visions 
(they are highly sacred and personal) – especially in a world where science and technology have 
become the central focus of modern thinking and where traditional imaginative experiences as a source 
of guidance in life are greatly undervalued – and, moreover, are greatly at risk of disappearing. I used 
the work of David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in 
Nineteenth-Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008) as a model.  
22Benjamin Kilborne, On Classifying Dreams in Barbara Tedlock (ed.), Dreaming: Anthropological 
and Psychological Interpretations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 171-193. 
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approaches23have long been major methodological approaches to the study of dreams 
and visions.  
 
These dreams were told long after the events of violence in KwaShange. As Portelli 
speculates, the possibility of a reconstruction of memories is real. After an event it is 
easy for some people to say that they dreamed about it before. Part of Chapter Ten 
will deal with the reconstruction of memories and focuses on relevant discourse 
frames and acts of recounting dreams, in other words the need to recognise ways of 
sharing dreams and visions. In this chapter, dreams are described without much 
critical analysis from the author, so as to place before the reader some of the most 
salient signs of anxiety and psychological effects this violence had on ordinary people.   
  
I have described in earlier chapters the nature of the Vulindlela community and the 
fact that differences – even antagonisms – existed before open conflict broke out in 
1987. It is likely that a half-conscious awareness of these produced some of the 
dreams which I record below. MaDlomo’s dream: 
 
I saw [in a vision] Vulindlela covered in flames of fire. A number of young 
and old men lying on the streets, some bodies were eaten by dogs. There were 
white men accompanied by multitudes of black men in traditional attire 
carrying shot guns and petrol bombs who were killing men and burning 
houses. Women and children were all pushed to the Msunduzi River; they 
were drowning and I heard them screaming very loudly, asking for help, but 
there was no one to help them.24  
 
This is a summary of a dream told by MaDlomo, a KwaShange survivor of political 
violence of the 1980s – 1990s. It is typical of many dreams that were narrated by 
women interviewees especially, who spoke about their memories of the times. 
MaDlomo had this dream in 1985. She believes that this was a revelation of what was 
about to happen in the area of Vulindlela.  
 
23James Kiernan, “The Social Stuff of Revelation: Pattern and Purpose in Zionist Dreams and Visions”, 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 55 (3): 304-318. 
24 Interview with MaDlomo, KwaShange, 17 April 2009. 
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MaDlomo describes herself as a devout Christian and her revelations, in fact, display 
remarkable similarities to those related in the Old Testament, e.g. in the narrative 
which describes how Moses received the Ten Commandments from God on Mount 
Sinai. Although MaDlomo strongly supported all attempts at KwaShange youth 
mobilization, she was not directly or actively involved in any political activities. She 
had, in fact, political influence, in the sense that leaders, including Moses Ndlovu and 
Nunu Mchunu, consulted her on a regular basis.25 In particular, she was consulted in 
connection with the interpretation of dreams and her prayers were often requested for 
important decisions and meetings. 
 
MaZuma Khanyile was 68 years old when I interviewed her in 2009. She was born in 
Vryheid. She was the second wife of the late Khanyile, who was killed in 1987 in 
Pietermaritzburg downtown, when KwaShange Inkatha and UDF fought each other. 
She recalled: 
 
In March 1985 I heard a voice talking to me, saying I must wake up, go 
outside and pray. I was not dreaming but I was awake. It was a voice that 
came from nowhere. I did so, I went outside and prayed […] after about 30 
minutes, I opened my eyes and I looked up in the sky. The moon was red. It 
was strange. I was terrified. I did not go back to sleep but I went to an old lady 
[MaKhumalo], my neighbour; I knocked and requested her to wake up and see 
the moon that looked strange. MaKhumalo was a member of the Apostolic 
Faith Mission. She was a well-respected old lady in the community. She 
looked at the moon and she began to prophesy, saying that what she saw in the 
moon meant that there was going to be a spilling of blood. There was going to 
be a war but she was not able to tell where and who would be fighting. From 
then we began to have women’s prayer meetings in the area, every Thursdays. 
After uManyano gatherings from our respective denominations, we would 
meet and pray against the evil we saw in a form of a vision. 26 
 
In February 1991, MaZuma Khanyile saw a vision: 
 
25 Interview with MaDlomo, KwaShange, 17 April 2009. 
26 Interview with MaZuma Khanyile, KwaShange, 17 April 2009. 
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It was on a Sunday morning, I was feeding my two-year-old baby; I was 
feeding him soft porridge. Before I finished feeding my baby, in the very bowl 
I saw blood. The bowl was full of blood. I became so scared and I left it there 
… I stood up and went to call my other two kids who were outside playing 
children’s games. I told them to come back home and I went out to tell one 
community leader that I suspected that we were going to be attacked that day. 
I do not know where that came from, but I had a strong feeling that what I saw 
in the bowl was meant to warn us that there was going to be an attack. I took 
my children and we went into hiding. The same day, in the afternoon, indeed 
there was an attack in the area. Luckily, some people took my call seriously 
and prepared themselves for the attack I had seen in a vision. On that day 
about 17 of the attackers were killed in KwaShange.27 
 
Another woman, MaNdlovu Zondi, was 65 years old in 2009. She was born in 
Nkandla. Her eldest son was killed in 1988 by the police, as he was one of the UDF 
leaders in the area. Her daughter died in the same year, in a bus that was stoned in 
Mvundlweni, an Inkatha area opposite KwaShange (see Chapter Two). She told me: 
 
In June 1985, I had a strange dream. I saw the whole area of KwaShange 
covered with water. All houses were covered with water and people were 
drowning. I was outside this huge dam […] as I was standing watching people 
drowning. Suddenly a voice that came from nowhere said to me, why are you 
standing? Run […] I ran to the bank of this huge dam full of dirty water […] I 
was running very fast […]. When I reached Zwartkop Mountain, I saw that the 
whole area of Inadi was full of water. It was on a Sunday night when I had this 
dream. The following Sunday I went to church and just before the service 
started, I spoke to one elderly woman. I told her about this terrible dream I had 
had. She advised me to share the dream with church members […] the same 
old lady had a gift of prophecy; she began to interpret the dream. She said the 
pool of water I saw was tears – she said something horrifying was going to 
27Interview with MaZuma Khanyile, KwaShange, 17 March 2009. See also Chapter Six, February 1990 
incident, where 17 Inkatha supporters were killed in KwaShange.  
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happen in the area – women and children were going to be in such a pain. 
There was going to be a lot of deaths.28  
 
In 1985, a 54 year old woman, MaNdlela Ngubane, lost her son, Zenzele, who was 18 
years old. He was killed in KwaShange at night, but up to the present day nobody knows 
who killed him. 
 
It was in 1986; I cannot remember the day this thing started, but it was just 
after nine at night when my husband and I went to sleep. When I entered into 
my bedroom, I saw bioscope playing on the wall in my bedroom. It was a big 
screen; I saw violence that I had never seen in my life. The bioscope showed 
me the area of KwaShange. I saw people that I know fighting against each 
other. I saw big weapons I had never seen before. I saw houses burning … this 
bioscope continued for about 10 minutes – after that I fainted, I became 
unconscious, I was told. When I woke up … it was almost midnight and some 
neighbours were in my bedroom, praying. Nobody else saw what I saw … my 
husband did not see the bioscope. The same night, I saw writing on the wall. 
Words were written in a language that I did not understand. 
 
This thing continued for about a month. I remember one day I was out of my 
house, doing some washing for my children. I heard a voice that said to me I 
must go my bedroom. I was terrified, but I went. When I entered, the bioscope 
was playing again - the same thing that I had seen was playing again. Again 
this played for about 10-15 minutes and it was followed by some words 
written on the wall. Words were written in a very strange language. 
 
It happened for the third time: this time I had gone to town. Before I finished 
what I was doing in town, the voice came to me: it said I must go to my 
bedroom. I was terrified; instead of going home, I looked for a public phone 
and I phoned my aunt in Mpophomeni. When I told her about this, she told me 
that I am mad. I must go to a diviner.29  
 
28 Interview with MaNdlovu Zondi, KwaShange, 15 March 2009. 
29Interview with MaNdlela Ngubane, KwaShange, 15 March 2009. 
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One day, MaNdlela went to fetch some firewood from a forest not far from her house. It 
was during this day that she received her first revelation, on 9 August 1985, on the 
Ntabaskopho Mountain. She had already collected enough firewood and was ready to tie 
it together and depart for her home when she suddenly heard a voice calling her name. 
Her name was called three times; and then the voice told her that she should leave the 
firewood and rush home. The voice never identified itself but she recognised it as her late 
son’s voice. MaNdlela doubted the voice, as she herself was well aware that her son was 
dead, but once again, it instructed her to go quickly. In addition to this instruction, the 
voice also told her that when she arrived home she must go straight to her bedroom. 
When she arrived at home, MaNdlela told her husband (who was outside the house 
tightening the fence) what had happened. The husband, who obviously thought that she 
was talking nonsense, ignored her. She decided to proceed to her bedroom as per 
instruction. On their arrival there, on the wall there was a ‘big screen’ playing a sort of 
‘action movie’. She saw violence she “had never seen before.” This was taking place in 
Vulindlela and she saw some KwaShange people. Woman and children were crying, 
trying to escape. She told her husband at night of what she had seen but was ridiculed. 
The following day she went to do some washing in a nearby river called Inembe. The 
same voice came to her and instructed her to go to her bedroom. She did so and the same 
thing happened. Almost a month later, she was in Pietermaritzburg at about 10 am, when 
the same voice came to her and told her to go back home and go straight to her bedroom. 
She saw a hand, writing on a wall in a language foreign to her, not English or Afrikaans, 
because she could recognise those two. The movie started again, showing a house in 
flames of fire. It dawned on her that this was a prophetic vision. She thought that the 
world was coming to an end. She began to take membership of the church but was still 
hesitant to discuss it with church leaders because her children and husband ridiculed her 
and thought that she was going crazy.30  
 
These are just a few of many dreams and vision my interviewees mentioned when I 
asked them what they remember about this violence. 
 
7.4 Contextualisation of empirical data and Conclusion 
These accounts reveal the gender divisions in KwaShange during the times of 
violence. The testimonies of these women – and the absence of men’s accounts of 
30Interview with MaNdlela Ngubane, KwaShange, 15 March 2009. 
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dreams – seem to imply that dreams and visions were experienced only by women, 
not men. One man claimed: 
It is only women who had dreams and had time to see visions because they 
slept and they had time to relax … we men were always alert, on guard…there 
was no time to relax for us to see visions, let alone sleeping for us to dream. 
But these miracles [dreams and visions] helped us, to know what Inkatha was 
planning. Our ancestors and uNkulunkulu were on our side, they kept us 
updated about what was about to happen.31  
This speaks to issues of gender divisions: women, in this society, saw visions and had 
dreams, whereas men practiced rituals and these rituals and muthi were for males only 
(see Chapter Eight). In this chapter, I have dealt with phenomena outside of the 
violence and experienced by women, who played no direct part in the conflict in 
KwaShange. These dreams and visions should not be interpreted in terms of uniform 
criteria – different, and often subtle, forms of action and criteria come into play. 
Dreams and visions in KwaShange may have mobilized, alerted and revived people. 
The ethnographic material that has been presented in respect of the political violence 
in KwaShange indicates the unique role played by dreams and visions in the discourse 
of political violence. 
These dreams and visions also reveal the abnormality of the time: times were 
‘muddled’. The Zulu term for ‘muddled’—dungeka, ukudunga—is a metaphor 
derived from stirring up mud in water. Although it could be applied to a state of mind, 
signifying confusion, it could also be applied to the disturbance of a household by an 
idungandhlu [literally a house-muddler], or the disturbance of a village by an 
idungamuzi (village-muddler).32 All of these meanings, certainly, were at play in the 
dreams of KwaShange women, who experienced their bodies, their homes, their 
families and their sense of community as ‘stirred up’ and under attack by forces 
threatening to kill them.  
In Chapter Four I have discussed the historical divisions in the community of 
Vulindlela between neighbours. Although it has been claimed that violence broke out 
31Interview with Meleko Shelembe, KwaShange, 14 Septermber 2008. 
32Absalom Vilakazi and Doke, Zulu-English Dictionary (Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1958), 
175. 
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in this area only in 1987, there were undoubtedly symptoms that it was imminent in 
the years before 1987, and the three dreams that I have presented here are evidence of 
this. When the ANC decided to resort to an ‘armed struggle’ against the apartheid 
regime in the 1960, they began to plant bombs throughout the country.33 In 1987 there 
were floods that destroyed communities in the Midlands that exacerbated the political 
violence between the UDF and Inkatha in the area. This political strife and 
catastrophic weather had psychological effects on Natal and Zululand residents. It was 
a period of great uncertainty about the future and to add to this, when violence had 
already erupted, families turned against each other. This conflict was unprecedented 
in rural areas like KwaShange. 
The dreams I have reported bear traces of a changing society, in which people were 
undergoing attacks, dispossession, displacement and despair.34 These were realities of 
the political violence and the effects of violence revealed through dreams. In these 
1980-1990s phenomena we catch a glimpse of new subjectivities being negotiated 
through the medium of dreams and visions.  
 
These dreams and visions provide evidence of the way in which non-combatants felt 
the violence—appropriation of cattle, control of territory, and the practice of torture—
that defined the context in which they were experienced. The recounting of dreams 
and visions allows people their own understanding of experiences, to extract meaning 
from them, and to relate this meaning to their everyday lives. Two ‘dreamers’ 
envisage television screens on which violence is played out – evidence that their 
visions relate closely to the conditions of the modern world as they know them. In this 
way, dreams and visions provide a framework for understanding themselves and the 
world, offering a means for finding solutions, from thwarted desires to the highest 
spiritual aspirations, as well as encompassing practical problems and the 
inconsistencies of daily life. Thirdly, the utilisation of dreams and visions as 
instruments to mobilise political support was not merely a phenomenon of the period 
of political violence. During subjection to colonial and apartheid situations, dreams 
and visions played a role in the struggle against oppression and in ethnic revival 
33Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, August 2005.  
34 David Chidester, Dreaming in the Contact Zone: Zulu Dreams, Visions, and Religion in Nineteenth-
Century South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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attempts. The same can be said in respect of recent dreams connected with political 
violence.  
In summary, it could be reasoned that these dreams and precognitive visions of the 
violence not only indicate the evidence of violence (i.e. trauma) and memory among 
survivors but indicate, firstly, the fact of a cultural continuity, in that the historical 
evidence shows these very responses to be native to peoples of Nguni origin–their 
modes of war, preparations for war and perception of war. Secondly, psycho-social 
reactions (both precognitively and in memory) toward such abnormal or ‘muddled’ 
times lead to the question if such dreams and precognitive visions can be described as 
either a method adopted by memories of survivors in attempts to explain such 
anomalies and traumatic incidents or, alternatively, if indeed there is certain ‘future 
knowing’ or foretelling involved. As there is no scientific empirical evidence offered 
the historian, as yet, to categorically claim the last, one must let it be, but nevertheless 
recognise that what is perhaps of more importance is that the culture allows for such 
in its belief system.  
 
In terms of the dreams and visions of KwaShange’s violence, the two views hold 
equal weight in terms of this thesis. While Meleko Shelembe’s quote above gives 
insight into the function of precognitive visions, dreams and visions, particularly of 
women, in giving warning with an explanation of it being an act of God and ancestors 
on the side of who-so-ever’s community being thus warned, it is also true that the 
argument for such ‘ominous signs’ are the construct of memory to explain what the 
survivors have experienced. This lends further credence to its having at least some 
role to play in healing, handling and dealing with trauma. If one were to accept that 
any survivor needs to continue with ‘ordinary daily life’ and continue to cope, then it 
must also be accepted they would need a satisfactory explanation for such a 
horrendous disruption of the course of that normal life, that of a sign as to how out of 
the ordinary the experiences of war indeed was, that the normal social order does not 
proceed as such and, in this, one can see the need for healing (as outlined in Chapter 
Nine) to enable the return to normal ‘ordinary daily life’ for survivors. One also needs 
to realise how the onus of such re-establishment of daily life would fall on women, 
mothers, grandmothers, sisters and daughters, who, in bearing the children’s needs, 
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have a particular urgency for such explanations. Of course it is also true that 
precognitive visions can be as easily explained as female (if you will) intuitive 
awareness of the indication of bad things about to erupt, this being intuited by any of 
the political hegemonies and secret war preparations of men of rival groups. As 
regards these signs, one must not forget the fact of the 1987 floods, which were truly 
horrific. It has already been noted that the IFP favoured of their card-holding 





 Chapter Eight 
 
LEGACIES OF THE PAST: RITUAL MURDER AND MUTHI1 IN 







The practice of ritual killing that was widespread during the conflicts of the 1980s and 
1990s still prevails in Vulindlela. Even today the communities are heavily affected by 
this ‘problem’.2 I quote from the Daily Sun a recent story which is still on many people’s 
lips: ‘Horror find at Sangoma’s (witch-doctor’s) House.’3 
This story was reported on the news on 31 January 2011. On this day, several newspapers 
in South Africa reported a gruesome discovery in Pietermaritzburg. A youngster by the 
name of Loyiso Jokweni (18) disappeared on Christmas day from his sister’s house. He 
had visited his sister and was originally from the village of Inanda,4 a semi-urban area 
outside Durban.  
 
Image Loyiso Jokweni from Daily Sun 21 January 2011 
1Muthi refers to medicine that not only heals or destroys the physical body but helps people and leaders to 
usurp (political) power from rivals and kin. In the context of war, muthi helps to fight and defeat rivals or 
enemies. My interviewees generally cited any success by a rival group during attacks as evidence of the use 
of muthi. Acquisition of proper muthi, and the powerful doctors (izinyanga) who administered it, were 
considered essential to Vulindlela during the violence.   
2Term used by informants in KwaShange to describe the muthi killings. 
3The Sowetan, 01 February 2011; see also Daily Sun, 31 January 2011, The Witness, 31 January 2011, 
Isolezwe January 2011, Ilanga, January 2011. 




                                                 
Jokweni was allegedly killed for muthi. His headless body was discovered on 17 January 
2011. The head of the unfortunate boy was found two weeks later, in the freezer of a 
witch-doctor. The South African Police Services (SAPS) have since arrested a sangoma 
and the man he had instructed to murder the boy. The intentions of the sangoma were to 
use the head, or parts of it, for muthi.5 
On 29 January 2011, a local policeman from KwaShange who knew about my research 
on muthi and muthi-related deaths asked me to accompany him and other police officers 
to Mafakatini. This is the area of the homestead of the sangoma who is alleged to have 
murdered Jokweni and mutilated his body. He wanted to show me the house, inside 
which a grave was discovered. In neighbouring areas people were anxious to know if 
their dead relatives’ missing body parts would also be found in this house. This included 
those whose relatives disappeared during the violence and who are ignorant of what 
happened to them. These people were hoping to reclaim the bodies for a respectful burial 
and to obtain closure. Some young people whose fathers had been buried with missing 
body parts were hoping to find some of these parts and get closure on the killings. 
Thulani Zulu explained, “Today I have bad luck because my father was buried without 
his ‘manhood’ (i.e. genitals)”.6 “I am hoping that they will find my son’s skull, left hand 
and arm, his children are troublesome in the community, and they use drugs. The 
youngest daughter has HIV; I think it is because of this problem.”7 Newspapers indicated 
that almost a thousand people marched to the house of this traditional healer.8 They 
proceeded to burn down the structure that had housed the grisly discovery. They were 
disappointed that they did not find any of the relatives’ body parts. The community 
believes that the sangoma sold the body parts or that they were taken away, either by the 
late Chief Shayabantu Zondi, or David Ntombela, who were believed to be using strong 
muthi.  
5Daily Sun, 31 January 2011. 
6Interview with Thulani Zulu, KwaShange, 29 January 2011. 
7Interview with MaNzimande Ngubeni, KwaShange, 29 January 2011. 




                                                 
The Daily Sun newspaper reported that the community threatened to kill the sangoma as 
soon as he is released. Police spokesperson Colonel Jay Naicker appealed to the local 
community to stay calm.9   
Traditional healers use various items that have symbolic meanings for obtaining power: 
for example nail clippings, hair cuttings10 and faeces found in and around their 
environment, to make powerful muthi.11 This muthi is then ritualised to enhance its 
efficacy by invoking the blessing of the ancestors; it is then considered ready for 
consumption, or to be smoked, or scattered in or around the desired location, or burnt to 
release the healing properties. Some kinds of muthi are not only used to cure disease, but 
can be applied to ward off evil spirits and bring good luck, mainly in business. 
Many Zulu people believe that to manufacture strong medicine, body parts obtained from 
animals (including human beings) must be harvested when the subjects are still alive.12 
The part used for the muthi will retain the spirit of the animal or human, which will 
enhance its potency. The more difficult the problem, the more extreme the intervention 
and the higher up the ‘food chain’ the  sangoma will go to obtain the part that will help to 
get the desired result.  
 
A snake which was used for muthi in Vulindlela.13  
9Daily Sun, 31 January 2011. 
10Louise Vincent, “New Magic for New Times: Muthi Murder in Democratic South Africa”, Tribes and 
Tribals, Special Volume 2 (Kamla-Rag Enterprises, 2008), 44. 
11Interview with Senzesenkosi Mkhize, an Inyanga, Richmond, 13 June 2010. 
12Interview with Senzosenkosi Mkhize, an Inyanga, Richmond, 13 June 2010. 




                                                 
Sometimes izangoma use animals for muthi. By moving from the use of animals to 
human beings, the traditional healer has not only crossed the line between legal and 
illegal, but he feels strongly that nothing else will solve the patient’s problem.  
I include this general discussion of muthi, belief in witchcraft and ritual murder because 
these beliefs and practices were prevalent during the political violence of the 1980s in the 
Midlands. The accused in the story referred to above was also implicated in ritual killings 
of UDF supporters during the period of my study. Many of the survivors whom I 




Human body mutilation and ‘necklacing’14 were practised by communities affected by 
the violence of the 1980s-1990s. Franklin attempted to draw a link between these rituals: 
 
[…] the neck and the stomach area are seen as links between the three main 
contrasting divisions of the body. This horror of the separation of the head from 
the body is perhaps fairly universal, and the burning necklace could be seen as a 
decapitator in a sense. It is perhaps of some relevance that the ‘guillotine’ 
(another term for the necklace) portrays this same idea. The term necklace could 
also have an ironic association. It usually carries positive emotional associations. 
Necklace are given as gifts, they are decorative and are normally seen to enhance 
one’s appearance. Also protective medicine is sometimes worn around the neck.15  
 
The existing literature on political violence in Natal and Zululand tends to emphasise 
‘necklacing’, but to play down the human body mutilation and the role played by 
14Necklacing was a common practice in townships in the 1980s and 1990s. UDF supporters placed a car 
tyre, sprinkled with petrol, around the neck of the enemy and set it alight in order to burn the person. It is 
not my intention in this chapter to discuss necklacing in detail. For details on the necklacing ritual, see 
Joanna Ball, “The Ritual of Necklace” (Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, March 1994), 1-23.  
15Karl Franklin,  “Kewa Ethnolinguistic Concepts of Body Parts”, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 
19: 1(1963), 54-63; see also Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre for the 




                                                 
izinyanga zempi (war-doctors)16 and rituals associated with war and the use of muthi in 
exacerbating the violent attacks. It is generally known in the communities of Vulindlela 
that Inkatha and UDF relied heavily on war-doctors to overcome their rivals. This chapter 
attempts to describe and analyse the centrality of the use of muthi in KwaShange during 
the period under study. I argue that war-doctors were at the core of the violence and that 
muthi played a crucial role in the rise of communities to power and the rise of individuals 
in Vulindlela in the late 1980s to early 1990s.17 In places where muthi rituals were carried 
out, important decisions were taken whether or not to attack rival groups.18  
 
This chapter aims to fill in gaps left by scholars who documented incidents of political 
violence in the Midlands, and Natal and Zululand in general. Some downplayed African 
rituals and beliefs in muthi and labelled it as ‘false consciousnesses.19 I believe such 
arguments to be irrelevant: the rival factions believed strongly in the efficacy of the muthi 
which they used, as did most of their victims.  
 
This chapter will demonstrate the tension between Zulu people, the missionaries and the 
civil authorities caused, by Zulu beliefs in rituals and the use of muthi. This does reflect 
earlier history, but is also pertinent to the cultural continuity of the practice, as well as to 
the mainline Western historians’ reluctance to broach the issue. It is true that the use of 
muthi and the lack of traditional cleansing (handled in a subsequent chapter) prove to be 
the source of stress to the men who participated in these early Zulu practices. The chapter 
will demonstrate the extent to which Christian and indigenous approaches to the concept 
of ukuthakatha (witchcraft) opposed or concurred with one another in the mid-to-late 
16Translation borrowed from Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and Ritual in the Zulu 
Rebellion (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 219-251. 
17Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa, Nunu Mchunu, Sakha Ndaba mentioned in their respective interviews that 
they depended heavily on muthi for protection. People in KwaShange alleged that Makhekhe Thabethe and 
Dlamini ‘iBhlamani’ had strong muthi. 
18Muthi ritual was done in different places, sometimes in a homestead of inyanga. Sometimes warriors had 
to be in a forest, bank of a river, on top of the mountain or in a ruined house. Inyanga gave instructions as 
to where a ritual should take place, depending on the kind of muthi they were using on that particular day. 
19L. Vail, “Ethnicity in Southern African History”, in Vail L ed., The Creation of Tribalism in Southern 
Africa (London: James Curry, 1989), intro; Belinda Bozzoli and Mmantho Nkotsoe, Women of Phokeng: 
Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-83 (Johannesburg, Wits University 
Press, 1991), intro. See also Tlou Makhura, “Missionary and African Perspectives on the Politics of 
Witchcraft among the Xhosa and Zulu Communities in the 19th Century Cape and Natal/Zululand”, 




                                                 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. My research in Vulindlela, especially the interviews 
with residents, suggests that in rural areas warriors (and communities) preferred human 
body mutilation rituals to the necklacing rituals which were prevalent in townships. 
These mutilations served both as punishment for an enemy and a means of obtaining 
body parts for magical purposes. I shall discuss this double purpose and how these rituals 
are claimed to be traditional ways of punishing ‘witches’. Secondly, I shall analyse 
testimony given by survivors of political violence in KwaShange and neighbouring areas 
who were affected by muthi murders in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The point in 
recording stories told by interviewees is not to assess their reliability, but to provide a 
window into the general perception of practices, beliefs and relationships of healers and 
their ‘medicine’ during this violent period. Finally, I shall explore how the content and 
circulation of these stories affected, and continues to affect, people psychologically. I 
argue that war-doctors or witches (as they are referred to by other interviewees) were the 
instigators of conflict.  
 
8.3 Traditional healers and muthi: debate from the past 
 
Muthi and associated rituals have played an important role in the lives of Zulu people for 
many centuries. For almost everything they did, muthi and rituals would be applied.20  
 
Traditional healers provided medical, ecological, social, political and military 
assistance to the nation. Each king had a team of healers that looked after his 
affairs. The kings depended on their healer or healers to help obtain and maintain 
political power, provide their services during times of disputes over leadership 
successions. They played a crucial role in the judicial system, to determine the 
degree of guilt for petty crimes.21 
 
20Karen Elizabeth Flint, Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural 
Exchange in South Africa (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 67. 
21Karen Elizabeth Flint, Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural 




                                                 
Controversy around the use of muthi and the role of traditional healers in South Africa 
during the pre-colonial period is well documented.22 Wars were fought not only with 
weapons but with the use of muthi. ‘Strengthening of warriors’23 and ‘doctoring of 
wars’24 were regarded as more important than any weaponry. Some Zulu fictions25, 
popular dramas26 and oral histories mention the prominence of traditional healers and 
war-doctors.27 Each clan and village had healers who were experts in muthi and rituals 
associated with battles.28 For example, the role played by the use of muthi has been 
recorded in the history of the rise of King Shaka and the establishment of the Zulu 
kingdom.29  
 
The oral traditions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries describe the rise of 
Shaka and the foundation of the Zulu kingdom in the late 1810s, not just as a result of 
Shaka’s ability to organize his army but also to the use of muthi. This muthi and the 
expertise displayed by Shaka’s healers and diviners is said to have contributed hugely to 
the rise to power of the Zulus and their dominance over other prominent clans in what 
later became known as Northern Natal. Even though Shaka used muthi, he opposed the 
witchcraft of others. According to Jeff Guy, the action of the sea had a strange fascination 
for Shaka.30   
 
22See Karen Elizabeth Flint, Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural 
Exchange in South Africa. (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008); A. T. Bryant, Zulu Medicine and 
Medicine-Men. Cape Town: C. Struik. J. Brownlee, “Account of Amakosa, or Southern Caffers”, Appendix 
1 in, G. Thompson, Travels and Adventures in Southern Africa, vol. 1 (London, 1827), 446- 448.  
23In Zulu this is called ukuqiniswa kwamabutho. 
24In Zulu this is called ukunyangwa noma ukuqiniswa kwempi.  
25See, for instance, Mageba Lazihlonza, Buzani kuMkabayi. 
26See, for instance, uShaka Zulu, Yize Uvalo, Umanqoba Isibindi, SABC radio dramas aired in the 1980s. 
27Collin Webb and John Wright, The James Stuart Archives, vols. 1-5 (Durban, Killie Campbell Africana 
Library and Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1975-2001) quoted in Karen Elizabeth Flint 
Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural Exchange in South Africa 
(Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008),  68. 
28Karen Elizabeth Flint, Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural 
Exchange in South Africa (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 68. See also A. T. Bryant, Zulu Medicine 
and Medicine-Men. (Cape Town: C. Struik). 
29Collin Webb and John Wright, The James Stuart Archives, vols. 1-5, quoted in Karen Elizabeth Flint, 
Negotiating Tradition: African Healers, Medical Competition, and Cultural Exchange in South Africa 
(Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008), 68. 
30Jeff Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom: the Civil War in Zululand, 1879-1884 (London: 




                                                 
[Any person suspected of being a witch] was required to throw his stick into the 
sea … and [the stick] of a witch never returned [with the advancing and receding 
waters]. The owner of the stick that never returned was in consequence killed on 
the spot on the grounds that he was a witch.31 
 
During the colonial period, the white people, and especially the missionaries, were 
critical of rituals, muthi and the witchcraft associated with it.32 There were a number of 
court cases that attempted to address this issue.33Guy, referring to a number of court 
cases that took place in Northern Natal where people were accused of preparing for 
war,34  reasons that colonial officials (and the missionaries) misunderstood African ritual 
practices. They reduced all rituals of healing and strengthening to war-doctoring. Because 
the missionaries believed that muthi was immoral, they influenced the colonial officials, 
who rewrote some of the African Customary Law to have it aligned more closely with 
Judaeo-Christian ways. ‘Smelling out’ by sangomas was made illegal because those 
identified in this way were often put to death. The colonial officials tried their best to 
31Magama Magwaza Fuze, Abantu Abamnyama lapa ba vela ngakona, edited and translated by A. T. Cope, 
as The Black People and Whence they Came: A Zulu View, (Pietermaritzburg, Shuter & Shooter, 1979),  
62-3. 
32See Belinda Bozzoli and Peter Delius eds., “History from South Africa Special Issue” 46-7, Radical 
History Review (New York, 1990),13-45; P. Chabal and J. P. Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument, (Oxford, 1999), 56; Peter Delius, “Witches and Missionaries in the Nineteenth Century 
“Transvaal”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 27:3 (Sept, 2001), 429-31. L. Vail, ed., The Creation of 
Tribalism in Southern Africa, (London: James Curry, 1989), Intro.; Belinda Bozzoli and Mmantho 
Nkotsoe, Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-83, 
(Johannesburg: Ravan, 1991), intro; J. V. B. Shrewsbury, Memorials of the Rev. William J. Shrewsbury, 
(London, 1869), 423. H. H. Fast ed., The Journal and selected letters of Rev. William J. Shrewsbury, 1826-
1835, (Johannesburg, 1994), 103, 111.  Stephen Kay, Travels and Researches in Caffraria, (London, 1833), 
171, 176, 183. John Philip, Researches in South Africa, vol.2, (London, 1828), 116-19.  W. C. Holden, The 
Past and Future of Kaffer Races, (Cape Town, 1963), 281. See also Adam Ashforth, Madumo: A man 
bewitched, (Chicago, 2000), 166-94; Ashforth, “An Epidemic of Witchcraft? The Implication of AIDS for 
the post-Apartheid State’, Journal of African Studies, 61, 1, (2002), 121-22. R. Elphick, The Khoikhoi and 
the Founding of White South Africa, (Johannesburg: Ravan 1985), 229-35; Jeffrey Peires, The Dead Will 
Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-57, (Johannesburg: Ravan, 1987), 31-
2; Harriet Ngubane, The Predicament of the Sinister Healer: Some Observations on the “Ritual Murder” 
and the Professional Role of the Inyanga’, in Murray Last and C. L. Chavanduka eds., The 
Professionalisation of African Medicine (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986).  
33Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 219-251; see also Collin Webb and John Wright eds., The James Stuart 
Archives, 1, 18 May 1914, 49 (Stuart emphasis). See also, ibid (Evidence by Mpukane: 18 March 1909, 
331-2). 
34Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University 




                                                 
label any use of muthi as witchcraft. Their intention was to obviate it completely. There 
were many controversies and even court cases regarding the use of muthi and 
witchcraft.35 Wallace Mills, however, was of the opinion that the missionaries’ 
opposition to African traditions and rituals started to relax in the first half of the twentieth 
century.36 In terms of war and rebellion and civil unrest, the prohibition of muthi and 
magical rituals would escalate into suppression and attack and trials, as was to be seen in 
the Bhambatha Rebellion of 1906 and subsequent courts marshal and trials.37 
 
There are records of human body parts being used for muthi in the twentieth century. 
Warriors were strengthened or doctored to overcome their enemies. It was considered 
essential that liquid used for the sprinkling should contain material particles (insila) 
connected with the person of the chief whose people were about to be attacked. Secret 
messengers would have been sent out beforehand to obtain such substances, which could 
have been as powerful as some of the chiefs hair, parings of this nails, or his spittle 
scraped from the ground, or as innocuous as scrapings from the floors of his huts or any 
utensils he may have used.  
 
35Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 232. 
36See Wallace Mills, “Missionaries, Xhosa Clergy and the Suppression of Traditional Customs”, in Henry 
Bredenkamp and Robert Ross eds., Missions and Christianity in South African History (Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand University Press, 1995), 153-172. 
37Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law, and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University 
of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 219. See also Benedict Carton, Blood from Your Children: The Colonial 




                                                 
  
 “Veal’s remains: A sketch with annotations by Intelligence Officer James Stuart.”38 





                                                 
During the Bhambatha Uprising muthi was used.39 Guy dedicates a whole chapter to 
court cases against people who he argues were ‘falsely accused of having performed 
ritual killings’ and used human body parts for muthi. He felt that in most cases these were 
not true and that colonial officials and Zulu headmen who had a grudge, or were rivals 
for the power of the accused, falsely blamed them for the deaths and mutilation of human 
bodies for muthi. During the Bhambatha Uprising in 1906, a force of Natal Police, under 
Lt. Colonel G. Mansel, marched from Greytown along the Keate’s Drift road and set up 
camp at Burrups. They passed through the Mpanza valley to Keate’s Drift and returned 
that evening along the same road. Bhambatha’s men were ready for them. They had been 
doctored for war by the war-doctor Malaza, whose medicine was designed to make them 
impervious to the white man’s bullets.40 Chakijana had posted them in three groups: one 
above a prominent rock near the road, one below it and one in a drainage ditch.41  
 
At around 7pm the police group approached along the road, unable to manoeuvre 
effectively as it was fenced on both sides. The advance guard, under Inspector O. 
Dimmock, bore the brunt of the attack. Four of his men were wounded and four 
(Sgt Brown, L. Sgt Harrison and Troopers Aston and Greenwood) were killed. 
Three bodies were retrieved (Sgt Brown’s body was found later, severely 
mutilated) and the wounded men were placed in the carriage […] Although two or 
three of Bhambatha’s men were wounded, it was claimed that Malaza’s medicine 
had saved them from death. Dinuzulu’s men witnessed this and they were no 
doubt impressed.42  
The stories told by my interviewees document popular memories and beliefs in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. The primary motives for using muthi were blood feuds and 
39Thenjiwe Magwaza, Yonah Seleti and Mpilo Pearl Sithole eds, Freedom Sown in Blood: Memories of the 
Impi Yamakhanda: An Indigenous Knowledge Systems Perspective (Thihoyandou: Ditlou Publishers, 
2006), 188. See also, Jeff Guy, Remembering the Rebellion: the Zulu Uprising of 1906 (Pietermaritzburg: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006), 197. 
40Interview with Nelson Zondi, Ngome, near Bhambatha’s Rock, 24 March 2004. See also Paul Thompson, 
“South African Military History Society, KwaZulu-Natal Branch”, Newsletter No. 328 (October 2002). 
41Paul Thompson, South African Military History Society, KwaZulu-Natal Branch. Newsletter No. 328 
(October 2002). 





                                                 
power-seeking on the part of rival political factions. This meant that the employment of 
poisoning and magical manipulation were culturally acceptable methods for political 
strategizing. People from all areas in the Midlands where I have carried out research on 
this subject stated that they depended heavily on war-doctors to direct and strengthen 
them during the violence.  
8.4 Muthi killing: stories of the 1980s and1990s 
Medicine murder occurred in several parts of South Africa that were affected by political 
violence. Few authors have investigated the subject in post-apartheid South Africa.43 Isak 
Niehaus, writing about the period 1990-95, explores the increase in witchcraft 
accusations and witch-hunting in Lebowa. He describes the diminution of the authority of 
the chiefs and how the political space was filled in the mid-eighties by the ‘comrades’, 
the youth; a comparable process was occurring in the Natal Midlands during the same 
period. Youth organizations, in a culture where age was associated with authority, ‘faced 
a severe crisis of legitimacy’ and one way in which they sought to gain acceptance was 
by pledging themselves to the elimination of evil; and witch-hunts were conducted.44 
Concerning the political violence of the 1980s and1990s in South Africa and the use of 
muthi, Ball noted, ‘these ‘muthi murders’ appear to have also increased considerably.’45 
Balic stated that there were ‘at least 30 ‘muthi murders’ in1987’ and quoted Hammon-
Tooke’s argument that ‘The incidence of medicine murders rises dramatically at times of 
political and social tension, insecurity and competition for economic resources.46 Thus 
the turmoil in South Africa saw the escalation of both witch accusations and ritual 
43Isaka A. Niehaus, “The ANC’s Dilemma: the Symbolic Politics of Three Witch-Hunts in the South 
African Lowveld, 1990-1995”, African Studies Review, 41 (1998), 93-118. See also Adam Ashforth, 
‘Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in the New South Africa’, Cashiers d’Etudes Africaines, 150-2 
(1998), 505-32.  
44Isaka A. Niehaus, “Witch-hunting and Political Legitimacy: Continuity and Change in Green Valley, 
Lebowa (1930-1991)”, Unpublished article, Department of Social Anthropology, (University of 
Witwatersrand, 1991), 3, 15 and 24.  
45Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, March 1994), 21.  




                                                 
(muthi) murders.47 A brief but relevant study that focused on the use of muthi by the 
‘comrades’ in the Midlands, Edendale, is that of M. B. Sosibo.48   
 
In the upheavals of the 1980s and1990s, Natal and Zululand witnessed ritual killings and 
muthi use which involved mutilating bodies and cannibalism, not only to strengthen 
warriors but also to weaken their opposition. This mutilation was defined by interviewees 
as punishment for the ‘witches’49 for bewitching and stealing or looting. UDF supporters 
labelled Inkatha supporters as witches and vice versa. The act of attacking people in their 
areas was equivalent to witchcraft. Secondly, the UDF and Inkatha accused each other of 
using strong muthi to bewitch and weaken the opposition. Each group also accused the 
other of theft. They called them criminals and thieves because the attackers looted cattle 
and property of their enemies.50 
 
This traditional punishment of witches was manipulated by warriors from UDF and 
Inkatha, claiming that it was an African method of dealing with witches. Sosibo states 
that the comrades in Pietermaritzburg would be given protective medicine by traditional 
healers and that this would be tied in a small bottle around their necks.51  
 
A member from the rival group might be labelled a witch. In the past, Hammond-Tooke 
pointed out, the reaction to a witch was violent, especially among the Nguni, Tsongo and 
47Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, March 1994), 21. 
48M. B. Sosibo, “Healing, Ritual and Violence at Edendale, Pietermaritzburg”, Paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Association for Anthropology in Southern Africa, 16-19 September 1992, 
University of Durban-Westville, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994.   
49Evans-Pritchard tends to distinguish between witches and sorcerers. He argues that a witch is born into 
his or her position and harms by means of psychic powers, a sorcerer is not born into his or her position and 
uses material substances such as medicines and charms. However, W. D. Hammond-Tooke writes that this 
distinction was not always expressed terminologically, for example abathakathi among the Zulu refers to 
both witches and sorcerers. See David Hammond-Tooke ed., The Bantu-speaking peoples of Southern 
Africa (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd: 1974), 337.  
50Interview with informants from both former UDF and Inkatha movements, KwaShange and Mvundlweni, 
17 April, 2010. 
51M. B.  Sosibo, “Healing, Ritual and Violence at Edendale, Pietermaritzburg”, paper presented at the 
Annual Conference of the Association for Anthropology in Southern Africa. 16-19 September 1992, 
University of Durban-Westville, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the 




                                                 
Sotho, where death was the usual penalty, but he makes no mention of mutilating bodies 
or burning. However, among the Nguni, the homestead of a witch was razed by fire.52 
The research in Vulindlela shows that there was consensus in different communities that 
the‘old tradition’ of punishment was acceptable for ‘witches’. Mutilation and the removal 
of bodily parts were perceived by some people in Vulindlela as something which was 
invented by the youth as a political tool to destroy their enemies.53 The youth were not, 
however, the only participants in these acts: there were many elders who were passive 
participants or directly involved.54 Such acts provoked horror and incomprehension. In 
1985, the Anglican Archbishop, Desmond Tutu, warned of necklacing, which was being 
practiced during the country-wide political unrest:  
 
If you do this kind of thing [human body mutilation for muthi ritual and 
necklacing], I will find it difficult to speak for the cause of liberation. If the 
violence continues, I will pack my bags, collect my family and leave this beautiful 
country that I love so passionately and so deeply […] I say to you that I condemn 
in the strongest possible terms what happens [in black communities].55 
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, stated that he ‘would not allow the future of 
South Africa to be decided by perpetrators who commit these kinds of acts’ [body 
mutilation and necklacing].56 In 1986, the Sunday Times described these acts as an 
‘offering to the demon that has entered the body of black politics.’57 In 1985, the Sowetan 
defined this as ‘becoming almost fashionable among blacks … this is the beginning of a 
terrible phase that spells doom to the black nation … this kind of savagery is completely 
52David Hammond-Tooke ed., The Bantu-Speaking People of Southern Africa. (London: Routledge & 
Kegan, 1947), 357. 
53Interview with Nunu Mchunu, Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 24 March 2009 and interview with Mhlekwa 
Ndawonde, MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 11 April 2010.   
54Interview with Nunu Mchunu and Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 24 March 2009. 
55Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Times, 5 August 1985, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace 
(Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994. 
56Pik Botha, Times, 5 August 1985, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994.  
57The Sunday Times, 16 February 1986, quoted in, Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report 




                                                 
out of step with the sophisticated  thinking and behaviour of the twentieth century.’58 The 
Star warned: ‘The children should know from their history books that this type of thing 
was common in the Dark Ages and cannot be countenanced in 1985.’59 The perpetrators 
of these activities were reported by the Star as justifying these killings, saying ‘For how 
long will you tell us to show mercy to these ‘systems’60 people when they kill us once we 
are in their hands? Why don’t you allow us to deal with these dogs in the same way they 
treat us?61 The perpetrators said that they were angered by attackers, in other words, these 
acts were caused by anger, ‘…and it is not possible to do this to the victim if you are not 
angry enough.’62 Other perpetrators said it was done ‘in order to show others how 
‘criminals’ and ‘witches’ are dealt with’.63 
Some scholars who have explored political violence in the Midlands have considered it 
an inappropriate subject to ponder.64 The increased incidence of muthi murder in times of 
political stress has been documented in a few historical studies.65 My own view is that the 
opposing forces saw the use of muthi, and magical means in general, as essential parts of 
their conflict. As a result of ignoring these matters, the reasons why warriors were 
mutilated and body parts mixed with muthi and eaten has been largely unexplored, the 
58The Sowetan, 18 April 1985, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the 
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994.  
59The Star, 18 April 1985, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994. 
60http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papball.htm#note1 10 November 2010. 
61 The Star, 11 July 1985, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994. 
62 Mail and Guardian, 28 August – 3 September 1992, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace 
(Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994. 
63 City Press, 4 July 1993, quoted in Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre 
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, March 1994.  
64Joanna Ball, The Ritual of Necklace (Research Report for the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, March 1994), 1.  
65Jean Comaroff and John, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South 
African Postcolony”, American Ethnologist 26:2 (1998), 279-303. Jean Comaroff and John, “Alien Nation: 
Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial Capitalism.” The South Atlantic Quarterly 101:4 (2002) 779-804. Jean 
Comaroff and John, “Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South 
Africa”, Law and Social Inquiry (2004), 513-545. See also Cape Argus, 2006, Eastern Cape News, “Muthi 
Murders Part of Religious Practice”, 23 September 2001; Daily Dispatch, “Police Tell of Muthi Murder”, 
October 30. P. Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft: Politics and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa. 
(Charlottesville VA: University of Virginia Press, 1997). John Matshikiza, “Multicultural Muthi 
Messages”, Mail and Guardian, 30 August 2004. Aaron Nicodemus, “Soccer Fan Brutally Killed for 
Muthi”, Mail and Guardian, 11 June 1999. Deborah Posel, “A Matter of Life and Death: Revisiting 
Modernity from the Vantage Point of the New South Africa”, (Wits Institute for Social and Economic 




                                                 
clichés left unquestioned. Even members of communities who themselves were 
sympathetic to the use of muthi, and who were directly affected by the violence, will 
nowadays refuse to discuss the practice and how it was used by war-doctors and warriors 
in the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence is that I myself (a former member of the Vulindlela 
community and a witness to much of the violence) had the utmost difficulty in persuading 
former combatants to discuss these matters. Eventually, through the influence of a local 
induna, they agreed to be frank with me, but insisted on remaining anonymous. 
Other evidence of the use of magical practices is present in Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission reports, police and coroners’ reports and Congress of South African Writers 
(COSAW) video footage.  
 Human body mutilation continued even after the violence subsided.66 Some authors 
suggested that South Africa is still witnessing what is described as an ‘epidemic’ of 
occult-related violent crime.67 It is believed that more than 300 people have been 
murdered for their body parts in the last decade in this country, although some accounts 
put the figure far higher, with one investigation reporting that there were 250 muthi 
killings in the Limpopo Province alone, in a single year.68 The actual frequency of muthi 
murder is difficult to gauge, because in a country with a high murder rate, estimated at 
about 43 murders per 100 000 people,69 it is likely that not every muthi-related murder is 
recorded as such.70 Though predominantly a phenomenon of the country’s more rural 
provinces, police records indicate that several muthi-related killings take place each year 
in urban Soweto.71 In 2000 a commission of inquiry into witchcraft was set up by the 
government after a spate of deaths in Soweto, in which young boys aged between one and 
66Mzilikazi Wa Afrika, “Patient’s Penis Skinned in Muthi Murder”, Mail and Guardian 29 May 1998. See 
also Joan Van Niekerk, “Failing or Future: Responding to the Sexual Abuse of Children”, SA Crime 
Quarterly (3), 11-16. 
67 Jean Comaroff and John, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from South African 
Postcolony.” American Ethnologist 26:2 (1998), 279-303.  
68Louise Vincent, “New Magic for New Times: Muthi Murder in Democratic South Africa”, in Tribes and 
Tribalism, Special Volume 2 (Kamla-Rag Enterprises, 2008), 43. 
69 Louise Vincent, “New Magic for New Times: Muthi Murder in Democratic South Africa”, in Tribes and 
Tribalism, Special Volume 2 (Kamla-Rag Enterprises, 2008), 43. 
70 Louise Vincent, “New Magic for New Times: Muthi Murder in Democratic South Africa”, in Tribes and 
Tribalism, Special Volume 2 (Kamla-Rag Enterprises, 2008), 43. 




                                                 
six had been kidnapped and murdered. ‘According to post mortem examination results, 
the child whose murder is discussed at the beginning of the chapter was left to bleed to 
death after having his genitals, feet, hands and eyes gouged out.’72 
 
The SAPS, in an article posted on its website, links ritual murder to the centuries-old 
belief that human blood73 and body parts are essential to the preparation of muthi.74 
Nonkonyana Mwelo, Chairperson of the Eastern Cape branch of the Congress of 
Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa), however, claimed that he ‘does not 
believe’ human organs are being used by witch-doctors for muthi and does not see any 
use for body parts as muthi and cannot understand why bodies are being mutilated in this 
way other than as a result of ordinary criminality.75 In contrast, the chairman of the South 
African Council of Churches, Reverend Thivhilaheli Nedohe, stated that:  
This kind of murder only shocks people who want to be shocked. If we have to go 
back into history, we will see that these deeds have been happening, and will 
persist, as long as the perpetrators continue to believe in it […].76 
8.5 Traditional healers and use of muthi: KwaShange testimonies 
8.5.1 My own recollections 
The abduction and death of Loyiso Njokweni described at the beginning of this chapter 
happened in an area of Vulindlela, Mafakatini, under Chief Nsikayezwe Zondi, whose 
people were killed in KwaShange in February 1990. About 17 people were killed and 
some of their bodies were mutilated for muthi. Of the incident, I recall: 
72 Interview with Mthandeni Dlamini, KwaShange, 15 November 2009.  
73 http://www.saps.org.za/7-crimeprev/7-sangoma2.htm Last accessed 10 February 2011. 
74 http://www.factnet.org/cults/Sangoma/index.html last accessed 10 February 2011 See also Joan 
Camaroff and John, The Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South 
Africa. Law and Social Inquiry, 513-545.  
75Cape Argus, Two Held for Cape ‘Muthi’ Killing, 8 August 2006. 
76Louise Vincent, “New Magic for New Times: Muthi Murder in Democratic South Africa”, in Tribes and 




                                                 
I found that I was obliged to hide when an attack took place. After an hour or so I 
came out of hiding. Walking home, I came across my neighbour, Sipho Ndlovu, 
and he told me: “we have finished them” [meaning that they, as ANC supporters, 
had killed Inkatha vigilantes]. I did not believe him but as I walked further I was 
‘welcomed’ by a ‘stream’ of blood and three mutilated human bodies, one of 
which had an arm, head and the abdomen was cut open, and the insides were out. 
The other two bodies as well were butchered, but I was too nauseated to get closer 
to see what body parts had been removed. In retrospect, I have been informed by 
some of the informants who participated in this act, that ‘manhood’, i.e. genitals, 
had been removed for muthi purposes. This is the scene I have carried in my mind 
since then, one of three memories which are more prominent than any of the other 
horror images I recall from the wreckage of the KwaShange violence. This event 
was well covered by the media; where on 10 February 1991 an ANC ‘ambush’ 
took place in KwaShange and 17 Inkatha members were killed.77 The following 
day the police went around trying to find people who had committed the act. They 
asked particularly women and youngsters like me (at that time I was about 13 
years old). However, when they asked me what I had seen, I mentioned that I saw 
three dead bodies, but I had to ‘close my eyes’ as it was too horrible to bear.78  
 
The memory of this scene was triggered by a response I received from informants in 
KwaShange, when I asked about the effects of the violence in KwaShange almost 20 
years after the violence. MaZamisa Shange gave an insightful reply. She said: 
 
Do not even ask. Today we are a fragmented, cursed and sick community and we 
will never again be the community that we once were before this violence started. 
We talk all the time when we have community meetings about a number of people 
who were buried without some of their body parts. A number of people were 
77Sunday Tribune, 17 February 1991; Sunday Star, 17 February 1991; Chapter Two of this thesis: The 
Psychological effects of 1980s-1990s Political Violence on children in KwaShange: An Autobiographical 
narrative; see also Mxolisi Mchunu, “Cultural Change, Zulu Masculinity and Intergenerational Conflict in 
the Context of Civil War in Pietermaritzburg (1987-1991)”, in T. Shefer et al. eds., From Boys to Men: 
Social Constructions of Masculinity in Contemporary Society (Cape Town: UCT Press, 2007). 




                                                 
killed and their bodies were mutilated and even today nothing has been done to 
correct that and I am telling you nothing will heal our community until those body 
parts are discovered. Today we have insane people [in our community] because of 
this revolting act … young people who partook … thula mntaka Zamisa kungaze 
kuthiwe uthe [oh! let me shut up otherwise I will be accused of divulging 
community issues].79 
 
An elderly woman, MaNdlela Ndlovu, said: 
 
Your Jacob Zuma [assuming that I am Jacob Zuma’s ANC supporter] has 
abandoned our community. Our children killed people during the violence. They 
used strong muthi … and all these other [evil] things they did. But when Mandela 
and Jacob Zuma got what they wanted [freedom and positions of power], they are 
now too busy building schools, roads and toilets. They forget the basics [rituals 
that need to be done after a war]. You know, those people who participated in 
these muthi rituals are now addicted to killing and harassing. Now that there are 
no Inkatha people to harass, they harass us, the community members 
themselves.80  
 
An elderly man, Manciza Zondi, added:  
 
[…] like in any other conflict, the use of muthi was prevalent in the civil war of 
1980s-1990s. In fact I can say that muthi was more important that any other 
weapon that was used. We were fighting against people who were known for 
using very strong muthi. I can tell you today that the reason why we [KwaShange] 
were strong and most feared by our neighbouring areas. It was not because we 
had big guns. No, no, no… but we used very strong muthi to strengthen ourselves 
and our families. There is no one in the area that did not use muthi. The few that 
79 Interview with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 




                                                 
refused [to use muthi], were all killed. I am just saying this because I want you to 




It is sad that even today we have some of our people who died and were buried 
without some of their body parts. We have people who were kidnapped by 
Inkatha people who declared them dead, but even today we do not know where 
they were buried. We had a baby that was stolen when she was only three months 
old, even today we do not know what happened to that baby; her grandparents 
were consumed by fire in a burning house. As a result we have things that 
happened in our community of which the consequences will still persist until we 
find closure to the matter. Until then we will still have the stigma we are having 
today. Could you [myself as researcher] find where those body parts are? Could 
you talk to the communities we fought with and arrange for us to have a proper 
cleansing ritual.82 
 
Although the above testimonies are wide-ranging, interviewees avoided the details of 
what happened. They were not willing to tell what they know or experienced – these 
happenings are not discussed. They are known only by those people who witnessed and 
partook in the rituals. As I have indicated earlier, those that disclosed some specific 
details warned me not to write about them.  
 
Community members stress the significance of cleansing rituals to the survivors. What 
happened carried many psychological effects. The people would have preferred ritual 
cleansing instead of developing infrastructure. Government would have done better if it 
had ensured cleansing of communities by doing cultural rituals to wash away all the 
misfortunes incurred by youths or child warriors and older men who had killed people 
and used their body parts. 
81Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 




                                                 
These emotional responses in some instances were accompanied by tears and are 
somewhat similar to responses from other areas affected by the political violence in the 
1980s and 1990s. In 2008 I interviewed the Nyawose family on the KwaZulu-Natal south 
coast, at KwaShobashobane, where I went to interview families who were affected by the 
25 December 1995 massacre. There I was meant to interview an old lady, Mrs. Nyawose, 
who had buried her son’s body with some body parts missing. She was permanently 
paralyzed, as she had been shot in the head in the same incident. Even in 2008 her head 
had permanent bullet scars and she was mentally ‘unstable’. I was warned by her 
daughter that I should not talk to her about the violence, as every time she talked about it, 
she had a nightmare and her daughter had to comfort her the whole night long.  
 
Engelbrecht, a police investigator in the area (south coast), shed light on the 
Shobashobane massacre:  
 
On Christmas morning, a Sunday, a large group of Inkatha supporters under the 
leadership of paramilitary structures mounted, from the south, a full-scale 
offensive on the ANC ward. The main attack group numbered well over 600 
people, and was spearheaded by a select group of men armed with automatic rifles 
and other firearms, followed by a large group of warriors (impis) covered with 
muthi and armed with traditional weapons, among the dead were six women and a 
baby. The prime target, ANC leader Khipha Nyawose, was shot dead and his 
body, as were many other bodies, [was] severely mutilated: his stomach was slit 
open and his genitals completely severed, to be used for muthi.83  
 
From the 1980s to the 1990s, at the time of the unrest, the use of muthi, witchcraft and 
magic was so prevalent and regarded as so dangerous by Zulu communities that Radio 
Zulu played radio dramas meant to conscientise people. This was especially so in 1987, 
when the political violence had just started. In KwaShange, Thabethe was given the alias 
83See http://www. Specialoperations.com/Foreign/South_Africa/Special_task_force. Website accessed 14 
March 2011. Engelbrecht, Assistance: National Investigation Task Unit, Natal South: Shobashobane 
Massacre at Zingolweni, 1. Interview with mama Nyawose, the late Kipha’s mother, and his sister, 




                                                 
‘Makhekhe’, after one of the characters of the drama, because he was alleged to have 
been seen performing the magic and killing his opponents to gain power as an Inkatha 
warlord.84  
 
Generally, people who lived in areas affected by the 1980s and 1990s violence were most 
susceptible to fear of the mysterious or unknown. Interviewees indicated that they had 
become used to ‘normal’ war, where two groups, Inkatha and UDF were fighting. 
However, they were completely subjugated by the abnormal or supernatural, where 
‘strange things happened’. They believed in the effects of rituals and ‘medicines’. 
Izinyanga (war-doctors) were aware that, despite the intrinsic potency they might have, 
they had an immensely powerful psychological effect on the warriors doctored for war 
and were therefore of value in conditioning them for victory. The more powerful one’s 
own medicine was believed to be, the greater the confidence of defeating the enemy. This 
belief in invincibility through ‘supernatural’ means and protection, coupled with their 
discipline and tactics, worked wonders when the KwaShange ANC warriors met their 
enemies on what were otherwise approximately equal terms. Occasionally the use of 
muthi had disastrous results, for example when they charged opponents armed with 
firearms, in the belief that their doctored shields were impenetrable to bullets. 
When talking to me, some interviewees indicated that certain leaders used supernatural 
muthi which had a lot of magic. They believe that the kind of muthi used was acquired 
outside South Africa. Some people in KwaShange believed that Inkatha leaders got their 
Muthi from Mozambique. For instance, iBhlamani Dlamini (see profiles in Chapter Five) 
84Commenting on the subject, Liz Gunner stated that: “The fear was so severe that Radio Zulu, now called 
Ukhozi FM, aired a radio drama that dealt with the subject. This is the seam of anxiety and ambiguity 
relating to power, the anxieties and stresses of modern life, and the space of the occult that the writer - both 
novelist and radio playwriter- the late Morris Bhengu, exploited so skillfully in his radio drama, Yiz’Uvalo 
and its sequel Unqob’Isibindi (In Spite of Fear, and Courage Wins Through). The linked Radio Zulu 
dramas ran for approximately six months in the mid-1980s on Radio Zulu, a section of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). A twenty-minute segment of the drama played regularly every weekday 
with a repeat in the evenings for those who had missed it through being at work. Bhengu used a skilful 
combination of melodrama, elements of esoteric knowledge, a strong plot-line and a range of auditory 
effects on radio, plus a powerful cast whose voices were already familiar to listeners. The drama was on the 
air from December 1986 to May 1987. See Liz Gunner, “Wrestling with the Present, Beckoning to the Past: 





                                                 
was one of the most feared leaders of Inkatha in the area because of his cruelty. He killed 
many people in the area of KwaShange, even before the political violence started in 1986 
between Inkatha and the UDF. Many people who were known to have resisted taking 
Inkatha membership, and who were opposed to the idea of making every community 
person a member of Inkatha, feared him.  
Discussing his fate, Bhekimpi Mbanjwa said: 
It was on a Friday, September 1987; I had just come into the area on the 5 pm bus. 
I saw iBhlamani across UMsunduzi River. He was herding his cattle. I was so 
terrified because I had never expected to see him there. I felt dizzy … in less than 
a minute he was right in front of me. His cattle were where he had been on the 
other side of the river. This is where he stabbed me [showing his big scar], luckily 
a group of young men, my neighbours who were just passing by, noticed and they 
came to assist me – I managed to escape.85   
A group of five interviewees described a similar occurrence: 
 It was on a Saturday morning before 6 am in 1987- after chief Shayabantu had 
attacked and killed people in KwaShange – we saw his car, a Ford Cortina, going 
through KwaShange to induna Guvaza Khanyile’s homestead. We ambushed the 
chief, having all kind of ammunition you can think of. Our intention was to kill 
him. We hid under the bridge. We saw his car come from a distance: he was 
driving very fast but when he was just about to pass the bridge, we all fell asleep. 
When we woke up, the car had already passed.86 
Thulebona Zuma says: 
In 1990, after the Seven Days War, when many people were still in refugee camps 
in Edendale, because we had a lot of time doing nothing at home [as young men] 
we were hurting that David Ntombela and his people are having a nice time [at 
85Interview with Bhekithemba Mbanjwa, KwaShange, 12 October 2010. 




                                                 
Elandskop] whilst our people were struggling in refugee camps. We decided to 
attack him, in revenge for what he and his people had done. We left here on 
Friday night, we had invited some uMkhonto We Sizwe soldiers to come and 
assist us to ‘finish’ with Ntombela. We went there … when we were just about to 
arrive at Ntombela’s homestead, strong mist came from nowhere … we got 
mystified, we couldn’t see [Ntombela’s homestead] any more but instead we saw 
a big dam where David Ntombela’s homestead was. We began quarrelling 
amongst ourselves and we almost killed each other on our way back.87 
Muthi murder is only one component of this belief system, which underpins other 
magical phenomena, such as the appearance of tokoloshe and mythical dinosaur-like 
creatures, the power magically to transform a human being into an apple, or a homestead 
into a dam and gun bullets into grapes.88  
My informants in KwaShange testified to the powerful and continuing belief of Zulu 
people in the effects of muthi and the power of those using it. They also offered insights 
into how these beliefs could weaken rival parties.  
8.5.2 Thirst for human blood:89 the mutilation controversy 
 
On 10 February 1991, an attack by Inkatha on the ANC-aligned community of 
KwaShange took place. The attack became known as the ambush of Inkatha. 
MaMthimkhulu Khanyile was awakened in her house at Mpumuza, near Sweetwaters in 
the Midlands, by a distraught Manzini Zungu, who had just escaped the attack at 
KwaShange. MaMthimkhulu and other neighbours who had relatives in the convoy 
87Interview with Thulebona Zuma, KwaShange, 12 October 2010. 
88Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 14 March 2009. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 
14 March 2009. Interview with a group of ten Inkatha members, Mpumuza, 17 February 2010. Interview 
with MaZamisa Shange, KwaShange, 11 June 2010. See also Joan Comaroff and John, “Alien Nation: 
Zombies, Immigrants and Millennial Capitalism”, The South Atlantic Quarterly 101: 4 (2002), 779-804; 
Joan Comaroff and John, “Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South 
Africa”, Law and Social Inquiry (2004), 513-545.  
89MaZamisa Shange used this expression to describe what she observed in KwaShange Youth. She said 




                                                 
immediately gathered together and set out to the scene of the disaster in KwaShange.90 
Her description of what she saw there provides a vivid insight into the aftermath of the 
‘KwaShange ambush’: 
 
As we approached the area a fearful and horrible sight presented itself, and the 
stillness of the spot was awful; there were our men lying all about the place, some 
naked and some only half clad. On the opposite side of the road I need not attempt 
to describe to you what I saw; all the bodies were full of spear wounds and nearly 
all of them were disembowelled […] I did not see not even one body that was not 
mutilated.91 
 
The accounts of MaMthimkhulu and other survivors of the KwaShange ambush mirror 
the sense of shock that KwaShange survivors of the incident felt upon their return to their 
homes, after hiding in river banks and valleys. “We saw the dead bodies of men strewed 
about on every side, and horribly mutilated …”. “Our children mutilated them and 
pierced them with spears all over their bodies” observed MaZamisa, while Madlala noted 
that “Every man who was killed or wounded was ripped up, and his bowels torn out.” To 
suffer a sudden, unexpected and astonishing catastrophe was bad enough, but the 
treatment of the dead understandably angered those who witnessed it. “It was enough to 
make your blood boil,”92 commented one (anonymous) man. “To see men cut open, the 
worst ever was done in the violence in the Midlands”, said a retired policeman who was 
called just after the ambush. The sense of horror provoked by the sight of men killed by 
the ANC followers still lingers today. Vulindlela Inkatha supporters discuss the subject, 
offering bizarre explanations, which hint at witchcraft practices and even cannibalism. 
 
In fact there should be little obscurity surrounding the reasons why the KwaShange ANC 
members treated the IFP dead in such a manner, as there is a good deal of contemporary 
evidence from local traditional healers’ sources, both with regard to the practices 
themselves, and with specific reference to this clash between Inkatha and the ANC. The 
90Interview with MaMthimkhulu Khanyile and Manzini Zung, KwaMpumuza, 13 October, 2010. 
91Interview with MaMthimkhulu Khanyile, KwaMpumuza, 13 October 2010. 




                                                 
warriors of both Inkatha and the ANC repeatedly stabbed, disembowelled and mutilated 
the bodies of the rival party’s men killed in action. They were in pursuit of three distinct 
post-combat rituals, all of which reflected the extent to which death in combat was 
regarded as an important part of interaction with the spirit world.93 
 
The dead of both sides often bore multiple stab wounds and this was a feature common to 
the descriptions of all the informants. In the fierce frenzy of action, it is likely that many 
enemies were stabbed more than once before they fell; despite the Zulu warrior’s famed 
expertise with their stabbing weapons, it was probably impossible to dispatch an enemy 
with a single clean thrust every time, especially if he was parrying with his own weapons. 
Given the large wounds made by the blades of the stabbing spears and the bullets, the act 
of inflicting death itself was likely to be messy.94 Nevertheless, bodies were deliberately 
stabbed again after death in a practice known as ukuhlabana or ukuhlomula.95 
Commenting about the practice of ukuhlabana, Knight says that mercy to a fallen enemy 
had less to do with delivering the final and fatal blow than a desire on the part of warriors 
to mark their role in the kill.96  
 
Members of the ANC and Inkatha all came from communal and traditionalist mind-sets, 
which were reinforced by complex pre-battle rituals, intended to bind the army together 
as a whole.97In action, therefore, those men who had been involved in the fighting, but 
had not actually killed an enemy, were entitled to some part of the ‘glory’ attached to the 
victory. In particular, the old practice of ukuhlabana had evolved in the hunt; after 
cornering and dispatching a particularly dangerous animal, the act of participation was 
93Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange, 19 March 2009. Interview with Chris Hlengwa, KwaShange, 
19 March 2009.  See also Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: 
Pen & Sword Classic, 2006), 100.  
94Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 19 March 2010. Knight, Brave Men’s Blood stated the same 
about the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. 
95Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 19 March 2010. Interview with Nunu Mchunu, KwaShange 
20 October 2010. 
96Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sword Classic, 
2006), 100. 
97For the Inkatha see A. T.  Bryant, The Zulu People As They were Before the White Man Came 
(Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter, 1949), 469, 476 and 478; H. L. Samuelson, Zululand: Its Traditions, 
Legends, Customs and Folk-lore (Natal: Marianhill Mission Press, n.d., 138; R.C.A. Samuelson, Long, 
Long Ago (Durban: Knox, 1929), 399-402. See also Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and 




                                                 
recognised when the men each came up and stabbed the dead beast.98 While the man who 
had actually killed it was allowed his particular share of the glory, ukuhlabana, or the 
stabbing the corpse after it was dead, reflected the participation of the other members of 
the hunt.99 
 
The same rule applied in warfare, particularly when fighting an enemy who had stood his 
ground bravely, and had therefore been a dangerous opponent. Mancinza Zondi, an ANC 
warrior that fought against Inkatha during the KwaShange ‘ambush’, explained: 
 
Indeed we stabbed our opponents even those who had already been stabbed and 
lying down. This is called abahlabana; then again those abahlabana became 
more numerous by reason of the fact that we had been fighting such formidable 
opponents. This custom was observed here [KwaShange] because it was 
recognised that fighting against such fearsome enemies and killing some of them 
was of the same high grade as lion-hunting, because Inkatha had SAP support, 
and they were known to be using strong muthi supplied by Manqele.100 
 
In regard to the second ritual, namely the custom of disembowelling a fallen enemy, 
termed ukuqaqa, this was directly related to the traditional Zulu view of the spiritual 
realm and its relationship with the world of the living. Prior to embarking on a campaign, 
the warriors were prepared for war in a complex set of rituals which set them aside from 
civilian life,101 and protected them against the harmful effects of isinyama – or literally 
‘darkness,’ the harmful spiritual consequences that flowed from shedding human blood. 
They could not return to ordinary society until they had undergone parallel cleansing 
ceremonies at the end of the campaign, for fear of contaminating their families with 
98Interview with Nunu Mchunu and Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 20 October 2010. Interview with Nelson 
Zondi, Engome, 2004. 
99Interview with Nunu Mchunu and Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 20 October 2010. 
100Interview with Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 20 October 2010. 
101 Interview with Nunu Mchunu and Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 20 October 2010;  Ian Knight, Brave 
Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sword Classic, 2006), 100; Jeff Guy, 
The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-




                                                 
isinyama.102 As part of the cleansing rituals, it was necessary that certain practices be 
observed with regard to the bodies of men who had been killed in battle. Specifically, it 
was necessary for a warrior to remove part of the clothing of a man he had killed and to 
wear it until he had undergone the necessary cleansing ceremonies. This practice was 
known as ukuzila – abstention from every-day life while in a dangerous state of spiritual 
pollution.103 Men who had killed in battle, but who had not yet been cleansed, were 
known as izinxeleha. Those who had particularly distinguished themselves by their tally 
in battle were said to be “wet with yesterday’s blood.”  As part of these observances, it 
was also necessary to slit open the stomach of the enemy.104 In the hot sun, any corpse 
begins to decompose quickly, and the gases given off by the early stages of decay cause 
the stomach to swell. In Zulu belief, this was the soul of the dead warrior, trying to 
escape to the after-life. The man who killed him was obliged to open the stomach, to 
allow the spirit to escape. If he did not, he would be haunted by the ghost of his victim, 
who would inflict various horrors upon him, including causing his own stomach to swell, 
until eventually the killer went mad. To allow the spirit free passage, a cut was made 
vertically down the stomach, from sternum to groin.105  
 
Ngubane, the present-day traditional healer of KwaShange, suggested that, as part of the 
ritual, it was necessary for the killer to run the blade of his spear along his own tongue, 
touching the blood. The purpose of this remains obscure, but probably has to do with the 
killer gaining supernatural ascendancy over his enemy by ritually ‘eating’ his spirit; it is 
perhaps no coincidence that the warriors cry of exultation is “ngadla” (I have eaten!).The 
fact that both practices were followed in Vulindlela and elsewhere in Natal and KwaZulu 
102Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sward Classic, 
2006), 100; Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), 229. 
103 Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sward Classic, 
2006), 100; Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005), This was also confirmed by Nunu Mchunu and Manciza Zondi. 
104 Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sward Classic, 
2006), 100; Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo Uprising: War, Law and Ritual in the Zulu Rebellion (Scottsville: 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005). 
105 Interview with Ngubane, KwaShange, 21 October 2010. See also Ian Knight, Brave Men’s Blood: The 
Epic of the Zulu War 1879 (South Africa: Pen & Sward Classic, 2006), 100; Jeff Guy, The Maphumulo 





                                                 
is verified by not only survivors of both ANC and IFP factions as to their observations of 
the mutilated corpses, but by traditional healer’ accounts. Mzila, an inyanga and 
descendant of Bhambatha Zondi’s war-doctors, said: It is the custom for one man killing 
another to take off the deceased’s things and put them on, even the penis cover. He 
mourns with them by so doing … If he has killed two or more he will take articles from 
each and put them on. He will not put on his own things until the doctor has treated him 
and given him medicines … to cleanse him from contagion or war killing” We took the 
ANC things at Vulisaka; they were all stripped. This was done to mourn them.106 
 
Mancinza Zondi, a respondent in a court case of the KwaShange ‘ambush’ incident, 
testifying at the Pietermaritzburg magistrate’s court, was also present at a number of 
other battles between Inkatha and ANC. He made several references to stripping and 
disembowelling the dead in a long and comprehensive account of the war, which was 
recorded when he was brought before a magistrate in September 1990. He said: 
 
As a rule we took off the upper garments, but left the trousers, but if we saw 
blood upon the garments we did not bother … All the dead bodies were cut open, 
because if that had not been done we would have become swollen ourselves like 
the dead bodies […] I heard that some bodies were otherwise mutilated.107 
 
It is not clear whether the disembowelling was always carried out in the immediate 
aftermath of the victim’s death, or later, once the full fury of the fighting had passed. 
Certainly, at least some bodies were disembowelled immediately after death. Manzini 
Zungu from KwaMpumuza survived the KwaShange ambush, and had glimpsed terrible 





106Interview with Mzila, Engome, 24 September 2004. 




                                                 
8.6 Details and rules of the normal practices of ‘doctoring’   
Interviewees from both the ANC and IFP disclosed that they never went to war without 
being specially strengthened by the war-doctors of their respective communities, a 
process which took a few days, and which was begun as soon as all the warriors had 
arrived at the secret gathering place.108The process was carried out to ‘bring together the 
hearts of the people’ and a ritual was performed entailing the sprinkling of troops with 
liquids with magical properties, the ritual of the bare-handed killing of a bull, and the 
disposal of the carcass in prescribed ways, and the cleansing of the individual warriors by 
inducing communal vomiting through the use of emetics and ablutions. 
In battle it was often preferred that the victim remain alive during disembowelment. 
When body parts, including internal organs, were removed while the victim was still 
alive it was believed that the power of the resultant medicine would be enhanced. 
Harvested body parts are usually mixed with other medicinal plant matter or cooked. The 
product is sometimes eaten, but may also be carried by the person who aims to benefit 
from its power. The use of human body matter in the production of traditional medicine 
does not always involve killing; for instance a living person’s nail clippings or hair 
cuttings may secretly be collected – or already dead bodies may be exhumed and used for 
muthi purposes. 
Details of the normal practices of ‘doctoring’ are basically comprised of three aspects: 
the ‘doctoring’ and protection of the individuals in a war zone, the ‘doctoring’ or 
strengthening of an army or impi and, lastly, the cleansing ceremonies after a battle. No 
warrior would go to war unless he had first taken some muthi for protection. He would go 
to the place where muthi was kept, usually in a war-doctor’s homestead, to fortify 
himself. Warriors also had to abstain from sexual intercourse. 
108During political violence warriors usually met at secret places, where nobody knew where they were 
except other warriors; this was mainly because when police came they usually asked children where older 
people were. In most cases, children would disclose the hidden information without suspecting anything. 
This was the main reason why warriors had to hide  The rituals were normally performed at night, in some 





                                                 
Anybody who was injured or had a wound was not allowed to take part in certain rituals 
or use certain kinds of muthi. This was one of the main reasons why women were not 
allowed to be near the area where muthi rituals were being practised, let alone taking part 
in them. Interviewees stated that women have a ‘natural wound’ - they are born with it 
[the vagina] and this disqualifies them from partaking. They are also believed to be 
‘weak’; they cannot keep secrets to themselves. When cornered by rivals, they could 
easily tell the enemy what muthi the warriors used. Discussing the kind of muthi used 
with ‘outsiders’ was dangerous, because if rivals knew, they could apply the same muthi 
or find muthi specifically to counter this muthi.  
8.7 Prominent war-doctors of Vulindlela 
Some war-doctors took advantage of the times and, regardless of where they were 
located, opportunistically assisted groups that promised to pay more. Sometimes an 
inyanga might have been situated in an Inkatha area, but secretly gave muthi to 
strengthen ANC warriors, and vice versa; it all depended on money.  
Although the violence was obviously traumatic to many people, some benefitted 
financially. This is what some authors defined as occult economies: ‘the deployment, real 
or imagined of magical means for material ends’.109 They detail what we know, from 
historical and anthropological accounts, about the occult in Africa, which is not a form of 
primitive magicality or “animism”; it embodies a set of ‘normative convictions about 
moral order, social value and material equity’; it provides a ‘matter of fact repertoire of 
“first cause” explanations in the face of human misfortune or natural catastrophe’; it 
suggests a set of practical techniques that can be deployed by those with the necessary 
power and knowledge to do so.110 
 
109Joan Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from 
South African Postcolony.” American Ethnologist 26:2 (1998), 279-303. 
110Joan Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, “Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from 




                                                 
Inkatha had a number of war-doctors they trusted. These included Manqele, Jamile in 
Durban and Mchunu, who lived in the neighbouring KwaMpande area. They also 
consulted with Mbanjwa in Richmond, in the ePhatheni area. Khangela Zondi in 
Mvundlweni was a brutal war-doctor who wore a heavy coat in winter and in summer. 
My informants claimed that every day in Mvundlweni, Inkatha people used to jump 
through huge flames of fire.111 This had an intimidatary effect on KwaShange people, 
because Inkatha people jumped through fire during daylight, to make sure that 
KwaShange people could see them.  
Other war-doctors’ names mentioned in KwaShange were Gabuza, a well-known war-
doctor who was also an expert on lightning and rain doctoring, and Mchunu who was the 
most feared war-doctor in Vulindlela. His son, Senzo, was a supporter of the UDF. In 
1987, when Inkatha attacked all UDF supporters in Vulindlela, Senzo, like many other 
UDF youth supporters, sought refuge in Edendale. After almost a year he went home at 
night to visit his parents; some Inkatha people saw him. Inkatha attacked and killed him 
the following morning. This action of Inkatha angered Mchunu, the war-doctor. He 
secretly approached the UDF in KwaShange, with the aim of avenging his son. He told 
the KwaShange people what kind of muthi Inkatha was using at that particular time and 
he gave them (KwaShange ANC) the same muthi.112  
8.8 Body parts used for muthi 
One informant that participated in the ritual said: 
 
We did it [ritual murder]. It had to be done; otherwise we were not going to win. 
We were going to be finished [by the enemies]. […] we captured one of them; we 
were instructed [by the war-doctor] that we should not injure the person because 
muthi does not work if the person is already dead. We took him to a stream. We 
111Interview with group of 12 men, KwaShange 14 May 2010. 
112This was the worst thing that was done to Inkatha. One of the reasons why muthi that was used was not 
disclosed was because it was dangerous. If your enemies knew the muthi you were using, they get the same 




                                                 
cut his genitals, left eye, left hand and when he was dead we cut open his 
abdomen and removed the liver and heart. 
My informant, Mthandeni Dlamini, in KwaShange, speaking of the killing of his son in 
1989:  
 
My son (15 years old), Thulani’s severed head, arms, legs and genitals were found 
in a forest, neatly packed separately, in black plastic rubbish bags. It was 
obviously muthi murder. We suspect that Inkatha killed him with the purpose of 
using his body parts for muthi purposes. This was common here […].113  
A person whose body parts were selected to be used for muthi was not supposed to have 
any scar on his body and he was not supposed to be injured. The body parts had to be 
removed while the person was still alive, so that those who took the body parts would be 
active and more powerful. When the person cried whilst they cut the body parts, the 
sounds would ‘be heard’ by the community he belonged to and that would make them 
lose the battle. They preferred to obtain body parts from the man who was leading the 
warriors but, because of the nature of violence, they usually did not know who the leader 
was, so they ended up mercilessly cutting anybody’s body parts.114  
They remove their masculinity, that is, their testes and penis. If they remove an enemy’s 
masculinity, the rival group the deceased man belonged to would be disempowered by 
the muthi mixed with his penis and testis. When the testis is mixed with muthi, the rival 
impi would all drink the muthi and call the name of the enemy camp and say negative 
things about them, just to weaken them. Each person would be expected to roar like a lion 
and proclaim ‘ngahlabana’. Everybody who has taken part in this ritual would be 
expected to stab an enemy, even if he was already lying down injured or dead.115  
113Interview with Mthandeni Dlamini, KwaShange, 15 November 2009. 
114Interview with Ngubane (traditional healer), KwaShange, 14 May 2010. Interview with Mdunge 
(traditional healer), KwaMpande, 15 May 2010. Interview with Ndlala (traditional healer), Northern 
Zululand, 15 June 2010. 
115Interview with Ngubane (traditional healer), KwaShange, 14 May 2010. Interview with Mdunge 
(traditional healer), KwaMpande, 15 May 2010. Interview with Ndlala (traditional healer), Northern 




                                                 
The left hand had to be removed and was used to stir muthi and sprinkle warriors with 
muthi. They used the skull to sit on. While the battle was in progress, someone prominent 
in the community would sit on the skull until the battle was finished, because standing up 
would be detrimental to his group and they would be defeated by the enemy.  
They also removed the eyes of the enemies, because they believed the eyes could be 
mixed with muthi called nkungwini that would cause the enemies not to see them, but 
rather see mist or a dam, or anything else. The eyes would be mixed with certain muthi 
that would confuse the attackers and they would end up fighting themselves. Inkatha was 
known to be strong on this muthi. Ntombela had been attacked several times, but his 
assailants, the UDF supporters, could not win because of the muthi. He drove confidently 
and alone in Edendale, without bodyguards.116 Inkatha was known to have a powerful 
medicine, Babengadubuleki (a charm against gun bullets). Even if you tried to stab such 
people with a spear, it would not work.117   
The liver and heart were mixed with certain unnamed substance, and the combatants had 
to drink this mixture. This was aimed at making them brave and vicious when faced by 
the enemy.  
 
8.9 Taboo and unwritten cultural ethics 
 
Despite the diversity of existing traditions, stories and memories, the topic of muthi and 
magic is still taboo in Zulu society. The dramas played on Radio Zulu mentioned earlier 
in this chapter attempted to break this taboo. They enabled the exploration of issues of 
power and violence in a way that was both public and intensely private. The airing of a 
topic as feared, as secret and yet as pervasively present–or potentially so-as witchcraft, 
was opened up for debate, even though there was often official silence. As an insider to 
Zulu culture, I am aware that by trying to understand more deeply the details of the 
subject, I am breaking an unwritten ‘law’, an issue of cultural ethics. 
116Interview with Fanozi Ndlovu, Edendale, 17 May 2010. Interview with a group of 12 men, KwaShange, 
14 May 2010. Interview with Moses Ndlovu, KwaShange, 18 August 2005. 




                                                 
 
All my interviewees were reluctant to talk about the use of muthi. Everyone I 
interviewed, especially those who participated in violent activities, was reluctant to talk 
about their use of muthi. People were most reluctant to talk about cases of actual 
cannibalism on the part of warriors. Yet I did my best to reassure interviewees, saying 
Lokhu kuphakathi kwami nawe (this is between you and me). Informants would say, 
Ungayithikuxu (do not tell anyone), Ufunelani ukwazi, uzokwenzani uma usuwazi (Why 
do you want to know, what are you going to do with this?) Others would say 
Ngizokutshela kodwa uma usungithutha ngiyothi angazani, angikutshelanga (I am going 
to tell you, but when you discuss this with other people, I will deny it and say I do not 
know, I never discussed this thing with you); Akukhulunywa ngo muthi (you do not tell 
anyone about muthi you used).  
 
It is for this reason that I have preserved the anonymity of my informants on this matter. 
The primary reason for these informants’ fears may be the sensitivity of the subject, 
because war muthi involves human body parts. People are scared to talk about it because 
further questions may be asked, such as, did you personally take part in the ritual? If the 
victim had to be alive during the process, does this not constitute murder? The SAPS 
have dossiers and the reports of pathologists who had to stitch up victims before burial – 
but these records are not accessible, even to researchers.118 If a man is arrested and there 
is evidence against him, he goes on trial, but it is believed that he can use muthi to escape 
the consequences. In KwaShange, community members believe that the reason why 
David Ntombela and many Inkatha leaders, known to have committed violent crimes, 
were not sentenced is because they had strong muthi.  
 
 
118Daily Dispatch, “Police Tell of Muthi Murder”, October 30; see also Joan Comaroff and John, “Policing 
Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South Africa”, Law and Social Inquiry, 
2004, 513-545. In 2008 I was denied access to records of muthi murders and suspected cannibalism by the 




                                                 
The warriors who participated in this ritual and families of people whose body parts were 
removed are still psychologically affected. They believe that even now, after the war, 
they carry the stigma associated with this ritual and that it affects them everyday. After 
the battle, or when the violence came to an end, it was important to conduct cleansing 





















POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD)1 AND RITUAL 
CLEANSING2 
 
After the gradual subsidence of the violence, in the climate of exhaustion within the 
KwaShange community, and the general will to leave behind what was increasingly seen 
as destructive madness, it will be understood that there was a great need for reconciliation 
between opponents and reintegration within the community. 
9.1 Background 
During the political violence, male children as young as 14 were trained in their 
communities to fight and defend their families. They eventually participated in killings 
and in rituals associated with war. These men, then adolescents, who earned respect for 
their heroism in the 1980s, are now regarded as villains and are ostracized by their 
communities. Political violence undermines individuals’ sense of belonging to society. 
The memories of such violence suggest to ordinary people how others value or devalue 
them as human beings.3  Williams suggests that a society under stress, in violent conflict, 
will have higher rates of depression, anxiety, panic and violence. If, as is often the case in 
war-torn societies, the conflict has continued, or has broken out sporadically, for years, 
violent behaviour may eventually become accepted, and may be common to large 
portions of the population, and thus may be considered a cultural phenomenon.4 Adam 
Curle, notes regarding societies torn by civil conflict, states that “alienation tends to 
escalate into post-traumatic stress syndrome. Violence generally continues to exist within 
1The PTSD approach was developed out of attempts to understand the problems faced by the American 
soldiers who fought in Vietnam. In this regard it was conceived as an instrument to deal with psychological 
distress in people who went from a situation of relative ‘normality’ into a traumatic experience (the war), 
and then returned to ‘normality’ - hence the prefix ‘post’.  
2This concept derives from research into home ritual cleansing rites.  
3D. Becker, “Dealing with the Consequences of Organized Violence”, Handbook for Conflict 
Transformation (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001). 
4L. M. Williams, “Adult Survivors of Childhood Abuse: Preliminary Findings from a Longitudinal Study”, 
The Advisor 5 (1992), 19–20. 
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the social fabric of societies coming out of conflict for decades or even centuries after the 
war”.5  
This chapter results from the findings of my research, and especially from what I have 
recorded in Chapter Seven, concerning the political violence in KwaShange, which left 
many people, young men in particular, ‘damaged in their spirits’.6 My research in 
KwaShange in 2008 – 2010, especially with those who were child warriors, and readings 
of the testimonies published in Truth and Reconciliation Reports, show that young people 
have ‘emotional scars’. As I have stated in previous chapters, political attacks in 
KwaShange started in 1986 and continued until 1996. During these conflicts (lasting 
more than 10 years in Vulindlela) many young males were drawn into armed conflict as 
active combatants. Discussion of later processes of healing the psychological wounds of 
war of these former child warriors constitutes the aim of this chapter.  
The present study emphasizes the importance of cultural understanding and healing, 
mental distress and trauma; these lead to the ways people express their affliction. 
Biomedical psychotherapeutic notions of mental distress and trauma constitute ‘Western’ 
social and cultural constructs, which may often be ineffective in contexts where cultural 
beliefs and world views are different.7 The biomedical approach to war trauma should 
thus be regarded as only one of several ways of dealing with post-war healing, since there 
are other ways of understanding health and healing in post-conflict situations, which are 
culturally prescribed and favoured by the victims and communities themselves. 
 
9.2 Introduction  
Violence consequent upon any civil war may result in trauma amongst those who 
experienced it. Trauma is a world-wide phenomenon, but little research has been done on 
5Adam Curle, Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Violence (Oxford: Jon Carpenter 
Publishing, 1995). 
6Words of an elderly woman in KwaShange who preferred to remain anonymous.  
7Alcinda Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique”, in Accord 
no.3. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
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how it presents itself in different cultures.8 Remedies for trauma are often culturally 
specific and imported remedies may be ineffective in South African communities in 
damaged by violence. This chapter explores the ways in which the rural, Zulu-speaking 
people of KwaShange interpret traumatic effects and trace them to cultural thinking as 
regards causes. I will explain how the people have reacted to trauma over time.  
 
Interviews conducted in KwaShange will be used to understand trauma from a non-
clinical perspective, informed by an African cultural belief system. In Vulindlela, trauma 
is conceptualized as ukuhlukumezeka. This implies a disruption between the supernatural 
and natural domains of life. This disruption appears in anthropological literature as 
stigma or contagion, which is believed to make people vulnerable to traumatic events 
such as political violence, poverty, unemployment and HIV/AIDS. Such traumas are 
understood to rupture social relations. For many KwaShange Zulus, trauma, rather than 
being an individual condition, is seen as a general consequence of a disruption in the 
balance between the supernatural and natural/social worlds.9 The discourse of trauma is 
central to social functioning and it is possible to understand mental health as a socio-
cultural construct.10 In terms of this view, to ensure efficacy, an approach to healing 
should include therapeutic strategies which draw on the appropriate world views. In this 
chapter I shall investigate the history of interventions premised on traditional Zulu 
healing practices to ensure culturally effective interventions.11 Historically, trauma 
interventions within the Zulu context took into account local understanding, as well as the 
indigenous capacity for dealing with ‘social scars’.12 Have these interventions evolved 
over time or have they remained the same? These are some of the questions that this 
chapter will attempt to answer.  
8Alcinda Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique”, in Accord no.3. 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
9See also Siyanda Ndlovu, “Trauma, Identity and Culture among Rural IsiZulu Speakers,” unpublished 
paper presented at Critical Method Nine (SA, ICC: Durban 2004). 
10L. A. Barnett, “Critique, Culture and the Cough: Examining Conceptualisation of Healing”, unpublished 
paper presented at Critical Method Nine (SA, ICC: Durban 2004). 
11See Julie Parle, States of Mind: Searching for Mental Health in Natal and Zululand, 1868-1918. 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007). 
12Alcinda Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique”, in Accord 
no.3. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
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Although research has been conducted in the area of trauma amongst victims of violent 
crime in South Africa,13 little attention has been paid to the way in which individuals 
construct and theorise their traumatic experiences and the impact that these explanations 
have on the healing process. This chapter will investigate the traditional understanding, as 
it prevails in KwaShange, of the traumatic violence of the past and how this impacts on 
the individual’s socio-cultural view of reality. The first part of my discussion will 
examine the social and cultural interpretations of war trauma by deconstructing the 
universality of a concept such as PTSD, commonly applied to populations affected by 
conflict and political violence. The second part looks at local understandings of trauma 
healing in KwaShange by means of case studies. I conclude by analysing critically the 
‘Reconciliation and Cleansing Ceremony’ in Vulindlela that took place in November 
2010. 
 
The methods of ritual cleansing after battles employed in traditional Zulu society are not 
unique, but are mirrored elsewhere in traditional societies in Africa, Asia and Australia.14 
The debate in South Africa, however, will be whether these methods of dealing with 
trauma can be relied upon or whether contemporary western-style trauma counselling 
should be preferred to traditional Zulu ways of dealing with PTSD. An important 
proportion of the country’s population is rural and still wedded to traditional culture. 
Even when they reside and work in urban areas, the same appears to be true. Traditional 
counselling methods have major advantages in comparison to other types, in that the 
individuals being treated have confidence in the processes, which are informal and less 
intimidating, allowing patients to be more at ease and less uncomfortable and alienated. 
9.3 Beyond Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder  
Dominant Western psycho-therapeutic models are often seen as universal and applicable 
everywhere. However, this assumption has been challenged, as Western psychology is 
13Vaughn John, “Natal’s War: Monitoring Internal Refugees and Assessing their Distress”, Unpublished 
Report (Centre for Adult Education, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1990). See also Philippe Denis, 
Radikobo Ntsimane and Tom Cannell eds., Indians vs Russians: An Oral History of Political Violence in 
Nxamalala 1987-1993 (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publishers, 2011). 
14Alcida Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique,” in Accord no.3 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 1997); 
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also a culturally constructed system. Modern psychology locates the causes of psycho-
social distress within the individual and devises responses which are primarily based on 
individual therapy.15 Recovery is achieved through helping the individual ‘come to terms' 
with the traumatic experience and healing takes place in private sessions aimed at 
‘talking out’ and externalising feelings. War-related PTSD was recognised in the 1980s 
in the United States and was based on research carried out with veterans of the Vietnam 
War.  
The situation may be different in other socio-cultural contexts. Boyden and Gibbs have 
shown that in Cambodia, individual therapy conducted by modern psychotherapists can 
be ineffective because it does not account for the part that ancestral spirits and other 
spiritual forces play in the causation and healing processes.16 By focusing exclusively on 
the individual, family and community efforts to provide support and care are undermined. 
Studies on healing war trauma in Mozambique have shown that recalling the traumatic 
experience through verbal externalisation as a means to healing is not always effective.17 
In many instances, people would rather not talk about the past and prefer to start afresh 
after certain ritual procedures, which do not necessarily involve verbal expression, have 
been performed.  
What happens in KwaShange, however, and in other parts affected by political violence 
in the Natal Midlands, is that the vast majority of young men I interviewed for this study 
were born during the political violence and are between 23 and 26 years old. There is also 
a sizeable group of those who were ‘heroes’ in the Vulindlela conflict. For these young 
men, trauma is not ‘post’, but rather ‘current’, and part of their everyday life.18 Most of 
the population of KwaShange is still living with the ongoing aftermath of violent and 
15J. Boyden and Gibbs, “Children and War: Understanding Psychological Distress in Cambodia” (Geneva: 
United Nations, 1997).  
16J. Boyden and Gibbs, “Children and War: Understanding Psychological Distress in Cambodia” (Geneva: 
UN, 1997). 
17Alcida Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique,” in Accord no.3 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 1997); See also Alex Vines, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique. 
(London: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York and Indiana University Press, 1991). 
18Carolyn Nordstrom, A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1997). Carolyn Nordstrom researched war and violence in Mozambique. She emphasizes the point that 
violence in Mozambique continued well beyond military attacks, landmines and direct war situations and 
she touched on the backlash of poverty, hunger and displacement. 
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traumatic circumstances. There is a need to adapt biomedical models to the concrete 
situations these people experience in day-to-day living.  
9.4 War trauma and the spirits of the dead  
In Zulu culture there are particular ways of understanding war trauma. People believe that 
war-related psychological trauma is directly linked with the anger of the spirits of those 
killed during the war. These spirits are called imimoya emibi (spirits of those who did not 
have a proper burial to place them in their proper positions in the world of the ancestors). 
Such people are believed to be unsettled and bitter, likely to cause harm to their killers or 
to passers-by.19 In Vulindlela this is a common understanding. Many people interviewed 
mentioned that the spirits of people killed during the violence – especially those that died 
in February 1991 – had to be appeased, to ensure peace.  
Ritual pollution, known as insila, constitutes an important element in the context of post-
war healing in Zulu cultural understanding. Pollution may arise from being in contact 
with death and bloodshed. Individuals who have been in a war, who killed or saw people 
being killed, are called banequnga (polluted by the 'wrongdoings of the war). They are 
seen as the vehicles through which the spirits of the war dead might enter and afflict the 
community. These spirits may afflict not only the individual who committed the offences 
but also an entire family or group. After the war, when combatants and refugees return 
home, they are believed to be potential contaminators of the social body. The spirits of 
the dead can disrupt life in their families and villages. The cleansing process is seen as a 
fundamental condition for collective protection against pollution and for the social 
reintegration of war-affected people into society.20 In KwaShange this did not happen 
immediately after the war in which the community fought amongst themselves – 
members who had participated in the February 1991 ‘KwaShange ambush’ were regarded 
as especially polluted. Some community members attributed disasters which followed to 
lack of cleansing, but others believe that Inkatha buried their own dead with strong muthi. 
19Alcinda Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique”, in Accord 
no.3. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
20Alcida Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique,” in Accord no.3 
(London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
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I will discuss how families and communities heal the social wounds of war in the post-
war period through rituals. However, not everybody performs cleansing and purification 
rituals or rituals to appease the spirits of the dead; such practices are more common in 
rural areas, although some people might perform them in urban settings. Religious beliefs 
determine the ways in which people make decisions concerning the treatment of war 
trauma.  
Rituals performed for former adolescent soldiers are aimed at dealing with what 
happened during the violence. Acknowledgment of the atrocities committed and a 
subsequent break from that past are articulated through the performance of rituals. Some 
rituals are addressed to those who have participated in the war but did not kill; others are 
particularly directed at those who killed other people. The latter are more complex and 
require the expertise of a traditional healer.  
9.5 The traditional concept of warrior-hood 
I use the archaic word ‘warrior’, because in traditional Zulu thinking there is a complex 
of ideas surrounding it, concerning the reasons why males conform to traditional military 
roles. Some men in KwaShange claim that they did not take part in political violence 
because they wanted to destroy or kill; they claim they sought to observe traditional 
warrior values: “To protect their community from the unruly behaviour exhibited by 
Inkatha.”21 They wanted to protect community ideals, and especially their families, 
communities and each other. From interviews I had with warriors it became apparent that 
they were driven by a conviction that said that if they had to kill, they needed 
transcendent reasons to do so.22 Throughout history, the only reason for fighting that has 
survived moral scrutiny is the fear of a direct attack with real, immediate threat to one’s 
people. PTSD is, in part, the tortured conscience of good people who did their best under 
21Interview with Moses Ndlovu, Chris Hlengwa and Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 2005 and 2009. 




                                                 
conditions that would dehumanize anyone.23 Almost all cultures, past and present, have 
had warriors and have had stories and rituals to help them recover from combat and guide 
them through life. The presence of warriors is so universal that many psychologists 
understand ‘warrior’ to be one of our foundational psycho-spiritual archetypes.24 
Most conventional therapies teach healers to avoid talk of morality, but war is often 
claimed to be a moral enterprise, and veterans in search of healing are on a profound 
moral journey.25 Healers and communities must support them in the process. In 
traditional cultures or communities such as KwaShange, men and boys who participated 
in violent activities were defined as warriors. This was not the same as a professional 
soldier; they were not members of a huge, anonymous military institution used for the 
violent execution of political ends. Rather, a warrior was one of the foundational roles 
that kept a community whole and strong. Warriors were fundamentally protectors, not 
destroyers.26 
Warriors, however, were not so highly valued or nurtured in KwaShange after the 
violence, and were often not accorded social status. A veteran, especially one who in the 
process of defending the community lost his opportunity to go to school, participated in 
strengthening rituals, or smoked dagga, appears to many, and sometimes to himself, as a 
failure in terms of normal civilian identity.  
9.6 Reverberations of violence and case studies of the cleansing of 
former warriors 
Father Benedict Mbhele is a leader of the Roman Catholic Church in Vulindlela and a 
trained psychologist. He interacted with some KwaShange former warriors. He told me: 
23 Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-
just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country 
24 Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-
just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country. See also Alcida Honwana, “Negotiating Post-War 
Identities: child soldiers in Mozambique and Angola,” in G. Bond and N. Gibson eds., Contested Terrains 
and Constructed Categories: contemporary Africa in focus (New York: Westview Press, 1999). 
25 Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-
just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country 
26Interview with Mancinza Zondi, KwaShange, 12 June 2010. 
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“Guilt, shame, alienation from the community and life itself—this was the legacy 
that the 1980s-1990s political violence left to young warriors in KwaShange.”27 
Nobuhle Ndaba, a Social Worker who specializes in trauma counselling at the University 
of Natal (now the University of KwaZulu-Natal), comes from KwaShange. Her family 
was deeply affected by violence. Nobuhle Ndaba came into contact with some of 
KwaShange former warriors immediately after the violence came to an end. She says: 
Dealing with young men who were traumatized (using ‘Western’ 
psychotherapeutic techniques) because of the 1980s violence was an impossible 
mission – it just did not work. Because I come from a family that deals with 
similar kinds of issues in a cultural way, I advised families of my patients to 
consider using cultural therapeutic means – these rituals are what my family did 
to all of us at home. As a trauma counsellor, I still go back to cultural means of 
dealing with my own past issues.28 
Rather than feeling that their participation in defending their community had restored 
their families’ honour, these former warriors spent years ravaged by nightmares, 
homelessness, drug and alcohol abuse and sitting with guns at ‘the ready’29, first because 
they are wanted by relatives and friends of people they killed or because of crimes they 
committed in the area.30 
9.6.1 Thembela Khanyile’s story: an example of the impact of violence 
Thembela Khanyile was sixteen years old in 1987 when he participated in ‘defending the 
KwaShange community from Inkatha.’ He feels that, as a former warrior, he does not fit 
27Interview with Fr Benedict Mbhele, leader of the local branch of the Roman Catholic Church. Similar 
cases were noted by Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country. 
28Personal communication with Nobuhle Ndaba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2009. 
29 Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-
just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country. 
30Personal communication with ex-combatants in KwaShange. 
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into the new South Africa. The only place he belongs to is “prison or six feet 
underground.”31 
I asked him why he was active while still so young, as he could have opted not to 
participate. “I wanted to finally be accepted as one of the community respectable guys,” 
Khanyile answered. “Participating in a fight against ill-doings of Inkatha cronies in a 
righteous cause would expunge my family’s past (they were seen as newcomers, 
insignificant in KwaShange) and earn a place in the community.” He did not know that 
by becoming a young warrior he would return with isinyama nokuhlukumezeka (PTSD) 
or a stigma in Zulu thinking, feeling less than ever like “one of the respectable guys.”32 
Participating in a war or violence in a battle fields fosters stigma at home. When 
we participated in wars related to the struggle, we inevitably brought its isinyama 
stigma and horror back to our homes. We could not help it.33 
Thembela Khanyile claims he has been trying to find the will to end it all. He never 
married, but has five children with three different women. He neglects his children and 
cannot keep a job. He could not come back to his family homestead because he had never 
been cleansed.34 
War echoes down the generations. We all carry the wounds of war, known or hidden. 
Thembela was wounded by his father’s participation in the conflict and his own. He has 
been ostracized by the community and now his children, in turn, are wounded by his 
history.35 When a warrior suffers from PTSD, his entire family and community are 
inevitably affected. From interviews I had with former warriors it appears that they have 
symptoms of PTSD—sleep disturbances, substance abuse, depression and problems with 
intimacy, employment and authority. The same trauma was mentioned by interviewees in 
31Interview with Thembela Khanyile, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
32 Similar responses were noted by Edward Tick when writing about warriors of the WWII, see Edward 
Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-just-
foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country. 
33Interview with Thembela Khanyile, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
34Interview with Thembela Khanyile, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
35Edward Tick, “Heal the warrior, heal the country”, accessed from http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/a-
just-foreign-policy/heal-the-warrior-heal-the-country. Interview with Thembela Khanyile and his uncle 
Sdumo Khanyile, KwaShange, 12 June 2010. 
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other areas affected by this violence, Shobashobane, Zingolweni on the South Coast and 
Richmond, where political violence survivors and former warriors suffer similarly.  
The next sections are briefly looking at the traditional ways of ritual cleansing and 
reconciliation. 
9.6.2 Ukukhumelana Umlotha (coming to terms with each other) 
Ukukhumelana umlotha is a Zulu proverb that explains ritual cleansing and reconciliation 
of two groups or individuals that had differences or fought and had been enemies. 
Traditionally, the two parties or individuals would act under the guidance of an elderly 
woman. After formal discussions in a hut, when they reach agreement the old woman 
would take them to the ploughed field and the two groups or individuals would eat ash 
and wash each other’s hands.36 This process is called “Ukuthelelana amanzi”;37 some 
people call it ukuhlambulukelana or ihlambo (to wash each other’s hands).38 
 
Such rites are said to have been performed in instances similar to that of the 1980s and 
1990s violence in Vulindlela, in order to get rid of the invisible but depressing shadow. 
Warriors, in particular, would be freed from the nightmares resulting from the human 
blood on their hands.39  As in the case of individual cleansing, communities would, under 
the supervision of an acknowledged healer (inyanga), undergo treatment including 
izintelezi (medicinal mixture, particularly for expelling and keeping at bay certain evil 
spirits), imibhemiso (medicinal mixture for inhalation), imbiza (medicinal mixture for 
internal cleansing by vomiting and otherwise expelling unhealthy substances) and 
amakhubalo (herbal remedies recommended for healing, recovery or prevention of 
ailments and evil spirits). The blood and other parts of the beast (preferably imbuzi 
36Interview with Zenze Mkhize (traditional healer), KwaVulindlela, November 2010.  
37Zenze Mkhize, inyanga KwaVulindlela. See also Berglund Berglund, A. (1976). Zulu Thought Patterns 
and Symbolism (London: Hurst and Co. 1976). 
38See Ben Khumalo-Seegelken, KZN Civil-War/uDlame 1976-1996: Hurting and Healing Motives and 
Perspectives. http://www.benkhumalo-seegelken.de/dokumente/UkuBuyisana_2011.doc  Accessed 14 
January 2011.  
39Interview with Zenze Mkhize (traditional healer), KwaVulindlela, November 2010. See also Ben 
Khumalo-Seegelken, KZN Civil-War/uDlame 1976-1996: Hurting and Healing Motives and Perspectives. 
http://www.benkhumalo-seegelken.de/dokumente/UkuBuyisana_2011.doc  Accessed 14 January 2011. 
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emhlophe (a white goat)), that had been selected, dedicated and slaughtered under the 
eyes of the officiating inyanga, form part of the ihlambo (medicinal mixture for the 
cleansing and purifying ritual), celebrated around the fire-place in the main hut, until 
shortly before sunrise.40 Other animals, preferably izinkomo (cattle), are slaughtered and 
utshwala (beer) is brewed for the feast on the following day, in which every neighbour, 
stranger or well-wisher from afar is welcome.  
 
Ben Khumalo, a Zulu theologian based in Germany, told me: 
 
My grand- and great grand-parents, so I was told, would - till dawn - engage in 
conversation among themselves and with abaphansi (ancestors) to whom they 
spoke as if they were physically present and, by so doing, [my grandparents] 
embarked on a new basis of ‘living in community beyond the disruption their 
relations had undergone.41  
 
Ian Berglund42 discusses the Zulu traditional ritual of reconciliation. When kinsmen are 
at loggerheads, a third party is called in to mediate. He or she invites them to cool the 
heat of anger. The two disputants would be seated opposite each other. Water mixed with 
ash and traditional medicine would be given to each person to wash his hands. Each 
would then be given a chance to air complaints. The mediator summarizes the statements 
of each person and asks them whether they are willing to forgive and forget. Each then 
takes a mouthful of water mixed with ash and spits it over his left shoulder. Thereafter 
the two drink beer from the same calabash. This is the communion of purification. Meat 
or beer is used. Such a ritual can be adapted and limited to the washing of hands. The 
symbolic cooling effect of water points to reconciliation.43  
  
40 Ben Khumalo-Seegelken, KZN Civil-War/uDlame 1976-1996: Hurting and Healing Motives and 
Perspectives. http://www.benkhumalo-seegelken.de/dokumente/UkuBuyisana_2011.doc  Accessed 14 
January 2011. 
41 Personal communication with Dr B Khumalo-Seegelken, Pieternaritzburg, 2010. 
42Axel-Ivar Berglund, Zulu Thought-Patterns and Symbolism (London: Hurst and Co., 1976). 
43 http://www.afrikaworld.net/afrel/tlhagale.htm by By Buti Tlhagale in Bringing the African Culture into 
the Church. 
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Berglund seems to suggest that the talking takes place at the same time as the two 
individuals or groups who have been fighting wash each other’s hands. This is 
contradicted by traditional healers, who understand reconciliation as a process that cannot 
be achieved in one event. Mkhize, himself a traditional healer, and four elderly women 
interviewed in KwaShange understand ukuthelelana amanzi or ukukhumelana umlotha as 
not an event but a process.  
The actual ceremonies arranged by individual families in KwaShange resemble the ritual 
which Berglund describes, but are not identical to it. Sipho Nxele, a former warrior, 
exhumed bodies of enemies from graves to get their body parts and then reburied them. 
He feels as though he had “dirtied and damaged his soul.”44 Zakhele Khanyile, another 
former combatant, declares that, though he had wished to be a great warrior of his 
community, all they gave him was “this dirty life and stigma.”45 
9.6.3 Ukukhishwa Iqunga (ritual cleansing) 
War poisons the spirit and warriors return contaminated. This is why, among the Zulu 
and in other traditional cultures, returning warriors were put through significant rituals of 
purification before reuniting with their families and communities.46 In traditional cultures 
it was believed that unpurified warriors could be dangerous. Even in modern societies, 
the absence of rituals to reintegrate a warrior into a peaceful community helps to explain 
why suicide, homicide and other destructive acts occur among former warriors. 
In traditional cultures, warrior-cleansing was often guided by diviners and traditional 
hearers and a particular traditional healer presided over “warrior medicine.”47 A diviner 
was responsible for overseeing the spiritual lives and well-being of the society’s warriors 
and communicating with ancestors on behalf of the warriors and communities concerned. 
Slaughtering an animal was considered to be the most important of all the activities.48 
44Interview with Sipho Nxele, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
45Interview with Zakhele Khanyile, KwaShange, 12 March 2010. 
46Interview with Ngobese, traditional healer, Impendle, 14 August 2010. 
47Interview with Ngobese, traditional healer, Impendle, 14 August 2010. 
48Interview with Ngobese, traditional healer, Impendle, 14 August 2010. 
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9.7 KwaZulu-Natal government’s intervention  
On 7 November 2010 the KwaZulu-Natal government, working with some people in 
Vulindlela, organized a community ritual cleansing and reconciliation ceremony. This 
was aimed at bringing about peace and reconciliation to families, neighbours and 
residents in the areas that had been fighting in the 1980s and 1990s because of their 
political alignment. This ceremony received wide public attention because of the nature 
of the violence in Vulindlela, but it did not go unchallenged by Inkatha. I do not intend to 
replicate the assertions made, but rather to explore the views of persons that were directly 
affected by the violence.  
In 1994 the KwaZulu-Natal government realized, that even though some families had 
performed ritual cleansing rituals, anger and resentment between communities still 
existed. The government established peace-committees within communities, but the 
efforts of the peace-committees to mediate a peace process always ended after a short 
period and fights erupted. The remnants of violent conflicts remained visible. The 
Premier’s office Of KwaZulu-Natal, in partnership with other government departments, 
such as Safety and Liaison and Arts and Culture requested the organization SINANI49 to 
support them in organizing cleansing ceremonies in a culturally acceptable way. The aim 
of these ceremonies was “to calm down the spirits of the dead and built up a climate of 
peace.” The two parties, Inkatha and the ANC, met to finally break the deadlock of war 
and make peace possible.50 Provincial cleansing ceremonies, for the most part effective, 
were carried out. In Richmond, five representatives from each of the four political parties 
worked together and managed to stop political violence in the area. In Umbumbulu, about 
40 traditional leaders and councillors worked actively on bringing peace among the nine 
villages in this area. In Estcourt, peace-making strategies were initiated by religious 
49SINANI facilitates intensive residential workshops which make use of small group support to offer a space for people 
to reflect on their lives. The workshops cover:  a sharing of an overview of one’s life, discussing particularly painful 




                                                 
leaders, who managed to draw in the political leadership of the area. The peace in 
Estcourt is fragile and the leaders are working hard to ensure that it deepens.51 
In November 2010 the government’s campaign to cleanse the communities that were at 
loggerheads in the 1980s and 1990s violence moved to Vulindlela. State President Jacob 
Zuma, KwaZulu-Natal Premier Dr Zweli Mkhize, the Zulu monarch, Goodwill 
Zwelithini, and chief Sondelani Zondi, from Vulindlela itself, were present. They 
emphasized in their statements a deep commitment to ukubuyisana [reconciliation], in 
very convincing terms.  
The Zulu monarch, in his address, affirmed the good intentions expressed by the hosting 
communities; he admonished young and old, reprimanded grumblers and troublemakers 
and encouraged the reconciling communities to continue steadfastly in their efforts. His 
words were heeded by participants in and around the stadium. Before other speeches 
commenced, six representatives of religious communities, including inkolo yendabuko 
(the ancestral religion), abakwaShembe (an indigenous faith society, the Nazarene 
Baptists), mainstream religions such as Christianity, Islam and Hinduism opened with 
prayers. 
 As I was standing watching the whole process of cleansing and listening to the speeches 
about reconciliation, I began to ponder: is this a fitting way of carrying out this ritual? 
The national, provincial and local leadership of Inkatha had said it was not going to 
participate in the cleansing ritual and reconciliation ceremony. I decided to leave the 
stadium and went to KwaShange, to ask survivors’ opinions. I conducted interviews with 
members of the community who were directly touched by the violence. 
Muzikayifani Khumalo, KwaShange violence survivor, said: 
I did not know about it. I only heard this morning on the radio that Jacob Zuma is 
coming and the King [Goodwill Zwelithini]. …No, no! Even if I heard, I am the 
last person who would have set my foot there. What reconciliation? What 
reconciliation? What cleansing? Who is cleansing whom? [He is crying]. Look at 
51Sinani www.survivors.org.za 
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my condition right now – you see [referring to his mud house].52 Is he [David 
Ntombela] prepared to return my cattle? Is he going to return our cattle? How can 
you speak of reconciliation, Macingwane, if people who looted our homes and our 
property are known and they live good life and we are still struggling because of 
their doings?53 
Makhosonke Mshengu replied:  
I knew about this meeting, last week there was a loud speaker when our headman 
encouraged community members to attend. He said he got the instruction from 
komkhulu [the chief]. I did not go. I want to be honest with you – I did not attend. 
How do you say sorry to a person who lost his relative because of you? I think 
what happened – happened and there is nothing we can do now. My brother was 
killed in front of his wife and children and since then things never got back to 
normal…I do not think that going there would have made any difference. I was 
drinking at home … life goes on.54  
Zodwa Ntsusha said: 
I can only reconcile if Inkatha supporters tell me who killed my father and, more 
importantly, if they were to tell the truth about where his body parts are hidden or 
buried. I would like those to be exhumed and be buried properly. My mother 
spent every cent she had consulting with diviners and traditional healers trying to 
see if they can help us to find closure, but it did not happen – she passed away in 
2003 and left us with stigma. I finished standard 10 but I do not have money to 
further my studies. My elder brothers are alcoholics. The eldest brother is not 
well, he often gets terrible headaches – he has a gun bullet that cannot be removed 
52Mdletshe’s house was burnt in March 1990 during the Seven Days War. He never recovered from this. 
His son, who was a teacher, was killed in one of the KwaShange attacks in 1988, allegedly by Inkatha 
supporters because he refused to join Inkatha youth meetings.  
53Interview with Muzikayifani Khumalo, KwaShange, 10 November 2010. 
54Interview with Makhosonke Mshengu, KwaShange, 10 November 2010. 
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from his head because of Inkatha. I cannot find employment – I have a stigma 
because no proper ritual was done after my father’s death.55 
As I have shown, some survivors disapproved of the cleansing ritual and reconciliation 
ceremony. I concluded that the cleansing ritual and reconciliation ceremony was not a 
success for everyone. Instead of healing survivors, some felt that they were re-wounded. 
The interviews above show survivors’ anger and resentment. Firstly, some people who 
were supposed to know about the gathering did not know. Secondly, concerned 
communities were not prepared in advance. Reconciliation is not an event, it is a process. 
Communities that were at loggerheads claimed that they felt aggrieved because they do 
not know the truth about what happened in the past. National, provincial and local leaders 
of Inkatha and the ANC, whose speeches incited people to violence, never apologized to 
the victims. The Inkatha leadership refused even to go before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. This was an indication that they were not prepared to tell the 
truth and/or reconcile with their former enemies. I concur with the statement of Inkatha 
about the gathering in Vulindlela, that “not enough ground work has been done to prepare 
the people in the area [for the gathering]. The IFP and the ANC still have a lot of issues 
to talk about.”56  
I believe that truth-telling is a pre-condition for reconciliation. It creates opportunities for 
people to see the past in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility. In the 
case of Vulindlela, both Inkatha and ANC supporters suffered and they have a collective 
responsibility to bring about peace in the area, for the sake of future generations. More 
important still is the recognition that victims and offenders are members of the same 
community, as survivors and as human beings, and simply have to get on with each other. 
The leadership of both these parties in the conflict should help the community of 
Vulindlela to points of agreement, partnership appears more sensible than sustained 
conflict. Common interests may be found in roles and identities that cross former lines of 
division, such as religion, gender and generation or region. Empathy, however, does not 
55Zodwa Ntsusha is 26 years old. She was born in 1986 during the violence. Her father was killed when she 
was only five years old; interview with Zondwa Ntsusha, KwaShange, 10 November 2010. 
56Albert Mncwango, IFP national spokesperson, The Witness, 11 November 2010. 
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lead to a fully harmonious community. Conflicts and controversy are part of all human 
communities. Moreover, empathy does not exclude the continuation of feelings of anger 
and resentment, nor does it require that the victims be ready to forgive and forget. 
Pardoning the offenders will, of course, broaden the basis for empathy, but for some 
victims it may be too distant, or too sudden, a goal. To pursue it relentlessly may result in 
an abrupt end to the entire reconciliation process. At this stage it may be unjust to ask 
victims to forgive if perpetrators refrain from expressing regret and remorse, as has been 
the case in Vulindlela. 
 
In this chapter I have looked at the discourse of trauma as it is central to social 
functioning and it is possible to understand mental health as a socio-cultural construct.57 
In terms of this view, to ensure efficacy, an approach to healing should include 
therapeutic strategies which draw on the appropriate world views. I have investigated the 
history of interventions premised on traditional Zulu healing practices to ensure culturally 
effective interventions.58 Historically, trauma interventions within the Zulu context took 
into account local understanding, as well as the indigenous capacity for dealing with 
‘social scars’.59 The chapter has attempted to answer the following questions: have these 
interventions evolved over time or have they remained the same? 
 
 
57L. A. Barnett, “Critique, Culture and the Cough: Examining Conceptualisation of Healing”, unpublished 
paper presented at Critical Method Nine (SA, ICC: Durban 2004). 
58See Julie Parle, States of Mind: Searching for Mental Health in Natal and Zululand, 1868-1918. 
(Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2007). 
59Alcinda Honwana, “Sealing the Past, Facing the Future: Trauma Healing in Mozambique”, in Accord 
no.3. (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
 283 
                                                 
Chapter Ten 
REMEMBERING THE VIOLENCE: CONSTRUCTION AND 
CONTESTATION OF COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUALS’ 
MEMORIES 
 
10.1 Background  
Memory has been studied since the end of the nineteenth century.1 Recently it has 
become one of the most written and discussed topics in academic disciplines, 
resulting in a number of publications covering an array of issues. Pierre Nora, in the 
introduction to his seminal three-volume work, published in English in 1996, 
attributed the preoccupation with memory to modernisation and the resulting 
“acceleration of history.”2 Some scholars have noted that interest in memory is 
intricately linked to trauma, particularly related to war and other armed conflicts.3  
Once memory was believed to be like “a video played back over – the details reported 
accurately and unchanged no matter how many times, or from how long ago.”4 Van 
der Kolk and Fisler state that memories “are invariable and do not change over 
time.”5 This perception of memory, however, has been found to be inaccurate. When 
memory is viewed with reference to past events, it becomes clear that the way in 
which memory represents past events can deviate from reality in many ways. An 
event or character stored in memory can be, and often is, altered by time and 
1 Ebbinghaus, H. Memory: A Contribution to Experimental Pyschology. H. A. Ruger, C. E. Bussenius 
translators, (New York: Columbia University, 1913). Original work published 1885. quoted in 
McNally, Richard. “Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 
– In Review, Vol 50, No 13. 2005, p. 817. 
2 Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in The Realms of Memory, ed. 
Pierre Nora, vol.1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1-20, Quotation is on p. 1. 
3 For example, Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in the 
Twentieth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), in particular, Chapter 1 
“The Setting: The Great War in the Memory Boom of the Twentieth Century” 17-51. 
4 Van der Kolk, B. A, Fisler R. “Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: 
Overview and exploratory Study. J Trauma Stress 1995;8: 505-25, quoted in McNally, Richard. 
“Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry – In Review, Vol 
50, No 13. 2005, p. 818. 
5 Van der Kolk, B. A, Fisler R. “Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: 
Overview and explaratory Study. J Trauma Stress 1995;8: 505-25, quoted in McNally, Richard. 
“Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of Psychiatry – In Review, Vol 
50, No 13. 2005, p. 818. 
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influenced by perception. Richard McNally says “No memory, traumatic or 
otherwise, is ever frozen and immune from the vicissitudes of time.”6  
In South Africa a number of scholars have published on the theme of memory. Sarah 
Nuttall and Cheryl Michael contend, however, that the theorising of memory in South 
Africa has been characterised by the weight given to politics, resistance struggles and 
race as determinants of identity.7 Nuttall and Carli Coetzee; Njabulo S Ndebele8 and 
André Brink write about memory and the significance of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s work. Nuttall looks at the differences between what is often regarded 
as the ‘freeing’ of memory and how such autobiographical narrative affects the 
narrators’ lives.9 Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool discuss oral history in South Africa, 
arguing that oral historians have too often constructed a ‘master-narrative of 
resistance’ from the individual memories collected in interviews.10 Central to their 
case is their reading of Charles van Onselen’s work.11 These works warn against over-
simplicity in the interpretation or reading of any form of life history or memory. 
10.2 Introduction 
My thesis focuses upon the history of political violence and how it is remembered by 
survivors: it relies heavily on oral sources and memories of the turmoil. I was exposed 
to my interviewees’ criticism of national and provincial attempts to help them to 
remember, forgive, forget and heal the wounds of the past. 
 This chapter is built around three fundamental questions: How is the political 
violence in KwaShange remembered? When and where do survivors remember? I will 
postulate in this chapter that memory can be influenced by any number of factors, the 
6 McNally, Richard. “Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry – In Review, Vol 50, No 13. 2005, p. 818. 
7 Nuttall, S, and Michael, C. (eds.), Senses of Culture: South African Culture Studies (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 6-10.  
8 Ndebele N. S, Fine Lines from the Box: Further Thoughts about Our Country (SA: Umuzi Publishers, 
2007), pp. 84-91. 
9Nuttal, S. “Telling ‘Free’ Stories? Memory and Democracy in South African Autobiography since 
1994” in Nuttal, S. and Coetzee, C. (eds.) Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa 
(Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
10 Minkley, G and Rassool, C. “Orality, Memory, and Social History in South Africa”, in Nuttal, S. and 
Coetzee, C. (eds.) Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa (Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 89-99. 
11 Van Onselen, C. The Seed Is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper 1894-1985 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 1996). 
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most significant of which would be personal perception and errors in the memory 
process. The chapter incorporates national and provincial dimensions and attempts to 
apply the issues that have been discussed on personal and collective levels. I shall 
begin by showing how issues of national or community memory have been privileged 
so much so that they undermine individual survivor’s memories. How the 
interviewees remember violence during my study was affected by national, provincial 
and local discussions about ‘forgiving and forgetting’ the atrocities of the 1980s-
1990s, which were still topical in Vulindlela and the province of KwaZulu-Natal in 
2010. 
I shall therefore look at the role of memory in the construction of history. In his 
article, Philippe Denis warns researchers about the careful treatment of oral history 
narratives.12 In this chapter I attempt to answer the question of what kind of caution 
they should exercise: how much is accurately remembered about this violence and 
how much is filtered through other experiences. There is a general consensus amongst 
scholars who have recently ventured into the field of oral history and memory that 
many things influence how people remember. Even the way a person is questioned on 
an event can alter the memory being retrieved. Also, memory is only concerned with 
what has been remembered, not what has been omitted. Thus there can be variance 
between what has been recounted and what actually occurred. Memory is therefore 
not merely a passive representation of events that occurred. 
Dominick LaCapra feels that no memory can be pure, since “it has always already 
been affected by elements not deriving from the experience itself.”13 Memory of 
trauma is even further removed from actual experience, since “what occurs is not 
integrated into experience or directly remembered, and the event must be 
reconstructed from its effects and traces.”14 I reason in this chapter that all memories 
undergo similar transformation. Just as personal memory is filtered through other 
experiences, “official” or sanctioned, state memories also alter, based on changes in 
political regime. In his writings on collective approach to memory Maurice 
12 Denis, P. and Worthington, J. (eds.) The Power of Oral History: Memory, Healing and Development. 
XIIth International Oral History Conference, Pietermaritzburg, 24-27 June 2002, 4 vols. 
(Pietermaritzburg: Sinomlando Centre, 2002).  
13 Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 21. 
14 Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1998), 21. 
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Halbwachs has shown that memory is subject to social context.15 This chapter argues 
that similar influences are at play in the life of memories at the state or provincial 
level. 
10.3 The ambiguities of the collective approaches to memory 
 
There is a plethora of studies on memorials, monuments and collective approach to 
memory. Sabine Marschall published on commemorative monuments, memorials and 
public statuary in post-apartheid South Africa. She reasons that these symbols are 
aimed at reconciliation, national building and the creation of shared public history. 
Marshall states, however, that not everyone identifies with these symbolic markers 
and their associated interpretation of the past.16 Marshall’s book critically explores the 
booming memorials phenomenon in the new South Africa, ‘the political discourses 
that fuelled it’; its inconsistencies and ambiguities.17 Khangela Hlongwane 
concentrated on commemoration and memories of ‘the class of 1976’, Hector 
Pieterson Memorial and Museum.18Lazarus Kgalema studied monuments as a 
‘symbol of hope’. He uses case studies of communities which have built monuments 
such as Thokoza, Katlehong, Tembisa, Wilgespruit, Vaal, Kagiso and Memelodi.19 
 
Kgereshi Mokwena explored the issues of collective approach to memory using 
Thokoza township, near Johannesburg, as a case study. Greater Johannesburg, like the 
Natal Midlands, was ravaged by political violence. In his discussion of the situation in 
Thokoza, Mokwena concludes that people who witnessed and experienced atrocities 
recorded and archived in their memories what they observed and experienced in 
Thokoza.  
 
15 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective approach to memory (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992). 
16 Sabine Marshall, Landscape of Memory: commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary 
in post-apartheid South Africa (South Africa, Brill, 2009). 
17 Sabine Marshall, Landscape of Memory: commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary 
in post-apartheid South Africa (South Africa, Brill, 2009). 
18 Khangela Hlongwane, Footprints of the ‘Class of 76’: commemoration, memory, mapping and 
heritage (Johannesburg: Hector Pieterson Memorial and Museum, 2008). 
19 Lazarus Kgalema, “Symbols of Hope: monuments as symbols of remembrance and peace in the 
process of reconciliation” (Centre for the study of violence and reconciliation, 1999).  
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When an historical event occurs, whether it is recorded or not, those who 
witness the occurrence archive it in their memories. To people who were 
actually involved in the incident, and those who were onlookers, the 
occurrence can create strong and long-lasting memories. When the incident is 
remembered, the experience is reconstructed through memories.20 
 
James E. Young holds that the nature of memory is one that is delicate, often 
suppressed, ever changing and, most importantly, invariably influenced by politics; 
‘the memories of [a] narrator are undoubtedly influenced by experiences and 
information acquired after an incident, they are modified by a narrative strategy.21 
Discussing collective approach to memory, Peter Novick contends that people make a 
conscious decision when they construct memory. They deliberately choose what they 
remember, how and when they remember - therefore memory, either individual or 
collective, is manipulated.22 Their memories are nevertheless shaped by collective 
ways of remembering. Mokwena defines space each side of the collective act of 
‘remembering’ as a deliberate, purposeful and planned recalling of certain memories 
by a group or through an institution such as government or the state.23 He reasons: 
 
It involves more than just the recalling of events, and includes the careful 
recomposing, reconstruction and even deconstruction of such memories to suit 
a particular agenda. This process is not a spontaneous but a carefully planned 
one.24  
 
20 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008).  
21 James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust memorials and meaning, quoted in Kgereshi 
Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special reference to 
the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008). 
22 Novick, P. The Holocaust and Collective approach to memory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). 
23 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Masters of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
24 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Masters of Art, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
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There is a relationship between the construction of memory and the healing process, 
especially as it relates to the use of memorials.25 Brandon Hamber stresses that, in 
order for people to come to terms with the past, it is essential that they relive it first, it 
in their minds; they can then move on to the second stage, which is the healing 
process.26 Hamber challenges the idea that, after violence, should states want to bring 
about peace and stability, they expect the victims of the violent activities to “forgive 
and forget”. Hamber reasons, “psychologically, sleeping dogs do not lie”, meaning 
that people cannot just bury and forget their past traumas simply because government 
urges them to do so.27  
 
I concur with Mokwena, that if governments introduce memorial projects or 
commissions such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, 
urging people to reconcile and forgive each other for their wrong-doings, people may 
not necessarily forget the past because government has told them to. Memories have a 
way of continuing even if they are not in line with the popular expectations of leaders 
or government officials.28 The way I see it, is that it also ambiguous, for surely the 
erection of memorials is a process of community or government - prescribed 
remembering – how then can the victims forgive and forget? Yet it is supposed to be 
for healing. In this regard Hamber suggests reparations. 
 
The reconstruction of memory in this case can take place at a national, provincial or 
local (community) level, where a collective decides to engage in an exercise meant for 
25 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Art, University of Witwatersrand, 2008). 
26 Hamber, B. “The Burdens of Truth: An evaluation of the psychological support services and 
initiatives undertaken by the South African TRC”, American Imago, Vol.55, No 1, Spring 1998, quoted 
in Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
27 Brandon Hamber, Dineo Nageng and Gabriel O’Malley, “Telling it like it is…”: understanding the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission from the perspective of survivors (Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg, South Africa), published in Psychology in Society (PINS), 
2000, 26, 18-42. See also Brandon Hamber, “The Burdens of Truth. An evaluation of the psychological 
support services and initiatives undertaken by the South African TRC”, in American Imago, Vol.55, No 
1, Spring 1998. 
28 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
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conscious memorialisation of an event or people.29 After the first democratic elections 
in South Africa there were a number of initiatives such a memorials, which were built 
with the intention of reconstructing the memories of violence supposedly to aid the 
healing process.30 The government introduced projects such as the Truth 
Commissions, commissions of enquiry and commemoration projects, which are 
usually employed to revisit and recompose memories.31 This notion of having one 
national memory has been criticized. Jaspal Singh and Rajendra Chetty state that this 
idea of collective approach to memory is problematic because memory, like truth, is 
subjective and dependent on the experiences of individuals.32 
 
There can never be one whole [memory], that the idea of collective history and 
memory is fraught with complications, and that […] the production of any 
history narrativising the past always contains an element of fiction.33 
 
Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson label collective approach to memory initiatives 
such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as “a hostage to their 
own memory” and therefore obstructions to the process of selective forgetting 
advocated by reconciling national political leaders. They challenged the call by the 
then State President, F. W. de Klerk, for South Africans to simply ‘let bygones be 
bygones’.34  
 
29Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
30 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Art, University of Witwatersrand, 2008). 
31 Brandon Hamber , The Burdens of Truth. An evaluation of the psychological support services and 
Initiatives Undertaken by the South African TRC, in American Imago, Vol.55, No 1, Spring 1998. 
32 Jaspal Singh and Rajendra Chetty (eds,), Trauma, Resistance, Reconciliation in post-1994 South 
African Writing (New York, Peter Lang Publishing, 2010). 
33 Jaspal Singh and Rajendra Chetty (eds,), Trauma, Resistance, Reconciliation in post-1994 South 
African Writing (New York, Peter Lang Publishing, 2010). 
34 Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson, “Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge 
in Post-conflict societies”, Journal of Human Rights 1,1: 35-54, quoted in Anna John Vetlesen, Evil 
and Human Agency: understanding collective avoiding (New York, Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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[…] it is critical that victims are not expected to forgive the perpetrators, or 
forget about the past because some form of reparations (or comprehensive 
report on the nature and extent of past violations) has been made.35 
  
Hamber and Wilson require reparations and it is not just remembering and memorials 
that can claim to heal the victims. Hamber and Wilson feel that the idea of dealing 
with the past through a national Truth Commission ascribes a collective identity to a 
nation and assumes that nations have psyches which experience trauma similar to 
individuals.36 
  
Mokwena reiterates Hamber and Wilson’s understanding, stating that collective 
approach to memory initiatives such as the TRC tacitly implies that pursuit of national 
unity is a unitary and coherent process when it is not, in fact, and that the national 
process of dealing with the past and individual processes of dealing with the past are 
largely concurrent and equivalent. A national process of uncovering and remembering 
the past is said to allow the country to develop a common and shared memory and, in 
so doing, creates the sense of unity and reconciliation for its people.37  
 
The collective approach refers to an initiative, for instance by an entity such as 
a government, to reconstruct and represent memory through the use of a Truth 
Commission, commissions of inquiry and projects such as public memorials 
and monuments. Such a move is believed to be helping the nation to develop a 
common and shared memory which is pivotal to the enhancement of unity and 
perhaps reconciliation, as in the case of South Africa. In some cases, the 
collective process would seek to re-enact one memory for the entire nation and 
individuals within it, in spite of their different experiences.38 
35Brandon Hamber and Richard Wilson, “Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge in 
post-conflict societies”, Journal of Human Rights 11: 35-54. 
36Brandon Hamber, and Richard Wilson, “Symbolic closure through memory, reparation and revenge 
in post conflict societies”, (paper presented to the Traumatic Stress in South Africa in South Africa 
Conference, Johannesburg, 2009), quoted in Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful 
experiences in a divided society, with special reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master 
of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008). 
37Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
38Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Art, University of Witwatersrand, 2008). 
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The case against the collective approach to memory reconstruction is that it ignores 
the fact that human society is not heterogeneous. Hamber and Wilson state that the 
collective national approach to memory reconstruction ascribes a collective identity to 
a nation, an identity of a traumatised people39 and this makes it dubious. They are 
critical of national processes such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
because these initiatives fail to recognise that each of the traumatised individuals live 
in a world of his or her unique circumstances. This results in the national process 
failing to take account of the individual’s personalised trauma, especially if the 
process was seen as a high-profile initiative, handling well-known cases involving 
high-profile political activists.40  
 
A similar dilemma was noted in smaller communities where people who had 
committed atrocities in their past were expected to join hands with the victims and 
work with the state to promote peace and harmony in the country and to forgive each 
other and forget all the wrongs done against them. This was a countrywide 
phenomenon; many local communities were coerced to abandon their memories in a 
sea of forgetfulness. Christians could counter that, according to the Bible, only God is 
able to genuinely forgive and forget “He throws our sins into the sea of forgetfulness 
and remembers it no more.”41 
 
This coerced forgetting was rejected in some local communities. Kgereshi Mokwena 
looked at the Thokoza Township near Johannesburg. The experiences and findings of 
Mokwena are similar to the community experiences in Vulindlela. In 2009 I was 
requested by the community to organize a committee that would express their views 
about their unhappiness at the KwaZulu-Natal government’s announcement of the 
erection of a Heroes’ Arch in Slangspruit. The Premier of KwaZulu-Natal announced 
this in 2009 and on a number of occasions I raised concerns with KZN government 
officials. In 2010 I organized a conference on the memories of political violence at 
  
39Hamber, B and Wilson, R. “Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post 
Conflict Society” (Paper presented to the Traumatic Stress in South Africa in South Africa conference, 
Johannesburg, 1999). 
40Hamber, B and Wilson, R. “Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post 
Conflict Society (Paper presented to the Traumatic Stress in South Africa in South Africa conference, 
Johannesburg, 1999). 
41Hebrews 8: 12 (New International Version). 
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Msunduzi Museum, Pietermaritzburg, with special reference to the ‘Seven Days 
War’. The Premier’s wife, Dr. May Mashego-Mkhize, delivered a speech announcing 
that the government intended to continue building memorials in the Midlands. 
 
On 27 March 2009, The Witness published my article. I was aggrieved about the fact 
that many people who suffered in the Midlands violence were ignored, their stories 
not heard and they were expected to forget what had happened to families and 
communities and move on with their lives. 
 
 The names of prominent people who fought in the struggle are written in 
history books; their names are engraved on a monument in Freedom Memorial 
Park in Pretoria. The names on the monument include those of dead and 
missing soldiers. Most of the people who suffered in the Seven Days War are 
not even known in the public arena, except the few whose names are at the 
peace monument that was erected in Imbali Stage Two. 
It is the consequences that we need to consider as a serious indictment on our 
society: most of the people who suffered are still tormented by what they went 
through. 
 
When I raised questions on behalf of my community as to why victims of the war in 
rural Vulindlela were ignored with regard to these memorials, I was told to raise it ‘on 
the right platform.’  Similar situations were noted by Mokwena in Thokoza. There 
had been reports, even in 2012, about a big monument to be built in 2019 in Imbali to 
commemorate the victims of political violence. People in other areas surrounding 
Pietermaritzburg, equally affected by violence, have been left wondering why they are 
excluded. One example of how collective approach to memory can go wrong is the 
Peace Monument erected in Imbali in the Midlands in 1998, in honour of those who 
died during the violence. The choice of the location of the Memorial means that 
people from areas neigbouring Imbali are confounded. Families of the victims and the 
people of Vulindlela were disappointed and frustrated by this act of the government. 
Many people I interviewed in KwaShange expressed their discomfort about the ANC 
government selecting where in the Midlands political violence was to be remembered. 
Many people said that Edendale is given more attention in everything, including 
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services: “asisezukuyivotela i-ANC thina, sikhathele” (we are not going to vote for the 
ANC, we are sick and tired [of being treated this way])”.42 
 
Sabine Marshall reasons that ‘the government invests in monuments to achieve 
specific objectives […]’  
 
…in South Africa, the government tends to assume a particular strong and 
somewhat paternalistic role, where government officials see themselves as 
public representatives who must develop strategies and make decisions on 
behalf of and in the interest of “the people” who elected them […].43 
 
Marshall argues that this occurs in a context where the majority of the population 
owing to a long legacy of marginalization and disempowerment strongly relies on the 
government to provide development and services, and where individuals often lack 
the capacity and experience to actively participate in decision-making and especially 
to take initiative and follow through with the implementation of proposed projects. 
 
As in the case of Thokoza township residents, Nonjabulo Khumalo, a political activist 
in KwaShange, who was part of the group I interviewed, expressed her unhappiness 
and that the government of the ANC, “…i-ANC esayilwela, sayilwela sisebancane. 
Uhulumeni osimele sonke thina esalwela umzabalazo kodwa iqhakambisa abantu 
baseyiDeni abahlukumezeka. Thina?....thina? [she was in tears] (…the ANC we 
fought for, we fought for from our very young age, our own government has singled 
out Edendale victims of violence [as if they were the only ones]… what about us? 
what about us? [from neighbouring KwaShange]...)”.44 
 
This is a shared view amongst many KwaShange victims of violence. As Mokwena 
noted with regard to Thokoza residents, “it is representative of the complaints of 
communities and individuals against what they considered to be an attempt to reduce 
and submerge their history, individual memories, pain, trauma and healing processes 
42 Interview with a group of five women, KwaShange, 14 November 2010. 
43 Sabine Marshall, Landscape of Memory: commemorative monuments, memorials and public statuary 
in post-apartheid South Africa (South Africa: Brill, 2009).  
44 Interview with Njoloba Khumalo, KwaShange, 14 November 2010. 
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under the image of a single area.”45 Since emotional healing requires space for 
individuals to reflect and heal at their own pace, collective processes such as the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission seem to be taking away that individual space by 
emphasising a collective approach. This may submerge individual memories under 
the collective’s uniform memory.  
 
Based on the findings of his research in Thokoza, Mokwena concluded that concepts 
such as nation, community and individuals do not necessarily refer to one and the 
same entity. He agrees with Anderson that they exist as entities in people’s 
imaginations and are their mythic constructs, wrongly equated with individuals’ 
experiences.46  
 
Following this line of argument one might conclude that the idea of a 
community having a psyche like a human being and being capable of suffering 
trauma may be in many cases be without basis. Concepts such as community 
trauma and community healing are also dubious political myths. This also 
applies to the concept of community healing which seems more metaphoric 
than literal.47  
 
Thus single programmes initiated on a national scale may not, in practical terms, be in 
a position to deal with the trauma experienced by every individual throughout the 
country and especially not with the trauma of people in small communities, where the 
sense of ‘nation’ is weak. Even the much-publicised TRC could not attain that kind of 
influence. Organisations such as Sinani (see Chapter Nine) and Khulumani Support 
Group48 thus took upon themselves the responsibility of filling in the obvious gaps 
45Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
46Anderson, B. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, rev. ed. 1991), quoted in Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful 
experiences in a divided society, with special reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master 
of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008). 
47 Kgereshi Petrus Mokwena, “Commemorating painful experiences in a divided society, with special 
reference to the Thokoza Memorial: A case study (Master of Art, University of the Witwatersrand, 
2008). 
48The Khulumani Support Group was formed in 1995 by survivors and families of victims of the 
political conflict of South Africa's apartheid past. It was set up in response to the pending Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission by victims who felt the Commission should be used to speak out about the 
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and provided psychological support to victims and survivors of violence at the 
individual level. The TRC Evaluation Report, compiled by Khulumani and the CSVR, 
states that the TRC’s national programme for healing was far above the individual 
survivor’s needs level and could not deal with their trauma and healing.49 The 
victims’ memorial in Imbali was the ruling party’s initiative and represented the 
party’s views and agenda, neither the full history nor the healing needs of the victims 
of the violence. Most victimised families in Vulindlela thus boycotted it. In 
KwaShange, interviewees said that they were not consulted on how to commemorate 
or where the commemorative structures were to be built, nor was there consultation 
on the name of the memorial. 
 
A similar debate occurred regarding the reconciliation and cleansing ceremony in 
November 2010 in Vulindlela, to commemorate the victims of the violence, but also 
to reconcile communities that were at loggerheads.50 According to interviewees in 
Vulindlela, the memorial ceremony was conducted by local, provincial and national 
politicians, without the locals’ knowledge.51 Many complained that the memorial and 
reconciliation ceremony aggravated their trauma, since hearing about the memorial 
revived terrible memories. Some said that they went to the extent of organizing 
themselves in order to disrupt the ceremony, so that it would not take place, because it 
would re-traumatise them instead of helping them to go through their personal 
healing. The memorial ceremony would perpetuate the haunting experiences and 
memories. Yet the memorial was supposed to be ‘the community’s’ way of 
commemorating those who died from 1987-1996. It does not seem as though 
individual survivors were regarded as members of the ‘community’, since many of the 
directly affected survivors were excluded.  
 
As the rest of my thesis indicates, the politics of the Midlands violence were very 
complex. At least two political parties were involved – communities and 
representatives belonging to both, even relatives, and any memorials should at least 
past to ensure that such violations never occurred again. http://www.khulumani.net/khulumani/about-
us/item/1-background.html. 
49 CSVR and Khulumani Support Group: Survivors’ perceptions of the TRC and suggestions for the 
final report. 
50 http://www.survivors.org.za/programmes/peace-building-programme.html. I attended the ceremony 
as a community member, also as a researcher.  
51 Interviews with Khethokwakhe Khuboni, KwaShange, 14 November 2010. 
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have reflected this if they claim to aim at the healing of memory. It was, however, 
seen by most of my interviewees and the community as a partisan process biased 
towards the ANC, this in spite of some of these very victims having been supporters 
of the ANC. Supporters who now find they lived in the ‘wrong’ zone to be 
remembered cannot depend on the government for their trauma to be recognized or 
assuaged. Many interviewees believed the violence will rekindle. Thus it is best to 
recall none of it, rather than a one-sided picture of such terrible experiences.   
 
10.4 Counter-Collective Memories and Individuals’ Memories 
Constructions 
 
In KwaShange, reluctance was displayed by people to participate in national and 
provincial initiatives to create community memorials. They did not participate in the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As seen earlier in the chapter, they opposed 
the memorial in Imbali. They opposed the memorial, cleansing and reconciliation 
ritual organized by the national and provincial governments in 2010 in Vulindlela. 
There seemed to be a counter-memory conspiracy.   
 
One of the reasons mentioned by interviewees is that in 1991, when KwaShange ANC 
combatants killed 17 Inkatha combatants, the late Harry Gwala, ANC leader in the 
Midlands in the 1990s, promised that the ANC government would erect a memorial 
stone in KwaShange, to honour those ‘heroes’ that fought in the battles [and killed 
Inkatha combatants] but nobody in the ANC-led government has implemented 
Gwala’s vision. This is one of the reasons why they are reluctant to support these 
initiatives. Another reason seems to be anger against Inkatha. Some interviewees 
mentioned that they do not think it is fair to be given equal recognition with Inkatha 
since Inkatha, leaders were ‘traitors’. 
 
Inkatha betrayed black people and the struggle in general. How could we 
submit names of our people to the Imbali memorial where in the same 
memorial stone there is a list of names of Inkatha members; who are we 
fooling here? Whose story should be told?52 
52 Mzoneli Mfeketho, KwaShange, 14 November 2010. 
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The attitude displayed by some KwaShange residents counteracts the government’s large-
scale plan. Daniel Bouchard delivered a counter-memory concept. He reasons that 
counter-memory can exist in opposition to the official (hi) story:53  
 
Individuals who do not subscribe to the dominant memory, who refuse to forget 
or remember what it prescribes, become part of society's counter-hegemonic 
groupings. Their memories exist in private spaces and individual minds. Their 
memories are subaltern and exist as a potentially threatening undercurrent to the 
social order. Their ability to survive depends on what claims to political resources 
and state power the group is able to muster.54
 
Yet, even in totalitarian societies, 
the state does not completely control individual or social memory. Agents of civil 
society can play an active role in strategies of remembrance; sometimes in 
collaboration with the state, sometimes against it.55 
 
George Lipsitz’s understanding of counter-memory differs somewhat from that of 
Foucault. In his view, counter-memory is a way of remembering and forgetting that starts 
with the local, the immediate and the personal.56
 
Unlike historical narratives that begin 
with the totality of human existence and then locate specific actions and events within 
that locality, counter-memory starts with the particular and the specific and then builds 
onward toward a total history. Counter-memory looks to the past for hidden histories 
excluded from dominant narratives. But unlike myths, which seek to detach events and 
actions from the fabric of any larger history, counter-memory forces revision of existing 
histories by supplying new perspectives about the past.57 Counter-memory embodies 
53 Daniel Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Select Essays and Interviews with 
Michel Foucault (Ithala, NY: Cornell University Press), quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics of 
public history in post-apartheid South Africa,” accessed from 
http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/Departemente1/geskiedenis/docs/baines_g.pdf. 
54 Daniel Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Select Essays and Interviews with 
Michel Foucault (Ithala, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 144, quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics 
of public history in post-apartheid South Africa.” 
55 Daniel Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Select Essays and Interviews with 
Michel Foucault (Ithala, NY: Cornell University Press), p. 144, quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics 
of public history in post-apartheid South Africa.” 
56 Lipsitz, G. Time Passages: Collective approach to memory and American Popular Culture 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p. 213. Daniel Bouchard (ed.), Language, 
Counter-Memory, Practice: Select Essays and Interviews with Michel Foucault (Ithala, NY: Cornell 
University Press), p. 144, quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics of public history in post-apartheid 
South Africa.”  
57 Gary Baines, “The politics of public history in post-apartheid South Africa.”  
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aspects of myth and aspects of history, but it retains an enduring suspicion of both 
categories. Counter-memory focuses on localised experiences of oppression, using them 
to reframe and refocus dominant narratives purporting to represent universal experience. 
Thus counter-memory is not a rejection of history, but a reconstitution of it.58 Particular 
versions of the past are selectively invoked to add credence and authenticity to truth 
claims,
 
as well as to assert the right to a particular legacy and identity. David Lowenthal 
cites a civil rights veteran: “If we don’t tell the story or control the telling it’s no longer 
about us”.59
 
The issue is one of ownership and control of the past, and how to get others 
to buy into a specific version thereof. This is where public memory comes into the 
picture. 
  
10.5 Examples from Interviews in Vulindlela 
 
Earlier events can be reconstructed in the process of remembering, as they are 
retrospectively instilled with new meaning. In other words, “the past is not preserved, 
but is reconstructed on the bases of the present.”60 This was evident in the interviews. 
The interviewees largely remembered events in the past by connecting these with 
current systems of meaning. These reconstructed memories on occasion strengthened 
resentment between individuals in Vulindlela communities. One interviewee, asked to 
share his memories of violence, said: 
 
[…] The reason why we have all these problems today in our communities is 
because the ANC allowed young people to control us – there is endless and 
uncontrollable crime in our community. Women were raped during the period 
of violence, women are still raped today. Schools were boycotted and broken 
into by the very same amaqaban,; we have similar problems even today. 
People were killed and their bodies mutilated then, have you heard [on the 
news], even today these things are happening. Who do you blame? The youths 
58 Lipsitz, G. Time Passages: Collective approach to memory and American Popular Culture 
(Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p. 213, quoted from Gary Baines, “The 
politics of public history in post-apartheid South Africa,” 
http://sun025.sun.ac.za/portal/page/portal/Arts/Departemente1/geskiedenis/docs/baines_g.pdf. 
59 Lowenthal, D. The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) see also Lowenthal, “Fabricating Heritage”, History and Memory, 10, 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 
5-24, quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics of public history in post-apartheid South Africa.” 
60 Halbwaches quoted in Edkins, J, Trauma and Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 32, quoted from Gary Baines, “The politics of public history in post-apartheid South 
Africa.” 
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that did not get opportunities to go to school during the violence period are 
responsible for all problems we are faced with and the ANC is responsible. 
Bheki Cele says people should return their illegal guns to the police. They 
[ANC] gave these guns to the ANC supporters to kill us. They are testing their 
own medicine.61   
 
One woman in KwaShange had an interest in being a ward councillor (Ward 4, 
comprised of areas aligned to ANC and IFP. These areas were at loggerheads in the 
80s and 90s) shared her memories of political violence: 
 
You see, the reason why our infrastructure development is delayed in 
KwaShange is because Inkatha [IFP] won the elections in the province in 
1994. They deliberately created a system that made it difficult for us 
[supporters of the ANC] to get development in our areas. We fought for this 
democracy. Many people in KwaShange lost their lives. Even today [2008] 
our area is not developed because, even though the ANC is in control of 
KwaZulu-Natal, many office officials are still IFP and they deliberately 
bypass ANC-supporting communities. I want to be a councillor so as to ‘settle 
the score’. Firstly, for all our people that Inkatha killed during the time of 
violence [in the 1980s-1990s]. Secondly, to develop ANC supporting areas in 
Vulindlela, as they have been ignored since 1994.62 
 
Another woman interviewee, in the IFP area: 
 
Now that there is no more fighting in our area, we need to seriously consider 
appointing women in the leadership of our communities. Women suffered a 
great deal; they were the ones who made sure that children are taken care of 
whilst men were fighting. The tension that existed between us [IFP] and ANC 
is the reason why we are not progressing as women in rural areas. I think we 
should put aside our differences as women and fight for our rights. Women are 
reliable. They are not corrupt as men are. I think one thing that the violence 
taught is that we should not allow men to do as they wish with our lives. The 
61Interview with Mhlephila Ndlovu, KwaShange, 14 March 2009.  
62 Interview with Nozibele Mthombeni, KwaShange, 12 March 2009. 
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reason why violence got out of hand was because men were dominating – and 
look where that brought us, to this endless circle of pain, suffering and lack.63  
 
These testimonies show that memories of violence are reconstructed. The earlier 
events are given new meanings as they are interpreted through the needs of the 
present day. Giving the past new meaning, they came to the conclusion that 
everybody is affected by political actions or systems in this country.  
 
The second interviewee feels that men were dominant in the past and their dominance 
led to the area being engulfed by violence. She feels that men should not be allowed 
to continue ‘messing-up’ the area [and the country] because “they are not reliable and 
they are corrupt.” She sees the suffering of women in Vulindlela [and South Africa, in 
general] as a continuation from the time of violence when men were dominant and led 
the area astray. The current outcries in the country about corruption influence her 
memory of violence. Women suffered then but they are still suffering today. She feels 
that women should take community leadership positions in Vulindlela, precisely to 
correct the wrongs that were done by men who led the area into an “unnecessary 
war”.  
 
Remembering is an important aspect in this regard, because in one sense these women 
“compose their memories to help them feel relatively comfortable with their lives, 
which give them a feeling of composure.”64 This corresponds with the fact that these 
two women are caregivers, reliable, anti-corruption, have memories of suffering and 
feelings of community leadership responsibility.  
 
Memories in KwaShange are often referred to as proof or evidence of what really 
happened. In the aftermath of violence, people draw on memories when justifying 
their actions today. One man shared his memory of violence and used them to justify 
why his son had to be appointed as the ward councellor in KwaShange.  
 
[…] I suffered a lot for this community. I was found guilty of a crime I did not 
commit – but a state gun that was signed out under my name was used to 
63 Interview with Thulile Mbongwa, KwaShange, 12 March 2009. 
64 Thomson in Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, p. 29.  
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killed Inkatha youth – the killing was justified because if the youth were not 
killed, many people would be dead by now. The Inkatha youth was planning 
to attack and kill many people here. […] Now I am not able to support my 
family because I cannot be employed. […] my son should at least be given 
opportunities by the ANC-led government to be a councellor. This will help 
my family to ‘put food on the table.’65 
 
The debate in KwaShange as to who should become the ward councellor, and why, is 
built partly on constructed memories of previous times – violence of the 1980s. The 
use of memories as proof of previous suffering and the reasons for benefitting in the 
current dispensation is common in KwaShange. Interviews show that people use 
memories of violence in their strategies to gain political authority and benefit from the 
current government of the ANC.   
 
Tacit carriers of community memory are often to be found in all three areas in the 
form of ruins of homesteads, shops and buildings that were once homes of people 
who were either killed or displaced by the violence. Families, even those who have 
relocated, will keep these places untouched, as reminders as sacred ground and the 
graves of their forefathers. It can be argued that these sites also tell the ‘silent’ story 
of the violence. 
 
 A number of ruins from the violence are kept untouched. They serve as constant 
reminders of what happened in KwaShange, but also as proof of the suffering of 
individuals. Many interviewees voiced their memories of the sites where their 
relatives died. These sites are, in the main, houses that were burnt with people inside. 
The survivors use these as proof when they claim compensation from the provincial 
government. They also use these ruins to prove that their suffering “really” happened.  
 
65 Interview with Ntandose Nhlumayo, KwaShange, 12 March 2009. 
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Burnt house in KwaShange – picture taken by member of SAP in 1987 (Pietermaritzburg archives) 
 
It is in these ruins that interviewees remembered details of their experiences; for 
instance, Zenze Dlomo remembered that his son had been wearing his grey raincoat 
because it had been raining. He also remembered that his son had been standing 
leaning on the wall when the bullet hit him and he was able to point to the section of 
the house which was standing. Many were overcome by emotions which they had 
suppressed.  Beside ruins or sites that are used as memory triggers and constant 
reminders of what really happened, others used photographs to evoke memories of 
violence. Visual historians such as Patricia Hays have shown the importance of 
photographs as legitimate historical texts to be analysed and presented.66 
 
Zulu philosophy says umenzi uyakhohlwa kodwa umenziwa akakhohlwa [the doer of 
bad deed forgets, but the sufferer does not]. This Zulu expression is  normally used if 
there has been a quarrel.  
 
66 Hayes, P. and Bank, A. “Introduction” in Kronos (Special Issue: Visual History, 2001) 27, pp. 1-14 
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My interviews with oral informants from KwaShange who were ANC supporters and 
from neighbouring areas which supported the IFP proved this expression to be 
correct. Many interviewees from KwaShange remembered only bad things that were 
done to them by Inkatha combatants. Gonyela Ndlovu was a UDF child combatant in 
1988 in KwaShange; in the same year he and other seven young UDF combatants 
were apprehended by police in Mvundlweni whilst carrying out an attack. They killed 
three men at the bus stop who were waiting for transport to Pietermaritzburg. In an 
interview, Gonyela Ndlovu said: 
 
Inkatha combatants were merciless; they often attacked unexpectedly and 
killed people. I cannot even count how many times we were attacked. They 
usually came at awkward times, early in the morning, 03h00, when everybody 
is fast asleep, and they burnt houses. Many people [in KwaShange] were killed 
in these attacks […]67  
 
Gonyela’s memory is selective. He seemed to have forgotten about the many 
atrocities and human rights violation he committed. All that he remembers, when 
asked about his experiences of violence, are atrocities committed by Inkatha 
combatants toward him and KwaShange people. This testimony is representative of 
many such stories in KwaShange, where oral sources speak as if they had not attacked 
Inkatha supporters, despite evidence to the contrary.  
 
In Mpumuza, an IFP neighbouring area, Manzini (in a wheelchair), who was injured 
in KwaShange in the February 1991 massacre, said: 
 
[…] Ngingaxola kodwa ngeke ngikhohle [I will forgive but I will not forget] 
what was done to us in KwaShange. Today I am in a wheelchair because of 
their brutality. I am grateful, however, because I am still alive because many 
of my neighbours did not survive. They died. They were killed and mutilated 
in KwaShange. Others disappeared; even today we do not know where their 
remains are.68 
 
67 Interview with Gonyela Ndlovu, KwaShange, 14 April 2009. 
68 Interview with Manzini, KwaMpumuza, 14 April 2009. 
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Another thing I noticed with Vulindlela oral sources, particularly those who had 
committed human rights violations, is that they minimise their actions during the 
violence. This is a less extreme form of denial. They do not deny that particular gross 
human rights violations occurred, but they question victims’ or recipients’ emotional 
responses or experiences. They make statements like “banehaba” (they are 
exaggerating) “nabozwela kakhulu” (they are too sensitive): 
 
This was common during those days, there was a war. Did they expect us to 
fold our arms when they attacked us? Did they not kill our people, did they not 
destroy our property? Did they not loot? For me it was not a big deal. These 
things should not be blown out of proportion. All I know is that we defended 
ourselves from people who attacked us. We eliminated ophumasilwe 
[warlords] and I do not regret we got rid of them because otherwise this area 
would be something else if they did not die […] so I am saying it is not a big 
deal.69 
 
 Many survivors of this turmoil have compartmentalised their memories. Because 
their stories are no longer regarded as heroic, as they used to be during the times of 
violence, they select or choose what they want to discuss with the interviewer. Painful 
and traumatic memories – especially the terrible things they did to their enemies – 
were not shared. In some instances they denied that certain gross human rights 
violations were committed. Many refused to revive these suppressed traumatic 
memories. Common immediate responses were either to remain silent or show anger, 
when, for example, asked about atrocities and body mutilations, in particular. Silence 
and anger seemed to be their defence mechanism. When they showed anger or 
remained silent they either changed the subject if the interviewee was a kind person or 
discontinued the interview if the interviewer was persistent. Only three people 
threatened me. The defence mechanism was used against a truth which seemed 
unbearable to them. What made them open up and tell the truth eventually? Survivors 
of violence have to develop trust in the interviewer that is genuinely prepared to listen 
and is not going to be judgmental. The venue in which the interviews took place was 
private. 
69 Interview with Ndonga Dlomo, KwaShange, 14 April 2009. 
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At the beginning of the interviews in 2008 there were high levels of resistance, mainly 
from men. Those men who had participated as young combatants at the time of the 
violence refused to share their memories. This group of men showed symptoms of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. They tended to be alcoholics, or use drugs (dagga). 
The majority is unemployed and some of them have been in and out of prison. They 
were mentioned as people who had committed atrocious acts in the name of the 
community. They were regarded as heroes at the time but after the violence had come 
to an end, they were regarded by the same community as villains.  
 
I was not there. I never did anything wrong. I do not remember anything. I 
think if you want to know how what happened, you should talk to your 
brothers and stop bothering the whole community. Why do you want to bring 
back things that we have forgotten about? Do you think it was nice? Do you 
think we enjoyed it?70  
 
In September 2008, I phoned Nosihle Phakathi and made an appointment to interview 
her. She promised that she would be ready. The following week I drove from Durban 
to meet with her in KwaShange, as per our arrangement. She did not come to 
welcome us (my research assistance and myself), but instead her older brother asked: 
 
Tell me, what are you going to gain with all this? […] do you realise that you 
are hurting people. Nosihle lost her three months baby. Inkatha people 
attacked her boyfriend’s family where she was at the time; they shot and killed 
everyone in the house, took the baby and burnt the house. She does not talk 
about this […] because she does not want to talk about it. I would advise you 
to stop it. She will not talk to you about it […].71  
 
These two passages are examples of aggression, anger and silence shown by 
interviewees in KwaShange. These statements attest that informants have not dealt 
with their past experiences. Sipho Sokhela, for instance, shows that his memories of 
the violence are unbearable. He does not want to remember it. In order to avoid 
70 Interview with Sipho Sokhela, KwaShange, 11 May 2008. 
71 Interview with Ndovela Phakathi, KwaShange 16 August 2009 
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talking about it, he becomes defensive and he tells ‘white lies’ – he started by saying 
“I was not there”, “I did not do anything” and “I do not remember anything.” Nosihle 
Phakathi’s silent response is a defence mechanism against the fact that she lost her 
baby.  
 
I continued working with members of the community, especially those that had a 
problem with sharing their memories, but I noted that many interviewees in the 
beginning were talking in generic terms – they avoided discussing personal 
experiences. To be on the safe side many interviewees used words like “sezwa 
kuthiwa” [we heard that this and that happened]. It took a lot of negotiation between 
myself and the individuals concerned and the intervention of community leadership. It 
was only when I shared my own experiences of this violence with community 
members in a meeting that many began to trust me. Others even mentioned afterwards 
that they thought that I was interested in getting stories for newspapers or radio, 
because in 2004 I was working for the SABC radio news and I was a regular 
commentator in The Witness newspaper in early 2009. As a result, many thought it 
was a journalistic project. It was only after I had assured them that I would not 
publish this in any newspaper or broadcast it on the radio that they agreed to talk to 
me. I referred to the safe, secluded place where we would do the interview. I had to 
promise that that I would not bring a camera or tape recorder, as I had done before. I 
promised that I would come alone, without my research assistant. I also promised 
them anonymity72. Even after this, it took them many months to agree to share their 
experiences. It was only in 2010 that I managed to break through and get some people 
to share – especially those who had been young combatants.  
 
Inkatha combatants were strong, they had ammunition and the sort of 
weaponry that we did not have. They came here at night with [Magnus] Malan 
and they were trained in Caprivi – so you see – they had a lot of support from 
the boers. To cause them pain, we had to be brutal to those that we managed to 
capture. We always ran to hide when we saw them [Inkatha] attacking, but 
when they started killing women and children who could not defend 
themselves – we used to come and defend our women and children. That is 
72 See appendix “consent form and letter  
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when we really started mutilating their bodies. You must know that we need to 
be strong. It was the only way we could protect ourselves from their bullets 
[…]73 
 
This is a typical example of a memory reconstructed.  Firstly, at the time it was not 
known that it was Magnus Malan who worked with the state police in Vulindlela to 
kill people; it was only during the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings that 
Malan spoke out and asked for forgiveness. The memories of this interviewee are 
mixed with information he must have learnt from newspapers, or heard on the radio in 
discussions after the violence. During the interview he spoke as if he saw Magnus 
Malan. Secondly, he spoke about Inkatha combatants as trained in the Caprivi. These 
details were not known at the time of the violence. They only surfaced after the 
violence, during the Commissions’ hearings.   
 
When I interviewed those who were young combatants during the violence, especially 
when asked about their involvement in muthi rituals and human body mutilations, 
many denied that it happened. Others admitted “we heard about it but we do not know 
details because we never partook of those rituals”. When I persisted, on some 
occasions I was harshly treated and requested to stop, because “it had nothing to do 
with you”. Some questioned me “where are we going with this discussion?” and 
“what are your intentions?” Others even asked “why are you asking these questions?” 
Many of them refused ever to talk to me again about their experiences of political 
violence in the 1980s-1990s. Some, when asked, claimed that they had forgotten. 
They did not remember anything that happened because “it was a long time ago”.  
 
10.6 Memory Triggers 
Human beings have memory triggers that set off very strong recollections of past 
experiences. In KwaShange, interviewees spoke of a number of things that brought 
back memories of the violence of the 1980s. Many spoke of memory triggers such as 
sound, a particular scent, or something a person sees, that flashes him or her back into 
his or her past. These triggers cause them to relive long ago times so intensely that 
73 Interview with an anonymous source in KwaShange, 14 September 2010. 
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nothing else existed but the moment they were reliving. Many indicated that they feel 
the same feelings they felt when the memory was born.  
10.6.1 Sgede’s testimony: 
I had been smoking dagga and drinking beer and joined [Inkatha] group that 
attacked and burnt Zibula’s family [in 1987]. I assaulted Zakhe Zibula [owner 
of the home that was attacked], kicked and stabbed [a two year-old baby] in 
the face, insulted Zibula’s wife with being UDF informer and of being a witch. 
I also got injured in the incident when UDF supporters came to defend the 
family. I must have also heard about the incident from my friends Tana and 
Latu Zuma, who were there when the attack was carried out.  And I'm sure I 
brooded about the incident for days when I was in Edendale hospital and then 
Plessislaer police station in Edendale. 
Sgede claims to have no memory of being part of the Inkatha group that attacked the 
Zibula family that night, or of anything he did or said. Like many other violent crimes 
he committed in the 1980s-1990s, it dropped down into a memory hole and has stayed 
there ever since. Sgede continued “[…] but even if I cannot remember that night, I 
have never forgotten that it occurred.” Several things serve as memory triggers for 
him. One memory trigger is the Zibula homestead itself. It is still there on the same 
plot in KwaShange and still the same house that was burnt, but rebuilt later. 
Following his friends’ advice, Sgede has not set his foot therein it for more than 
twenty-four years. He fled to Elandskop that September [1987], but returned home 
many times to visit. “And I could not walk past that the homestead without 
remembering the incident [attack] I could not remember.” 
Another memory trigger for Sgede is a mark on the face of Nana Zibula [who was 
wounded when she was two years old]. Nana is mature now, but the scar is still there. 
As she grows older, the scar grows bigger. Nana Zibula’s testimony about the incident 
contains a similar phenomenon. She cannot remember the actual incident, but because 
of the scar on her face and the information she received from her parents about how 
she was injured and by whom, she can talk about the incident as though she 
remembered it.  
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Another memory trigger for Sgede is Edendale hospital itself and the Plessislaer 
police-station, which is opposite the hospital. These two institutions are situated on 
the main Edendale Road. Anybody travelling by bus or other transport from 
KwaShange to Pietermaritzburg is bound to see them. 
Two other memory triggers involve the name of the Zibula. The homestead is close to 
the main road in KwaShange and the name of the bus stop close to the homestead is 
“KwaZibula”. Every time the name is mentioned Sgede remembers the night when he 
attacked the Zibula homestead. Zibula subsequently died because of the injuries he 
received during the attack. His grave is marked by an imposing monument. “When I 
pass the grave, I think of that night of attack,” Sgede says. 
Some people reported that they contracted terminal illnesses. A few have bullets, 
which cannot be removed, in their bodies. They take medication, which itself is a 
constant reminder to them that they went through a terrible phase in their lives.  
10.7 Where do they remember? 
Most of my interviews were conducted in KwaShange. The landscape, mountains, 
hills and rivers bring back memories of the violence. Beside the fact that they see 
these things every day, once they are asked about the violence they point at these 
things as their memory triggers. For instance, Moses Ndlovu walked with me to 
Msunduzi River where his daughter was shot and killed during the Seven Days War. 
They seem to remember well when they are in the KwaShange area – when many of 
their experiences took place – as opposed to when they are elsewhere.  
 
10.8 When do they remember? 
As I have claimed earlier in this chapter, some memories are suppressed; some 
people, whom I began to persuade in 2008 to be interviewed, refused and said they 
had forgotten what happened. They only started opening up when they developed 
trust in me. After a long period of persuading them to talk, they started talking in 





10.9 Dreams and reconstructed memories 
 
The concept of flashback (while the facts of the dream might not be accurate, the 
feelings are), implies the literal re-instatement of the sensory context of the traumatic 
event. Yet the notion of a timeless, inflexible, photographic reproduction flies in the 
face of what we know about the dynamics of the brain.74 In other words, the feeling of 
sensory reinstatement can be very powerful, but this metacognitive (knowing about 
knowing) sense of literal replaying is illusory. The same holds for traumatic 
nightmares. Although survivors reported that their nightmares are replays of the 
traumatic experiences, this cannot literally be true. To be sure, dreams tied closely to 
the traumatic events can be reconstructed and “re-experienced” during sleep, but such 
re-experiences are not reproductions.  
 
Flashbacks can happen in a number of ways. While most people think of flashbacks 
as visual, they can tie into any of the senses. For example, one women mentioned that 
she often gets a memory or flashback when she smells braai meat. Since 1987 she has 
never again eaten braai meat or wanted to be around where there is braai meat. This 
ties into a memory in which she saw a person burning to death during one of the 
attacks in KwaShange. She was at close range and she could smell the burning body, 
which “smelt like braai meat.”  
 
Example of a dream: Zenzile Hlomuka says she dreamt in 1987 of a group of 
vigilantes attacking KwaShange, carrying traditional weapons and singing war songs. 
Their commander was a short man with long hair, dark in complection, and they were 
accompanied by a few white men. In the dream, the white men were carrying ‘big 
machine guns’ she had never seen before. In telling her dream in 2009, Zenzile 
attached names to the faces she had seen in her dream. She calls the commander of 
the impis David Ntombela and she identifies the white men that accompanied the 
combatants as state police led by Magnus Malan.  
 
Zenzile admits that she only got to hear about David Ntombela in 1990. The same 
applies to Magnus Malan, who was not known in KwaShange in the 1980s. People 
74 McNally, Richard. “Debunking Myths About Trauma and Memory, The Canadian Journal of 
Psychiatry – In Review, Vol 50, No 13. 2005, pp. 113-7. 
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got to know about him and his contribution to the KwaShange violence in 1996, when 
there were TRC hearings in Pietermaritzburg. This is a typical example of a 
reconstructed memory. Her narration is based on knowledge she acquired many years 
after she had dreamt. Her telling of the dream is influenced by what she heard in the 
TRC hearing, as well as what she read in the newspapers about state police.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter claims that past-present relationships shape memory. 
Individual and collective or state memories are reconstructed. In KwaShange, 
individual memories are influenced by time, guilt and shame. The violence this thesis 
is concerned about happened 15 to 25 years ago. It is a relatively long period and 
much has been said in the media and TRC, so interviewees reconstruct their memories 
based on what they have learnt or heard subsequently. Some interviewees feel guilt 
and have shameful or unpopular memories.75 These are those who are alleged to have 
been violators of human rights. They are the ones who show signs of guilt and anger 
when asked to remember. These shameful memories, that interviewees cannot tolerate 
emotionally or imagine that they are too risky to disclose, are also shaped by ongoing 
relationships to people and spaces around them.76 How people consciously and 
unconsciously evaluate the external significance of their memories determine how 
they frame their memories and stories for disclosure, or retain them as privately 
closed and inaccessible. Moreover, constructions of the private/public relationship are 
crucial in shaping what is remembered, how it is remembered, what is silenced or 
forgotten, what is expressed and how it is expressed and to whom.  
 
75 Thomson, A. Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend quoted in Field, S. et al. Imagining the City: 
Memories and Cultures in Cape Town  (Cape Town: HSRC, 2007), p 10. 
76 Connerton, P. How Societies Remember (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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Chapter Eleven 
 





This chapter provides a summary of the aims of the study, including the argument, 
followed by an assessment of the contribution of the study and an outline of 
implications for further research.   
 
Ryszard Kapusckinski, a Polish journalist, wrote:  
 
The world contemplates the great spectacle of combat and death, which is 
difficult for it to imagine in the end, because the image of war is not 
communicable – not by the pen, or the voice, or the camera. War is a reality 
only to those stuck in its bloody, dreadful, filthy insides. To others, it is pages 
in a book, pictures on a screen, nothing more.1 
 
Despite Kapusckinski’s claim, with which I agree to an extent, that the full horror of 
war cannot be communicated in words or images, I have tried in this thesis to record 
and communicate some of the facts of the violence in Vulindlela, KwaShange.  
 
The study fills an existing gap in the literature on political violence in the Natal 
Midlands, by describing and analysing the history of political violence in KwaShange, 
centring the account on the testimony of survivors, and its effects on the community 
members in the ensuing years. Most studies concerning violence during the period of 
the conflict did not obtain details of what happened in local communities. I have 
therefore looked into the events that took place in a relatively small community and 
how the violence generated there subsequently spread to surrounding areas of 
Vulindlela. I describe key events prior to 1987, which contributed to the climate in 
which hostilities took place – such as the breach between supporters of Inkatha and 
those of the UDF in the early 1980s.  
 
1Ryszard Kapusckinski, Another Day of Life, quoted in Kentridge, M. “The Unofficial War in Natal: 
Pietermaritzburg Under the Knife”, paper presented in a seminar at Wits University, 29 March 1990. 
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11.2 Restatement of the argument 
  
My hypothesis is that suffering experienced as a result of this violence, and its 
consequences, has influenced the lives of the whole population of KwaShange, and 
that this has been transmitted across generations, through whole families and 
communities. The social structure of the community was affected by it and, by 
implication, successive generations were, and probably will be, also affected. I 
contend that the impact of political violence in KwaShange is felt beyond immediate 
survivors and it has become part of some of the resident’s identity.  
 
11.3 Contributions of the present study 
 
This study cannot do full justice to the history of political violence in Vulindlela, 
which would occupy volumes. My major preoccupation is to record this turmoil and 
to produce the first scholarly work specifically on KwaShange. The wish that the 
conflict be recorded as it took place in this small area was attested to by the 
exhilaration of local leaders when approached to contribute to the study by recounting 
their memories of the history of the area and of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. 
MaZamisa Shange, now about 90 years old, exclaimed, “I knew that the complex 
history of this area would be told by one of us.” Her contemporary, Manciza Zondi, 
concurred with her, saying that “this is our heritage, this is our wealth [laughing 
sarcastically] – this is the only share of inheritance we can give to our young ones.”2   
 
I have provided a new type of contribution to the literature on political violence in 
Natal and Zululand, but particularly the Midlands: the experience, memories and 
interpretation of the insider. I feel that political violence not only affects the 
generations that experienced and actively participated in the violence; those born 
during and after the violence suffered – and continue to suffer – a great deal. Within 
the existing literature, there is little focus on, or analysis of, the psychological effects 
on survivors many years after the violence ended.  
 
2Interview with MaZamisa Shange and Manciza Zondi, KwaShange, 14 March 2010. 
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Most of the earlier studies concentrated on townships; few attempted to focus on rural 
areas. My own work describes and analyses the prevalence of muthi use and all rituals 
associated with it, a subject avoided by most other historians.3  
 
Women are at the heart of acts of remembrance, because political conflicts or wars 
move out of the battlefield and into every corner of civilian or ordinary people’s lives. 
This is why women, as well as men, construct the story and disseminate it. Women 
join men in forming a new class of historical actors: what we now term “witnesses,” 
people who were there; who have seen war at close range, whose memories are part of 
historical records. Their testimony documents the crimes they have seen, but their 
stories and their telling of them in public are historical events in their own right. Most 
studies on political violence have neglected the experiences of women. This thesis 
provides women with a platform outside of KwaShange on which to share their 
memories. They tell of their prophetic dreams related to this violence, a subject that 
has never been touched on in the existing literature.  
  
Much research has been conducted in the area of trauma amongst victims of violent 
crime in South Africa, but little attention has been given to the ways in which an 
individual constructs and theorises his or her traumatic experiences and the impact 
that these explanations have on the prognosis and the healing processes. My study 
investigates and describes the non-professional understanding of traumatic violence 
within a historical and political context and how this impacts on the individual’s 
socio-cultural view of reality. 
 
For Freud, violence is innate in human nature and finds easy expression in times of 
conflict. Backer states that political violence undermines individuals’ sense of 
belonging to society. Political violence is laden with social meaning and tells victims 
how others value (or devalue) them as human beings; it communicates to them their 
3I think the reason why this ritual was not recorded was the monitors’ abhorrence of what they would 
consider barbaric custom. When Jeff Guy launched his book, Remembering the Rebellion: The Zulu 
Uprising of 1906, at the Campbell Collections on 19 October 2006 he said, when he was doing field 
research at KwaMaphumulo, he wanted to ignore the incident of the death of Oliver Veal, who was 
killed for ritual purposes. However, it was Qwabe people who broached the subject and asked Guy to 
take up the issue because they felt that Veal’s spirit had to find rest and be reconciled.  
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place in society.4 Adam Curle states that a society under stress, such as civil war or 
violent conflict, will have higher rates of depression, anxiety, panic and violence. If, 
as is often the case in war-torn societies, the conflict has continued or broken out 
sporadically for years, this behaviour may eventually become accepted and may be 
common to large portions of the population and thus may be considered a cultural 
phenomenon.5 Curle notes, regarding societies torn by civil conflict, that “alienation 
has tended to escalate into post-traumatic stress syndrome. Violence generally 
continues to exist within the social fabric of societies coming out of conflict for 
decades to come.”6  
 
Generally, what I describe in this thesis did not take place in the public eye, nor was it 
recorded in newspaper reports: it does not deal with any prominent man that was a 
founder of the UDF or Inkatha, or with ‘war lords’ or commanders of vigilante 
groups. It is not much concerned with the sufferings of the mighty in camps or on  
battle fields, but rather with the sacrifices, emotional torture, agony and psychological 
effects that almost every man, woman and child endured.   
 
My study was conducted 15 years after the end of the violence in KwaShange. The 
fundamental questions my work attempts to answer are: how is the violence 
remembered by its survivors 15 years later; what are the consequences of the 
experiences and how do they affect family life and schooling? How much 
displacement of families has there been? I have tried, especially in Chapters Three, 
Eight and Nine to answer the following questions: how did communities, families and 
individuals survive these traumatic experiences? How did they cope, or fail to cope, 
with their experiences, both then and 15 years after the end of the violence? 
 
In Chapter One I examine the issues mentioned above, which, I assert, have never 
been subject to investigation. This chapter then proceeds to set this study in the 
4D. Becker, “Dealing with the Consequences of Organized Violence”, in Berghof Handbook for 
Conflict Transformation. (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 
2001). 
5Adam Curle, Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Violence (Oxford: Jon Carpenter 
Publishing, 1995). 




                                                 
context of the wider literature concerning Natal violence, memory and trauma. I 
introduce my topic and explain under what conditions my study was carried out. 
 
Chapter Two explains and justifies the research methodology of the study (mainly 
with respect to interviews). I systematically and rigorously reveal my research 
methodology and myself as “the instrument of information generation.”7 This engages 
with the insider-outsider debate. I note that critical and feminist theory, post-
modernism, multi-culturalism and action research help reframe one’s understanding 
of insider-outsider issues, particularly in respect of positionality and power and 
knowledge construction. This chapter considers the advantages and disadvantages of 
insider research. Against this background I consider my own position. I reason that 
the insider-outsider dichotomy is simplistic. I found myself in a constantly changing 
continuum between the two positions.  
 
Chapter Three deals with what I consider to be my main contribution to the scholarly 
work on violence in the region. The effects of the violence of the 1980s and 1990s on 
the generations not directly involved because of their age, and on the ‘born free’ 
generation, constitute a major subject in my study; I have also presented the accounts 
of actual combatants. I have used my own memories to paint a picture of the 
psychological and emotional effects of this upheaval. I offer first-hand accounts of 
this terrible period of the past, drawn from the time period that I am interested in, as 
primary sources. My mother’s memories and my own provide ‘windows’ into the 
past. 
 
Part of the subject matter of this thesis is how I experienced the violence of 1987 to 
1996, from the age of about eight until my early teens. This period of uncertainty and 
violence marked my life and affected my identity. I have made regular reference to 
my historically constructed self, shaped by my own history and past experience. Mine 
was a childhood that, in its interactions between parents, children and siblings, was 
echoed in many other families in KwaShange. I use this thesis to understand some of 
the effects of war on family dynamics. This adds an authentic dimension to existing 
7Ruby, “Exposing Yourself: Reflexibility, Anthropology and Film” in Kinesis Reports 3: 1 (1980), 153. 
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knowledge of the violence in the Midlands. I hope that my work helps to justify the 
methodological use of self in research. 
 
My study does not claim to be an account of facts and events, but of personal 
experiences, which thousands of people who experienced violence suffered time and 
again. It is the inside story of KwaShange, told by one of its survivors. What makes it 
unique is that it does not focus on great incidents, but deals with the multitude of 
small emotional and psychological effects. It tries to answer the question: how was 
everyday life in KwaShange during the years of conflict reflected in the mind of the 
average person? That is why I have opted to use myself and my mother as examples 
of what was going on in people’s minds, because I know what was happening in my 
mind. Section one deals with how a scholar researches a traumatic event that he 
himself experienced. What influence has the past on the present – the memories of 
violence today? Personal experiences are interwoven with scholarly comment and 
used to explain how my research project developed. I use autobiography as a method 
in qualitative research and discuss the challenges and opportunities it raises for 
qualitative researchers.  
 
This thesis tries to answer, with reference to the small details of personal experience, 
the question of what happened in KwaShange. As mentioned earlier, this area has 
never been researched. What happened there in the 1980s and 1990s is not 
documented. 
 
In Chapter Four I provide an historical background to KwaShange. I record the 
influxes and layers of diverse groups of refugees and others who settled in the area, 
the final wave of whom were escaping from white farms. Chapter four attempts to 
show how these various epochs and phases affected the KwaShange area. It 
documents these, with the object of determining the roots of violence in the 1980s and 
1990s. I reason that the history of KwaShange remains in the hearts of its residents, 
and more especially it resides in the spirits of their ancestors, in their graves. This 
chapter specifically shows a deep history of internal conflicts in the area (so-called 
‘faction fights’) and how this fed into and was overlain by the later political violence 
between Inkatha and the ANC. While political violence was not a new phenomenon, 
what happened from 1987 onwards was different from anything that preceded it.  
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Chapter Five has two main thrusts. Firstly it provides biographies of four key ring-
leaders of the contending forces in KwaShange. These men played a central role in 
the civil unrest which unfolded. Two of them (Ngedlezi Mchunu and Makhekhe 
Thabethe) were leaders of the Inkatha group in the area, two (Moses Ndlovu and 
Chris Hlengwa) were UDF/ANC leaders. Drawn from newspaper sources, but also, 
critically, from interviews with these protagonists, I offer insight into the 
disintegration of the KwaShange community into civil war and its wider 
repercussions in Vulindlela, in general. The interviews and biographical sketches, 
among other sources, reveal how the bitter enemies Mchunu and Hlengwa were once 
best friends, how the union leader, Ndlovu, was recruited at a remarkably early stage 
into the ranks of the ANC. Secondly, this chapter provides a month-by-month, 
sometimes day-by-day chronology of events in KwaShange, based mainly on 
interviews I conducted in KwaShange. 
 
The principal purpose of chapter six is to explain the wider politics that stood behind 
the conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s in Natal and Zululand, with a view to showing 
how provincial and national developments, in particular the emerging tension between 
Inkatha and the ANC at the national level of leadership, changed the climate in 
KwaShange and fuelled violence. 
 
Chapter Seven focuses on the subject of precognitive dreams and visions of political 
conflict. The chapter outlines some precedents in colonial and apartheid society, 
before concentrating specifically on KwaShange. A key point that this chapter makes 
is that dreams and visions comprise a culturally defined means of communication 
between the living and the ancestors or God and have a strong impact on 
communities’ conceptions of reality. I reason that through dreams and visions one can 
gain an additional and unique access to the period studied; dreams and visions in 
KwaShange affected and influenced the political history of the area. I note that it was 
mainly women who experienced prophetic dreams and visions in this period. The 
chapter goes on to discuss dreams and experiences by women. A common theme for 
several of the dreams that it discusses is their revelatory, predictive character. Another 
was the carnage they saw. A third was their muddled, disturbed character. The chapter 
then elaborates on a point raised earlier, the gendered character of visions and dreams 
– women saw visions, men practised rituals.  
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The chapter records that women are at the heart of acts of remembrance of political 
conflicts. It demonstrates that the violence moves out of the battlefield and into every 
corner of ordinary people’s lives. Women join men in forming a new class of 
historical actors: what we now term ‘witnesses,’ people who were there; who have 
seen violence at close range, whose memories are part of historical records. This 
chapter discusses the dreams and visions women had during and after the violence. In 
my opinion researchers, through studying the dreams of their research subjects, gain 
access to their period of study. Dreams are often about past and future events. In the 
case of KwaShange, individuals had dreams that affected the history of violence in the 
area. I suggest that historians, especially those that conduct research into the lives of 
people who have faith in the prophetic powers of dreams, should draw on dreams and 
visions, because they are part of most Zulus’ lives and beliefs. 
 
 Chapter Eight highlights on the issue of ritual murder in the conflicts of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The aim of this chapter is to fill the critical gap left open by scholars of 
political violence in the Midlands, Natal and Zululand. It postulates that war doctors 
were at the core of political violence and that muthi made from human body parts 
played a crucial role in the rise of communities and individuals to power. The chapter 
first explores the prior history of muthi power, from Shaka onwards. It then justifies 
its focus on this subject, noting first that some scholars who have explored the 
political violence in the Midlands have considered it an inappropriate subject to 
ponder and, secondly, that this means ignoring the reasons why warriors were 
mutilated and body parts mixed with muthi were eaten. This chapter chronicles the 
psychological and social scars that muthi murders have left on the KwaShange 
community. It concludes by noting that few cleansing services happened after the 
violence came to an end, leaving these people deeply psychologically wounded. 
 
Chapter Nine in many ways extends the argument presented in Chapter Eight. It 
makes a number of central points. Firstly, the young people who were involved 
continue to bear emotional scars. Secondly, that processes of healing of the 
psychological wounds of war of these former children warriors need to be carried out. 
Thirdly, that biomedical psychotherapeutic notions of mental stress, trauma and 
healing may be inappropriate and ineffective in contexts where cultural beliefs and 
world views are different, remedies for trauma often being culturally specific.  
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Chapter Ten connects with Chapter One – the Research Methodology Section. It 
answers one of the questions raised in the thesis, how political violence is 
remembered by individuals, by the community and by the state. Analysis of 
testimonies from KwaShange interviewees indicated that their memories are 
influenced by time, guilt, shame and the accounts of others, over the years.  
 
My reliance on oral interviews poses a dilemma: it is impossible for me to judge with 
certainty whether my interviewees were telling the truth or presenting stories they had 
heard or created. What is of importance, however, is the way their memories are 
constructed and presented; because this reflects what they perceive should be known 
about this recent history. All research methods have their strengths and weaknesses. I 
mention in Chapter One the view that oral history is necessarily subjective, but while 
I recognise that oral history is unlikely to produce uncomplicated ‘truth’, I believe that 
its central strength is that in the dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee 
one can learn much about the importance of the past – or a telling of it – in the 
identity of the interviewee.8  
 
Understanding how people individually and collectively remember sensory 




11.4 Limitations of Current Research 
 
 
The limitation of this study, as is the case with most studies that use oral interviews as 
the main research method, is that it is restricted in scope because not everybody who 
knows the story is prepared to share it; oral sources are not always readily accessible. 
This study deals with a subject that left many people traumatised, while others lost 
their lives. The voices of those who died are not audible. Some people died with 
information that could have been invaluable for a study such as this. Property was 
destroyed and the State of Emergency made it impossible for detailed information to 
be documented by the media. Many private documents, like death certificates and 
8Sean Fields, “Memory, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Significant of Oral History 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, History Workshop at Wits University, 1999.  
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photographs which could have been helpful in this study, were burnt. Another 
limitation is that the study takes place almost 15 years after the end of the violence. 
Some people may have genuinely forgotten important information; others have died 
without passing the information down to younger generations. It is impossible to 
distinguish a lie from the truth without corroborative or contradictory evidence. My 
study relies, to an extent, on newspaper articles written concurrently with the violence 
and on violence monitors who recorded details of the events. These accounts help to 
validate or throw doubt on my interviewees’ narratives. I am also aware that state 
controls on the press may have rendered accounts inaccurate. 
 
I found that people in KwaShange are moving on with their lives; many did not 
realise that they still have these issues buried in their minds. When asked to 
remember, some broke into tears, whilst others deliberately blocked off the memories.   
One woman in Liberia used a metaphor of an earthquake in a vivid description of the 
violence that she had experienced. 
There are not many warning signals; the pressure building up from the bottom 
is not visible. It just hits. The ground shakes and splits. The noise of crumbling 
emotions is great. And then, a deep silence settles over the destruction. Now 
nobody can trust the ground, and the clean-up appears impossible.9   
This metaphor applies well to the experience of the civil war in KwaShange and the 
challenges it poses for dealing with the past.  
Trauma associated with the KwaShange violence is like a ‘scar on the soul’ to some 
people. Something that they block – but no matter how they suppress it, it is always 
there in their memories. People do not readily speak about this for fear of 
exacerbating the now established hatred between former neighbours and between 
9S. William, Approaches to dealing with trauma caused by war and political repression. Quoted from 
Committee for Conflict Transformation Support (CCTS) Newsletter 18.  2002.  http://www.c-




                                                 
generations. I have found a certain conspiracy of silence applicable to many of those 
who lived through these events.  
The great challenge with which the government is faced is to unify communities 
divided by political hatred, or memories of losing their relatives. Faced with such 
divisions, and uncertain about the fragile peace that came like bolt of lightning after 
the elections of 1994, the new government decided to put nation-building and 
reconciliation high on their list of priorities. In Chapter Nine I outline the programmes 
of government aimed at solving the problems remaining from the period of conflict.  
 
These processes of reconciliation and community-building may not be on the victims’ 
agenda of priorities. The victims’ and survivors’ primary needs might be personal 
healing and not national reconciliation, since the two are not necessarily mutually 
inseparable. Some of the victims might not even be aware of the government’s 
priorities and how they relate to their own traumatic situation. The ideas of 
reconciliation and nation-building that our government is promoting may not have 
anything to do with individual trauma and healing, at all.   
 
In the same way as the TRC did, national and community projects for symbolic 
reparation have shown a tendency to approach issues of memory and healing on a 
broad scale, failing to address the trauma of individuals. After considering the 
problems that national or collective processes can cause, especially the sidelining of 
voices that needed a platform and further traumatising the individuals they are 
suppose to help, I admit to harbouring some doubt as to whether national projects 
have the ability to help the individual healing process.  
 
I take issue with concepts such as ‘community trauma’ and ‘community healing’, due 
to their limitations as definitions and my doubts about their applicability. It would be 
simplistic, however, to conclude that attempts to achieve healing by collective 
memorial projects are completely ineffectual. The TRC played an important role in 
providing the space and platform through which the wounds of the past could be laid 
bare, so that appropriate remedial measures could be taken. One such outcome of the 
TRC was the birth of organizations such as Khulumani, whose focus was on 
addressing issues of personal healing. According to the study conducted by 
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Khulumani and the CSVR, survivors affirmed that, though the TRC did not cater 
adequately for their healing, it did provide a necessary platform upon which 
individual healing could progress.10 The fact that a nationally-driven memory 
reconstruction process may not completely address the needs of individual victims 
and survivors may not mean the two cannot converge at all.  
 
Although initiatives such as the KwaShange annual memorial prayers (see Chapter 
Nine), born of the collective efforts of communities, may not adequately address the 
needs of individual survivors, they play a crucial role in creating space for suppressed 
voices to be heard. In Hamber and Wilson’s words, these types of initiatives help 
traumatised individuals to ‘articulate their individual narratives’,11 which is necessary 
for the healing of the individual. This kind of platform for the voices of surviving 
victims should be understood as the beginning and not the final stage of a 
psychologically liberating process. The TRC is said to have provided such a 
platform.12 
 
A final conclusion can be drawn from the entire thesis: 
 
There is evidence in the archives, media reports and oral interviews that males and 
females, while no doubt both surely traumatized by the civil war, perhaps had 
different conflicts and approaches to the war situation and the subsequent trauma. 
Males appeared to be dealing with earlier traditionalist Zulu masculinity issues of 
power-politics and protecting hearth, territory and home. This resulted from their 
roles as warriors and bread-winners and their position within politics. They aligned 
themselves with political factions such as Inkatha or the UDF (and respective unions 
and allies), according to their circumstances at the time. Men who fought have to 
handle guilt for deeds perpetrated during the war and often show symptoms of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, like soldiers who return to civilian society only to find no 
support for their role in the war. 
10CSVR and Khulumani Support Group: Survivors’ perceptions of the TRC and suggestions for the 
final Report. 
11B. Hamber  and R. Wilson, “Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and Revenge in Post 
Conflict Society (Paper presented to the Traumatic Stress in South Africa conference, Johannesburg, 
1999). 
12Peter Storey, A different Kind of Justice: (in the New World Outlook: The Mission Magazine of The 
United Methodist Church, 1999). 
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Females, however, appear to have had other means of trying to restore peace during 
the fighting, approaching neither Inkatha nor the UDF/ANC, but a white 
opposition liberal party, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), for intervention and 
negotiation with the Nationalist government (see Chapter Six). Subsequent to the 
violence, some females wished to work for the community (such as the woman who 
wished to be an ANC councillor), but found themselves stymied by male power-
politics (see Chapter Ten). It is possible that trauma was suffered by women like my 
mother (see Chapter Two), who feared for their children, families and homes, who 
still had to work and who watched their men, both husbands and sons, ‘destroying’ 
themselves and their nearest and dearest for ‘ideological’ reasons.  
 
Secondly, what seems to have been happening, indicated in the historical archives, the 
media records and the oral interviews, is a process of adaptation of black societies 
from a more patriarchal Zulu traditional socio-political order to a more urbanised, 
even global one, complicated by the apartheid and post-colonial struggle of the times. 
It was a surely as much a spiritual battle as one of the here-and-now, a battle 
involving the ancestors. The ways of the past that they endorsed must have been 
seriously compromised and maybe healing had to be spiritual. 
 
Thirdly, my question is whether the fighting was worth it for those who lived through 
the civil war and were left with broken homes, enmity, grief and having to cope 
permanently on their own. The people on both sides of the political divide feel that 
neither Inkatha nor UDF supporters really won. All they say is that this civil war 
irreversibly changed the fabric of their lives.  If the Nationalist apartheid regime 
following colonialism, impacted so balefully on the lives of ordinary black people, 
this civil war exacerbated the impact. Evidently no memorial can do justice to the 
suffering, even with the best of wills. One can argue that this was inevitable and the 
freedom attained in 1994 was the reward, but then it must also be said that this was no 
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A CODE OF ETHICS FOR ORAL HISTORY PRACTITIONERS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
(adopted at the OHASA 3rd Annual General Meeting in Polokwane on 24 October 2007) 
 
When planning an oral history project 
 
1. Considering any possible harm that the interview process may cause to the interviewee’s 
feelings or reputation or his/her community 
 
2. Acquiring sufficient technical knowledge to conduct an interview of the best possible 
standard. 
 




Before the interview 
 
4. Following a culturally-appropriate protocol when approaching the interviewee and 
requesting an interview. 
 
5 Informing the interviewee of the purpose for which the interview is to be carried out and 
ensuring that he or she has understood this. 
 
6. Agreeing on the place, time and circumstances of the interview. 
 
7. Agreeing on whether or not the interview should remain confidential and on where and 
how the interview material will be stored and disseminated. This should be done in writing 
(release form) or verbally with a record on tape. 
 
8. Agreeing on how the interviewee will benefit from the interview (eg receiving a copy of 
the tape and transcript / a community celebration). Ensuring that the interviewee do not have 
no false expectations. 
 
 
During the interview 
 
9. Respecting the interviewee’s style of personal interaction (language, posture, dress, eye 
contact, etc). 
 
10. Being gender sensitive. 
 




12. Verifying that the interviewee remains comfortable with the interview process and, when 
necessary, granting him/her the right to withdraw. 
 
When processing the interview 
 
13. Ensuring that the interview is transcribed, indexed, catalogued and made available as 
agreed with the interviewee. 
 
14. Ensuring that all possible measures are taken to preserve the interview material. 
 
15. Informing the interviewee of any change regarding the storage or dissemination of the 
interview. 
 
16. Verifying that no part of the interview has a defamatory content. 
 
  
On completion of the project 
 
17. Reporting back to the interviewee or his/her community and giving them a copy of the 
recording if an undertaking to do so has been given. 
 
18. Acknowledging the contribution of the interviewee and his/her community in any form of 
subsequent publication.   
 
19. (Where applicable) Sharing with the interviewee or his/her community any form of 
financial benefit which may accrue to the interviewer. 
         
 



























Consent Letter (English version) 




Mxolisi R Mchunu of the School of Anthropology, Gender and Historical Studies of the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal is undertaking research with men and women in the area of 
KwaShange on survivors of violence memory of what happened during the time of violence. 
The research is being undertaken because history needs to understand more about how the 
violence of the 1980s-1990s affects people today. How has it affected people’s attitudes, 
values, practices and relationships? A number of participants have been approached to be 
interviewed for this study and this Consent Letter serves to inform the participants of the 
purpose and aims of the study.  
 
Voluntary participation. 
Participation in the study is completely voluntary. Participants choose to participate of their 
own free will.  Should any participant decide he/she does not want to do so he/she can 
withdraw from the interview without threat of consequences. If a participant decides to start 




The participant will be asked to answer questions by the interviewer. It is envisaged that the 
interview will be about one and half hours long. The questions will be asked verbally by the 
interviewer and the participant will respond verbally directly to the interviewer. The 
questions are about the participant’s memory of violence in KwaShange. Some of the 
questions are of a sensitive nature. The participant has been informed in this Consent letter 
that he/she will be asked some personal questions about his/her involvement in the violence 
and about anything that affected him/her directly. Throughout the participant can refuse to 
answer any such question if it makes him/her feel uncomfortable. 
 
Everything that the participant elects to keep confidential will be kept private, including the 
names of those participants who have elected to remain anonymous. The participant can elect 
a period of time to keep the information embargoed. The information will be used to write a 
PhD thesis and will be analysed together with the responses of other participants. 
 
Risks 
The participant may find some of the questions are mildly distressing. There is a risk that the 
information he/she gives could be seen by someone else but elected confidentiality and 
anonymity is assured.  
 
Benefits 
There are no direct benefits to the participant for participating. However, the research will 







 If any participant has any questions regarding this study, or would like additional 
information to assist him/her in reaching a decision about participation, he/she is free to 
contact Philippe Denis at 0333 2605464   or Dr Vukile Khumalo at 031 260 1409  
If any participant would like an assurance  that this study has received ethical clearance 
through the UKZN Office for Research Ethics or should any participant have any comments 
or concerns resulting from his/her participation in this study, he/she can contact Ms 
Phumelele Ximba. Tel: 260 3587. Email: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Having read and understood the above explanation,  
 
I, ____________________________ Of ____________________________, hereby give my 
consent to participate in the study with the proviso that I do____________ do not_________ 
elect to have my name withheld and will indicate in the interview which sections I elect to 
have held confidential or “off the record.” And I elect to have the record of the interview 
embargoed_________for a period of________years. Alternately I do not request that the 











Ethics Committee: Study approved by the Human/Social Sciences Ethics Committee of the 















5.4 Summary of events in KwaShange leading up to the 1987 violence 
 
In the late 1950s Moses Ndlovu and Nunu Mchunu and other young men of their age from 
KwaShange, who had come mainly from white-owned farms, escaping the tenant-labour 
system, were already politicised. They attended ANC organised meetings in 
Pietermaritzburg, where they met with people like Harry Gwala, Moses Mabhida and others 
of the more politically sophisticated ANC active leadership. They became influenced by this 
leadership and ideology and this became their political rationale for becoming involved in the 
struggle against Apartheid.1 
 
In 1960 the struggle against Apartheid in the country intensified: Ndlovu, Mchunu and 
Kubheka became attached to the ANC. They had their own informal meetings in KwaShange 
and encouraged each other not to miss these meetings.2  
 
The ANC, PAC and SACP were banned by the Nationalist government in 1960 and no open 
meetings of these organisations were allowed thereafter. Mchunu, Ndlovu and other new 
members had no contact with the main ANC. Aitchison recorded that when the ANC was 
banned in 1960, the province of Natal was not a great centre of resistance.3 
 
In March 1961 Mchunu and Ndlovu from KwaShange attended the All-in-Africa Conference 
held in Plessislaer in Edendale. Clearly by this time, they were fully committed to ANC 
ideology. Drum Magazine in 1961 reported the atmosphere of the conference, which left a 
mark on the minds of Mchunu and Ndlovu:  
  
Few meetings can have been preceded by so many unfavourable omens as the All-in-Africa 
Conference at Maritzburg. There was the ban on the two main political organisations, the 
round-ups and imprisonment of leaders, the last-minute withdrawal of some Liberal Party and 
1 See Chapter Four for details. 
2 See Chapter Four for details. 
3John Aitchison, “The Origins of the Midlands War”, in Ran Greenstein ed., The Role of Political Violence in 
South Africa’s Democratisation (Johannesburg: CASE, 2003), 48, Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An 
Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and Politics of Loyal Resistance (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 
Thembisa Waetjen, Workers and Warriors: Masculinity and the Struggle for Nation in South Africa (Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press: 2004).  
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ex-PAC men, the difficulty of finding accommodation for delegates, and the problems of 
transport. There was the decision to change the hall after tape-recording wires were reported 
to have been found in the original venue. Yet despite all this, 1400 delegates from all over the 
Union got to Pietermaritzburg and many of them slept out in the veld because there was no 
other place for them to stay. Inside the hall the labourers, the clerks, peasants, ministers of 
religion, intellectuals, the people from all walks of life, got down determinedly to discussing 
the need for united political action.4 
 
After this all-important congress, the Nationalist government intensified its ‘war’ against all 
organisations that fought against apartheid and many people who were suspected of 
orchestrating resistance against state laws were killed.5It was for this reason that Mchunu and 
other members of the ANC decided to play it safe.6 This killing and detention of people who 
were suspected by State Police to be ANC, PAC or SACP members continued in the years 
after the 1961 congress in Edendale.  
 
In 1973, because of the lack of open political activities in Natal, the ANC instructed   Ndlovu 
to contribute to the formation of labour unions, which eventually amalgamated and became 
part of COSATU. This was an important achievement for the KwaShange  community 
members who had decided to participate in the struggle, but who had to be cautious of 
showing sympathy with the banned ANC. Ndlovu’s active participation in the unions meant 
that these persons were kept up-to-date with political happenings.7  
 
In 1975 the first man from KwaShange, Kubheka, was detained under the State of Emergency 
regulations. In the same year, Ndlovu was tasked by the ANC in exile to identify suitable 
young men and women within the trade union structures to be sent abroad for military 
training. Ndlovu worked tirelessly in KwaShange, recruiting mainly young males. He also 
recruited youth in other places in Natal and Zululand. This caused him to work with seasoned 
unionists and ANC leaders like Harry Gwala, Mathews Meyiwa, Alpheus Mdlalose and 
William Khanyile. 
 
4Feature article in the Drum Magazine, May 1961. 
5Interview with Dr May-Mashego Mkhize, Pietermaritzburg, 24 June 2010, see also Interview with Nunu. 
Mchunu, KwaShange, 13 August 2008. 
6See Chapter Five my interview with Nunu Mchunu, see also Interview with Dr May-Mashego Mkhize, 
Pietermaritzburg, 24 June 2010. 
7See Chapter Four for details. 
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In 1975, Inkatha was re-established by Chief Buthelezi as an ‘internal wing’ of the ANC.8 
Mchunu, Kubheka and Thabethe joined Inkatha and became active members of the 
movement. In 1979, tension arose between Inkatha and the ANC in exile, and in 1983, the 
UDF was formed in response to the Nationalist Government’s proposals for a new tri-cameral 
Parliament, which was to include representative government for Coloureds and Indians, but 
exclude Africans as supposedly having Homeland Government representation. The UDF then 
became the ‘internal wing’ of the ANC in exile and Inkatha became increasingly an ethnic 
Zulu movement. 
 
On 11 June 1986 the ANC in exile declared ‘armed struggle’ and in December 1986, the 
Inkatha leaders in KwaShange assaulted community members who participated in BTR 
Sarmcol strike in Howick. 
 
8See Mzala, Gatsha Buthelezi: Chief with a Double Agenda (London: Zed Books, 1988). 
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